Sri Lanka: A Besieged Society

S Sivasegaram

Sri Lanka is in deep crisis on many fronts, and its politics is almost a total mess. Yet, its President, Mahinda Rajapaksa, elected by a whisker in November 2005, thanks to the boycott of the election by the Tamils in the North-East, after a last-minute call by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), is the only Sri Lankan head of government to have grown in popularity since election. He owes this immense popularity among the majority Sinhalese to his rejection of the peace process and the success of the armed forces in regaining, at a very high but unknown cost in men and material, all but 200 sq. km of the vast territory held by the LTTE.

Results of the provincial councils elections held during the past six months, show soaring support for the government; and if a general election is held now the government will secure with ease a two-thirds majority in Parliament. This apparent strength of the government and the preoccupation of the media, political parties and the public with military gains in the North conceal the crises faced by the country on several fronts.

This essay is intended to address the crisis gripping Sri Lanka on various fronts that do not receive adequate attention. Thus, despite the importance of the war and the consequent humanitarian crisis, it deals with them only briefly. The next section contains a short comment on the war and the humanitarian tragedy. It is followed by comments on the failing economy amid the growing global crisis and corruption in high places; violation of human and fundamental rights; the drift towards lawlessness; and foreign meddling. It concludes with comments on the impending threat to democracy and the tasks ahead in defending democracy.

The War and the Humanitarian Tragedy

The nominal interest of the ‘international community’, meaning imperialist countries, is in the humanitarian crisis. Their declared concerns have drifted with the course of the war, resumed in early 2006, with the Ceasefire Agreement in place until the government withdrew unilaterally from it in February 2007. Earlier calls for a negotiated settlement and end to hostilities became muted calls for a ceasefire last year; and are now reduced to concern for the safety of civilians entrapped in LTTE-controlled areas.

Indiscriminate bombing and shelling by the government armed forces have been the main cause of the human tragedy, aggravated by the deliberate blocking of essential supplies including food and medicine to LTTE-controlled areas. In the latter half of 2008, international and local news media and non-government organisations were ordered out of the conflict zone by the government so that now only the Internal Red Cross has limited access to the affected areas. Thus the true situation of the people even in areas regained by the government forces remains unknown.

The LTTE is now confined to less than 200 square kilometres of territory with an estimated 300 000 people, whom the government claims are held against their will as a human shield. People facing a dire shortage of essential goods and services and threatened by bombing and shelling will like to move to more secure areas. But it is uncertain whether they sufficiently trust the government or the armed forces to move into government-controlled areas. Reports of injury and deaths in government-designated security zones due to shelling by the armed forces are certainly no inducement to move into those areas. The living conditions of people who are further away from the conflict zone are equally pathetic: besides lack of attention to their urgent needs, they are treated as terrorist suspects by the security forces; and utterances by people in high places, later retracted, to the effect that ‘security villages’ will be set up to detain the displaced persons for up to three years are ominous.

The LTTE, with its emphasis on armed struggle at the expense of mass political work, failed to pay adequate attention to the safety and well being of the people in its territory. But for foreign governments and international organisations to demand that the LTTE should ‘release’ the people under its wings is wrong, without simultaneously insisting that the Sri Lankan government ends all attacks on civilians and ensures the safety of civilians wherever they are, and ensure that they are not harassed or victimised by the denial of essential goods and services. Strangely, no call has been made to deploy independent observers to find from the people on either side of the battle lines about their wishes and experiences.

Many who express deep concern about the humanitarian crisis now ignore the abject human rights record of the government, which they denounced strongly only months ago. Equally, pro-LTTE agitators fail to criticise it for its serious lapses, especially on matters of safety and well-being of the people, and with regard to respecting their wishes.

The Economy in Crisis

The Sri Lankan economy was propelled towards doom by the ‘open economic policy’ initiated in 1978, accompanied by unrestricted imports, reckless privatisation of state assets, and opening up the country to parasitic if not predatory foreign investors. As a result, the emergent national economy and well-functioning state enterprises were effectively destroyed or swallowed up by foreign predators.

The escalation of national oppression and conflict diverted public attention from the effects of the erroneous economic policy and repressive measures against political resistance to it. The resultant war, aided by foreign meddlers, some siding with the government and others fishing in troubled waters, added to the economic burdens of the country, which since 1978 has become increasingly dependent on the export of cheap labour, directly by employment abroad and indirectly through export processing zones where foreign ‘investors’ exploit the Sri Lankan export quota for apparel to the US and Europe. Besides the social implications of such employment, the diversion of close to 15% of the work force from useful production has made the economy susceptible to invasion by cheap imports and a rise in consumerism.

While the ‘open economic policy’ made the country vulnerable to the vagaries of the global economy, the need to finance the war and service foreign debts meant further privatisation, transfer of public assets to foreign interests, and weakening of the economy. When credit form foreign governments and lending agencies slowed down, the government in 2007 turned to private bankers by issuing bonds at high interest rates. In the wake of the declared ‘victory of the war against terrorism’, the government now appeals to the Sri Lankan émigré population to invest in government bonds.

The global economic crisis has begun to bite, although the government is putting on a brave face. The plantation sector, still a major part of the export sector, is affected by a fall in tea sales and in some regions the plantations are cutting down production and the number of working days of plantation workers. Apparel export to the US and Europe has shrunk, and a few hundred garment industries have already closed down. Recruitment to the Middle East has slowed down, as redundancies and wage reductions are on the horizon. Thus, besides the impending fall in overseas remittances, unemployment will be a major problem in the months to come.

However, a thriving employment sector may be the armed forces, with over 400,000, of a population of 20 million, serving in the police and the armed forces and a proposal to increase the number by 100,000 to ensure security in the North-East.

The economy has also been hurt by serious financial irregularities, bribery and corruption, and recently even unlawful speculation using state funds, as in the hedging deal on petroleum, which made the state-owned Ceylon Petroleum Corporation liable to US$ 7,000,000 to a group of banks involved in the deal. Several other corrupt deals, including the purchase of military equipment, have been exposed by sections of the media, but corrective action has been rare; and nobody has been held answerable, except for political expediency, while the mediapersons concerned have been intimidated or harassed.

Crises of Human and Fundamental Rights and Law and Order

Sri Lanka’s record on human rights was not bright 20 years ago: today it has hit rock bottom: Sri Lanka fell from a rank of 51 (among 139 countries considered) when Reporters sans frontiers (RSF) started ranking a few years ago to 165 (among 173, or the ninth worst) in 2008. Attacks on media personnel, including the gunning down in January 2009 of Lasantha Wickramatunge, Chief Editor of Sunday Leader, known for his views critical of the government and exposure of corruption in high places, and the killing of opposition politicians, fare importantly in such matters. Killing of other civilians does not, however, attract sustained attention of the international media, with exceptions such as the killing of 13 employees of a France-based NGO in 2006.

Threats, assaults, abductions and killings are commonplace. Very few cases are properly inquired into; and hardly a serious crime involving human rights has been solved. Yet, hundreds languish in prison without trial or inquiry under Emergency Regulations, even through the years of the ceasefire, as terrorist suspects; and the numbers have risen sharply in recent years to include Sinhalese left activists and opponents of the war.

While several political killings and attempts have been attributed to the LTTE, the main opposition party has charged that forces close to the government had been responsible for some of them; and many of the criminal acts against dissenting politicians and journalists as well as abduction for ransom are feared to have been carried out with the connivance of those responsible for preventing them.

The courts of law have on occasion ruled against mass expulsion of people and even refused bail to criminal suspects associated with the ruling party. There was a recent instance when the police were reprimanded for attempting to frame an opposition politician. These are, however, exceptions and not the rule. Judges including the Chief Justice have been threatened for their verdicts. But that is not new. The country has seen enough of it since 1978, when the new Constitution enabled the politicisation of the judiciary and the police. As a result, the 17th Amendment to the Constitution was unanimously adopted in 2000 that made a Constitutional Council (CC) responsible for appointments to key posts in the Supreme Court, the Police and the Elections Commission among others. But the CC has not been reconstituted since its term lapsed in 2005, allowing room for abuse, as under the JR Jayawardane regime (1978-989).

Foreign Concerns

The country changed status from a British colony to an imperialist neo-colony in 1948, but defended itself against blatant interference in its internal matters, but for siding with US imperialism by choice under the United National Party (UNP) governments (1948-56, 60-65, 77-94). The conflict of this policy with Indian hegemonic ambitions since 1977 made India side with Tamils to further its interests in Sri Lanka. With its aim achieved in 1987, the Indian establishment switched sides to its new client, the Sri Lankan state.

Rivalry continues between US imperialism and India for hegemony in South Asia and has played a major role in derailing the peace process initiated around 2000, with the backing of the US. India resented Norwegian mediation, and asserted its interests and undermined the peace process at every turn. The US and its allies, having banned the LTTE and being committed to a global war on terrorism, were on a sticky wicket to object to the resumption of war in 2006. Meanwhile, the Indian establishment, pretending neutrality, backed overtly and covertly the Sri Lankan government, politically as well as militarily, using Chinese and Pakistani interests in Sri Lanka as a pretext, although neither country posed a serious threat to Indian interests.

This is not the place to discuss the political theatre of Tamil Nadu and the games played by the Delhi mandarins. But the humanitarian crisis in Sri Lanka is again an important issue in India, despite New Delhi’s wishes otherwise. The ongoing agitation in Tamil Nadu for a ceasefire in Sri Lanka was triggered by news of the suffering in the North of Sri Lanka reaching the state, despite efforts by the mainstream media to play down the events since resumption of hostilities in 2006. Reports of deaths due to indiscriminate bombing and shelling by the Sri Lankan armed forces and the suffering due to obstruction of essential goods and services caused public shock and anger. Yet, it was only after the Communist Party of India, not a reputed champion of the Sri Lankan Tamil cause, organised state-wide protest rallies that the strength of feeling was realised and mass protests gathered momentum. Protests in Tamil Nadu will lose their impact on Delhi after the general elections in India this year, unless the movement takes new directions, free of manipulation by opportunistic political parties.

International concern on human rights violations, threat to the media, the state of lawlessness including killings and abductions, and other issues have been mere formalities and have never been translated into action. The general attitude seems to be to hope for an early end to the conflict by the elimination of the LTTE as a fighting force, so that the imperialist countries can get on with furthering their interests in this island of strategic interest. Irrespective of how the war ends and the conflict continues in other forms, the ‘international community’ has little to offer to the victims.

The Threat to Democracy and the Task Ahead

The threat to democracy transcends the killing of as many as five MPs in the past three years, and the intimidation, abduction and killing of leading members of opposition parties and journalists, and attacks on the media. The present government has surpassed previous governments in dividing and weakening every potential challenge to its authority. Initially, minority nationality MPs were tempted with posts so that they joined government en bloc, like the two Hill Country Tamil parties, or broke ranks with the leadership, as in the case of the Sri Lanka Muslim Congress. Then, dissenters and corrupt individuals among UNP MPs were tempted into government ranks; and nearly every government MP was made a minister, or a junior minister.

The JVP leadership, by then too closely identified with the government, realised that its partner was ready to marginalise it. But by the time the JVP decided to part company in 2008, a dissent group cultivated within it sided with the government and formed a splinter faction. The TMVP (Tamil People’s Liberation Tigers), the group that split from the LTTE, was made a partner of the government coalition in the Eastern Provincial Council, and then an existing split was deepened by preferential treatment of the weaker faction, rendering the TMVP powerless and dependent on government for its survival.

Thus what exist as parliamentary political parties are severely weakened bodies without political vision and pose no serious threat to the government, unless its fortunes suffer serious setbacks. But general elections may be held before that. Meanwhile, the political landscape is being encroached upon by the clan of the President, whose three brothers are entrenched in positions of power.

Sections of the media, not so much the mainstream media, have carried a fair share of the burden of exposing corruption, nepotism and abuse of power. Thus subduing the media and prevention of the development of a mass opposition movement are principal concerns of the government. The rising threat to the media, once confined to Tamil journalists and printers, has crossed the ethnic threshold and forced an unprecedented number of Sinhalese and Muslim journalists to leave the country during the past year. A newspaper establishment and a radio station were shut down in 2007, and editors have been abused or threatened by people in power. The wave of arrests, intimidation, attacks and killings need to be seen against this background. The mainstream media has, however, learnt to conform on matters relating to ‘national security’ and is muted in its criticism of the government. Meanwhile, the government has, as part of its ongoing agenda to muffle dissent, proposed legislation to curb the electronic media. The NGO establishment too, for reasons of personal gain and fear of clamp-down for ‘anti-state activities’, is muted in its criticism of the government.

The Sri Lankan armed forces numbered far fewer than a thousand when the JVP launched its insurrection in 1971 and today we count by the hundred thousand. There is, besides army deserters and former militants, a thriving underworld with a significant say in the outcome of any political process. Added to this is rabid religious fundamentalism, growing out of chauvinistic politics with a parasitic social group attached to it. These forces could make an explosive mix that can plunge the country into lawlessness. To add further fuel to this potentially explosive situation are frustrated Tamil politicians calling for the ban of Tamil political parties known to be supportive of the LTTE. Thus the threat to democracy is serious and could become real in the context of the impending economic failure and armed conflict that may go on beyond a military defeat of the LTTE. National security could be the pretext for a fascist take over of the country.

The challenge before the genuine left, progressive and democratic forces is, therefore, daunting. But the conduct of the organised left among the Sinhalese is not encouraging. The discredited old left is less worth than an overgrown toe nail to the government to which its ‘leaders’ are clinging on for survival. Two militant Trotskyist parties have, during the past, two years got addicted to NGO funding so that their agenda is dictated by their NGO sponsors. Recently, the two parties moved close to the UNP in a ‘broad-based front to defend democracy’.

Thus the revival of the peace movement and a campaign for democracy is central to the revival of the left movement in the South. It should be accompanied by an anti-imperialist programme and resistance to meddling by foreign powers in any form, especially in the armed conflict and in advancing their interests in the name of peace, progress and stability.

The Evolution of Knowledge Production in Capitalist Society

Curry Malott

Epistemology, or the study of knowledge, is at the heart of all teaching, learning and knowing in general. When setting out to examine and understand the knowledge produced by any system, it is imperative that one focus on the most central and underlying assumptions informing the knowledge-production process. Because we are interested in the knowledge produced by both capitalism and neo-liberal capitalism, we will begin our investigation looking at its ideological structure, historically contextualised. We pay particular attention to what knowledge is deemed valid and which knowledges are deemed invalid (Kincheloe, 2005) within the social universe of capital as a central aspect of understanding the role power plays in the validation process.

Competing Conceptions of Social Class 

What defines capitalism more than any other characteristic is that it is a class-based system. At its most basic level, social class can be understood as the hierarchical grouping of people based on similar economic and occupational characteristics giving way to the collective experience of social rank and caste, such as lower/working class and upper/ruling class, and the manifest relationships between and within such stratum. Associated with the notion of class, and especially with caste, is the idea that it is predetermined by government power or noble authority, who loosely determines, by birthright, what occupations are available to which groups.

Because occupation is not judicially determined by birthright in North America — the United States, Mexico, and Canada, among much of the world — the ontological perspective that differences in wealth and power exist not because of social class, but rather, are indicative of the division of labor that roughly represent the natural distribution of intelligence and drive, represents the dominant, hegemonised perspective, which tends to not be overtly stated in the knowledge production process, but rather, is implied. From this perspective, socio-economic difference becomes no more or less important to human diversity than eye color or body type, that is, one of many neutral differences that are entitled to universal respect and dignity. Class difference is therefore not something to be resisted, but rather, tolerated. Within this interpretative framework, through which praxical knowledge about being in the world is produced, the concept of social class, to reiterate, is rarely discussed or included. In other words, within the knowledge production process of the bosses/the ruling class, social class is constructed as non-existent.

As the vast majority of humanity, with varying levels of severity, are oppressed as wage workers by this hierarchal system of neo-liberal capitalism, it should be no surprise that there exists an ancient tradition of knowledge production from working-class/subjugated perspectives, which, in different ways, have argued that the unequal relationship between what we might call bosses and workers is not the natural outcome of genetically-determined endowments and deficiencies but is the result of a long legacy of abuse. We might begin naming this legacy as coercive, brutal, and manipulative manifesting itself in highly concentrated accumulations of wealth and power that are as nearly deterministic as birthright in reproducing class structure and social relations, more generally affirming the central role class plays in capitalist society. Within this paradigm, the concept of social class is most fundamentally represented in the relationship between the vast majority, divested from the means of production, therefore possessing only their labour to sell as a commodity, and the few who hold in their hands the productive apparatus, land, and resources, and the vast fortunes accumulated from purchasing the labor power of the landless multitudes at a price far below the value it generates. In short, this antagonistic relationship between social classes represents the heart of what capitalism is.

Drawing on the insights of Adam Smith, Noam Chomsky (2007), summarising what we can understand to be the ontological perspective of the profiteer or capitalist, notes that, “the ‘principal architects’ of state policy, ‘merchants and manufacturers,’ make sure that their own interests are ‘most particularly attended to,’ however ‘grievous’ the consequences for others” (pp. 41-42). Similarly, outlining the primary self-serving invention of the capitalist, the corporation, Joel Bakan (2004) observes that, “corporations have no capacity to value political systems, fascist or democratic, for reasons of principle or ideology. The only legitimate question for a corporation is whether a political system serves or impedes its self-interested purposes” (p. 88). Because safety and environmental regulations are a cost to production and thus encroach on margins, they are frequently violated as corporations sacrifice the public to satisfy their own self-interests.

Since The Great Depression of 1929 it has been increasingly difficult in North America to externalise these costs to those who rely on a wage to survive. For example, to appease an increasingly rebellious underclass the Bretton Woods system was established in 1944, which, among other things, limited the mobility of capital, and, as a result, weakened the deadly grip of capital. However, with the assistance of an intensified emphasis on the propaganda machine, including schools and the corporate media, that have been designed to manufacture the consent of the working and middle classes to support their own class-based oppression as normal and natural, Bretton Woods was dismantled in 1971, which gave way to an era of unrestricted capital movement, and, consequently, the massive redistribution of wealth upwards (Chomsky, 2008). This focus on the use of consent/the control of ideas/hegemony has resulted in the production of knowledge taking on a renewed importance within American and Canadian settler societies. The struggle over the purpose and goals of the education system has consequently become one of the primary battlegrounds where the working classes and the ruling class vie for political power to determine the course of history.

From this epistemological perspective, as long as social class exists, that is, as long as there are two antagonistically related groups, workers and bosses, rich and poor, or oppressed and oppressors, there will not be consensus on what explains the basic structures of society because what tends to be good for one group tends not to be beneficial for the other. For example, the idea that social class does not explain the inequality rampant in capitalist societies, but is the result of natural selection, is good for the beneficiaries of market mechanisms. At the same time, the notion that the violent class relation that can only ever offer cyclical crisis and perpetual war is at the core of capitalist society has provided much fuel against capitalism. In short, the class struggle that is indicative of capitalism itself is represented in the “fact” that higher wages are good for workers because they increase their standard of living, but hurt the bosses by encroaching on margins/profits.

From here a smart place of departure might be to observe the current post-Bretton Woods economic structure of North America. A look at the data indicates that in the last 10 years in the United States the wealth of the ruling class has exploded while the middle class has simultaneously experienced a steady period of decline as the offshoring trends of the 1980s and 1990s have dramatically effected not just blue-collar manufacturing jobs, but white-collar service sector employment as well. As a result, the ranks of the poor and the pissed off have continued to swell. No longer able to finance a middle-class lifestyle, consumer debt also skyrocketed during this period. Setting off a system-wide pandemic of foreclosures, the bosses assured the public that the economy was fine, largely ignoring the high cost the public was paying. According to Greider and Baker (2008):

In the long run, the destruction of concentrated wealth and power is always good for democracy, liberating people from the heavy hand of the status quo. Unfortunately, many innocents are slaughtered in the process. As the US manufacturing economy was dismantled by downsizing and globalization, the learned ones (Alan Greenspan comes to mind) told everyone to breathe easy — ultimately this would be good for the workers and communities who lost the foundations of their prosperity. Now that “creative destruction” is visiting the bankers, we now observe they are not so accepting of their own fate.

Reflecting on this quote in a personal communiqué Joe Kincheloe observed that, “now that ‘creative destruction’ is reaching the corporate elite, they are not so sanguine about the situation,” which is to be expected because, from the boss’ perspective, “the pain of structural adjustment for the privileged is more distressing than it is for the poor.” It was only a matter of time before the mega-banks collapsed into their own self-made house of cards constructed of worthless defunct mortgages. The current crisis and the government’s attempts to “bail out” the capitalists with an unprecedented 700-billion dollar “bill”, which increased to nearly a trillion dollars before it passed both the Senate and the US House, has exposed the self-destructiveness embedded within the logic of capital.

The knowledge being produced about the bailout aired through the corporate media focuses on the ways the bailout will benefit “mainstreet”, that is, the workers of capital, which, in a way, has some element of truth to it because the financial capitalists cannot operate on their own. That is, they depend on other capitalists involved in industry, commercialisation, real estate, etc. to borrow money and invest in human labour as a commodity who actually do the work and produce the wealth that is then appropriated, reinvested, gained, lost, etc. It should, therefore, not be surprising that the majority of representatives of the House and US Senators, in making their case for the bill, stressed, over and over, the benefits that will accrue to the “small people” as justification for their “yea” rather than “nay” votes. But using that indirect “benefit” to obscure the basic antagonistic relationship between labour and capital, which, as long as it remains intact, the majority of humanity will suffer, can be viewed as nothing short than an aplogoy for the inevitable injustices of capitalism.

We might, therefore, say that the mere existence of capitalism, its ruling classes in particular, represents the constant risk of an uprising, and the more powerful the bosses, the greater the inequality between the oppressors and the oppressed, and therefore the greater the probability of an uprising or frontal assault designed to seize control of state and private power. The bosses tend to have this awareness, and it is for this ruling-class class-consciousness that the hammer is always in the background. However, the elite are more interested in avoiding disruption because that kind of instability is not good for business. The ruling class perceive those who rely on a wage to survive as a constant pontential threat because their existence as labour is structually, by definition, set against their own creative human impulse.

From this perspective, labour is always instinctively operating at some level of uprising in their struggle to relieve themselves from the chains that bind them. The objective of the capitalist is, therefore, to keep working class resistance at the lowest possible level through the combined use of force and consent, placing special emphasis, for obvious reasons, on consent, that is, the control of ideas. It has been argued by mainstream progressive sources that the slight hesitation to pass the recent trillion-dollar bailout “bill” represents a victory for democracy because of the public’s overwhelming disapproval and the swelling “crisis in confidence”.

This crisis in confidence does not merely refer to the reluctance to spend money, as the corporate media would have us believe, but runs to the very core of capitalism as a viable economic system. Former United States President George W. Bush alluded to this reading of the world in a special television appearance where he reassured his audience, the “small people”, that “democratic capitalism is the best system that ever existed”. Similarly, White House Press Secretary Dana Perino offered similar reassurance arguing that the United States is “the greatest capitalist country in the world” and that the public only needs to be willing to suffer for a short time so “we” can, once again, “enjoy prosperity”. Of course, the bosses would never offer workers a choice in the matter, so we will suffer unless we fight back and challenge policies that treat the well being of the public as incidental. That is, as long as the basic structures of power remain intact and wealth is flowing to the elite, the well being of the public is not a concern.

Let us now situate in an historical context the ways in which knowledge is and has been constructed to explain and account for these trends and inequalities. The remainder of this chapter examines different approaches to these class-based issues. We end our discussion with critical pedagogy, which has recently begun to emerge as a leading force in emancipatory educational practice.

***

It is worth restating, risking unnecessary repetition, that social class and related concepts, within western political discourse, have traditionally been articulated along an antagonistically related continuum. On one end, there is the idea that the existence of social class is evidence of the natural evolution of human society increasingly necessary as civilisation becomes more complex and advanced. On the other end of the spectrum, it tends to be argued that the existence of social class is the result of the appropriation of the naturally occurring division of labor, and therefore conceived as an unequal relationship that has been continuously and rather violently forced upon humanity. These two positions do not merely represent both sides, as it were, each possessing equal weight, and therefore embodying independent existences, unaware or unaffected by the other. What is demonstrated below is the intimate relationship between these competing perspectives on social class, one hegemonic, and therefore endowed with the power of the capitalist-state, (supporting the interests of the rich and the powerful), the other, counter-hegemonic, and as a result, historically marginalised by the dominant society, (representing the interests and concerns of the vast majority).

However, there has emerged within the critical conception of social class — and the social more generally — a tradition of thought that challenges the assumption of an external objective reality that the mind can neutrally comprehend with as much accuracy as a mirror reflects objects. As a result, such approaches refocus the debate from questions of accuracy to questions of certainty. While this shift may seem qualitatively insignificant, its ontological implications have immense pedagogical and curricular consequences. That is, if knowledge exists outside the realm of human intervention, then truth can be absolutely known and externally imposed. However, critical pedagogy argues that democracy cannot be pre-scripted because it is not a prescription. Democracy is a way of being in the world informed by common values such as social justice, equality, freedom, responsibility, and so on (Freire, 2005). While the practice of democracy undoubtedly requires complicated theoretical knowledge, it also requires that those insights be actively engaged with the concrete context, making it much more than a way of knowing — again, it is a way of being. These pedagogical issues are discussed in greater detail in the final sections of this paper.

In the process of outlining this dialectical discourse, we have demonstrated the complex and contradictory nature of the concrete context thereby underscoring both the conceptual limitations and benefits of the hegemonic/counter-hegemonic dichotomy outlined above. We begin investigating the assumptions underlying the production of knowledge under capitalism in Europe because it was the European model of class society that was reproduced around the world through the process of colonisation, which, in most regions, such as North America, continues to serve as the dominant paradigm.

Discourse Wars: Knowledge Production within Capitalism

Among the many scholars who have engaged in an in-depth study of the innermost workings of Europe’s model of class society, that is, capitalism, Karl Marx has proven to be the most influential, resilient, relevant, and responded to (both positively and negatively). One of the most widely read constructions of knowledge of all time, the Manifesto of the Communist Party (1848/1978), by Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, has touched, in one way or another, every major revolution around the world rendering its conceptualisation of social class particularly important for the study at hand.

By the end of the Manifesto’s first sentence — a relatively short sentence — Marx and Engels have clearly broken with the idealist romanticism of bourgeois scholarship by firmly situating their analysis of class within an historical dialectics of antagonistically competing interests noting that “the history of all hitherto existing society is the history of class struggles” (p. 473), and taken to its logical conclusion underscores the tenuousness of the present moment. The duo continue, linearly and temporally, from a European-centered perspective, naming what they understand to be the stages of conflicting interests that define human social development situating its beginning in ancient Rome and Greece, which would eventually give way to the modern, capitalist, bourgeois era.

Eurocentric, as suggested by the late Senegalese scholar and scientist, Cheikh Anta Diop, because there is evidence that suggests that capitalism is not, as Marx suggested, a relatively recent human construction because it existed in ancient Egypt. For example, Diop (1955/1974) argues that in rural and urban centers during Egypt’s Middle Kingdom (2160-1788 B.C.) there existed “marginal capitalism” as evidenced by the labour force being “free” and “contractual” and the existence of “a business class who rented land in the countryside and hired hands to cultivate it” motivated by the sole purpose of generating “huge profits” (p. 210). In the cities, Egyptian capitalists engaged in what seems to be very modern business practices such as “interest-bearing loans, [and] renting or subletting personal property or real estate for the purpose of financial speculation” (Diop, 1955/1974, p. 210). While Diop (1955/1974) argues that it was the “inalienable liberty of the Egyptian citizen” (p. 210) that prevented the development of “strong capitalism” with more power over the populous than the state or nobility, the contradictions within Egypt’s hierarchical arrangements did lead to a series of unsuccessful internal revolutions.

Again, Diop’s analysis, examined next to Marx and Engels’ (1848/1978) history of human social development, underscores the latter’s European-centered perspective. That is, naming what they understand to be the stages of conflicting interests, beginning with ancient Rome, which transitioned into the Middle Ages, and finally giving way to the modern bourgeois era, Marx and Engels (1848/1978) comment: “freeman and slave, patrician and plebeian, lord and serf, guild-master and journeyman, in a word, oppressor and oppressed” (p. 473). However, while Marx and Engels’ timeline and family tree of humanity might be inaccurate, the conclusion that is drawn from the developmental concept remains highly relevant and instructive: the oppressors and the oppressed “stood in constant opposition to one another, carried on an uninterrupted, now hidden, now open fight, a fight that each time ended, either in a revolutionary reconstitution of society at large, or in the common ruin of the contending classes” (p.474).

This observation is particularly relevant, as capital’s current crisis, discussed above, has exposed, in stark relief, that the very existence of capitalism is an elite class war continuously waged in a never-ending quest to increase the bottom line, which can only come from more and more unpaid labour hours put to work grinding up more and more of the Earth’s vital ecosystems. As part of the process of abstracting and distorting these class relations, the stock market is incorrectly presented as the producer of value. Challenging the assumption that the “profits and losses that result from fluctuations in the price of” stocks represent “an index of genuine capital accumulation”, that is, “reproduction on an expanded scale”, Marx (1894/1991), in Volume Three of Capital argues that they are, rather, “by the nature of the case more and more the result of gambling, which now appears in place of labour as the original source of capital ownership, as well as taking the place of brute force” (p. 607-609) or the exertion of labour power”.

With the development of global capitalism Marx (1894/1991) saw financial capitalists or bankers taking on a more central role as “imaginary money wealth” created on the stock market “makes up a very considerable part” of the money economy. As a result, bankers have become “intermediaries between the private money capitalists on the one hand, and the state, local authorities and borrows engaged in the process of reproduction on the other” (p. 609). Providing an analysis of how this system, with its built-in upward pulling gravity, without strict regulations, inevitably leads to an imbalance of commodities to consumer ratio, and therefore to a disruption in the actualisation of value, Marx (1894/1991) observes that “if there is a disturbance in this expansion, or even in the normal exertion of the reproduction process, there is also a lack of credit” creating a crisis in the confidence of the actual value of credit, which is indicative of “the phase in the industrial cycle that follows the crash” (p. 614).

Marx (with Engels), despite his shortcomings, therefore seems to offer what has proven to be a valid observation, that is, human society tends not to stand still — it is always in a stage of development — and as long as the old oppressed class become the new oppressors, society will remain pregnant with a new social order. Returning to the Manifesto, in making their case that the relations of production under capitalism will eventually be burst asunder, Marx and Engels (1848/1978) document the process by which Europe’s (concentrating on France, England, and Germany) bourgeois capitalist class emerged “from the ruins of feudal society” (p. 474) playing “a most revolutionary part” (pp. 474-475) in that transformation.

The massive amounts of wealth extracted from the Americas by European powers led Marx and Engels (1848/1978) to the conclusion that “the discovery of America,” as they called it, was one of the primary driving forces behind “the increase in the means of exchange and in commodities generally” and therefore to the “revolutionary element in the tottering feudal society, a rapid development” (p. 474). The argument is that the small-scale feudal arrangements were not equipped to organise the large armies of labour necessary for transforming the massive amounts of raw materials imported from the Americas needed to meet the exploding European demand for commodities, which was fueled by the influx of unprecedented resources. What is more, unlike Europe’s nobility whose power stemmed from their possession of land, the emerging bourgeoisie, without land, gained their advantage through the accumulation of capital due to the mercantile role they played in the extraction of American and African wealth. Summarising the bourgeoisie’s transformation from the oppressed to the oppressors, Marx and Engels unveil their most feared and celebrated prediction — that the bourgeoisie, who are still in power, like all of the oppressors before them, too will fall. A Marxist analysis might, therefore, view each new crisis of capital, such as the most recent one, part of capitalism’s march toward its own inevitable demise. Consider Marx and Engels’ (1848/1978) description of the capitalist class:

“The bourgeoisie, wherever it has got the upper hand, has put an end to all feudal…relations. It has pitilessly torn asunder the motley feudal ties that bound man to his “natural superiors”, and has left remaining no other nexus between man and man than naked self-interest, than callous ‘cash payment’…. It has resolved personal worth into exchange value, and in place of the numberless indefeasible chartered freedoms, has set up that single, unconscionable freedom — Free Trade.… The weapons with which the bourgeoisie felled feudalism to the ground are now turned against the bourgeoisie itself…. The bourgeoisie forged the weapons that [will] bring death to itself; it has also called into existence the men who are to wield those weapons — the modern working class….” (pp. 475-478)

While the broad strokes painted in the Manifesto of the Communist Party are useful for beginning to understand why knowledge produced by subjugated populations through the lens of Marx’s work continues to be both feared and exalted, we must focus more centrally on his more elaborated work on the division of labor as a transition into the perspectives of his pro-bossnon-solidarity critics, which continue to hold political sway in the contemporary context of global capitalism. In Volume 1 of Capital, Marx’s (1867/1967) discussion of primitive accumulation as part of the historical development of the capitalisation of humanity, which, as alluded to above, began in its “strong” form in England roughly a decade before Columbus set foot in present-day Haiti, is useful here in understanding Europe’s engagement in the Americas in particular, and global affairs in general. Because of the light it sheds on the discussion that follows, a sizable excerpt taken from Volume 1 of Capital (Marx, 1867/1967) is presented here:

The so-called primitive accumulation…is nothing else than the historical process of divorcing the producer from the means of production. It appears as primitive, because it forms the pre-historic stage of capital and of the mode of production corresponding with it.
The economic structure of capitalistic society has grown out of the economic structure of feudal society. The dissolution of the latter set free the elements of the former.

The immediate producer, the labourer, could only dispose of his own person after he had ceased to be attached to the soil and ceased to be the slave, serf, or bondman of another. To become a free seller of labour-power, who carries his commodity wherever he finds a market, he must further have escaped from the regime of the guilds, their rules for apprentices and journeymen, and the impediments of their labour regulations. Hence, the historical movement which changes the producers into wage-workers, appears, on the one hand, as their emancipation from serfdom and from the fetters of the guilds, and this side alone exists for the bourgeois historians. But, on the other hand, these new freedmen became sellers of themselves only after they had been robbed of all their own means of production, and of all the guarantees of existence afforded by the old feudal arrangements. And the history of this, their expropriation, is written in the annals of mankind in letters of blood and fire….

The starting point of the development that gave rise to the wage labourer as well as to the capitalist was the servitude of the labourer. The advance consisted in a change of form of this servitude, in the transformation of feudal exploitation into capitalist exploitation….

The expropriation of the agricultural producer, of the peasant, from the soil, is the basis of the whole process. The history of this expropriation, in different countries, assumes different aspects, and runs through its various phases in different orders of succession, and at different periods. (pp. 714–716)

From Marx’s work we can begin to read or construct the entire modern world as mediated and dictated by the westernised process of value production through the capital-labour class relation. In other words, we can understand the entire process, from the on-going need to primitively accumulate and expand, to the establishment of petrol-chemical industrialism, as a form of class struggle that began as a counter-hegemony, but has since developed into perhaps the most oppressive, destructive, and irresponsible hegemony in recorded history. Put another way, capitalism was initiated by Western Europe’s bourgeoisie against their feudal lords, some of the last remnants of Europe’s “Dark Ages”, but now rule with more barbaric force than ever before imagined. Ultimately, it has been the vast majority of humanity, disconnected from the soil and therefore from their indigenous culture, who have suffered from centuries of bourgeois pathology. In his examination of the historical development of class relations, Marx points to the division of labour as offering a place of origin.

Marx argues that during the early stages of human development the division of labour was a naturally occurring by-product of age- and sex-based physical difference, but also, and we would add, it is the result of the non-hierarchical creative diversity/multiple intelligences unique to human consciousness, as well as to the unpredictable nature of complex events, such as the establishment of purposeful economic systems. Within the division of labor, from this perspective, reside the most basic structural roots of organised society. Commenting on the division of labor Marx (1867/1987) notes:

Within a family, and after further development within a tribe, there springs up naturally a division of labor, caused by differences of sex and age, a division that is consequently based on a purely physiological foundation, which division enlarges its materials by the expansion of the community, by the increase of population, and more especially, by the conflicts of different tribes, and the subjugation of one tribe by another. (p. 351)

The issue of one tribe subjugating another will be taken up later. For now I would like to focus on the context Marx situates this naturally occurring division of labor in. Marx (1867/1967) hones in on the place-specific nature of tribal communities commenting that “different communities find different means of production, and different means of subsistence in their natural environment” (p. 351). In other words, the development of technology is informed by the specific characteristics of physical place or geography such as climate, terrain, arable land, game, waterways, distance and accessibility to other human communities, and so on. As a result, human societies have developed vastly different technologies based on geography, which constitute the original source of commodities, that is, products produced in one context and consumed in another. For example, civilisations that emerged close to large bodies of water have tended to create ship-building technology, whereas those communities whose traditional lands are covered with ice, such as in the Arctic, have developed technology conducive to more efficiently navigating the snow such as sleds and snow shoes.

In the following analysis Marx begins to break, however slightly, from his Eurocentric, linear analysis, acknowledging the persistence of ancient communities in the “modern” era. As an example, Marx (1867/1967) points to “those small and extremely ancient Indian communities, some of which have continued down to this day, are based on possession in common of the land…and on an unalterable division of labor” (p. 357). However, “each individual artificer” operates independently “without recognising any authority over him” (Marx, 1867/1967, p. 358). Marx attributes this independence, in part, to the fact that within these arrangements products are produced for direct use by the community and therefore do not take the form of a commodity and therefore avoiding the value-generating process associated with it. As a result, the alienating division of labor engendered by the exchange of commodities is also avoided. Marx defines commodities as products consumed by others rather than those who produced them, and those who produce, under capital, are not independent craftsmen, but externally commanded.

Marx (1867/1967) quickly returns to Europe and goes on to argue that the guilds, who more or less laboured independently, resisted the bourgeoisie’s commodification of production and therefore “…repelled every encroachment by the capital of merchants, the only form of free capital with which they came into contact” (p. 358). Marx notes that the guild organisation, by institutionalising stages of production as specialised trades separate from one another such as the cattle-breeder, the tanner, and the shoemaker, for example, created the material conditions for manufacture, but “excluded division of labor in the workshop”, and as a result, “there was wanting the principal basis of manufacture, the separation of the labourer from his means of production, and the conversion of these means into capital” (p. 359). Marx stresses that the process of value production is unique to capitalism and is therefore a “special creation of the capitalist mode of production alone” (p. 359), and therefore not an original or natural aspect of the division of labor. Driving this point home, Marx critiques the “peculiar division” of manufacture, which “attacks the individual at the very roots of his life” giving way to “industrial pathology” (p. 363). Because of the forcefulness and accuracy of much of Marx’s work, many proponents of capitalism have been forced to attempt to refute the idea that capitalism is a form of pathology, and that the capitalist relations of production, the relationship between what we might crudely call bosses and workers, is negative or harmful for those who rely on a wage to survive, the vast majority of humanity. What follows is therefore a brief summary of some of Emile Durkheim’s pro-capitalist constructions that continue to dominate official knowledge production in the western world, which, with slight variations, are all capitalist.

***

Widely influential French sociologist Emile Durkheim is considered to be one of the “fathers” and founders of sociology and anthropology. Through the late 1800s Durkheim challenged much of Marx’s analysis, setting out to demonstrate that the deep inequality between social classes that drew much attention from critics such as Marx — a central aspect of the Industrial Revolution that began in England — was a natural product of the development of human societies, and should therefore not be resisted, but encouraged through such sorting mechanisms as schools. Essentially, what Durkheim (1893/2000) argues is that humanity (those relegated to the status of worker) would be wise to divest itself of any illusions of maintaining an independent existence and rather “equip yourself to fulfill usefully a specific function” (p. 39) because society requires it, that is, to bend ourselves to fit within the system that exists, to submit ourselves to the labour it requires. What Durkheim suggests is that the bourgeoisie, rather than a ruling class that embodies its own negation, represents the end of history and therefore the manifestation of the final and most advanced stage of human social evolution.

However, Durkheim could not ignore the class antagonism highlighted above by Marx, due, in part, to the intensity of the class struggle of his time and the recent memory of the worker’s Paris Commune of 1871. Acknowledging the human need of not being made a slave or being externally controlled, while maintaining his belief that inequality serves a necessary function in advanced societies, Durkheim notes that “moral life, like that of body and mind, responds to different needs which may even be contradictory. Thus it is natural for it to be made up in part of opposing elements…” (p. 39). In effect, Durkheim tells us that “progress” has a price — a price that tends to cause distress within the individual — but that is the nature of the universe, and it is not wise to challenge laws of nature. Building the foundation for this “functionalist” approach to sociology in his dissertation Durkheim (1893/2000) theorises:

We can no longer be under any illusion about the trends in modern industry. It involves increasingly powerful mechanisms, large-scale groupings of power and capital, and consequently an extreme division of labor…. This evolution occurs spontaneously and unthinkingly. Those economists who study its causes and evaluate its results, far from condemning such diversification or attacking it, proclaim its necessity. They perceive in it the higher law of human societies and the condition for progress. (pp. 37-38)

Again, Durkheim does not stop here in his analysis of objective reality as he reaches ever deeper into the grandiose, going on to argue that the division of labour does not just occur within the realm of economics, but can be identified within every aspect of life, and within all forms of life, rendering it a “biological phenomenon,” and therefore a law of nature. By claiming that capitalism happened “spontaneously” and “unthinkingly”, Durkheim effectively rewrites history erasing the long struggle against the commodification of humanity that was anything but spontaneous or without thought. Essentially, Durkheim takes Marx’s idea of the naturalness of the division of labor and divests it of its independent and communal nature, and replaces it with the notion that inequality and subservience to power are necessary manifestations of the advanced development of the division of labor.

This basic formula, with roots in Platonic epistemology that views intelligence as naturally and unevenly distributed, continues to exist in contemporary hegemonic discourses of the ruling elite — it is the presupposition informing the entire foundation of ruling class policy and practice. As a side note, the current crisis in confidence, discussed above, can, in part, be understood as stemming from the seeming incompetence and confusion coming from the political bosses in Washington and elsewhere. Not only does Durkheim support this idea of a naturally-occurring hierarchical conception of class within societies that undergoes intensified scrutiny during times of crisis, but he ranks civilisations/nations on a similar scale. Essentially, Durkheim argues that there is a tendency among societies that demonstrates that as they grow larger, the division of labor grows more specialised and entrenched, and as a result, they become more advanced. However, confronted with the existence of larger non-white nations, Durkheim argues that there are exceptions to this rule, which seems to stem from his belief in racial hierarchy. Consider:

The Jewish nation, before the conquest, was probably more voluminous than the Roman city of the fourth century; yet it was of a lower species. China and Russia are much more populous than the most civilized nations of Europe. Consequently among these same peoples the division of labor did not develop in proportion to the social volume. This is because the growth in volume is not necessarily a mark of superiority if the density does not grow at the same time and in the same proportion…. If therefore the largest of them only reproduces societies of a very inferior type, the segmentary structure will remain very pronounced, and in consequence the social organization will be little advanced. An aggregate of clans, even if immense, ranks below the smallest society that is organized, since the latter has already gone through those stages of evolution below which the aggregate has remained. (p. 49)

Durkheim’s implied white supremacy was not his own invention, nor was the idea of a natural hierarchy among Europeans represented within the division of labor new to him either. However, it is beyond the scope of this essay to trace the origins of those ideas. What follows, rather, is an analysis of how hegemonic conceptions of the division of labor have influenced policy in the United States situated in a more contemporary context from Lippmann to Friedman. Beginning with Lippmann we investigate how the idea of a natural hierarchy represented in the existence of rank-able social classes informed his ideas and practice concerning both domestic and foreign affairs.

Propaganda and Capitalism in the United States

Walter Lippmann was a highly influential architect of this discursive model contributing significantly to the implementation of its practice, a point Noam Chomsky (1999) has consistently given much attention to. For more than 50 years Lippmann was perhaps the most respected political journalist in the United States “winning the attention of national political leaders from the era of Woodrow Wilson through that of Lyndon B. Johnson” (Wilentz, 2008, p. vii). However, within the western tradition of hegemonic philosophy and practice, Lippmann’s ideas tended to fall on the liberal end of this distorted continuum. That is, while he believed it was the paternalistic responsibility of democratic government, comprised of those endowed with a naturally superior intelligence, to mould “the will of the people”, it must be for the common good and carried out without the conscious manipulation of propaganda. Set against what he believed to be the crude tactics of McCarthyism and the Red Scare, Lippmann was concerned with purifying “the rivers of opinion that fed public opinion” (Steel, 2008, p. xv).

Like Durkheim before him, Lippmann too, discounted the ideals of democracy (such as the notion that the will of the people does not need to be externally commanded) as an “illusion” referring to it in Public Opinion(1922) as “the original dogma of democracy”. As we will see, Lippmann constructed a theory of humanity, assumed to represent the objective reality, as being too ignorant and steeped in prejudice and bias to be able to achieve the necessary competence to know what is best for themselves rendering the theoretical idea of democracy a fantastic vision, but not conducive to the imperfect reality of human depravity. Lippmann biographer Ronald Steel (2008), in his foreword to the recently re-issued Liberty and the News (1920/2008), reasons that:

The horrors of World War I had shattered his optimism about human nature. His propaganda work, reinforced by the repressive activities of the government’s propaganda bureau, the Committee on Public Information, had made him realize how easily public opinion could be molded. He had always believed that a free press was the cornerstone of democracy. He still believed that, but with a new qualification. (pp. xii-xiii)

That “qualification” was his assertion that democracy itself is an unachievable ideal. Contributing to his belief in the inferior intelligence of the general public was his engagement with the emerging field of psychology that reinforced his beliefs about the nature of human perception rendering most people unfit to participate in the democratic process. For example, in The Phantom Public (1927) Lippmann argues that “man’s reflexes are, as the psychologists say, conditioned. And, therefore, he responds quite readily to a glass egg, a decoy duck, a stuffed shirt, or a political platform” (p. 30). Lippmann was clearly informed by the idea that the public is limited to perceiving the world only as it has been trained to. As a result, there tends to be a great gap between what is believed about the world and the actual world, or, objective reality.

Highlighting the persistence of this paternalistic attitude, the US House of Representatives recently discounted the people of the United States’ overwhelming objection of the trillion-dollar bailout bill, arguing that the public is unable to comprehend the severity of the problem, and thus only see clear skies blind to the approaching storm. According to Lippmann (1927), not only is the public inherently limited in its sense of perception, but in its desire to know commenting that “the citizen gives but a little of his time to public affairs, has but a casual interest in facts and but a poor appetite for theory” (p. 24-25).

Summarising his position Lippmann (1927) concludes that it is false to “…assume that either the voters are inherently competent to direct the course of affairs or that they are making progress toward such an ideal. I think it is a false ideal. I do not mean an undesirable ideal. I mean an unattainable ideal…” (pp. 38-39). Lippmann therefore viewed education no more suitable to achieve democratic ideals than any other false sense of hope. As it turns out then, the United States, which has long presented itself as the world’s leading proponent of democracy, has a history of being influenced by thinkers who believe in hierarchy and supremacy and therefore view the theoretical context of democracy as not representative of the concrete context of human nature, and therefore an unwise goal to pursue.

Of course, men like Lippmann, armed with their superior capacities, do not suffer from the afflictions of inadequacy. From this perspective, the division of labour is largely based on the naturally occurring unequal capacities of men rendering some more fit to lead and design the social structure, while the most useful function for the vast majority reside in their physical ability to follow direction and labour — as passive spectators rather than active participants. The responsibility of those most fit to lead, the responsible or capable men, is therefore to regiment the public mind as an army regiments its troops. This is the boss’s moral and paternalistic “commitment”, as Lippmann (1943) referred to it. Because Lippmann’s conception of class was based on the assumption of a natural hierarchy, he was logically able to claim a moral relativism as well, which stands in stark contrast to Marx’s privileging of democratic relations over the unjust relationship between labour and capital, that is, between the oppressed and their oppressors. In making this case — a case ultimately against democracy — Lippmann (1927) proclaims, “It requires intense partisanship and much self-deception to argue that some sort of peculiar righteousness adheres to…the employers’ against the wage-earners’, the creditors’ against the debtors’, or the other way around” (p. 34).

The peculiar nature of Lippmann’s political relativism is further brought to the fore in his discourse on US foreign policy where he draws on the notion of “justice” as it pertains to the use of force. Lippmann’s analysis in U.S. Foreign Policy (1943), seems, in many ways, to be a direct response to the arguments presented in the highly publicised War is a Racket (1935/2003) by anti-war activist, World War I veteran, and Brigadier General Smedley D. Butler. Summarising his position on war Butler (1935/2003) comments:

War is a racket. It always has been. It is possibly the oldest, easily the most profitable, surely the most vicious. It is the only one international in scope. It is the only one in which the profits are reckoned in dollars and the losses in lives. (p. 23)

Reflecting on the United States’ involvement in the First World War, Butler (1935/2003) notes that “we forgot, or shunted aside, the advice of the Father of our country. We forgot Washington’s warning about ‘entangling alliances’” (p. 26). In U.S. Foreign Policy: Shield of the Republic, published eight years after War is a Racket, Lippmann (1943) invests a significant amount of time making an argument against the pacifism alluded to in War is a Racket, without, however, referring directly to Butler or his work. Like Butler, Lippmann too draws on the legacy of General George Washington, but draws almost opposite conclusions. Consistent with his usual style, Lippmann (1943) paints a picture of the benevolent leader whose responsibility it is to protect the national interest — the interests of the rich — which he must have the military capacity to do. Otherwise, through his vulnerability, he is inviting his enemy’s provocation, and therefore irresponsibly putting those who rely on his paternalistic protection at unnecessary risk.

Washington did not say that the nation should or could renounce war, and seek only peace. For he knew that the national “interest, guided by justice” might bring the Republic into conflict with other nations. Since he knew that the conflict might be irreconcilable by negotiation and compromise, his primary concern was to make sure that the national interest was wisely and adequately supported with armaments, suitable frontiers, and the appropriate alliances. (Lippmann, 1943, p. 51)

Lippmann’s reasoning here is simple enough: an empire, such as the United States, will not survive without room to grow and the muscle needed to protect its “interests”, that is, the interests of the rich or responsible men which include the subjugation of their own population during crises of confidence and the extraction and concentration of wealth. The essence of his argumentation lies in the same age-old paternalistic guardianship and moral relativism that allows questions of justice to be freed from issues of domination and subjugation. In making his argument Lippmann cites the Monroe Doctrine of 1823 as evidence of the United States’ “commitment” to extend its “protection…to the whole of the Western hemisphere” and that “at the risk of war, the United States would thereafter resist the creation of new European empires in this hemisphere” (Lippmann, 1943, p. 16). Monroe’s doctrine has come to be interpreted as “professing a unilateral US ‘right’ to circumscribe the sovereignty of all other nations in the hemisphere” (Churchill, 2002, p. 335) influencing its aggressive dealings with Indigenous sovereigns within its boundaries and those within its hemisphere such as Cuba and Jamaica and all other Latin American and Caribbean nations (Malott, 2008, 2007; Cole-Malott & Malott, 2008).

The context Lippmann situates US foreign policy in provides a useful lens for understanding the nation’s current policies, such as those concerning not only Cuba, but globally. After all, it is the responsibility of the more capable men to make decisions for less capable men, and any illusions concerning democratic principles only restricts the natural development of the division of labor worldwide. As we will see below, Milton Friedman (1962/2002) picks up on this line of reasoning arguing that restrictions on the extraction and accumulation of wealth and the further entrenchment of class antagonisms only threatens the freedom of “progress”, that is, capitalism, and of men and women pursuing it.

***

Milton Friedman, pro-capital, economist extraordinaire, received worldwide recognition in 1976 winning the Nobel memorial Prize in Economic Sciences and has been touted as the world’s most influential economist of the twentieth century. Friedman has drawn the attention of the likes of internationally-renowned political analyst and activist Noam Chomsky (1999) who referred to him as a “neoliberal guru” while vociferously critiquing his (1962/2002) Capitalism and Freedom for hegemonically equating “profit-making” with being “the essence of democracy” and that “any government that pursues antimarket policies is being anti-democratic, no matter how much informed popular support they might enjoy” (p. 9).

Friedman’s supposition that the surest way to freedom is through capitalism is informed by the ancient hierarchy of intelligence paradigm that views economic competition the playing field most conducive to fostering the environment that will encourage and enable the superior individuals to rise to the top and assume their place as leaders and decision makers, that is, capitalists. Attempts to legislate against exploitation and abuse to ensure a functioning democracy, from this approach to knowledge production, is viewed as an attack on freedom because it prevents the naturally endowed masters from assuming their biologically determined place within the hierarchy. This construction is an unquestionable aspect of objective reality. Informed by this logic, the primary responsibility of government is therefore to “preserve the rules of the game by enforcing contracts, preventing coercion, and keeping markets free” (Friedman, 1955, p. 1). Connecting Friedman’s philosophy to practice Chomsky (1999) observes:

Equipped with this perverse understanding of democracy, neoliberals like Friedman had no qualms over the military overthrow of Chile’s democratically elected Allende government in 1973, because Allende was interfering with business control of Chilean society. (p. 9)

In order for government, and society more generally, to fulfil their scripted functions, reasons Friedman (1955), they require social stability, which is not possible without “widespread acceptance of some common set of values” and “a minimum degree of literacy and knowledge” (p. 2). Friedman (1955) reasons that the government should subsidise these basic levels of education because it “adds to the economic value of the student” (p. 4) and capitalists should invest in their labour just as they invest in machinery. The public is therefore viewed as a resource to be manipulated by the natural leaders for the common good. Making this point, Friedman (1955) argues that education “is a form of investment in human capital precisely analogous to investment in machinery, buildings, or other forms of non-human capital” and can be justified as a necessary expenditure because “its function is to raise the economic productivity of the human being” (p. 13). For Friedman (1955) then, knowledge production as an actively engaged endeavour is reserved for the elite, rendering the vast majority subject to the necessary “indoctrination” needed to ensure the widespread acceptance of “common social values required for a stable society” even if it means “inhibiting freedom of thought and belief” (p. 7).

As one of the world’s leading theoreticians of free market capitalism, it should not be surprising that Friedman (1955) was a strong supporter of the privatisation of, and thus the corporate control over, public education, masking it with a discourse of choice. In more recent times, he acknowledged that the testing-based No Child Left Behind Act touted as the surest path to increasing achievement was really designed to lend weight to the choice and voucher movement by setting schools up to fail and then handing them over to private managing firms such as Edison Schools (Kohn, 2004). Critical educator Alfie Kohn (2004) has commented that “you don’t have to be a conspiracy nut to understand the real purpose of NCLB” (p. 84). That is, NCLB is nothing more than a “backdoor maneuver” (Kohn, 2004, p. 84) constructed around conceptions of choice allowing private for-profit capitalists to take over public education. Friedman’s theory paved the theoretical pathway for these neoliberal tendencies of the public realm being handed over to corporations to be realised.

Friedman’s theory is based on the assumption that the competition for education dollars would push, out of the necessity to survive, education investors to offer superior products to attract customers. Schools that offered a sub-standard product would not be profitable, and would therefore be forced to either improve or close. Again, The No Child Left Behind Act of George W. Bush has served as a standards-based approach to usher in Friedman’s desire to privatise public education, which has had disastrous results on the knowledge production process. As a result, a major blow was leveled against the practice of education as an active engagement designed to understand the world and to transform it, taking aim specifically at the labour/capital relationship and its manifest hegemonies such as white supremacy and patriarchy.

These developments, however, are well documented. For the purposes of this discussion we will turn our attention to the larger Eurocentric vision of Friedman’s discourse, which is equally relevant as we approach a potentially new era in knowledge production in North America. That is, the potential Democratic presidency of Barack Obama, while pro-capitalist in principle, on their homepage, claim to “believe” that “teachers should not be forced to spend the academic year preparing students to fill in bubbles on standardized tests” (Obama Biden). The manifestation of this desire would provide critical pedagogues much needed breathing room to engage in counter-hegemonic knowledge production and critical praxis after this long period of Friedman-inspired privatization.

Friedman leaves little room for misinterpretation regarding his conceptualisation of democracy and social class, which, we will see, is, in many ways, almost the exact opposite of Marxism, underscoring, in a sense, a testament to Marx’s continued relevance in terms of directly and indirectly informing popular democratic movements challenging basic structures of power and therefore demanding a response by the architects of contemporary US public hegemonic discourse and policy. Within his paradigm Friedman (1962/2002) situates capitalism as the central driving force behind human evolution and therefore responsible for the “great advances of civilization” such as Columbus “seeking a new route to China” (p. 3), which consequently led to the emergence of vast fortunes generated by Europe’s colonialist empire building, slavery, genocide/depopulation and repopulation, and on a scale so massive, so horrendous and so utterly barbaric as to render comprehending its manifestation as a criminal act carried out by real living, breathing, feeling people almost unimaginable (Malott, 2008). Friedman, therefore, does not seem too different from his predecessors. That is, describing Columbus coming to the America’s as one of the great advances in civilisation can only be understood as callous and thoroughly Eurocentric.

But again, Friedman draws on the example of Columbus for the “advances” that have resulted from the “freedom” to pursue private “economic interests,” and therefore as evidence to support capitalism. Friedman (1962/2002) goes so far as to argue that free market “capitalism is a necessary condition for political freedom” (p. 10). Friedman’s thesis can be understood as a direct response to the popular support for nationalised economies designed to promote an equal distribution of the wealth generated by the productive apparatus arguing that “collectivist economic planning has…interfered with individual freedom” (p. 11). Individual freedom, for Friedman, stems from unregulated market mechanisms “stabilised” by a limited government whose function is to “protect our freedom both from the enemies outside our gates and from our fellow citizens: to preserve law and order, to enforce private contracts, and to foster competitive markets” (p. 2). Friedman points to the Soviet Union as an example of what he argues is the coercive tendency of government intervention in economic affairs. It is not surprising that Friedman does not mention the infinitely more democratic and egalitarian nature of Cuba’s centrally-planned economy compared to the US-supported free-market systems in the Caribbean and Latin America (Malott, 2007).

The “law and order” referred to by Friedman can best be understood as the way in which “the descendants of European colonizers shaped…rules to seize title to indigenous lands” (Robertson, 2005, p. ix) and to “enforce” these “private contracts”. Similarly, the Monroe Doctrine, touted by Lippmann (1927) as bound by “law” and “custom,” can be understood as extending the United States’ “sphere of influence” to the entire western hemisphere. That is, to ensure the resources and productive capacities of not only this region, but much of the world, would be controlled by US interests. These self-endorsed “commitments” of the United States have been upheld with deadly force explaining the US’s simultaneously open and hidden war against the Cuban Revolution and Castro’s trouble-making in the hemisphere (Chomsky, 1999; Malott, 2007). While the hegemony of US power has seemed all but total, it has not been without critique and resistance from not only Cuba and Latin America, but within the US as well. At the heart of this counter-hegemony has been the ongoing development of critical pedagogies, one of the primary philosophical influences of which can be traced to both Southern and Northern Native America.

Critical Pedagogy and Indigenity: Democratic Praxis against Social Class

Although he is certainly not the first critical pedagogue, the late Brazilian radical educator, Paulo Freire, is, however, the practitioner credited with the founding of what we have come to know in North America ascritical pedagogy with his first book being published in Brazil in 1967. Freire’s Pedagogy of the Oppressed, initially published in the United States in 1970, is arguably the seed from which critical pedagogy in education in North America has sprouted. Freire and other critical theory-trained Latin American, critical pedagogues were highly influenced by liberation theologists such as Leonardo Boff (1971/1978) and Clodovis Boff (1987) of Brazil, Peruvian Gustavo Gutiérrez (1973/1988), and world-renowned Archbishop Oscar Romero (1988/2005) of El Salvador, who was assassinated in 1987 after becoming “known across the world as a fearless defender of the poor and suffering” earning him “the hatred and calumny of powerful persons in his own country” (Brockman, 1988/2005, p. xv). What is common among these leaders is that they all practised (practice) and developed their theologies with the poorest and most oppressed sectors of their societies, who, wherever indigenous peoples are found, tend to be indigenous peoples. Within these theologies of liberation we can therefore find the democratic impulse that can be treated, risking romanticisation, as a common characteristic among a diverse range of traditional indigenous communities.

Critical pedagogy has always been concerned with challenging the discourse of hierarchy that legitimises oppression and human suffering as indicative of the natural order of the universe. Rather than viewing intelligence as unequally distributed and therefore the practice of democracy extremely limited, critical pedagogy is based on an armed love and radical faith in people’s ability to tend to their own economic and political interests in the spirit of peace and mutuality. In a recent series of interviews with David Barsamian, Noam Chomsky (2007), describes the characteristics of what he understands to be the praxis of democracy, that is, widespread political participation.

There can’t be widespread structural change unless a very substantial part of the population is deeply committed to it…. If you are a serious revolutionary, you don’t want a coup. You want changes to come from below, from the organised population. (p. 121)

This unyielding democratic impulse of western-trained, North American critical pedagogy can be largely attributed to the generous philosophical gifts of not only Native South Americans but Native North Americans such as the Haudenosaunee. According to Donald A. Grinde (1992) in ‘Iroquois Political Theory and the Roots of American Democracy’, many of the “founding fathers” of the U.S., Benjamin Franklin most notably, rejected the anti-democratic European model drawing instead on the brilliance of the Iroquois system of shared governance designed to ensure democracy and peace by putting power and decision-making in the intelligent hands of the people united in a confederation of nations and not in the divine right or assumed superiority of a ruler. Grinde and others in Exiled in the Land of the Free (Lyons & Mohawk, 1992) document, in great detail, the generosity of the Iroquois leaders in assisting Euro-Americans, before, during and after the American Revolution, in creating a unified Nation composed of the original 13 colonies as the foundation for long-term peace, freedom, liberty and democracy in North America. Putting the American Revolutionary war in a context foreign to traditional social studies instruction, Grinde (1992) notes that “the first democratic revolution sprang from American unrest because the colonists had partially assimilated the concepts of unity, federalism, and natural rights that existed in American Indian governments” (p. 231). It is abundantly clear that the gift of democracy received by the United States government by the Haudenosaunee has all been but subverted. For examples of the democratic tradition in contemporary times, outside of Native communities themselves, we have to turn our attention to the highly marginalised critical tradition.

However, we might say that this democratic tradition, commonly associated with European critical theory (i.e. Marxism), is an appropriation because the Native American source of these generous gifts, in the contemporary context, tends not to be cited. For those already engaged in the life-long pursuit of knowledge, this is an easily amendable flaw — requiring of such western-trained critical theorists/educators an active epistemological and material engagement with Native Studies and Indigenous communities the world over (Ewen, 1994; Kincheloe, 2008). We might say that the critical theoretical tradition, rooted in indigenous conceptions of freedom and liberty, represents a rich history of opposition to anti-democratic, authoritarian forms of institutionalised power — private (corporate), federal (state), and religious (Church/ clergy) — for it is this unjust power that poses the greatest barrier to peace. The example of the Haudenosaunee is relatively indicative of this tradition, which stands in stark contrast to the anti-democratic model perpetuated by Durkhiem, Lippmann, Friedman, and the like.

Questions of Certainty, Issues of Pedagogy

Questions of absolutism and certainty also become epistemologically central in the realm of pedagogy and the theory of our educational practice. Postmodern analyses challenge us to question the deterministic absolutism characteristic of enlightenment science. However, it would be foolish to take these critiques as an excuse not to consider what seem to be the more useful conclusions of modernist social science in regards to the role power plays in the legitimation process. For example, Marxists and other Enlightenment science radicals have gone to great lengths to quantify and reduce social trends concluding that the doctrinal system of the elite consistently portrays a distorted imagine of reality as neutral and therefore just how it is. This has been accomplished in the contemporary era through the establishment of a ruling class-controlled propaganda machine, employing schools, the government, and the mass media, which serves the function of maintaining social control. Some scientists argue that this control must be established, by either force or consent, whenever people are oppressed, because the species has a predetermined propensity for freedom and democracy, which is therefore built into the genetic design as an endowment.

Sceptical of any absolutisms regarding the highly complex and little known phenomena of consciousness and free will, that is, the human condition, we might argue that it only appears that humans are naturally democratic because the values of democracy have long been accepted and internalised by the vast majority of humanity rendering it easy to confuse that which has been socially constructed for a biologically determined characteristic. Rather than attempting to make a deterministic case for the human condition, as either democratic or competitive, we might argue that behaviourism has demonstrated that humans’ socially constructed schema are vulnerable to external manipulation suggesting more of a blank slate orenvironmental theory. Instead of putting this knowledge to work in the service of domination as the behaviourist tradition has done, we evoke it here to raise caution against anti-democratic practice.

However, we take issue with the radical or progressive scientific tendency to treat either of these analyses asmore or less accurate representations of objective reality even when they are grounded in the facts and not based on a desire to oppress and dominate. Following the postmodern insights of critical constructivism we therefore challenge the assertion that there is an objective reality that exists independent of the senses because it is the schemas of the mind that constructs ideas, explanations, and guides the practice of choice. Pedagogy based on the presupposition of an external objective reality can too easily lead to a form of anti-democratic critical banking and therefore not inclusive of the multitude of subjugated knowledges based on the multiple positionalities of oppression. We argue, on the other hand, that students should be actively engaged in the process of discovery or knowledge production based on a dialectical relationship between their own experiences and the theory of the social that suggests that there exists a macro-structural hegemonic power base that represents the common class enemy of the vast majority, despite the vast epistemological diversity found within human culture and individuality.

Again, it is not our aim to challenge critical descriptions of capitalism, especially those coming from the Marxist tradition, but to reframe them not as objective reality but as social constructions that, for now, do seem to best represent the phenomena in question (Kincheloe, 2005), that is, neol-iberal capitalism. In so doing, we invite learners to become actively engaged in the discovery process, or the process of naming and renaming the concrete context through the production of knowledge. Ultimately, the epistemological goal of critical pedagogy is not only to construct accurate and useful knowledge about the concrete context and the self, but to construct knowledge about how to transform the self as part of the process of transforming the world. For Marxists this means challenging and dismantling the labour/capital relationship and creating new relationships between people based on an inherently different set of values and ideals that challenge the hierarchies of antiquity that continue to dominate. We might understand this critical approach to knowledge production as part of the democratic process of becoming.

Conclusion

Reflecting on the current crisis of capitalism, working people, as always, will bear the burden because the bosses will not pay the costs if they can defer it to “the simple people”, as US Congressmen and women so often paternaliistically refer to the American people as. So they pay. But sometimes it takes a trillion-dollar reward for systemic irresponsible deception — the loving touch capitalism has always afforded “the bewildered herd” — to waken the sleeping giant of those who rely on a wage to survive. The crisis in confidence is the sleeping giant waking up, which goes much deeper than the reluctance to spend/consume. That is, the questoining goes to the heart of the modern world — the process of value production and its dehumanised underlying driving force, which is the quest for profit, whatever the consequence. While thesleeping giant metaphor can be useful and powerful, however, the risk is that it is a form of reductionism. That is, reducing the infinitely vast diversity of consciousness to a single entity flattens out the richness of all the contributing parts. We therefore must be careful not to confuse the individual parts for the whole (Kincheloe, 2005). To illustrate this point we might say that while the left pinky toe seems to effectively stimulate the epistemological curiosity of many people, it alone cannot account for the complexity of the entire giant.

As critical pedagogues it is within these instances of overt crisis that is our time to shine and do what we do: teach and engage with democratic principles, that is, help that big old giant stand up, become self-actualised, reach its full non-deterministic potential, and mature gracefully. Pedagogy is always critical at this juncture because the dominant paradigm does not recognise that we are all unique free wills and not things to be directed because it can’t. If the system did, it would not be what it is. It would be something different, and that is what we want. What will life after capital be like? Who knows? Maybe we’ll decide to call it Fun Style. Who is against fun? To be successful we must continue to rigorously strive to name the world, as it currently exists. We might call this the struggle over the meaning of our language, and thus, the meaning of the world and ourselves.

For example, despite the central role social class plays in determining the conditions of human life in capitalist society, it is a concept that receives very little attention in corporate media outlets. On rare occasion when it is introduced, it tends to be treated as the objective state of falling within a particular income bracket and is therefore just one of the many ways people are diverse, no more or less special than being male or female, or short or tall, for example. What is implied is that inequality is the natural state of humanity, and that any centrally-planned attempts to democratise the distribution of wealth is therefore unnatural because it limits the individual’s freedom to create his or her own economic destiny, allowing the cream to rise to the top, as it were. The entire history of coercion, propaganda, genocide, and conquest that paved, and continues to pave, the way for class society to exist, and the on-going resistance against it, tends to be left out of these discussions, almost without exception. Making a similar observation Chomsky (1993) plainly states that “in the United States you’re not allowed to talk about class differences” unless you belong to one of two groups, “the business community, which is rabidly class-conscious” and “high planning sectors of the government” (p. 67).

It is therefore not saying too much that the class-perspective found in the work of Durkheim, Lippmann, and Friedman has greatly influenced the business press, which tends to be “full of the danger of the masses and their rising power and how we have to defeat them. It’s kind of vulgar, inverted Marxism” (Chomsky, 1993, p. 67). What we find is that this self-serving perspective of those who benefit from class-based inequalities, in mainstream, dominant society, is presented as objective reality — as normalised and naturalised. However, because our humanity can be limited, but never completely destroyed, hegemony cannot be complete, and the less so, the more serious we take the wisdom of those who counter-hegemonically came before, and those who continue to generously contribute to the critical tradition.

References

Bakan, J. (2004). The Corporation: The Pathological Pursuit of Profit and Power. New York: Free Press.

Boff, C. & Boff, L. (1986/1987). Introducing Liberation Theology. Translated from the Portuguese by Paul Burns. Maryknoll, New York: Orbis.

Boff, L. (1971/1978). Jesus Christ Liberator. Maryknoll, New York: Orbis.

Brockman, J. (1988/2005). Preface. In Oscar Romero. The Violence of Love. Compiled and translated by James R. Brockman. Maryknoll, New York: Orbis.

Butler, S. (1935/2003). War is a Racket. LA: Feral House.

Durkheim, E. (1893/2000). The Division of Labor in Society. In Timmons Robert and Amy Hite (Eds.). From Modernization to Globalization: Perspectives on Development and Social Change. New York: Blackwell Publishers.

Chomsky, N. (1993). The Prosperous Few and the Restless Many. Interviewed by David Barsamian. Berkeley, CA: Odonian Press.

Chomsky, N. (1999). Profit Over People: Neoliberalism and global order. New York: Seven Stories.

Chomsky, N. (2007). What We Say Goes: Conversations On U.S. Power in a Changing World. Interviews with David Barsamian. New York: Metropolitan Books.

Chomsky, N. (2008). Anti-democratic nature of US capitalism is being exposed. Irish Times. http://www.irishtimes.com/newspaper/opinion/2008/1010/1223560345968.html

Churchill, W. (2002). Struggle for the Land: Native North American Resistance to Genocide, Ecocide, and Colonization. San Francisco, CA: City Lights.

Cole-Malott, D. & Malott, C. (2008). Culture, Capitalism and Social Democracy in Jamaica. In Brad Porfilio and Curry Malott (Eds.). The Destructive Path of Neoliberalism: An International Examination of Education. New York: Sense.

Ewen, A. (Ed.) (1994). Voices of Indigenous People: Native People Address the United Nations. Santa Fe, NM: Clear Light Publishers.

Freidman, M. (1962/2002). Capitalism and Freedom. London: University of Chicago Press.

Freire, P. (1970). Pedagogy of the Oppressed. New York: Continuum.

Greider, W. and Baker, D. (2008). Big Banks Go Bust: America’s Financial System in Crisis. (September, 16, 2008).   http://www.alternet.org/story/98863/

Grinde, D.A. (1992). Iroquois Political Theory and the Roots of American Democracy. In Chief Oren Lyons & John Mohawk (Eds.), Exiled in the Land of the Free: Democracy, Indian Nations, and the U.S. Constitution. Santa Fe, NM: Clear Light Publishers.

Gutiérrez, G. (1973/1988). A Theology of Liberation: History, Politics and Salvation. Maryknoll, New York: Orbis.

Kincheloe, J. (2005). Critical Constructivism Primer. New York: Peter Lang.

Kincheloe, J. (2008). Critical Pedagogy in the Twenty-first Century: Evolution for Survival. In Peter McLaren and Joe Kincheloe (Eds.). Critical Pedagogy: Where are we now? New York: Peter Lang.

Kohn, A. (2004). NCLB and the Effort to Privatize Public Education. In Deborah Meier and George Wood (Eds.). Many Children Left Behind: How the No Child Left Behind Act Is Damaging Our Children and Our Schools. New York: Beacon.

Lippmann, W. (1920/2008). Liberty and the News. Oxford: Princeton University Press.

Lippmann, W. (1922). Public Opinion. Boston: Little, Brown and Company.

Lippmann, W. (1927). The Phantom Public: A Sequel to “Public Opinion.” New York: Macmillan Company.

Lippmann, W. (1943). U.S. Foreign Policy: Shield of the Republic. Boston: Little, Brown and Company.

Lyons, O. & Mohawk, J. (Ed.) (1992). Exiled in the Land of the Free: Democracy, Indian Nations, and the U.S. Constitution. Santa Fe, NM: Clear Light Publishers.

Malott, C. (2007). “Cuban Education in Neo-Liberal Times: Socialist Revolutionaries and State Capitalism.”Journal for Critical Education Policy Studies. 5(1). [Online] Available at: http://www.jceps.com/?pageID=article&articleID=90.

Malott, C. (2008). A Call to Action: An Introduction to Education, Philosophy, and Native North America. New York: Peter Lang.

Marx, K. (1894/1991). Capital: Volume 3: A Critique of Political Economy. New York: Penguin Classics.

Marx, K. (1867/1967). Capital: Volume 1: A Critical Analysis of Capitalist Production. New York: New World Paperbacks.

Marx, K. & Engels, F. (1848/1978). Manifesto of the Communist Party. In Robert Tucker (ed.). The Marx-Engels Reader: Second Edition. New York: Norton.

Obama Biden. (accessed 10-04-08). “Education.” http://www.barackobama.com/issues/education.

Robertson, L. (2005). Conquest by Law: How the Discovery of America Dispossessed Indigenous Peoples of Their Lands. New York: Oxford University Press.

Romero, O. (1988/2005). The Violence of Love. Compiled and translated by James R. Brockman. Maryknoll, New York: Orbis.

Sotsisowah, (1978/2005). Thoughts of Peace: The Great Law. In Akwesasne Notes (Ed.). Basic Call to Consciousness. Summertown, TN: Native Voices.

Wilentz, S. (2008). General Editor’s Introduction. In Walter Lippmann. Liberty and the News (1920/2008). Oxford: Princeton University Press.

Being, Becoming and Breaking-Free: Peter McLaren and the Pedagogy of Liberation

Peter McLaren in an interview with Ravi Kumar

“Exploitation is normalized institutionally when a small minority (the capitalists) monopolize the means of production, and workers must rely on wage labor at the behest of the capitalists. This inequity is preserved and reproduced by the state. The presence of the unemployed pressure employed workers, ensuring that they will work unremittingly  hard to produce for the capitalists.  So an anti-capitalist curriculum begins with the struggle for morality, which can only occur outside of capital’s value form. Equality is impossible under capitalism since under capitalism it is the quality of labor power that is paramount, not the equalization of labor power.”

I

Ravi Kumar: You have been in the forefront of revolutionary critical pedagogy along with other social scientists. Where does the break happen in the works of revolutionary critical pedagogues from that of earlier educationists – the neo-Marxists like Michael Apple or critical pedagogues such as Henry Giroux?

Peter McLaren

Peter McLaren: I don’t see it so much as a break or rupture as coming to a fork in the road, a fortuitous crossroads of sorts — and deciding to take a different path, recognising that the journey I had taken with fellow critical educators had been a long and arduous one, freighted with travails and tribulations, a voyage where a lot of learning had taken place and many important struggles had been initiated.  Apple’s work was important to me as a graduate student because it was a clear exposition of a neo-Marxist analysis of the North American curriculum and policy initiatives and Giroux’s work — where I find more similarities to Zygmant Bauman, Castoriadis,  and the Frankfurt school than to the revolutionary Marxist tradition out of which my more recent work has emerged — remains important to me to this day; I consider Henry one of the most insightful and protean scholars on the topic of youth culture and one of the most illuminating critics of contemporary social formations, including the blood-sucking behemoth we refer to as neo-liberal capitalism. His creative and brilliant work on so many topics has inspired an entire generation of intellectuals. What’s different among us? Well, I think many things, and I would point to the most significant as my preoccupation with the writings of Marx, my hoisting of class as a central concept in teacher education, and the creation of socialism for the twenty-first century and linking education to the worldwide struggle for socialism, and working towards the instauration of Marxist educational theory in North America, along with a few fellow travellers. That path was opened up to me, in part, by the work of British educationalists Dave Hill, Mike Cole, Glenn Rikowski and Paula Allman.  Back in the mid 1980s, Mike Cole challenged me to subject my own work to a Marxist critique and I am glad that I obliged.  Now I think your question leads to a more important question — what differentiates my work in general from the progressive tradition in North America?  In the early 1990s I was working from a perspective I called critical postmodernism — the term critical postmodernism or resistance postmodernism was used, after Teresa Ebert, to distinguish it from ‘ludic postmodernism’ or the postmodernism of the spectacle, of the theatrical apparatuses of the state, the politics of representation and the propaganda of desire, a pedagogy of “arousal effect”,  a kind of micro-resistance linked to a secret museum of academic codes and codices that existed within culture where culture’s mystified nature could be explored and a politics of negation unleashed, the aim of which was to produce a well-tempered radical where the alienation of everyday life under capitalism was seen as not so bad because it was suffered by good people.  I was concerned that, among the cultural avant-garde, questions of class became ideationally sequestered from internal scrutiny — there existed a proclivity to self-censorship related to questions of class because the working class in their role as organic intellectuals were relegated to the role of cultural workers, and needed tutelage in the spaces of the vanguard regarding questions of cultural production whereas questions of class were deemed to be self-evident and to some extent too inevitable.

Now I don’t want to leave you with the impression that I don’t think culture is very important, since culture is linked to ways of “living out” historically specific antagonisms and relations of subordination. Given that the politics of liberation is headquartered in critical consciousness and ignited by revolutionary praxis where historical agents transform themselves through their struggles, I became interested in pedagogical spaces that could make the strange familiar and the familiar strange, more specifically in the sense of accounting for the “rich totality of many determinations” that Marx talks about. In other words, I tried to do a number of things: to understand how a distracted and indifferent subjectivity (that led to critics bemoaning the superficiality of modern life), one that remains blasé to shifts and changes within a moving modernity, can be invited into new perceptions of the social self by building a critical lexicon gleaned from the critical literature; to make the subterranean or oblivious workings of capital more conspicuous to teachers and educators, to conceive of the concept of praxis as ontologically important, and examine history not as something already written or hardwired into predicated or predictable outcomes but open to change once certain ideological and material conditions are superseded and fetishized everyday life grasped  dialectically (i.e, those conditions that shape and educate our desires surreptitiously or in tacit ways). I wanted to add some dialectical flesh to the progressive bones of critical pedagogy (which had becoming increasingly domesticated, as Paulo Freire was turned into a type of benevolent, almost Santa Claus figure), and tried to give this flesh an almost raucous, ribald and garrulous physicality through an eclectic writing style — without becoming trapped in a phenomenology of sensation or seduction. I tried to understand in theoretical terms, what gives our desires direction?  And, of course: What is the direction of our desiring? I became interested in the notion that human beings form reality in the process of becoming human, that praxis determines human beings in their totality, in other words, that praxis distinguishes the human from the non-human, which is something Karel Kosik talked about in his work on the dialectics of the concrete.  Following Kosik, I became interested in the movements of the world’s totality and how this totality is uncovered by human beings, and how, in our uncovering this totality, we develop a particular openness towards being. How can we discover ourselves as historical beings?  The results of our actions in and on and through the world do not coincide with our intentions. Why is this?  What accounts for the disharmony between the necessity and the freedom of our actions as human beings creating and being created by historical forces?  These are questions that motivated my thinking, and still do.  Do we make history or does history make us? Or do both occur simultaneously? I do not believe we are summoned by some higher power to create historical outcomes but that, following Marx, we make history.  Kosik saw this as the interconnection of the objectified and objectivised praxis of humankind.

This praxis in the form of production forces, forms of thought, language, etc., exists as historical continuity only because of the activity of human beings.  But this objectified and objectivised praxis has a form, and it is this form which is fixed in human history and seems over time to be more real than human reality itself and becomes the basis for historical mystification, for what Kosik refers to as the basis of the possibility of inverting a subject into an object. So, in effect, this forms the possibility for ideological mystification, for the ideological state apparatuses, all the way to the current kind of totalitarianism we had under the Bush administration ruled by the “big lie” – a lie that enters people’s heads as if it were a metaphysical being, a mystical substance in which human beings seek a guarantee against chaos, against chance, against the everyday contingency of life.  So that every individual enters conditions not of their own making, and there is a dialectic we must uncover between individuals and those conditions that are given for every generation, epoch and class.   And as Kosik noted, we can transcend these conditions but not primarily in our consciousness and intentions but through our praxis. We get to know the world by actively interfering in it. We discover our revolutionary ethics in the process of our objectification and our resistance to it. I tried to convey to my students that economics is not some nomothetic discipline but an ethic — a moral philosophy — that is perverse because of the way it deals with practical human relationships through its frenzy to maximise profits.  I became interested in the work of Raya Dunayevskaya and her notion of absolute negativity.  Absolute negativity, in Raya’s sense of the term, does not refer simply to an endless series of negations but a negation that can free itself from the object of its critique. Raya discovered this in Hegel.  Hegel worked with a type of self-referential negation, which was modified by Marx.  By negating itself, negation establishes a relation with itself and is freed from dependence on the external object — so this type of negativity, since it exists without relation to another outside itself is absolute — it is absolved from dependence on the other. This type of negation has negated its dependence on an external object. Marx critically appropriated this concept to explain the path to communist society. As Peter Hudis has explained, Marx via Hegel understood that to negate something still leaves us dependent on the object of critique. The alienated object is simply affirmed on a different level. So when you look at revolutions of the past, you see that they were still trapped by the objects that they tried to negate. They didn’t fully negate their negations, so to speak. Along these lines, Peter Hudis notes that communism is the negation of capitalism but as such it was still dependent on the object of its critique insofar as it replaced private property with collective property. Communism thus was not free from the alienated notion that ownership is the most important part of being human. Ownership was still affirmed, but on a different level. Of course, it was good to negate private property but this did not go far enough to pave the way to a truly new, a truly positive society. In order to meet this challenge, you need a human praxis that can achieve the transcendence of alienation. And this necessitates a subjective praxis connected with a philosophy of liberation that is able to illuminate the content of a post-capitalist society and convincing the popular majorities that it is possible to resolve the contradictions between alienation and freedom. Now it is clear that attempts to concretise absolute negativity as a new beginning rather than repeating the mistakes of an earlier era have been halted by the forces of colonisation and imperialism. Ramon Grosfoguel, Nelson Maldonaldo-Torres, Enrique Dussel, Walter Mignolo and Anibal Quijano and others are writing cogently and presciently about the coloniality of being in this regard, where the epistemological genocide linked to the Eurocentric forces of colonisation, and economic exploitation linked to capitalism, are demonstrated to be co-constitutive of plundering the oppressed (invented non-beings) of their alterity, their liberty, and their humanity — where, as Enrique Dussel notes, indigenous peoples have become but free labour for a colonial tributary system  linked historically to European capital. I am interested in the historical process of the European ego’s missionary sense (I discover, I conquer and I evangelise) and ontological sense (I think) and how this links up to the concept of the transnational capitalist class and the transnational state apparatus as developed by William Robinson.

 

RK: Freire, with whom you have worked and whose ideas you have critically used in your works, has been used by different shades of intellectuals and even agencies that sustain the rule of capital. What is it that allows the use of Freire’s works/ideas by them and what difference does it make when you use his ideas in your works?

PM: Well, I make no claim to a ‘purer’ interpretation of Freire’s work.  I think of the influence that Karel Kosik’s Dialectics of the Concrete had on Freire, and I think we can understand Freire best when we see his work in terms of how he fashioned the notion of praxis. In this respect, I would argue that Freire’s work has been flensed by liberals.  The politics of his praxis has been pasteurized.  The supreme postulate — the unity of theory and practice — is upheld by liberals and criticalists alike —but the original philosophical questioning (at least within materialist philosophy) that formed the conditions of possibility for revolutionary praxis has disappeared. Thus, as Kosik notes, the unity of theory and praxis has come to be realised and grasped in different epochs in very different ways.  Liberals often deal with the pseudo-concrete when utilizing praxis — they view it in terms of addressing the practical applications of pedagogical theory, or something like that, in which the focus is on the subjective consciousness of the individual. Praxis in the way I understand it, via Freire, and others, is the ontological process of becoming human. Reality manifests itself in this becoming, in this onto-formative process of becoming, in which the practice of being human forms and interprets reality. So praxis, as Kosik points out, is a specific mode of being that determines humans in their totality.

A specific mode of being, praxis becomes a way of transcending our finitude and helps us to constitute our relationship to the totality of human existence.  Many approaches to knowledge limit the notion of praxis, fetishize it, and turn it into some kind of technique of learning.  Here, formal logic replaces dialectical logic.  This goes against a materialist philosophy of praxis in which praxis is viewed as an onto-formative process, as the historical mediation of spirit and matter, of theory and action, epistemology and ontology.  Here we need to talk about revolutionary praxis, denouncing oppression and dialectically inaugurating new forms of social, educational and political relationships.  Clearly, reflecting on our practice means finding ways of organising and activating our pedagogical relationships so that the oppressed become protagonists in their historical formation.  Freirean praxis is oriented towards socialist relationships and practices, and this has been jettisoned by liberals.  Revolutionary praxis is, if Marx’s stresses are taken into account, is not some arche-strategy of political performance undertaken by academic mountebanks in the semiotics seminar room but instead is about “the coincidence of the changing of circumstances and of human activity or self-change”.  It is through our own activities that we develop our capacities and capabilities. We change society by changing ourselves and we change ourselves in our struggle to change society. The act of knowing is always a knowing act.  It troubles and disturbs the universe of objects and beings, it can’t exist outside of them; it is interactive, dialogical. We learn about reality not by reflecting on it but by changing it.  Paying attention to the simultaneous change in circumstances and self-change and creating a new integrated worldview founded upon a new social matrix – what I call socialism – is how I understand revolutionary movement as praxis.

RK: The works of revolutionary critical pedagogues have been often critiqued as non-viable, as ideals which cannot be achieved. Their works are also critiqued on the grounds that they do not talk much about curriculum, teacher training, classroom transactions or students psychology. Rather they are seen as arguing against imperialism and capitalism or resistance against capitalism. How would you respond to such critiques?

PM: I think there is some truth to this criticism.  But there are several ways to look at this dilemma. First and foremost, if there are no other critical educators addressing neo-liberal capitalism and imperialism, specifically from a Marxist perspective, or dealing systematically with what Anibal Quijano and Ramon Grosfoguel call the “coloniality of power” then it is obvious revolutionary critical educators need to be up to this task.  Clearly, the copious offerings of the postmodern left have remained regnant in the education literature, Hardt and Negri’s work on the immateriality of labour, the multitude, and Foucault’s work on the archaeology of power, etc. Joining these are neo-Weberian approaches to class.  There are, in my mind, too few Marxist analyses available for students to engage within the educational field, although perhaps it is different in India, and I know that it is different in England with the work of Dave Hill, Mike Cole, Glenn Rikowski, Paula Allman, and others gaining worldwide visibility. So in terms of my own work, I have been trying to address issues that you and colleagues in England and elsewhere have been addressing for a much longer time.  My task, along with other North American critical educators, has been to try to give the anti-capitalist movement relevance for North American educators.  One theme that has dominated my work has been a Marxist critique of global capitalism. The sociologist Willian I. Robinson argues that we have a global capitalist system that has entered a new phase during the last two decades – what we have come to call neo-liberal capitalism. Obviously we need to mount a politics of resistance. Social and political forces are still needed to challenge state power at the national level. It is wrong to think that there is no more need to talk about state power or the need for political organisations that can cooperate in civil society as well as in political society. We have two extremes at the current historical juncture:  the old model of the vanguard party overthrowing the state (the vertical model) and the civil societarian position about changing the world without taking state power. Enrique Dussel points out that asking whether or not it is possible “to change the world without taking power” is the wrong question.  Power, notes Dussel, can’t be “taken” as it were a “thing”. Power belongs to the political community, to the people, as it were.  Power can be exercised institutionally by representative delegates of the community but the question remains – in whose interests do these institutions serve?  Dussel argues,

The package of State institutions (potestas) needs to be untied and changed as a whole by conserving what is sustainable and eliminating what is unjust – thereby creating the new.  Power (as potestas) is not “taken” en bloc.  It is reconstituted and exercised critically in view of the material satisfaction of needs, in fulfilment of the normative demands of democratic legitimacy, and within empirical political possibility.  But to be clear, without the obediential exercise of delegated institutional power the world cannot feasibly be changed. To attempt to do so is little more than abstract and apolitical moralism and idealism, which clearly results from practical and theoretical confusions.

And Robinson is correct in positing a crucial remaining question: What types of political vehicles will “interface” between popular forces and state structures? What’s the relationship between the social movements of the left, the state, and political organisations?  Previously the relationship was vertical (cultivating a top-down hierarchy), now it’s horizontal (cultivating democratic social relations from the ground up). So what will eventually replace the neo-liberal model?  Market capitalist models?  Reformist models that will sustain the rule of capital? What are the forms of organisation we need to resist the rule of capital?  At the level of the state as well as the public sphere.  What political vehicles can the popular majorities create that can interface between popular forces and state structures?  How can popular forces utilise state power in order to transform the state and bring about a socialist alternative to the capitalist law of value?  According to Robinson, previously there was a vertical model. In the last 15 or 20 years, the emphasis has been on horizontal relations, networking among different social groups, and bringing about democratic relations from the ground up via participatory democratic forms of organisation. Here, indigenous organisations have taken the lead. We need countervailing forces from below – popular forces and movements of popular majorities from below that can put pressure on the state (where global forces pressure even revolutionary governments to moderate structural change), even when the state is working towards socialist ideals such as the case of Venezuela. What are the pedagogical implications in all of this?  How can we look at critical pedagogy as a social movement, as a broad coalition of groups?  How do we define pedagogy in this context? How is critical pedagogy a force for change that exists as much outside of schools as within them? These are questions that need exploring. And there are too few of us in the field of education engaging these questions.

Let’s take another important theme.  In addition to challenging the neo-liberal globalisation of capital, revolutionary critical educators need to address the concept of colonialism. Anibal Quijano, for instance, notes that with the help of capitalism, the idea of race helped to yoke the world’s population into a hierarchical order of superior and inferior people and it became a central construct in creating and reproducing the international division of labour, including the global system of patriarchy. He writes how, historically, slavery, serfdom, wage labor, and reciprocity all functioned to produce commodities for the world market – and this “colonial power matrix” (“patrón de poder colonial”) came to affect all dimensions of social existence such as sexuality, authority, subjectivity and labour.   Berkeley professor Ramon Grosfoguel conceptualises this as a historical-structural heterogeneous totality that by the late 19th century came to cover the whole planet. Grosfoguel has described the coloniality of power as an entanglement of multiple and heterogeneous global hierarchies (“heterarchies”) of sexual, political, epistemic, economic, spiritual, linguistic and racial forms of domination and exploitation where the racial/ethnic hierarchy of the European/non-European divide transversally reconfigures all of the other global power structures. As race and racism became the organising principle that structured all of the multiple hierarchies of the world-system, different forms of labour that were articulated to capitalist accumulation at a world scale were assigned according to this racial hierarchy.  Cheap, coercive labor was carried out by non-European people in the periphery and “free wage labor” was exercised by people of European descent in the core. Such has been the case up to the present day.  Grosfoguel makes an important case that, contrary to the Eurocentric perspective, race, gender, sexuality, spirituality, and epistemology are not additive elements to the economic and political structures of the capitalist world-system, but a constitutive part of the broad entangled “package” called the European modern/colonial capitalist/patriarchal world-system. Now as revolutionary critical educators, we need to examine class struggle in the context of the production of the coloniality of power.  This is an important project.  So yes, this is a lot of theoretical work, and the basic arguments need to be laid out before we can build a curriculum that can address these issues and more work needs to be done before we can mine their implications for teacher education, curriculum, and a psychology of liberation. When we look at psychology, we can look to the pioneering work of Frantz Fanon and, of course, Ignacio Martín-Baró, the Jesuit priest who was murdered by the US-backed military forces of El Salvador. Of course, some educators are addressing the issue of decolonising pedagogy at the level of the classroom, of decolonising the curriculum, and this is important work. It is not that works addressing these themes have not been done before for many years. It’s just that when new questions and configurations arise at the level of global politics, we need to examine their implications from both geopolitical and micropolitical perspectives, using new conceptual schema and utilising empirical work being done on the ground. And putting it all together.

But, a single revolutionary critical educator would find it difficult to do everything you mention in your question all at once – to put implications for curriculum planning, for learning theory, for psychology, for teacher education, for pedagogical approaches in the classroom all in one book, or one study, for instance. I like to see revolutionary critical education as a collective enterprise. Some critical educators are writing about classroom issues, others are looking at the curriculum. I am writing more on a “macro” level, trying to develop a coherent philosophy of praxis – and of course I benefit from the work being done by critical educators worldwide. If I were a pre-service student in a teacher education programme, obviously reading a book by McLaren would not be enough to answer so many important pressing questions that classroom practitioners need to address. The key would be to read educators who can give you some philosophical foundations, including the concept of revolutionary praxis, some historical foundations, ethical and epistemological foundations, and some multicultural foundations that include issues around gender and patriarchy and sexuality and disability, and foundations for developing critical classroom practices, including eco-pedagogy and teaching for a sustainable biosystemic future. We are a collective effort.  People sometimes want me, or some other revolutionary critical educator, to do everything in a single text.  The key is not to look for a single source but to appropriate critically from a wide expanse of revolutionary critical discourses – inside and outside of the educational literature.  Here in the US we have a field called educational foundations. But you don’t see programmes called educational foundations as much today as when I began teaching in schools of education a number of decades ago.  I think we need to revive educational foundations, and try to revision them as critical educational foundations programmes.

The state is not a neutral site, and what we need to challenge is how capital has shaped it and how it is shaping capital. Civil society is part of the state and is not an autonomous region that miraculously floats above the messy world of class antagonisms. Many progressive educators fail to realise this.  So what happens?  In their refusal to move beyond reclamation of the public sphere and an embracing of an anaemic and abstract conception of democracy and freedom, they unwittingly reflect the leftist face of the capitalist class in which appearances are created and preserved while reality is eroded. For me, the struggle is about building a socialism of the concrete, not an abstract utopia, a radical democracy of the abstract spawned by a revivified civil society.  And we all have been remiss is failing to spell out what this means, what this could be like. That is the challenge for some of us, and until we develop a coherent direction of where to go AFTER capital, then we will be trapped in a leftist neo-liberalism, and that is a very perilous place for humanity to be.

II

RK: How do you analyse the current recession as a pedagogue? How do you see it as a teacher-worker affecting the educational scenario?

PM: Teachers need to develop anti-capitalist pedagogies. They need to involve their students in a discussion of the current global economic crisis — and not be afraid to use the word “capitalism.” We need to stress the “class” dimension of the crisis in Marxian terms. We need to enter into discussions about how capitalism works and how the question of politics pervades questions of the economy and the distribution of wealth and class power.  And how all these questions have a moral dimension (can morality exist within capitalism?) as well as a political basis. There is a tremendous fear about socialism in the US these days, but we must remember that the ruling class only fears socialism for the poor because the entire system is protected via socialism for the rich, a system that is comfortably in place — although it needs to be unmasked as socialism for the rich.  The great US polymath, Gore Vidal, pointed out that the US government prefers that “public money go not to the people but to big business. The result is a unique society in which we have free enterprise for the poor and socialism for the rich” and we can clearly discern the truth in that statement when we look at the recent nationalisation of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac where you can see clearly that the US is a country where there exists socialism for the rich and privatisation for the poor, all basking in what Nouriel Roubini calls “the glory of unfettered Wild West laissez-faire jungle capitalism” – and what Marxist theorist David Harvey argues has led to  “a financial Katrina”— that  has allowed the biggest debt bubble in history to fester without any control, causing the biggest financial crisis since the Great Depression. Indeed, socialism is only condemned when it profits the poor and the powerless and threatens the rich. But capitalists are quick to embrace a socialism for the rich — which really is what neo-liberal capitalism is all about. But of course, it’s called free-market capitalism and is seen as synonymous with the struggle for democracy. But free-market ideology cannot fix a crisis created by free-market ideology. I look around me to the decaying infrastructures of the cities here and I feel I am living in some kind of slow-motion demolition of civilisation, in a film noir comic book episode where denizens of doom inhabit quasi-feudal steampunk landscapes of wharfs and warehouses and rundown pubs, roaches sliding off laminated table cloths, in an atmosphere of dog-eat-dog despair. Those whose labour is exploited in the production of social wealth — that is, the wage and salaried class — are now bearing most of the burden of the current economic crisis in the US and, quite simply, what is called for is a mass uprising like we saw in Argentina in 2001-2002 when four presidents were forced out in less than three weeks, like we saw in Venezuela when the popular majorities rescued President Hugo Chavez during a CIA-supported coup, or like we saw in Bolivia, when the indigenous peoples put Evo Morales in power or what we are seeing in Iceland, in Latvia, in Greece, in South Korea today. We need to cry “”¡Que se vayan todos!” (“All of them must go!”) And flush contemporary deregulated capitalism down the toilet.  But the interminably overcast political world and the media/videosphere in the US provide the US public with what Paul Valéry described as “the succour of that which does not exist” – in this case, a belief that free-market capitalism is still the best of all possible systems and needed to keep democracy safe from the feral hordes of barbarians who might turn to the evil of socialism if we are not vigilant in protecting our way of life. As educators, we are faced with a tough challenge in teaching about and against capitalism.

William Tabb notes that the system itself created this crisis by floating the stock of new companies that promised to invest in high technology. Prices rose so high that the stock market came crashing down. When the Federal Reserve lowered interest rates and kept lowering them, it became easier for companies and individuals to borrow and it helped people pay off debt and borrow more and low-interest mortgages made home ownership cheaper.   As housing prices rose and kept rising, mortgage originators gave out easy loans with little or no down payment as well as low teaser-rate loans, which would reset in the future, were offered, and interest-only mortgages became common. Adjustable-rate mortgages allowing borrowers to make very low initial payments for the first years became popular. The banks learned to securities these loans by selling the collateralised debt obligations to someone else who would receive the income. You would get paid up-front with money you could lend to still more borrowers. Tabb tells us that between mid-2000 and 2004, American households took on three trillion dollars in mortgages while the US private sector borrowed three trillion dollars from the rest of the world.  Almost a half of the mortgages were financed with foreign money.  And when the Securities and Exchange Commission changed the rules to allow investment banks to take on a great deal more risk, we saw the collapse of Wall Street as we have known it.  When the big investment banks received an exemption from regulation limiting the amount of debt they could take on, they borrowed and invested more in relation to the actual capital the bank possessed. But they ran out of money when things went bad. This is what happens when you put your faith in the magic of the market (the market is the singular most important deity in the US) allow banks to self-regulate. Social regulation in the public interest is, and has always been — an anathema to the ruling class, or the transnational capitalist class, however you describe the guardians of the interest of capital. The ruling class and its powerful fractions of capital put the blame on too much governmental regulation — not too little — with respect to the current crisis just at a time when we need strong government action.

Because of the credit squeeze, businesses cannot get sufficient credit and so are cutting back on investment, on payroll, on employees and are not pursuing strategies to help working people — why aren’t  mortgage rates being lowered to let people stay in their homes? Why is money being thrown at the banks when they need to be nationalised and reorganised?  We need to move to direct job creation, not giving tax breaks to corporations doing business in the US. As Tabb notes, minimising or eliminating their tax burden leaves the working people to pay more. Tabb is correct in arguing that the issue of class power and the structural nature of capitalism as a system of class domination have to be brought front and centre — we need to critique the very class structure of capitalism. If we wish the patterns of taxation and pro-corporate policy we need greater social control over capital with its recurring crises and unpredictable cycles and chronic instability and a complete rethinking of the system in terms of what economic democracy really means for the wretched of the earth.

Given the nature of capitalism, and primed by the laws of capitalist competition and accumulation, capitalists are forced to produce a surplus product in order to produce surplus value; and in order to generate even more surplus value, must be reinvested and this continued reinvestment expands surplus production and there exists a continual need to discover spaces for surplus production. Capitalists are in continual search for new means of production as well as natural resources and the necessity of raw-material extraction has led to what some have called the new imperialism. What we need, obviously, is a non-capitalist class structure.

We are entering a period where leftist educators must play an important role in the global struggle with finance capital.

The most important approach to discussing the crisis in capitalism has been developed, in my view, by Glenn Rikowksi in his discussion of the social production of labour-power as this relates to education.  “Labour-power” is the potential or ability of workers to work, it is the latent value (or the promise of creating value possessed by human labour) that has not yet been expended. “Labour” is the actual activity of producing value. The profit, or what Marx refers to as surplus value, arises when workers do more labour than is necessary to pay the cost of hiring their labour-power.

Exploitation is normalised institutionally when a small minority (the capitalists) monopolise the means of production, and workers must rely on wage labour at the behest of the capitalists. This inequity is preserved and reproduced by the state. The presence of the unemployed pressure employed workers, ensuring that they will work unremittingly hard to produce for the capitalists.  So an anti-capitalist curriculum begins with the struggle for morality, which can only occur outside of capital’s value form. Equality is impossible under capitalism since under capitalism it is the quality of labour-power that is paramount, not the equalization of labour-power. These are issues that need to be explored. Glenn Rikowski puts it this way:

In capital’s social universe, ‘values’ have no substance, but value is the substance. Morality, is the struggle for morality, the struggle to make it real, and this can only be a possibility (still only a possibility) in the movements of society post-capitalism. Moral critiques of capitalism are in themselves insufficient, as Marx held (though they are understandable, and may energize people and make them angry against the system, and this anger may lead to significant forms of collective struggle). However, the struggle to attain morality, the struggle to make values possible, continually crashes against the fabric of society. It is this that makes struggles for gender equality, ‘race’ equality and so on so explosive. In capitalist society, these forms of equality (like all other forms of equality) are impossible. But the struggle for their attainment exposes their possibility, a possibility that arises only within a post-capitalist scenario.

On this analysis, collective quests for gender and ‘race’ equality are a threat to the constitution of capitalist society; they call forth forms of equality that can have no social validity, no existence, within the universe of capital – as all forms of equality are denied except for one. This is equality on the basis of exchange-value. On the basis of exchange-value we are all equal. There are a number of aspects to this.

First, our labours may be equal in terms of the value they create. However, as our labour-powers have different values, then 10 weeks of my labour may be equal to a single day of the labour of some highly paid soccer player. Equality here, then, operates on the basis of massive substantive inequality. Secondly, the value of our labour-powers may be equal; so one hour’s labour of two people with equal labour-powers (in terms of labour-power quality) creates the same value. In a paper of last year, I go on to show that although these are the only forms of equality socially validated within the social universe of capital, practically they are unattainable as other social drives break these forms of equalisation…. For example, the drive to enhance labour-power quality as between different capitals, national capitals and between individuals pursuing relative ‘self-investment’ in their own labour-powers would constantly disrupt any systematic attempt to create equality of labour-powers through education and training. Although forms of equality on the basis of exchange-value are theoretically possible, the first (equality of labour) is abominable as it is compatible with massive inequalities of income and wealth, whilst the second (equality of labour-powers) is practically hopeless. The outcome of all this is that struggles against inequalities in capitalist society are struggles for forms of equality that cannot exist within capitalism. Yet they nevertheless constitute struggles against the constitution of capitalist society, and also for equality than can attain social existence on the basis of the dissolution of the social universe of capital.

Rikowski explains, after Marx, how labour-power is transformed into labour in the labour process, and how, in this movement value, and then at a certain point surplus value, is generated. He illustrates that there are two aspects to labour: it is a process of producing use-values and also value (a valorization process). These are not two separate processes but both are expressions of the one and same set of acts within the labour process. Rikowski puts it thus:

If the product is useless then value is not realized at the point of sale. Labor power consists of those attributes of the person that are used in creating a use-value (the use-value aspect of labor power), but labor power also has a quantitative, value-aspect too. Through the activity of the worker (labor) in the labor process, some of our personal powers (labor power) also become expressed as value-generation. Thus: labor power is the unique, living commodity that is the foundation of value, the substance of the social universe of capital. We create the social universe of capital.

Rikowski goes on to argue that education and training play a key role in the social production of labour-power. There exists a social drive to reduce all education and training to labour-power production and, according to Rikowksi, this reflects the deepening capitalisation of the whole of social life. In contemporary capitalist society, education and training play an incredibly key role in the social production of labor power – which Rikowski reminds us is the single commodity on which the expansion of capital and the continuation of capitalist society depend. Thus, it behooves us mightily as critical educators to understand the processes by which  education and training increasingly operate as vehicles of labour-power production, and — and this is crucial to remember — it is not labour but  rather  labour-power that generates value when it is expressed as labour in the capitalist labour process. Value is the substance of the social universe of capital. Education and training thus have a key role to play in the maintenance and expansion of the social universe of capital. As educators, as students, we are all involved in socially producing labour-power, although teachers have more social power in this regard than do students. If we are part of the endless social drive to enhance labour-power quality then we are at the same time participating in a process that necessarily creates an inequality of labour-power values, and works against what education in capitalist society should be about, which is labour-power equalisation.  I am brought back to one of Marx’s reflections, “The realm of freedom begins where the realm of necessity is left behind,” and also, “limiting the length of the working day, is a crucial demand.”

The key here is to recognise the fundamental contradiction between the drive to enhance labour-power quality, and the real necessity of labour-power equalisation. And the latter is not possible within the social universe of capital. Rikowski is at the forefront of this idea, and here his contributions to critical pedagogy are of inestimable importance. Business and corporate leaders realise that education is all about the reproduction of labour-power for capital although, as Rikowski notes, they call it ‘human capital’, and this is a very scary term indeed.  But it is accurate. In my writings I try to capture the alienation and fetishization and commodification of human life, of capitalism turning living labourers into abstract labourers.  Here in the US, the process of educating students’ labour-power for capital is increasingly standardised — we make sure students can take standardised, multiple-choice exams that stifle their thinking and make them less able to develop the critical skills that can help them figure out that they are fodder for the reproduction of capitalist social relations. Rikowksi notes that “teachers and trainers have huge strategic importance in capitalist society: they are like ‘angels of the fuel dump’, or ‘guardians of the flame’, in that they have intimate day-to-day responsibility for generating the fuel (labour-power) that generates what Marx called the ‘living fire’ (labour)”. God forbid that students might question the representatives of capital! So the task becomes: Who can compete best in enhancing the quality of labour-power of students to further the efforts of neo-liberal globalisation? We, as teachers, labour for labour power production!  We are learning to labour for labour-power enhancement, not labour-power equalisation.

So how can we disturb this process?  How can we subvert, unsettle, resist, rupture and confound this process? Well, Rikowski argues that we can “work to enshrine alternative educational principles and practices that bring into question the constitution of society and hint at ways in which expenditure of labour-power does not take a value form.” We are constituted by labour and capital and this contradiction plays itself out within the deep recesses of our psychologies (as psycho-Marxism has shown us).

We are constituted by the concrete, qualitative, use-value aspect; and secondly by the quantitative, abstract value-aspect of labour and we are produced, necessarily as ’living contradictions’. We are, assuredly, propelled by the movement inherent in this living contradiction in the direction of transforming ourselves by changing society (by the coincidence of changing circumstances and self-change, as Marx would put this notion we call revolutionary praxis), and through this by struggling to build a social universe outside of capital’s value form. So we can begin this task when we acknowledge how we can’t have real equality through exchange-value, but only on the basis of the equalisation of labour-power, or the equality of valorization of labour-powers. And why?  Rikowski hits the socialist nail into the capitalist coffin when he says:

This is because the inequalities of labour-power quality generated within the capitalist labour process require re-equalisation to the socially average level in order to attain the equalisation of labour-power values that is the foundation of social justice in capitalism. As individual capitals are responsible for generating these inequalities, then they are responsible for re-engineering labour-power equality. Thus, capitalist enterprises are responsible for providing compensatory education and training in order to equalise labour-power values. As this process has indeterminate effects regarding surplus-value creation, which is the basis of capitalist profit, it is unlikely that, in practice, representatives of capital (employers) would pick up the tab.

Now here we can see why Rikowski notes that “social justice on the basis of capital exists only in the form of a mode of social life denied” precisely because  the struggle for labour-power is annulled by capital’s social drive to enhance labour-power. We need to focus not only on social relations within the classroom but to take into serious account the quality of social relations in all organisations seeking to transform capitalist society.  Here, all of us — whether we are teachers in classrooms, or workers in factories, or working in retail at the local boutique — are encouraged to become critical revolutionary educators. So, along with Rikowski, Paula Allman, Dave Hill, and Mike Cole, and others, I would like to see educators put into practice the critique of capitalist production and this should include, as Rikowski emphasises, the production of teacher work and its relationship to social domination in capitalist societies.  And, of course, needed are theorisations and strategies of how labour-power can be used by workers in the service of anti-capitalist activity.  As Rikowski notes:

Labor power is the supreme value-creating power on which capital depends for its existence, and it is incorporated within labourers, who have the potential to withhold this wonderful social force (through strikes or leaving the employment of a capital) or worse, to use labour-power for anti-capitalist activity and ultimately for non-capitalist forms of production. Together, these features make labour-power capital’sweakest link. Capital depends on it, yet has the capacity to be used by its owners against capital and to open up productive forms which capital no longer dominates. Marx and Marxist analysis uncovers this with a great force and clarity as compared with any other critical social theory.

So, insofar as we are able to, as Rikowski puts it, “critique the ways in which human labour constitutes capitalist society (how we become dominated by our own creations) and the constitution of capitalist society in terms of its basic structuring features” we are building the foundation for a truly critical pedagogy.  Here we can ask ourselves how we become constituted — I would even use the word “enfleshed” — by the following aspects of labour-power summarised by Rikowski, below:

  1. The value aspect of labour (power): the quantitative aspect
  2. The use-value aspect of labour (power): the qualitative aspect
  3. The exchange-value aspect of labour (power): the aspect that determines the equality of labours and labour-powers
  4. The subjective aspect of labour (power): the will determined aspect
  5. The collective aspect of labour (power): the cooperative aspect (involved in workers working together)
  6. The concrete aspect of labour (power): the particularities and peculiarities of labour and labour-power attributes involved in specific labour processes and in specific work roles

Secondly, and here I am following Rikowski’s typology of what a truly revolutionary critical pedagogy would look like, I would explore how inequalities are generated by capitalist society —racialised inequalities, patriarchal inequalities, inequalities based on differential treatments of various social groups.  The third moment in Rikowski’s architectonic is his recommendation that we critique all aspects of capitalist life. Rikowski summarizes this as follows:

  • It is based on the works of Marx and Marxism, first and foremost;
  • The starting point is the critique of the basic structuring phenomena and processes of capitalist society – which involves a critique of the constitution of capitalist society;
  • The second most significant level of critique is the host of social inequalities thrown up by the normal workings of capitalist society – and issues of social justice can be brought in here;
  • The third level of critique brings in the rest of capitalist social life – but relates to the first and second levels as frequently as possible;
  • Two keys fields of human activity in contemporary society stand in need of fierce critique: capitalist work and capitalist education and training (including the social production of labour power);
  • Labour-power – as capital’s ‘weakest link’ – deserves special attention as it has strategic and political significance.

I would add another feature to the schema Rikowski has provided.  For me, since the value form of labour (abstract labour) that has been transmogrified into the autonomous moment of dead labour, eating up everything that it is not, can be challenged by freely associated labour and concrete, human sensuousness we need to develop what I call a philosophy of revolutionary praxis. This involves envisioning a non-capitalist future that can be achieved by means of subjective self-movement through absolute negativity so that a new relation between theory and practice can connect us to the idea of freedom. As Peter Hudis argues, the abolition of private property does not necessarily lead to the abolition of capital so we need to push further, to examine the direct relation between the worker and production. Here, our sole emphasis should not be on the abolition of private property, which is the product of alienated labour; it must be on the abolition of alienated labour itself. As I have mentioned before, Marx gave us some clues on how to transcend alienation, ideas that he developed from Hegel’s concept of second or absolute negativity, or ‘the negation of the negation’. I’ve written about his, and it comes mainly from the work of the founder of Marxist humanism in the US, Raya Dunayevskaya. In addition to this, we need an approach to decolonising pedagogy, and its not just a question of the epistemicide — the epistemological violence visited upon pedagogies (including pedagogies of liberation) via Eurocentric teaching philosophies and practices — but a question of pedagogies driven by neo-liberalisation, involving themselves, both in tacit and manifest ways, in spreading market ideology. This is where I support President Hugo Chavez, and movements in Latin America that are anti-neo-liberalisation.

RK: Barack Obama’s election as US President has reintroduced the debates on race and whether class can be termed the primary category and fundamental basis of social structure. Obama in a recent interview said, “…everybody’s learned their lesson. And the answer is not heavy-handed regulations that crush the entrepreneurial spirit and risk-taking of American capitalism. That’s what’s made our economy great. But it is to restore a sense of balance”. Given such deep commitment to capitalism one cannot expect him to revert back on what neo-liberal assault has done, even though majority of African-Americans are poor and pauperised, and worst hit by recession. In such case, Obama would not have greater sympathies for his race. Private capital, which helped him amass the largest ever election fund, will remain his priority. How do you see this situation?

PM: Well, I am going to answer this using some comments I made in a recent article about the election that is in press here in the US. The recent presidential election was perhaps little more than a rehearsal for a return of the same, a pretext for the restatement of business as usual in a different voice, whose message is more about timbre and pitch than policy— a rewriting of the old (the Leibnizian “we live in the best of all possible worlds”) in the new subjunctive language not simply of hope and possibility (what if?) but of resounding and reverberating hope and possibility (‘what if’ meets ‘we shall’), delivered in the Horatio Alger-Joins-the-Orange-Revolution  aerosol discourse of “Yes We Can!”.   This is because the hope of which Obama speaks is impossible to achieve under capitalism. Even if Obama has the best intentions, the rules of the game prevent the kind of difference that will make a real difference. Everything that could conceivably bring about the kind of social transformation that will dramatically change for the better the fabric of everyday life in America is unmasked as an impossible contradiction if we place it in the context of the persistence of capitalism as the only alternative way to organise the globe for overcoming necessity. Of course, we won’t place it in such a totalising context (isn’t totalising one of the bete noires of the Marxists, according to post-structuralist pundits?), but will focus on the subjective nature of the trauma or on the cultural aspects of the global crisis in which we are living rather than analyse the structural of systemic roots of the crisis).

In this regard, the election could be likened to a media virus programming its own retransmission via a well-worn template that has no entrance for the critic and no exit for the cynic. And no substance whatsoever. Participant spectators trying to use their ballot for political change find themselves sucked right back into a social universe of diminishing expectations and endless spectacle that keeps them narcotically entrained in a strange loop of sound-byte aphorisms.  It’s forcing them to chase their tails inside what resembles a fetishized moebius strip, and absents any counterpoints or counter-narratives, devoid, in other words, of contextual or relational thinking. Or following the hands of an Escher drawing where the sketch dissolves into the artist then dissolves back into the sketch, ad infinitum; illusion and reality appear an endless dance with little chance of breaking out into a new moral, political or economic logic through some form of metacommunication or metapraxis — after all, who is there to listen except the already insane?

The unwitting victims, the popular majorities, have once again fallen prey to a contagion of manipulation, of an endless circularity of mutual determinations that spreads like a bacilli in a fetid swamp disguised as a golden pond that sports at its centre a shining marble fountain spurting audacious hope like a geyser of yellow ink. Obama’s fountain of national renewal.

The mainstream media coverage of the election created a vortex of political indeterminacy, of radical contingency — a multi-temporal, non-synchronous dynamic internal to the mechanisms of the election coverage as such — that encouraged anti-dialectical analyses of the issues facing the American public, causing its coverage to slip and slide, and remain unfastened to any coherent historical narrative of social change, making contextual thinking impossible and blurring the distinction between illusion and reality, between the cadaver and the autopsy that follows.  The historical and contextual rudderlessness of the media created a conceptual field in which real transformation cannot be conceptualised.  Such is the nature of the corporate media.

The election was a media spectacle that served as little more than an allegorical background for the battle for the soul of America. The media used our ballots to reproduce at the level of action the symbolic violence they export daily at the level of ideas. The goal is to get a neo-liberal of the right or the left elected — somebody who will not challenge the presuppositions of the transnational capitalist class. In the interests of subverting the Bush regime, voting Democrats became organs of the body politic, subverting their own interests in the belief that their votes would matter, that they had the power to explode the limits or the self-contained subjectivity of our media-educated expectations and conditioned political agency.

The conservative recipe for economic well-being – tax cuts and low inflation through monetary policy controls and unfettered and unregulated markets cannot succeed under global neo-liberal capitalism. The overall savings rate of Americans (it’s been dropping since 1997) failed to increase with tax cuts. Supply-side economics pivots on a small number of Americans controlling a significantly large amount of the nation’s total income – 1% of Americans that the GOP’s tax policies have favoured — and this policy has clearly failed the poor. Deficit spending did grow the economy by 20 per cent during Bush’s tenure but between 2002 and 2006, it was the wealthiest 10 per cent of households that saw more than 95 per cent of the gains in income. Deregulation simply became a criminal enterprise of making more and more profits.  But the real question is whether or not the system of capitalism itself is criminal. Without answering this fundamental question, we focus on the salaries, benefits and bonuses of the top executives that are getting taxpayer bailouts from Washington. We bristle at the executive largesse in terms of cash bonuses, stock options, and personal use of company jets (the average paid to each of the top executives of the 116 banks now receiving government financial aid was $2.6 million in salary bonuses and benefits) — the total amount would actually cover bailout costs for many of the banks (so far they have received 188 billion of our taxpayer dollars) that have accepted tax dollars to keep afloat. So, while we fume about Wells Fargo of San Francisco, which took $25 billion in taxpayer bailout money with one hand and gave its top executives up to $20,000 each to pay personal financial planners with another, we would do well to focus more on our complacency with respect to capitalism as the only system under which democracy can flourish (and that’s quite an assumption about the state of democracy in this country).

The richest 400 Americans own more than the bottom 150 million Americans combined; their combined net worth is $1.6 trillion.  During the Bush years, the nation’s 15,000 richest families doubled their annual income, from $15 million to $30 million and corporate profits shot up by 68 per cent while workers’ wages have been steadily shrinking (and the workers are not the ones who are being bailed out by the government). That scenario isn’t about to change radically with the election of Obama, who might possess Jeremiah’s aliveness to spiritual vision (don’t his hands look light lighted candles when he speaks) but is unwilling to unmask and name the powers that be because, well, for one thing, he is that power.

Predictably, the Republican spin machine, FOX News, is trying to stave off a New Deal type of depression-recovery program discussed by Obama by claiming that most historians agree that Roosevelt and the New Deal actually prolonged the Great Depression. Of course, this revisionist reading of history sounds even silly to freshmen college students, but if it gets repeated often enough, it will be received by FOX TV’s hapless listeners as if it were regurgitated from the bowels of the gospel.

We haven’t seen the worst of the economic crisis. And while we might not see a return to the orphan trains of the 1920s, where hundreds of thousands of homeless and orphaned ‘street urchins’ were taken to small towns and farms across the US as part of a mass relocation movement of destitute children and unloaded at various train stations for inspection by couples who might want to adopt sturdy children to help them work the farms, we can be sure that children will be suffering through the current recession along with their parents.

The media — the instruments of the cultural commonsense of the social — are structural features of capitalist society and thus part of society’s social practices and as such must be linked to larger historical developments linked to wider social forces and relations. Seen in this light, it becomes clear that the media supports those institutions that undercuts the collective needs, rights, and causes of workers and sullies any fertile ground in which social struggles might take root that can challenge capital on behalf of labour and the global working-class.  In other words, the corporate media normalise the social division of labour and the ruthless exploitative practices needed to keep this division in place. Different blocs of capital must expand in order for capitalism to survive, and this means extracting the most profit possible. This essentially determines what gets produced, how, and by whom. It accounts for why one in six children worldwide are child labourers, and why corn and sugar are now often produced in the so-called Third World not to feed the hungry but to provide biofuels for advanced capitalist countries. This is why education and healthcare systems in the US are in tatters.

As racism became the torch of hope for the electoral victory of the Republican Party, millions of Americans decided that the juggernaut of hate riding on a crest of bile was too much for the American public and a groundswell of support for Obama — largely made possible by the organising skills of the anti-war movement and the popular left — was just enough to change the tide of history. To what extent the left can keep the pressure on the Obama presidency to focus on the unemployed at least as much as on the beleaguered industries remains to be seen. And even if it managed to keep the pressure on, there is no guarantee their voices will be heard as Obama has shifted centre-right since his election victory and seems bent on getting US troops further bogged down in Afghanistan. Regular “America at War” features on media outlets are sure to be there as long as US capital seeks to impose its will on foreign markets and serve as the alpha male for the transnational capitalist class.

And what about race?  Since people of color still lag well behind whites in almost every major social, economic and political indicators, Eduardo Bonilla-Silva (2008) asks whether Obama will contest the new system of racial practices – what Bonilla-Silva calls “the new racism” — that is co-structured by a new racial ideology called “color-blind racism”.  In other words, is Obama a post-civil rights minority politician (i.e., an anti-minority minority Republican or post-racial Democrat) who is successful because he does not directly challenge the white power structure?  Bonilla-Silva argues that social movement politics and not electoral politics is the vehicle for achieving racial justice. And he notes that Obama’s policies on healthcare, immigration, jobs, racism, the war in Iraq and the Palestinian question are not radical, that he has made a strategic move towards racelessness and that he has adopted a post-racial persona and political stance. Obama doesn’t like to talk about racism (and when he does he likes to remind people he is half white) and unlike black leaders unpopular with whites (such as Jesse Jackson, Maxine Waters, and Al Sharpton) even suggests that America is beyond race. Bonilla-Silva writes that Obama works as a “Magic Negro” figure:

Obama also became, as black commentator David Ehrenstein has argued, the “Magic Negro” — a term from film studies that refers to black characters in movies whose main purpose is to help whites deal with their issues. In this case, voting for Obama allowed many whites feel like they were cleansing their racial soul, repenting for their racial sins, and getting admission into racial heaven!  Obama became whites’ exceptional black man — the model to follow if blacks want to achieve in Amerika!

 

For many non-whites, particularly for blacks, Obama became a symbol of their possibilities.  According to Bonilla-Silva (2008),

He was indeed, as Obama said of himself, their Joshua – the leader they hoped would take them to the Promised Land of milk and honey. They read in between the lines (probably more than was/is there) and thought Obama had a strong stance on race matters. For the old generation desperate to see change before they die (Jackson crying, John Lewis, etc.), and for many post-Reagan generation blacks (will.i.am from The Black Eyes Peas) and minorities who have seen very little racial progress during their life, Obama became the new Messiah following on the footsteps they did not such much as Martin and Malcolm.

But as Bonilla-Silva remarks, Obama’s policies on race matters were not that much different from Hillary’s, he was the darling of the Democratic Leadership Council, his economic and healthcare programmes are modest, he wants to expand the military by 90,000, intends to redeploy troops from Iraq to Afghanistan, is a big supporter of free-market capitalism and his policies on Cuba, Venezuela, North Korea and Palestine are no better than Hillary’s. But many Obama voters believed (and many continue to believe)  that “these are tactical positions Obama needed in order to get elected” and many of his positions are temporary, and Obama will suddenly turn left when he takes office. Obama’s really a “stealth candidate” – a revolutionary about to announce a far shift to the left that will have both liberals and conservatives quaking in their boots. The fear that Bonilla-Silva (2008) raises — that “the voices of those who contend that race fractures America profoundly may be silenced” in Obamerica — are real, and that Obamerica may bring us closer to the racial structure of many Latin American countries:

We may become like Brazil, Cuba, Mexico, Belize, or Puerto Rico — nation-states that claim to be comprised of “one people” but where various racial strata receive social goods in accordance to their proximity to “whiteness”.  And like in Latin American countries, Obama’s nationalist stance (“There’s not a black America and white America and Latino America and Asian America; there’s the United States of America”) will help close the space to even talk about race. Hence, in Orwellian fashion, we may proclaim “We are all Americans!, but in Obamerica, some will still be “more American than others.

And while clearly racial justice has been retreating to its lowest point since the Kerner Commission Report announced 40 years ago that “Our nation is moving toward two societies, one black, one white — separate and unequal” the election of Obama is unlikely to signal a permanent reversal of this trend.

Can Obama take on the military establishment?  The corporate structure? Sheldon Wolin notes that we live in an “inverted totalitarianism” in which the entertainment industry via spectacles and diversions is able to keep the citizenry politically passive, as long as there exists a reasonable standard of living. Even if there are more popular protests due to the economic crisis, the media will ignore them. In my view, we need more Battle of Seattle, in every city, simultaneously!

III

RK: In your work Capitalists and Conquerors, you argue that schools teach students skills that are required by capital and even their dreams are limited to the sphere of capital. The desire to transcend the rule of capital is suppressed through the mechanics of school. This also invokes the Althusserian idea of ideological state apparatuses. How does one counter this suppression?

PM: I have tried to give you the basics of this answer in my discussion of Glenn Rikowski’s path-breaking work on teaching for an anti-capitalist future. I have had trouble, myself, taking on the ideological apparatuses of the state, especially after a right-wing group in 2006 launched an attack on me and my fellow leftist professors at UCLA, placing me as the number one figure in their Dirty Thirty list, as the most dangerous professor at UCLA. Steve Best, Tony Nocella and I have just finished editing a book on academic repression.  In the introduction we discuss right-wing pundits such as David Horowitz, who has penned an Academic Bill of Rights. The introduction to the book describes the Academic Bill of Rights as “a thinly veiled Trojan horse that threatens the core values and very life of academia. Horowitz’s clever tactic is to use liberal/Left discourse to advance an extreme rightwing agenda that strips professors – or any professor not a totally brainwashed product of American society and its capitalist values – of their right to publish, teach, and act as citizens as they wish. What the Academic Bill of Rights attempts to do is to give the already advantaged and overprivileged more power than the surplus stock it already holds. “Intellectual diversity” and such phrases are merely code words for empowering rightwing ideologies. It’s call for “balance” is really a ploy for imbalance, for a pre-’60s sterile groupthink, conformist environment dominated by conservative thought without any diversity among faculty, programs, courses, and intellectual life (if there would be one at all). Unable to think outside of the corporate box and utilitarian model of education, they have no idea what real education is, a mission that includes encountering and engaging differing viewpoints; students would be denied this opportunity. It is healthy and vital for conservative students to hear radical perspectives, as it is for progressive students to hear conservative perspectives”.

The truth of the matter is the stranglehold of corporate power on the universities is choking the life out of whatever remains of the university’s role as a vehicle for the advancement of public life. Some of us are directly involved in fighting for academic freedom, and resisting the capitalist and imperialist values that the universities are coming to enshrine through curricula, business partnerships, and the like. Our battle in the schools of education, housed in universities, is through the advancement of critical pedagogy. Critical pedagogy is under ideological assault, both here and elsewhere, such as Australia. Bill Ayers, the distinguished leftist at the University of Illinois, Chicago, who was a member of the Weather Underground in the 1960s,  was demonised recently by the Republican Party during the  Presidential election, since Ayers and Obama knew each other as fellow community activists in Chicago. So, the demonization of Ayers has also spread to a demonization of so-called “critical” educators in general, some of whom who are tarred with the same brush as being anti-American and pro-terrorist.  These are tough times for the educational left. Very tough times.

RK: The resistance to this suppression becomes furthermore difficult when one finds, what you call “reproletarianisation” of teachers. Given this situation we encounter certain problems, as in the case of India. There are teachers who are employed till the age of “retirement” with different kinds of benefits and their unionisation is limited to demands for salary raise. On the other hand, there are teachers who are employed on contract with meagre salary (in many cases as low as $20) by government. In a sense while there is a ‘teaching aristocracy’ that does not consider itself as workers and on the other a pauperised teaching labour force, which is non-unionised. The role of the Left forces in these cases has been dismal. Where does resistance begin in such cases?

PM: Yes, the same is true here.  Teaching assistants in universities in many cases do the bulk of the teaching yet they get little compensation and protection. Many students want a few waivers so they can go to school while they teach and not pay tuition. Budgets are currently being slashed, and tuition fees are rising dramatically.  Historically, it has been a tough battle to get academic student-employee unions recognised. Universities, no longer protected from the market, as they once were through funding by the state, are relying more and more on corporate funding that invests in technology-based research, research that can make the corporations more effective and help to make them dominant in the neo-liberal capitalist economy.  Professors – especially those in the hard sciences – put as much, if not more, effort in getting research funding and doing research than teaching, and of course the class sizes are ever-increasing and there is a decrease in the number of full-time, tenured professors teaching classes and there is the necessity for more cheap intellectual part-time labour in the form of teaching assistants. So strong union movements are needed to protect teaching assistants, since they face a difficult task.  Clearly, the labour aristocracy needs to be challenged. There needs to be joint-efforts between tenured professors and teaching assistants, they have to form a united front and work together with the unions to take on the universities.  This type of united front is needed, and it should have a common purpose of saving the university from becoming just another sub-sector of the economy.  All of this revolves around developing an understanding of how social institutions need to reorganise themselves – in tandem with the reorganisation of society as a whole – to fight the capitalisation and commodification of subjectivity, to fight universities whose mission is to educate labour-power for capital, and such a valorization process can only lead to structured hierarchies of power and privilege that serve the few, and bring misery to the many.

RK: This crisis is augmented by the increasing significance of a non-political, anti-capital, anti-class gang of people (also called activists) who do not approach the problems under capitalism such as the issue of displacement of millions of Indians (caused by ‘developmental’ projects) as by-products of a system that needs to be overthrown to prevent such callous and insensitive treatment of the masses. The World Social Forums or the Narmada Bachao Andolan (movement against a big dam on river Narmada because it displaced millions) have been criticised on such lines. Where does one place the role of such an ‘opposition’?

PM: Well, clearly we need to insist on the priority of affiliation –political commitments based on the basis of moral and political judgement – rather than a politics of filiation, or ethnic belongingness. But this mandates that activists examine critically social relationships in their totality, that is, in the context of their relationship to the greatest totalising force history has ever known – capitalism.

The 1999 battle of Seattle summoned a collective “ya basta!” that saw the closure of a meeting of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) and since that time the WTO, World Bank and IMF have been forced to conduct their business behind police barricades. Initially, the WSF forum succeeded in creating an anti-hierarchical and non-vanguardist space for the grassroots left to give collective voice to a critique of global capitalism and its attendant abuses. But it soon became taken over by established political parties of a leftist bent, who promoted reformism and various forms of accommodation to capitalist accumulation and the law of value, and also gave way to the glamour politics of major celebrity speakers. The question that has been posed to the WSF by James Petras and others is: “To what extent does WSF dissent become a fashionable guerrilla apostasy and to what extent does its work actually threaten the interests of global capital? The fundraisers, after all, set the agenda.  And many of the sponsors of the WSF are hardly radical institutions. What is heartening is the recent declaration of the Assembly of Social Movements at the recent WSF in Belem, Brazil, 2009. Here the social movements – which are in solidarity with the efforts by feminist, environmentalist and socialist movements – maintain promisingly that the current global crisis  “is a direct consequence of the capitalist system and therefore cannot find a solution within the system”.   They write: “All the measures that have been taken so far to overcome the crisis merely aim at socialising losses so as to ensure the survival of a system based on privatising strategic economic sectors, public services, natural and energy resources and on the commoditisation of life and the exploitation of labour and of nature as well as on the transfer of resources from the Periphery to the Centre and from workers to the capitalist class.” An important consensus has been reached – that a radical alternative is necessary that would do away with the capitalist system.

  • Nationalising the banking sector without compensations and with full social monitoring;
  • Reducing working time without any wage cut;
  • Taking measures to ensure food and energy sovereignty;
  • Stopping wars, withdraw occupation troops and dismantle military foreign bases;
  • Acknowledging the peoples’ sovereignty and autonomy, ensuring their right to self-determination;
  • Guaranteeing rights to land, territory, work, education and health for all;
  • Democratise access to means of communication and knowledge.
  • Here, we can appreciate the fact that forms of ownership that favour the social interest are supported and advanced: small family freehold, public, cooperative, communal and collective property.

But all of this is a cautionary tale: The mass movements and trade unions can always be coopted by centre-left regimes or even centre-right regimes. As critical educators, we must work tirelessly to broaden our political project to include the support of social movements seriously challenging the distribution of public wealth and the destruction of local habitat and economies by multinational corporations. As Petras argues, social movements must work towards developing national cadre structures so that they have a chance to take state power – without state power little can be done to seriously challenge the power of the transnational capitalist class. Needed more than ever, Petras argues, are concrete organisations of struggle rooted among radical youth and among ‘employed’ as well as ‘informal workers’ in a broad effort at socialist revival and renewal that will ensure socialist organisations make stronger organic links with everyday anti-capitalist struggles. Direct intervention of conscious socialist-political formations deeply inserted in everyday struggles capable of linking economic conditions to political action is, according to Petras, the only way forward.  That is the point at which we must secure our opposition to the rule of capital.

RK: It is significant to talk of such categories of ’opposition’ because at a certain plane, their acts have furthered the idea of education as autonomous in itself. Hence, we find thousands of ‘alternative’ schooling systems, which rarely link the flaws and fallacies in education system to the rule of capital. The dialectics of labour and capital, or system and education machinery is missed out by such experiments and so is the simultaneity of reform and revolution. How do you see resistance to capitalism and its education system coming up?

PM: Yes, there is danger in presenting education as autonomous, as unconnected to the totality of capitalist social relations. Here in the US, we have charter schools, and alternative schools, but very few of them, to my knowledge, teach from an anti-capitalist perspective.  Such schools assume, ideologically, left liberal (i.e., reformist) positions but at the level of practice they amount to a left neo-liberalism, since by not challenging the law of value in capitalist societies, they implicate themselves in the widening economic gap between the rich and the poor.

RK: Lastly, you argue that schools should become “sites for production of both critical knowledge and socio-political action”. How do you see this happening given the complex relationship of schools, system (run by private capital), and pauperising mass of people? What direction should the analysis of educational ills take?

PM: Well, I believe that my previous answers have mainly addressed your final question, and I can only add the following point – whatever strategies we adopt in our analysis of education, they need to have a transnational reach. Which is why it is important that we have conversations such as this, since we are in the process of charting out a transnational anti-capitalist agenda on the part of educational workers, global citizens who fight both locally and globally for bringing about a socialist future? Now the first step is to become aware of the perpetual pedagogies at work that normalise the rule of capital – the corporate media, the new computer and communication technologies, and all of the ideological state apparatuses that serve to legitimise capitalist social relations. We need to become critically literate about how all of these media function through multiple literacies, and how the new technologies work in the process of self and social formation. Once we know how they work in the process of ideological production, we can develop ways to interrupt their efforts and counter them. Our classrooms, community organisations, alternative media, and social movements can become sites for the creation of a counter-public sphere in which we can strengthen and coordinate our efforts to build national and transnational cadres – but this requires that we work to exercise state power responsibly and protagonistically by transforming the institutional structures of society and working to change the state from the bottom up in participatory, democratic and revolutionary ways.

 

Peter McLaren is a Professor in the Division of Urban Schooling, the Graduate School of Education and Information Studies, University of California, Los Angeles.  He is the author and editor of 45 books and hundreds of scholarly articles. Professor McLaren’s writings have been translated into 20 languages.  Four of his books have won the Critic’s Choice Award of the American Educational Studies Association. One of his books, Life in Schools, was chosen in 2004 as one of the 12 most significant education books in existence worldwide by an international panel of experts instituted by The Moscow School of Social and Economic Sciences and by the Ministry of Education of the Russian Federation.  McLaren was the inaugural recipient of the Paulo Freire Social Justice Award presented by Chapman University, California. The charter for La Fundación McLaren de Pedagogía Critica was signed at the University of Tijuana in July, 2004. La Catedra Peter McLaren was inaugurated in Venezuela on September 15, 2006, as part of a joint effort between El Centro Internacional Miranda and La Universidad Bolivariana de Venezuela. Peter McLaren left his native Canada in 1985 to work in the United States where he continues to be active in the struggle for socialism. A Marxist humanist, he lectures widely in Latin America, North America, Asia, and Europe. His most recent book (co-authored with Nathalia Jaramillo) is Pedagogy and Praxis in the Age of Empire (Rotterdam and Taiwan, Sense Publications).  With Steve Best and Anthony Nocella, he has co-edited a forthcoming book, Academic Repression: Reflections from the Academic Industrial Complex (AK Press). In 2006, during the Bush administration, Professor McLaren made international headlines when he was targeted by a right-wing extremist organization in the United States and put at the top of the “Dirty Thirty” list of leftist professors at UCLA. The group offered to pay students a hundred dollars to secretly audiotape McLaren’s lectures and those of his fellow leftist professors.  Professor McLaren’s work has been the subject of two recent books: Teaching Peter McLaren: Paths of Dissent , edited by Marc Pruyn and Luis M. Huerta-Charles (New York: Peter Lang Publications) [translated into Spanish as De la pedagogía crítica a la pedagogía de la revolución: Ensayos para comprender a Peter Mclaren. , Mexico City, Siglo Veintiuno Editores] and Peter McLaren, Education, and the Struggle for Liberation , edited by Mustafa Eryaman (New Jersey: Hampton Press).

The Meaning of the Zapatista Struggle

T Gz MeeNilankco and S Sivasegaram 

Introduction 

This essay is the outcome of an attempt to understand the significance of the Zapatista movement and its uprising on New Years’ Day 1994 that led to the Zapatistas taking control of much of the state of Chiapas in the southeast of Mexico, 15-years after the event. Even those who acknowledge the importance of the uprising to the anti-imperialist cause, differ in their assessment of the Zapatista movement, its theory and practice, and their implications for the Third World. Some, especially those who reject armed struggle and the need for the oppressed masses to seize state power, tend to romanticise it and prescribe it as the model for anti-imperialist struggles. Anarchists are most approving of the Zapatista method of government; and NGOs relish aspects that help them to promote post-modernist theories hostile to Marxism, and their rejection of organised political parties and armed struggle against the oppressor, imperialism in particular. There are others who resent the seemingly naïve populism that fails to put in clear perspective the violent and oppressive nature of the state.

The essay summarises the impact of the Zapatista insurrection in 1994 on the Mexican state, the practice of democracy by the Zapatistas in Chiapas, and the wider impact of the Zapatista movement on democracy in Mexico. Zapatista concepts of participatory democracy and autonomous development in Chiapas, including “rule by obeying” are briefly outlined and commented upon, with special reference to the movement’s resistance to government programs and democratisation of politics and administration. Attention is drawn to the efforts of Zapatista networks to re-embed social values in making economic and political decisions, and thereby transform hegemonic meanings and practices of democracy and development in Mexico, thus far understood and applied in terms of corrupt bourgeois democratic practices and neo-liberal notions of economic development.

Comments in the sections that follow on the philosophy, programme, activities and achievements of the Zapatistas are based on factual but largely uncritical writings on the uprising of 1994 as well as subsequent developments. The essay in its concluding section contains a critical assessment of the significance of the Zapatista movement to Third World struggles against oppression.

The Background 

Latin American social movements for human rights, acceptable living and working conditions, and to end corporate exploitation and military violence have from the mid-1990s acquired a momentum of their own. The indigenous populations, motivated by the desire to claim their economic and political rights that have been denied to them for generations and in the process inspired to rediscover their legacy cruelly denied to them by European intervention five centuries ago, are now increasingly assertive and politically effective. They have pledged to fight poverty and put the needs of the people before the interests of the U.S. and multi-national corporations. Their resistance, based on decades of organising among indigenous groups and unions, besides contributing to major political changes in Latin America in recent years, has produced a vibrant array of popular movements and lessons for meaningful democracy in the region.

These developments are inseparable from the process of democratization that has been at work for some years in Latin America and forced elected governments to be at least formally more democratic, in a region which not long ago was ruled almost entirely by military dictators in the service of U.S. imperialism. The people are now most forthcoming in their expression of disappointment and disillusion with existing democratic institutions and have in several instances dared to build democratic alternatives based on mass participation, rejecting elite and foreign domination.

Indigenous movements in Latin America came to the fore by drawing attention to ethnic issues in a context where politics, at best, concerned issues of class but not ethnic identity. The emergence of identity-based social movements and growing political awareness among the indigenous people has been an important contributor to political democratization. The new century has witnessed a series of victories for the people of Latin America, many without recourse to armed struggle, although not entirely free of counter-revolutionary action and consequent bloodshed. The ongoing struggle of the Colombian rebels initiated in mid-20th Century is an important exception, and that of the Zapatistas of Chiapas, Mexico is another of a different kind.

An Overview

Mexico, in its endeavour to become a First World country, had made arrangements to formally join the North Atlantic Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) on 1st January 1994. In the early hours of that day the Zapatista Army of National Liberation (EZLN) stormed the municipalities of Chiapas demanding “democracy, liberty, and justice for all Mexicans” (Bruhn, 1996). The EZLN comprising mainly campesinos (poor indigenous peasant farmers) deliberately chose that day for their uprising since the signing of NAFTA on that day would be a major media event drawing the audience of millions of people from around the world.

This unexpected entry of the EZLN into the international scene was a declaration of the presence of indigenous peoples in a globalised world, and a call for democratic alternatives to neo-liberalism, which the EZLN identified as “a new war of conquest for territories […which] is a strange modernity that moves forward by going backward” (Marcos, 1997). The EZLN thus declared war on the Mexican government, and denounced the new neo-liberal policies scheduled to take effect on that day.

The ending of armed clashes between the Mexican army and the EZLN in Chiapas with a cease-fire 12 days after the uprising, has been followed by 15 years of military stalemate between the government and the EZLN since neither side can afford to initiate hostilities. The EZLN, while following a non-violent course, has refused to disarm, let alone surrender. The Mexican government, under pressure to abide by international conventions on human rights, resorts only to covert military violence. The Zapatistas, meanwhile, have mobilised considerable international support and solidarity, so that overt confrontation and a genocidal war will be a public-relations nightmare for a government seeking First World respectability. There is political stalemate too, with the government declaring illegal the Zapatista Autonomous Rebel Municipalities (MAREZ) established in Chiapas by the EZLN, based on which the EZLN is refusing to return to negotiations with the government.

The EZLN has adhered to the ceasefire and, despite its belief in armed uprising where necessary, it was cautious in its use of violence in its military attacks. Yet, despite the EZLN refraining from warfare, the governments of Mexico and the U.S. call it a terrorist organisation, nominally because it remains armed but actually because it resists U.S. imperialist ambitions. The EZLN, despite its continued possession of arms, has vigorously pursued non-violent, educational forms of struggle to achieve its objectives, averting violent response to provocation by the Mexican military and paramilitary forces (Bruhn, 1999); and is only engaged in what it calls “a war of ideas not bullets” with “words as weapons” to prevent its own military destruction, to attract resources, and to build a broad coalition of mostly non-state allies to exert pressure on the government to respond positively to its demands, mainly the implementation of the San Andrés Accord on Indigenous Culture and Rights signed in February 2006, the only negotiated agreement to be reached between the Mexican state and EZLN (Burgess, 2003) for compiling laws and stipulations on Indigenous Rights.

Thus, some identify the EZLN as a social movement and not a revolutionary guerrilla movement since, despite its goal of dissolution or restructuring of the existing government institutions, its methods differ from those of other Latin American armed movements, the most important being that it never aimed to overthrow the government (Johnston, 2000), although it initially called for the dissolution of the federal government and/or restructuring of its oppressive institutions. It has also endorses the existence of the Mexican state and has not sought to undermine it by demanding secession.

The EZLN approach is based on the view that a real revolution cannot come about by a mere change in the reins of power, but requires long-term change in individual consciousness, state institutions, material conditions, and civil society. Thus it aims to change the way both local and national government are run by working with the masses, organising at grassroots level, and bringing about structural changes from the bottom to the top (Gilbreath and Otero, 2001). The EZLN approach has important parallels with the “Mass Line” advocated by Third World Marxist Leninists during and after the struggle for state power, and also seems to draw on the thoughts of Antonio Gramsci (1971). The aim to alter the status quo by a strategy of maximum popular participation by including virtually everyone in the political decision-making process, however, seems to be oblivious to the nature of the state in class society, certainly the Marxist understanding of it.

The EZLN has evolved an unarmed governing body, the Juntas de Buen Gobierno (JBG or good-government councils, better known as ‘juntas of good government’) to use revolutionary reforms aimed at fundamental political and economic changes (MacEwan, 1999), in other words structural reforms, to achieve a radical transformation of society. The Zapatista approach here is akin to that of early socialist idealists.

Promotion of Democracy 

The EZLN was the first armed guerrilla movement to propose a peaceful resolution of contradictions with the state. Following the uprising, it invited popular organisations to work towards altering the balance of forces between the state and civil society and defeating the ruling Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI). Its most direct contribution to democratization was to challenge the racist practices in Mexico by the creation of fresh awareness of indigenous rights in the socio-cultural sphere.

The uprising of 1994 gave a greater impetus to the democratization of Mexico than any activity of the parliamentary opposition. The latter has been notorious for its compromises with the ruling PRI, which has used every possible means to undermine the opposition. Thus, despite political pressure from the opposition from time to time, the authoritarian political system remained effectively intact, whereas the social movement initiated by the EZLN, heightened political activity and enhanced democratic debate.

The key difference between the two approaches was that, unlike the EZLN, the Mexican political parties had a vested interest in the existing political system. Hence the latter did not dare to alter the framework within which they worked while the former went outside the framework to use mass mobilisation as the driving force of democratization. While there are limits to what mass mobilisation could achieve without overthrowing the existing oppressive state apparatus, the EZLN uprising put Mexico’s political system to test by bringing into focus the failure of formal democracy to address the concerns of an invigorated population. Continued mass activity and mobilization by the EZLN was a compelling factor in forcing the government to respond to a wide range of social concerns.

The EZLN acted pragmatically in taking advantage of a situation where armed confrontation was not in the interest of the Mexican government and agreeing to a ceasefire, since it was not equipped to establish and defend a revolutionary government of its own. Thus there is need here for caution against making a virtue out of necessity. The EZLN also avoided provocation by emphasising the potential of “civil society” (meaning subordinate individuals and organizations independent of the state’s corporatist structures, which is closer to the meaning in which Gramsci used the term than typical NGO usage which purposely excludes political organisations) to bring about democratic change. Thus the line adopted by the EZLN was in direct conflict with the ruling PRI’s policy of a managed transition to electoral democracy and radical free-market reforms with a negative impact on peasant life (Harvey, 1998).

The EZLN approach, with much in common with the emerging Latin American left, conceptualised power as a practice situated both within and beyond the state and exercised through what Gramsci referred to as “hegemony”, comprising the dissemination of beliefs and values that systematically favoured the ruling class (Dagnino, 1998). It opened political spaces where new actors in civil society could press for democracy and social justice. Thus the EZLN initiated a cultural strategy that challenged PRI hegemony by redefining national symbols and discourses in favour of a more genuine and broader democracy.

The party system before the uprising had little incentive to significantly reform the state. The emergence of the EZLN as a challenge to the system of political representation led to cooperation among political parties to achieve meaningful changes (Prud’homme, 1998). Following the uprising, the interior minister (a former governor of Chiapas) resigned, and electoral reforms were announced to allow international and civic observers to monitor the presidential elections of August 1994, and by 1996 the Federal Electoral Institute became an independent body run by non-partisan citizens rather than by the government.

Responses to the uprising and the ensuing social movement from Mexican intellectuals was mostly disapproving of the violence but approving of the net outcome. (Collier and Collier, 2005; Barry, 1995). The main contribution of EZLN to Mexico’s democratization was, however, the impact of the uprising on mass political awareness. In Chiapas it initiated fresh interest in indigenous cultural empowerment to transform the social and political climate. It also inspired and enabled other indigenous Mexicans to make demands and be heard amid resistance by the local Latino population.

Across Mexico, the response of the public to the uprising was positive. The first important mass response was a spontaneous rally by thousands protesting against air attacks by the Mexican air force on the retreating rebels and the summary execution of rebels captured by federal soldiers. Besides popular demands on the government to stop the war, people went on to organise human rights security cordons around the venue of peace talks during sessions. They also delivered supplies to jungle communities besieged by federal army units; set up “peace camps” to monitor human rights conditions in communities threatened by military presence; organised health, education, and alternative production projects; built civilian-based Zapatista support groups, and participated in fora and encounters convoked by the EZLN to discuss democracy and indigenous rights (Bruhn, 1999). Much of the mobilization since the EZLN’s call for democracy occurred outside traditional political channels. The EZLN aimed to extend democratization to the economic realm to address the social costs of the neo-liberal economic model, especially the free market and globalised trade.

Its communiqués and other pronouncements in the wake of the uprising made it clear that the EZLN opposed not only the lack of democracy but also the neo-liberal free-market reforms that had opened up Mexico to the forces of global capitalism and diminished the ability of the nation-state to shape the domestic economy as it became increasingly integrated into global capitalism (Cooper, 1994). They explained the aggravation of socio-economic disparities by free-market reforms in terms of the relationship between economic marginalization and political exclusion and the extent to which it hampered democracy. Thus the uprising was also a bold statement by an oppressed minority against an encroaching global capitalism that threatened the small Mayan farmer and, by extension, any subordinate group unable to shoulder the weight of global competition (Slater, 1998), and thereby encouraged demands for democratization in the economic sphere.

The Zapatista movement further contested the socio-cultural manifestation of state power embedded in everyday life with a counter-discursive that reinterpreted national symbols in favour of its project of building a movement based on a shared understanding of the obstacles it confronted. To borrow Gramsci’s terminology, the EZLN changed its strategy from a “war of movements” challenging state power by force of arms to a “war of positions” contesting the moral and intellectual leadership of Mexico’s ruling class. The uprising contributed to an expansion of democracy in the political domain and beyond it into the cultural.

Democratising Administration

In 1994 the EZLN set up the Clandestine Revolutionary Indigenous Committees (CCRI) to enable dialogue and negotiation and to house a de facto rebel government; and in 1995 it initiated “autonomous projects” in the areas where it had strongest control, and proceeded to expand. The EZLN started with projects to afford communities with a local democratic government, based on general assemblies and consensus voting, something that indigenous people were denied under the local state government (Nash, 2001).

Several indigenous communities have had de facto autonomy based on their own customs well before the EZLN demanded the Mexican government to allow them autonomy under the law (Collier and Quaratiello, 2005). In 1998 the Zapatista support bases decided to construct the Autonomous Municipalities (MAREZ) to implement the de facto autonomy in the San Andrés Accord 0f February 2006 that the federal government refused to implement. The functions of the MAREZ are to provide justice, community health, education, housing, land, work, food, commerce, transport, information and culture. The MAREZ, besides, emphasises gender equality and encourages women to participate at all levels of civil government (Marcos, 2003). Within MAREZ, the communities name their authorities, local health promoters, community teachers, and elaborate their own laws based on social, political, economic, and gender equality among the inhabitants of diverse ethnic communities; and an assembly of all members of an indigenous community decides whether it should belong to a MAREZ, and each community elects and withdraws its representatives for the MAREZ (Flood, 1999).

The civil government has no power over decisions like going to war and signing peace accords without formally consulting the communities. Consultations take place in every community, and are by a form referendum preceded by intense discussion. Voting is direct, free, and democratic; and the date and place of the assembly, the main points discussed and views expressed, the number of people over 12 years of age who attended, and the vote are recorded in the official minutes. For example, the decisions to accept the San Andrés Accord and later to break off talks with the government were based on such consultations (Flood, 1999).

Each MAREZ is unique: some have a single ethnic identity while others have plural identities including ones speaking different Mayan languages. The MAREZ are dynamic and constantly changing so that the Zapatistas constantly adapt their rhetoric and policies to accommodate and to satisfy an increasing number of members. What is common to them, however, is the principle of ‘governing by obeying’. Governing by obeying too pre-dates the Zapatistas in Chiapas and has been a system in which the community monitored the authorities carefully and recalled and replaced them when necessary (Bartra and Otero, 2005).

The Zapatista concept of participatory democracy is a hybrid of representative and direct democracy, and seeks to allow citizens considerable control over political decisions while retaining the efficiency of a presidential or parliamentary system (Ribeiro, 1998), and the EZLN established in August 2003 a non-hierarchical participatory democratic structure comprising the Juntas de Buen Gobierno (JBG) to address the needs and concerns of the people.

Thus the JBG while coordinating the MAREZ does not take over their functions and, while mediating between communities, regions, the state, and international actors like NGOs, has left ultimate political power with the communities (Mentinis, 2005). The JBG also mediated in affairs within and between municipalities and between MAREZ and government municipalities. Thus they serve to counteract imbalance in the developments in the MAREZ and the communities. Elections to the JBGs are from the bottom up, with governance guided by the philosophy of ‘governing by obeying’, so that by implication government officials accept that they are there by courtesy of their constituencies (Collier and Quaratiello, 2005).

With the establishment of the JBG, all domestic and foreign policy matters were directed through it, by-passing the EZLN. The EZLN worked with those in responsible positions in the organisation in each community, in groups of communities, and areas covering several groups to ensure that those who did not discharge their duties were, “in a natural fashion, replaced by another” in keeping with the principle of ‘governing by obeying’. The role of the CCRI has been to guide the EZLN in each region and to maintain the necessary checks and balances by monitoring the operations of the JBG to ensure clean government in conformity with the principle of ‘governing by obeying’ (Mentinis, 2005). The EZLN has kept out of the affairs of autonomous authorities, and no military command or member of the CCRI is allowed a position of authority in a community or a Municipality. Anyone seeking to participate in autonomous government is required to resign from office in the EZLN (Marcos, 2003).

Despite the three tiers of civil government, namely community, municipal and JBG, the Zapatista model is ‘non-hierarchical’, and the organizations have no executive power over one another. Their functions complement each other in the protection of human rights, monitoring and implementation of community projects and work, keeping law and order in Zapatista territory, and conducting foreign policy with international civil society organisations (Collier and Quaratiello, 2005). This conduct of democratic local government stands in sharp contrast to the conduct of the Mexican government, with a history of authoritarian rule, neglect, and oppression of the indigenous people (Mentinis, 2005).

The carefully planned and implemented EZLN initiatives have thus far demonstrated to the indigenous people that feasible alternatives exist for democratic self-government, and that ways exist to combat inequality even under conditions of extreme poverty and military oppression. Sub-commander Marcos declared that preventing those with disproportionate wealth from gaining undue influence over the political agenda became ‘the single most important area of reform needed to enhance the quality of democracy’ (Marcos, 2003).

The ‘Other Campaign’

On 1st January 2006, exactly 12 years after the uprising and even longer years of struggle for indigenous rights, the EZLN reasserted its anti-capitalist roots by launching its La Otra Campaña (the Other Campaign) to link non-partisan anti-capitalist national liberation struggles across the country. The Campaign sought to mobilise these forces as a “national campaign for building another way of doing politics, for a program of national struggle of the left, and for a new Constitution” (Mentinis, 2005); and in the process introduce its local autonomy practices to indigenous autonomy initiatives so that they persist in confronting broader structural inequalities. The Campaign also sought to expand the scope of the radical politics of recognition by evolving a loosely-knit collective of diverse national political forces comprising radicalised ethnic groups which drew on the cultural knowledge and experiences of historically marginalised political actors to construct anti-capitalist alternatives to hierarchical positioning in society. It is, however, the contrast with a well-structured political party and mass organisations linked to political parties that made the Other Campaign appealing to Anarchists and NGOs alike.

The Other Campaign had to be alert to new developments in capitalist thinking and their implications for the Mexican state. This was important since neo-liberal hegemony is about global expansion of capital as well as the taming of dissident claims. In first 12 months of the Campaign, Sub-commander Marcos met with people to listen to their concerns and discuss forms of struggle. The emphasis on listening in the Other Campaign is interpreted by some as a break with conventional political party platforms as well as with the vanguardist politics of revolutionary movements. But such views deliberately ignore the mass line advocated by Marxist Leninists for most of the last century, which laid emphasis on listening to the people. Differences in approach between the Zapatistas and Marxist Leninists relate to context and to the avoidance of a well-defined ideological stand by the former.

Experience at grassroots level has shown that, the alongside the centrality of listening, the resulting dialogues needed to be understood as existing in a terrain of hierarchical power, with the indigenous experience extreme political and economic inequality. Also, recognition cannot be exclusively cultural since ethnically marked traits exist alongside persistent colonial legacies and biological signifiers. Thus there will be an inevitable need to draw on shared experiences of racialisation and forge political alliances across cultural borders, and based on class.

Tactical Media

The Zapatistas use the term “tactical media” to refer to its idea of using the media to “exploit the theatre and poetry of a political action”. EZLN has demonstrated much skill in using new media to communicate and generate universal solidarity in Mexico and worldwide (Meikle, 2004). This concept, used as a form of political activism, is based on the notion that “the important thing is the spectacle that you make out of an event in the media, as opposed to the event itself” and the impact of the communications revolution, which has allowed some degree of power for the audience by eroding, even slightly, media monopoly in mass communications.

The Zapatistas developed the idea further to open up new channels to provide a powerful forum for political participation by citizens, or “e-democracy” on an unprecedented scale. “Digital, networked media allow for faster, diverse, two-way communications between users who have both more control and more choice” as they simultaneously become users, producers and agents of social change. This was a valuable contribution of the Zapatistas to anti-establishment struggles and the idea has subsequently been used more effectively by campaigners against globalisation on a massive scale during this decade.

New Realities 

Two major events in Mexico in 2006 demonstrated the potential as well as the limitations of the method of Zapatistas. One was the struggle since May 2006 in Oaxaca a poor southern state, bordering Chiapas, following the heavy-handed action of the state governor Ulises Ruiz against striking teachers. Opponents of the repressive local regime resisted repressive measures by the Mexican armed forces under the leadership of APPO (Popular Assembly of the Peoples’ of Oaxaca), founded on 17th June 2006 and embracing a large number of social organizations that include the striking teachers and indigenous people. Following state repression, the struggle demanding the dismissal of Ruiz became one of resistance to Mexican state and its misguided economic policies. The violent occupation of Oaxaca by the militarized police provoked protests throughout Mexico; and the Zapatista-inspired Other Campaign together with others blocked highways throughout Mexico on November 1st and all roads through Zapatista territory in Chiapas. APPO took over the running of city of Oaxaca and some 30 municipalities throughout the state and proposed that Popular Assemblies be created throughout Mexico and that grassroots organizations join together to create a new way of exercising representative democracy. Although the APPO uprising lost momentum and declaration by the EZLN’s Delegate Zero (Sub-commander Marcos) “We are on the eve of either a great uprising or a civil war” referring to uprising the failed to realise, and the Other Campaign itself has not had a follow-up, APPO as well as other indigenous peoples organisations remain active to varying degrees.

The second was the Presidential Election in July 2006. The EZLN uprising was instrumental in bringing an end to PRI domination in 2000, but led to the election of Vincente Fox, an even more pro-U.S. President. He was succeeded in 2006 to be succeeded by Felipe Calderón, an equally vigorous supporter of imperialism. Calderón cheated Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador, the leftist Partido de la Revolución Democrática (PRD) candidate of victory by electoral malpractices in the Presidential election. The public which was confident of victory for Obrador participated in mass demonstrations against the victor Felipe Calderon and calling for a recount. The mass mobilisation was unprecedented in scale in Mexican political history. Although the Zapatista uprising was a factor in the rise in support for the left candidate and in inspiring the mass mobilisation that impeded the inauguration of Calderón by nearly five months, the EZLN itself had refrained from endorsing Obrador’s candidature.

The situation for the EZLN has taken a turn for the worse since the election Calderón as President of a polarised country with a weaker mandate than his predecessor. Calderón has become more dependent on military, now subsidised by the U.S. and has been particularly harsh towards Chiapas, where the government has complemented its “iron fist” policy with a divide and conquer strategy aimed at undermining the EZLN. Calderón has intensified the creation and training of anti-Zapatista paramilitaries within the Chiapas and has used various programs to make dubious land grants, often in EZLN-occupied zones, to anti-Zapatista families and indigenous outfits such as the Organization for the Defence of Indigenous and Peasant People, with ties to the government and/or paramilitary groups. The purpose is to use the land titles as pretext to stir violence and justify military intervention. There has also been increased activity in the military bases on indigenous land in Chiapas. (COHA, 2008)

While the mayor of Chiapas is from the PRD, the likelihood of him and the PRD coming out in support of the EZLN is in doubt, partly because of the EZLN’s failure to support Obrador’s candidature. It is also doubtful that the election of Barack Obama as President of the United States will usher in a new era of U.S.-Mexican relations that would change things in favour of the EZLN. The White House will not undergo an ideological shift of sufficient magnitude to uproot neo-liberal economic policies, the root cause of Third World suffering, least of all that of Mexico’s indigenous population. Imperialist interests will decide Obama’s priorities, and little will happen that would sour relations with the Mexican government.  The commitment to the unpopular NAFTA will remain while minor reforms of NAFTA are possible. Unlike Bush, Obama may prefer to avoid a bloody conflict with the EZLN, while moves to undermine the EZLN’s efforts at self-rule will continue.

Concluding Remarks

The Zapatistas have demonstrated that ordinary masses who are not academically or professionally qualified can rule themselves better than the Mexican liberal democracy has done so far. They have worked to heal the wounds created by a history of authoritarian rule and have through the strengthening of cooperatives, diversification of production, and building food security made life more bearable for the indigenous population in Chiapas.

Apart from aspects specific to Mexico and its indigenous people, the Zapatista experience, both positive and negative, reaffirms the validity of the Marxist Leninists approach, which insists that the people are the masters. The intervention of ideology and the party of the proletariat need not be an obstacle to empowering the masses and the need for flexibility, dynamism, and sensitivity to local idiosyncrasies has been emphasised time and again. It will be useful to compare the approaches to revolution of Marxist leaders of the calibre of Mao Zedong and Amilcar Cabral among others and that of the Sandinista leadership, despite subsequent defeat of the revolutionary lines.

While the EZLN has clearly pointed out that although their system is working for them their solution is not the only answer to social justice, there is a strong tendency among politically motivated NGOs and sections of anarchists and left liberals to idealise and generalise the Zapatista strategy to make a case against the Marxism and revolutionary armed struggle. There are on the other hand Marxists who dismiss the Zapatistas as mere reformists. That is not very healthy either.

The Zapatista ideology has to be understood in the Mexican context, with emphasis on the conditions relating to the indigenous people. The Zapatistas have created a social democracy in an area known for extreme poverty, prone to internal divisions and violence, and deemed to be ungovernable by the state. The EZLN have solved some problems that Mexico’s emerging liberal democracy and Presidential system have failed to address. While the benefits of the Zapatista system are felt exclusively within their limited zones of influence, its practice of indigenous autonomy offers alternatives for terrains marked by the interplay of assimilationist and multi-culturalist discourses. Experiences relating to resisting the political, economic and cultural logic of late capitalism can be relevant to geographically isolated ethnic groups and communities, like the Indian Tribal people, and to other oppressed nationalities as well.

The claim of the EZLN that it is not seeking state power is a reflection of objective reality. The question of state power would enter the picture only when there is a call for secession or a bid for political autonomy based on the principle of self-determination. Without conditions making secession the only feasible option or a strong secessionist tendency within Chiapas, the question of state power simply does not arise. A call for autonomy would have led to a situation in which the region could declare autonomy without secession, but at the risk of providing the pretext for the Mexican state to unleash a destructive war against a politically isolated EZLN.

To say that the EZLN has rejected armed struggle is to say that it has signed its own death warrant. The decision of the EZLN to accept the ceasefire was a realistic move since prolonging the conflict was not in its interest or that of the people of Chiapas. It was, however, the military success and the martyrdom of hundreds of EZLN cadres that made it possible for the EZLN to gain and retain control of a large territory and govern it according to the principles of participatory democracy, and defend the culture, resources and livelihood of the people. It was the uprising that made the people of Mexico as a whole more aware of the inequality surrounding them, the devastating effects of NAFTA, and the desire of many in Mexico to have more of a say in decisions that affect their daily lives.

What the EZLN has done is to consolidate its gains and build on that basis. But the equilibrium is delicately unstable. While it may not opportune for the EZLN to resort to armed struggle, it will be folly to be unprepared against a state that is busy undermining EZLN authority in Chiapas in anticipation of a good chance to strike. ‘Globalised’ and ‘liberalised’ Third World economies like that of Mexico’s do not change their ways unless forced to, since the ruling classes have too much at stake, and that includes Chiapas. If measures are not taken by the EZLN to avert confrontation with Calderón’s “iron fist”, the EZLN could face a renewal of violence against the Mexican authorities before his term ends in 2012.

With the path to peace and autonomy far from clear, defensive preparedness, avoidance of conflict with local paramilitaries while exposing their ties with the government, and a vigorous campaign to draw the attention of international anti-imperialist forces to events in Chiapas, will help to deter the Mexican state from going for a military solution. With the enemy and its super-power patron keen to make an example out of Zapatista resistance to neo-liberalism, successful resistance to oppression requires besides courage and dedication to the Zapatista cause, the strongest possible backing of domestic and international forces. Thus, those who, for whatever reason, uncritically endorse the line pursued by the EZLN cannot be true friends of the EZLN, because they fail to draw attention to likely pitfalls.

While the Zapatista campaign against neo-liberalism and globalisation provides remarkable insights into the workings of the imperialist world order and its rejection of bourgeois democratic solutions are commendable from a revolutionary perspective, the reluctance of the EZLN to expose NGOs as an arm of imperialism is a matter for concern. NGOs seemed to be papered over by the term Civil Society by many writers supportive of the Zapatista movement. Besides the prospect of the NGOs who are active in Chiapas playing a counter-revolutionary role at the opportune moment, the involvement of EZLN with NGOs and its failure to caution the people about them runs against the spirit of self-reliance.

The question of development cannot be ignored. The EZLN uses ultra-modern communication technology for its propaganda and the question of advancing technology for production cannot be deferred for too long. These are areas in which extra caution is required because of the delicate balance between modernising production and defending the traditional way of life. Survival will require every group of indigenous people to move into the modern world, but the point is to make the transition without destruction of the fabric of the indigenous society. This too is an area where caution against covert imperialist intervention is important.

Finally, the authors appeal to progressive forces to recognise the positive features of the Zapatista movement and its struggle, learn from them, and be supportive of the struggle. That is not to say that the Zapatistas should be spared criticism; but to denounce outright the Zapatistas for what is perceived as a wrong line will only help those who seek to isolate them. The correct approach would be to encourage the Zapatistas to take their anti-imperialism to its logical end and form lasting alliances with the revolutionary left in Mexico and Latin America as well as to forge links of solidarity with the international revolutionary left.


References:

Barry, Tom (1995) Zapata’s Revenge: Free Trade and the Farm Crisis in Mexico. Boston: South End Press.

Bartra, Armando and Otero, Gerardo (2005). “Indian Peasant Movements in Mexico: the Struggle for Land, Autonomy and Democracy” in Moyo, Sam and Yeros, Paris, Reclaiming the Land: A Resurgence of Rural Movements in Africa, Asia and Latin America. London and New York: Zed Books.

Bruhn, Kathleen (1999) “Antonio Gramsci and the palabra verdadera: The political discourse of Mexico’s guerrilla forces”, Journal of Inter-American Studies and World Affairs, Summer 1999.

Bruhn, Kathleen (1996) Taking on Goliath: The Emergence of a New Left Party and the Struggle for Democracy in Mexico. Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania State University Press.

Burgess, Katrina  (2003) “Mexican Labour at Crossroads”, in Tulchin, Joseph A. and Selee, Andrew D.,Mexico’s Politics and Society in Transition. Boulder: Lynne Reinner Publishers, pp. 73-108

COHA (2008): “The Future of Mexico’s EZLN” .

Collier George A. and Collier Jane F. (2005) “The Zapatista Rebellion in the Context of Globalization”, The Journal of Peasant Studies. Special Issue on Rural Chiapas 10 Years after the Zapatista Uprising Vol. No. 3-4, 2005.

Collier, George A. and Lowery Quaratiello (2005) Basta! Land in the Zapatista Rebellion in Chiapas. Oakland: California Food First Books.

Cooper, Marc (1994). Zapatistas: Spreading Hope for Grassroots Change. Westfield, NJ: Open Magazine Pamphlet Series.

Dagnino, Evelina (1998). “Culture, citizenship, and democracy: changing discourses and practices of the Latin American left”, in S. Alvarez, E. Dagnino, and A. Escobar (eds.), Cultures of Politics, Politics of Cultures: Re-Visioning Latin American Social Movements. Boulder and Oxford: Westview Press.

Flood, Andrew (1999) “The Zapatistas and Direct Democracy”, Anarcho-Syndicalist Review, #27, Winter 1999.

Gilbreath, Chris and Otero, Gerardo (2001) “Democratization in Mexico, The Zapatista Uprising and Civil Society”, Latin American Perspectives, Issue 119, Vol. 28 No. 4.

Gramsci, Antonio (1971). Selections from the Prison Notebooks. New York: International Publishers.

Harvey, Neil (1998).The Chiapas Rebellion: The Struggle for Land and Democracy. Durham NC and London: Duke University Press.

Johnston, Josée (2000) “Pedagogical Guerrillas, Armed Democrats, and Revolutionary Counterpublics: Examining Paradox in the Zapatista Uprising in Chiapas Mexico”, Theory and Society Vol. 29, No. 4.

MacEwan, Arthur (1999) Neo-liberalism or Democracy? Economic Strategy, Markets, and Alternatives for the 21st Century. London and New York: Zed Books.

Marcos, Sub-commander (1997) “The Seven Loose Pieces of the Global Jigsaw Puzzle, Neo-liberalism as a puzzle: the useless global unity which fragments and destroys nations”.

Marcos, Sub-commander (2003) “Chiapas the 13th Stele”.

Meikle, G (2004): “Networks of Influence: Internet Activism in Australia and Beyond” in Gerard Goggin (ed.)Virtual nation: the Internet in Australia, University of New South Wales Press, p. 83.

Mentinis, Mihalis (2006) Zapatistas: The Chiapas Revolt and What It Means for Radical Politics. Pluto plus.

Nash, June (2001) Mayan Visions: the Quest for Autonomy in an Age of Globalization. London and New York: Routledge.

Prud’homme, Jean Francois (1998). “Interest representation and the party system in Mexico,” in Philip D. Oxhorn and Graciela Ducatenzeiler (eds.), What Kind of Democracy? What Kind of Market? Latin America in the Age of Neo-liberalism. Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania State University Press.

Ribeiro, Gustavo Lins (1998) “Cyber-cultural politics: political activism at a distance in a trans-national world,” in S. Alvarez, E. Dagnino, and A. Escobar (eds.), Cultures of Politics, Politics of Cultures: Re-Visioning Latin American Social Movements. Boulder and Oxford: Westview Press.

Slater, David (1998) “Rethinking the spatialities of social movements: questions of (b) orders, culture, and politics in global times” in S. Alvarez, E. Dagnino, and A. Escobar (eds.), Cultures of Politics, Politics of Cultures: Re-Visioning Latin American Social Movements. Boulder and Oxford: Westview Press.

A Review of “Waiting for Renée”

Paresh Chandra

Paramita Ghosh, Waiting for RenéeWriters Workshop, Kolkata, 2008, ISBN:978-81-8157-770-2, pp. 70, Price (HB) Rs 150. Contact: renee.miss@gmail.comTwo usual questions asked about a piece of writing: 1) Is it fun? (This often translates into: does it take effort? If it does then it is not fun.) and 2) Does it give a good representation of reality? As a critic, I can afford to snobbishly disregard the first and the second I will try to rescue since it is after all, a result of years of reading of books that ‘reflect life’ and is closer to the canon. In fact there is still nothing wrong with demanding a piece of writing to be a ‘representation of reality’, if we only complicate our understanding of the phrase. ‘Representation of reality’ does not imply verisimilitude. Verisimilitude is one avatar that this phrase took and its age to my mind seems gone. If truth be told some of my favourite writers never tried to achieve this effect in their writing. Descriptions became outdated since Dostoyevsky (even though naturalism had just emerged). If you are looking for easy fun, find another book. Reality is there, not much verisimilitude.

The introduction that the writer wrote for this collection suggests that “The Story of Renée” captures the tussle between a Reneewoman and a man about the telling of stories and ‘construction of narratives’.  Maybe she wants the reader to believe that. In a sense it is true, but I don’t know if she has done the story much good by writing that. It is not just that. Yes, there is the woman and there is the man, and the woman seems imaginative and (pardon me for using such passé terms) spontaneous and the man is all about the facts and there is tussle. Some may find it strange that the names that come up in the tussle are all French – Sartre, Simone, Napoleon (Renée?) – even though as the author points out in the introduction it is about India. Keeping in mind all the hullabaloo surrounding the discourse of ‘Indian Writing in English’, the author seems to be living on a knife’s edge, using such references and yet trying, it appears to pay her way out of strife, bribing her Indian readers with that introduction of hers.

Remember Freud’s dream book? Remember what he said about dream content and latent thought? What you think you see is not the real thing, though you see the real thing as well. The tussle is what you think you see, but it is not the real thing. The real thing is something else, which you also see. To me it seems the more important idea is the seemingly marginalized (repressed?) one. In a subtle way, does the story suggest that Sartre and Simone are Indian? If feminism can be Indian, and if an Indian woman can write about a tussle between a woman and a man, then aren’t they Indian? Is the only way of writing available to the Indian writer (writing in English) one that ignores these experiences that are definitive of her/his aesthetics and reality in favour of descriptions of some ‘Indian reality’ that would get her/him the Booker Prize? Maybe not, says the story. ‘You tell me’, also says the story. The woman in the story, who ‘sang a French chanson’ dreams of writing a European story and the Indian reader might laugh at her inauthenticity but the story has already been written and the reader without knowing has been roped in, into the bargain.

The story tries to negotiate the situation of the Indian writer writing in English, the guilt of being privileged and writing for the privileged, and the anxiety of representing also the one who is not privileged. As ‘post-colonial’ subjects, we like to think of ourselves as special. But in point of fact this problem is universal, in this case more pronounced maybe. The experience of art in a class society is inevitably one of leisure and class privilege. To somehow negotiate this anxiety, this ‘guilt of art’ is the attempt of every artist. The most that a piece of art can do is accept this guilt and bring it out in its relation with the social. If it doesn’t do that the repressed will return in uncomfortable ways and if it does that, the situation remains uncomfortable all the same.

The ‘presenting a slice of life’ approach does not seem to be working for many of these writers; the pressure of negotiating a landscape of which they aren’t a part, always proves overpowering and instead of ‘breaking the landscape’, they often end up ‘exoticising’ it, or reducing it to stereotypes (the two are pretty much the same thing). Ghosh, it appears, tries to do something different. Something, possibly not completely original, but then imitation in art as Vargas Llosa says somewhere, is not a moral but an artistic problem and Ghosh seems enough of an artist to personalize this ‘plagiarism’. In ‘The Kites’ for instance, she is able to handle the antinomy of social discontent pretty well through the boy who wants to destroy the houses so that he can make a long board to iron more clothes only to realize that with the houses gone there would be no more clothes to iron. Some snapshots in this story might actually be a part of her lived experience, for instances that of presswallas having to hurry up and down the stairs to collect clothes in ones and twos. The story is indeed an urban one and is able to encompass nicely the experience of the writer as well as the characters. But she wisely decides not to offer a last word, or at least not an easy one. The enigmatic last paragraph is where the answer to whatever question the reader might ask lies, but it has to be found; it does not give itself up as Adiga’s false ones do.

Ghosh remoulds and brings to life seemingly dated motifs by adding strange perspectives. One cannot be sure if the woman in red is sad or if it’s right to think that she’s. The imaginary stenographer takes her notes, deferring judgement. To express the strangeness of everyday situations, words themselves become strange in their relation to each other. In an uneasy situation of a domestic battle, time becomes ‘uncertain’.  Short sentences become narratives and the longer ones mere frames.

‘The time is uncertain. The lamp posts are so tall that this evening who knows if a bulb or a star will hang itself.’ (23)

Everydayness slips into the metaphysical through the word ‘uncertain’. Drab reality lit by strange but smooth writing presents a similar chiasmatic structure, possible only in the in-between state where matter and anti-matter coexist and nothing is quite final—there is a promise of stability but the promise exists because it was not kept.  In openly choosing typical urban images, the text seems to accept that it has come late in the day, but this acceptance does not imply that it has nothing to add. Difference in form is often a sign of fundamental change, though I wouldn’t throw in all my money yet; I would wait and watch.

The feeling of being in limbo that she preserves, well most of the time, does fade a little on occasions when I think she becomes uncharacteristically eager to cut the Gordian knot. ‘A writer trying to find words’ has been done before, but that has been the fate of most things. And each writer finds words differently and each could be put into a story. In any case, till a point the story seemed to be going in one direction and then it changed route. Maybe the author chose a male persona to distance herself or to give an appearance of distance, but another likely reason seems to be good old verisimilitude—maybe somewhere in the back of her mind, Ghosh thought it would be more believable if a guy gets the call to revolution. I say that because I find this part of the story somewhat bewildering and I can’t imagine why this episode, if it had to be there, had to be there in this fashion unless she wants to give us a taste of ‘bitter’ reality. The revolutionary as a windbag with a beard is a stock image now and in such circumstances when faced with the unsure, dreamy artist seems more of an ass. It seems that this one time in her desire to present the sad face of reality, she gives in to the old way and instead of giving us a type gives us a stereotype. Her style in this part loses its characteristic ease and allows out of place sarcasm to creep in. (‘While my friend fills in the picture, I learn that I am a hidden radical.’) The change in style makes me unsure of whether I should give her the benefit of the doubt and suggest that these feelings are not recommended or valued, though if her intention in choosing a male character was distance, this is possible as well.

The thing about anticipation is that it allows you to keep one foot into what you are waiting for without allowing the complacency of ownership. It keeps you on your toes and never allows you to become comfortable. It tells you that it is not the perfect world. You should not become complacent because there is unhappiness, inequality, injustice (class?). You are insignificant and you cannot afford to become complacent. You can change things but you haven’t yet. You can create meaning but you haven’t yet. You think you can do these things but you can’t be sure. A work that does not preserve or recreate this uncertainty has no siblings in the realm of philosophy and is by extension not art. At the very least, Waiting for Renée tries to be art.

I think the volume is pretty. The binding could be better though. ‘A Credo by P. Lal’, on the last page in spite of the wry tone makes me feel good about possessing a ‘limited edition’ object.

Resistance, Crisis, and the First US Black President

 Curry Stephenson Malott

Within capitalist societies, the United States in particular, there tends to exist a deeply entrenched culture of resistance that has developed since the radicalization of the working class during the Great Depression of 1929. The objective of the capitalist class is therefore to keep working class insurrection at the lowest possible level through the combined use of force and consent, placing special emphasis, for obvious reasons, on consent, that is, the control of ideas. It has been argued that the slight hesitation in the US Congress and Senate to pass the trillion dollar bailout “bill” for the bankers and the more recent one for the auto giants is a representation of the public’s overwhelming disapproval and the swelling “crisis in confidence”.

This crisis in confidence does not merely refer to the reluctance to spend money, as the corporate media would have us believe, but runs to the very core of capitalism as a viable economic system. US President George W. Bush alluded to this reading of the world in a special television appearance where he reassured his audience, the “small people,” that “democratic capitalism is the best system that ever existed.” Similarly, White House Press Secretary, Dana Perino, offered similar reassurance arguing that the United States is “the greatest capitalist country in the world” and that the public only needs to be willing to suffer for a short time so “we” can, once again, “enjoy prosperity.” Of course the bosses would never offer workers a choice in the matter, so we will suffer unless we fight back and challenge policies that treat the well-being of the public as incidental. That is, as long as the basic structures of power remain intact and wealth is flowing to the elite, the well being of the public is not a concern.

Making this argument, drawing on the insights of Adam Smith, Noam Chomsky (2007), summarizing what we can understand to be the ontological perspective of the profiteer or capitalist, notes that, “the ‘principle architects’ of state policy, ‘merchants and manufacturers,’ make sure that their own interests are ‘most particularly attended to,’ however ‘grievous’ the consequences for others” (pp. 41-42). Similarly, outlining the primary self-serving invention of the capitalist, the corporation, Joel Bakan (2004) observes that, “corporations have no capacity to value political systems, fascist or democratic, for reasons of principle or ideology. The only legitimate question for a corporation is whether a political system serves or impedes its self-interested purposes” (p. 88). Because safety and environmental regulations are a cost to production and thus encroach on margins, they are frequently violated as corporations sacrifice the public to satisfy their own self-interests.

We might therefore say that the mere existence of capitalism, its ruling classes in particular, represents the constant risk of an uprising, and the more powerful the bosses, the greater the inequality between the oppressors and the oppressed, and therefore the greater the probability of an uprising or frontal assault designed to seize control of state and private power. The bosses tend to have this awareness, and it is for this ruling-class class-consciousness that the hammer is always in the background. However, the elite are more interested in avoiding disruption because that kind of instability is not good for business. The ruling class perceive those who rely on a wage to survive as a constant potential threat because their existence as labor is structurally, by definition, set against their own creative human impulse.

As a pro-capitalist solution to the constant threat of working class resistance British economist John Maynard Keynes (1936/1997) developed the economic theory known as social democratic liberalism, which was harshly condemned during the 1950s and beyond by Milton Friedman and other neoliberals as socialist or collectivistand therefore misguided (Hill and Kumar, 2009; Hursh, 2008; Porfilio and Malott, 2008). Keynes advocated for a series of restrictions and taxation placed on accumulated wealth in order to “get rid” of the “objectionable characteristics of capital,” such as “instability” (p. 221). World renowned journalist and Keynesian supporter, Walter Lippmann (1937/2005), argued that taxing the rich was necessary in “relatively rich societies,” such as the United States, because “there is a strong tendency for the supply of capital to become so large that the rate of interest falls to a level where there is little inducement to invest it in new enterprise” (p. 229). In other words, when the profit gained from investing x amount of capital becomes so minimal that taking the economic risks that accompany speculative enterprise leads to dramatic reductions in investment and the resulting economic instability, government intervention becomes a necessity for the perpetuation of capitalism. When capitalists hoard capital, Lippmann (1937/2005) reasons, substantial sums of “wealth” are “withheld from use,” which slows down production, increases unemployment, and leads to “the extreme poverty of the marginal workers” (p. 229). Lippmann (1937/2005) concludes that “under these circumstances” it is necessary to use “taxing power” to “pump the surplus funds of the rich out of the ordinary capital market and into public investments” (p. 229).

Keynes (1936/1997) points to the “separation between ownership and management” and “the development of organized investment markets,” that is, the Stock Exchange system, as contributing to both increased investment, which, from a capitalist perspective, is positive, but also to “greatly” enhancing “the instability of the system” (pp. 150-151). For example, Keynes (1936/1997) observes that because the Stock Exchange is primarily designed to “facilitate transfers of old investments between one individual and another,” there is a propensity to “spend on a new project what may seem an extravagant sum, if it can be floated off on the Stock Exchange at an immediate profit” (p. 151). As a solution Keynes (1936/1997) suggests that capital should be made “less scarce” to “diminish” the “excess yield” or profit, which can be done “without its having become less productive – at least in the physical sense” (p. 213). This ability to stabilize markets through regulating “the competition of the rate of interest on money” led Keynes (1936/1997) to “sympathize” with the observation that all value “is produced by labor” (p. 213).

While the pro-capitalist liberals offer valuable insights for understanding the economic system of speculation, until the basic relationship between capital and labor and the process of value production are subverted, the majority of humanity will continue to live in a state of siege. However, there is reason to be hopeful. For example, there is currently widespread anticipation that the contemporary conservative era is coming to a close symbolized by the election of Barrack Obama to be the next President of the United States of America, and the country’s first African American president. Obama received sixty three million votes, or fifty two percent of those who voted, by appealing to a general sense of economic justice that is widespread throughout society and to the multicultural sensibilities of today’s youth with promises of real change, such as ending both the war in Iraq and the test-driven focus of NCLB and redistributing wealth more equally among the population by providing tax relief for working people while simultaneously increasing the taxation of the rich. Obama has also consistently pledged to pursue this path of peace, which is what people want, by promising to listen to not only other world leaders previously ignored and demonized by the US, such as President Hugo Chavez of Venezuela, but the people of the United States, which we hope will prove to represent the beginning of the United States’ acknowledgment of democratic ideals in the contemporary era.

However, it is also true that Obama achieved what he achieved by distancing himself from affirmative action, the Reverend Jeremiah Wright, and aligning himself with the bankers, which were necessary moves to gain the support of capital and it’s media. It is important to note that much of the enthusiasm over an Obama presidency overlooks the simply fact that the position of U.S. President is not a kingship. While the power of the presidency has greatly increased during the Bush years, the framers of the Constitution nevertheless sought to ensure that the Commander in Chief was not too powerful indicated by Congress’ ability to veto the President’s vetoes. The President’s main functions are to validate the laws passed by Congress and to lead the armed forces. While the President can propose legislation, only the Congress can pass them, again, rendering the power of the executive branch limited. This brings us to a very serious issue.

That is, because much of the population is riding high on the hopes and aspirations of the presidency of the nation’s first Black President, there is great risk of even deeper cynicism and hopelessness that existed during the Bush years if those dreams are not realized by the Obama cabinet. The selection of Rahm Emanuel (and other neoliberals), who made millions as an investment banker, as Obama’s Chief of Staff is an indication ofmore of the same. Emanuel voted for NAFTA, welfare reform, and the PATRIOT ACT. However, these points, which indicate that Obama represents the interests of the ruling elite, are obvious and no surprise to most working people. That is, while many oppressed people, overcome with joy over the fist African American president-elect, are well aware that the grassroots struggle for justice must continue in earnest. At the same time, Noam Chomsky (2008) brings attention to the fact that during the past sixty years real income for working people has grown twice as fast under Democrats as compared to Republicans. In other words, while the election of Obama and the Democratic Party did not subvert the basic relationships of power, it most likely will lead to real benefits for those who rely on a wage to survive, and a more positive socio-political environment to engage in cross-racial class struggle and social justice work.

The challenge for critical pedagogues is therefore to connect with community organizations and not loose sight of what millions of Americans have themselves acknowledged what they have in common with each other, which the Obama victory has trumpeted for the world to hear – symbolically and actually. He demonstrated that over sixty three million American citizens are roughly of the same mind when it comes to democratic values such as freedom from economic oppression and embracing diversity. Obama was right in his acceptance speech that the victory is not his, but ours, because it is only an actively engaged citizenry that can create the lasting change that so many long for.

Curry Stephenson Malott is a Professor in the social and philosophical foundations of education at D’Youville College in Buffalo, New York. His recent works include A Call to Action: An Introduction to Education, Philosophy, and Native North America, NY: Peter Lang (2008) and (co-edited with B. Porfilio) The Destructive Path of Neoliberalism: An International Examination of Urban Education, The Netherlands: Sense (2008).

References

Bakan, J. (2004). The Corporation: The Pathological Pursuit of Profit and Power. New York: Free Press.

Chomsky, N. (2007). What We Say Goes: Conversations On U.S. Power in a Changing World. Interviews with David Barsamian. New York: Metropolitan Books.

Hill, D. and R. Kumar. (2009). Neoliberalism and its Impacts. In Dave Hill and Ravi Kumar (Eds). Global Neoliberalism and Education and its Consequences. New York: Routledge.

Hursh, D. (2008). Neoliberalism. In David Gabbard (Ed). Knowledge & Power in the Global Economy: The Effects of School Reform in a Neoliberal/Neoconservative Age. Second Edition. New York: Lawrence Erlbaun Associates.

Keynes, J.M. (1936/1997). The General Theory of Employment, Interest, and Money. Amherst, NY: Prometheus.

Lippmann, W. (1937/2005). The Good Society. London: Transaction.

Porfilio, B. and C. Malott. (2008). Introduction: The Neoliberal Social Order. In Bradley Porfilio and Curry Malott (Eds). The Destructive Path of Neoliberalism: An International Examination of Urban Education. Rotterdam, The Netherlands: Sense.

Global Financial Crisis – A Classic ‘Ponzi’ Affair?

 Sunanda Sen

The current turmoil in the US financial market and its spilling over to financial markets overseas has made it once more evident that we need to scrutinise the validity and relevance of the neo-liberal theory and policies which brought about this mess.

We try in the following pages, to interpret the crisis: first, by identifying the two special characteristics of the current crisis which also explain its intensity. We also look into the dominant precepts behind, an uncritical acceptance of which has led to policies as can be held responsible for much of the current malaise in the financial sector. These are the mainstream or neo-liberal economic doctrines to achieve what were considered as “efficient” financial markets. Second, we interpret the unfolding of various bankruptcies and bailouts in the US financial sector which have come out in public domain. Finally, we pay attention to the actual and potential threats for a similar crisis as seem to prevail upon India.

What Triggers a Financial Crisis?

To get at the background of the US (and currently the global) financial crisis one needs to address the following two major issues: First, the prevalence of high stakes in the financial markets under uncertainty with risks involved in holding assets often disproportionately high as compared to their realised returns. Such transactions have been identified in the literature as Minskian ‘ponzi’ deals, which, as was pointed out by the post-Keynesian economist, Hyman Minsky in 1986 (1), are both unsustainable and hazardous as compared to acts of simple hedging or even speculation on asset prices in markets.

With ponzi finance, the high returns as are offered to entice the new investors to lend and invest are often not realised in the market by the borrower. To avoid an impending default and an interruption of business, it is not only necessary for new investments as above to continue but also these need to be adequate to compensate the losses as are incurred on previous investments. However, as confidence on these assets is gradually eroded, these transactions come to a grinding halt, leading to big holes in the balance-sheets of the concerned parties. The pattern with ponzi finance as above is very different from hedge finance which to some extent keeps the system going as long as hedging offsets the losses against possible gains. Even speculatory finance, which dwells on more risk than under hedging, can be sustained until it becomes ponzi, when borrowings at high rates no longer generates equivalent returns, a situation which is currently on in the US financial markets.

The second factor which contributed to trigger the recent financial crisis relates to financial innovations in de-regulated financial markets. By generating derivative instruments which aimed to protect asset values in uncertain markets, derivatives also made it possible to invest and acquire assets much more easily. Thus, with ‘futures’, a typical derivative product which arranges a contract towards the sale and purchase of an asset in some future date, the deal can work to the convenience of both the buyers and sellers involved by insuring against the uncertainties in the market, while dispensing with cash transactions at the time of the contract. Thus the buyer contracting a ‘long’ (buying) position deposits only a fraction of the contracted price as ‘margin’, with the exchange trading organisation (usually a security exchange). Innovations and instruments as above in the financial sector have opened up vast potentials for expanding financial market transactions which are no more constrained by availabilities of bank credit. However, transactions as above and the agents involved can remain in business as long as the hedging works to minimise the risk under uncertainty and the risk-adjusted returns offered to those with long (buy) positions are realised by those who hold the short (sell) positions on assets. These may not materialise in a typical ‘ponzi’ situation, as described above.

It now remains to be seen as to how aspects as above are handled in mainstream theory and policy with its advocacy for wide-ranging de-regulations in financial markets. By postulating rational expectations and access to full information for all agents in the market, uncertainty, in terms of these theories, does not get in the way of achieving efficiency when markets are left free. Accordingly, speculation under uncertainty is reduced to arbitrage (in point of space) and hedging (in point of time) and the market is supposed to take care of uncertainty-related concerns by using financial derivatives. From this angle financial markets perform the best when there is no restraint on trading, both in spot markets and in those for derivatives. In case lenders are wary of potential defaults by borrowers which may be due to incomplete or asymmetric information in the market, they resort to credit rationing, as held in the literature. But both borrowers as well as lenders are still viewed as rational beings who decide feely on their lending or borrowing activities in the market.(2) Positions as above, emanating from advanced countries, have continued to dominate policies in financial markets and the financial institutions.

However, the magnitude and the intensity of the latest happenings in the USA and elsewhere seem to have jolted a bit the entrenched positions held by the establishment with efforts to bend the standard rules of monetarism and free markets under capitalism. Otherwise how can one interpret the huge bailout packages from the state in a country (or countries) which always have been strong advocates of free-market capitalism?

Financial Markets – What All have gone Wrong in US Financial Markets?

Back in the 1970s, the US economy was subjected to an unprecedented wave of credit squeeze as the Fed Chairman, Alan Greenspan, launched a series of monetarist strategies to contain inflation. Reacting to above, financial innovations led the way to credit creation beyond the usual banking orbits. Thus a large number of US firms started having access to short-term credit by using, as collaterals, securitised assets like commercial papers.(3) As the wave of securitisation (of assets) caught on, new forms of financial intermediation were provided by investment banks which lent their expertise in re-packaging the securities which were now marketed easily and sold to other banks or non-bank financial units that included the investment banks as well. Since these transactions were outside the orbit of conventional banking channels, the Fed had no regulatory power over these. Instead, these were subject to the jurisdictions of the US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). One witnessed, as a consequence, a 50% decline in the proportion of US financial assets as were held by banks between 1950 and 1990. Credit and transactions related to securities were made easy along the non-banking channels, with rates charged at much lower spreads as compared to those along conventional banking channels. Transactions as above facilitated the churning of multiple asset-backed securities (ABS). These were generated on the basis of the original (or underlying) asset, propping up multiple counterparties which held those assets. Leveraging played a major role in the creation of these debt financed assets, which continued as long as there was trust and confidence in the uncertain markets on these newly created financial assets.

Mortgages on property opened up new profit opportunities in the financial sector, by creating a market which targeted the section of US citizens who had so far been financially excluded on grounds of race and/or income, while banks followed credit-rationing which ruled out such loans.(4) Possibilities to securitise the mortgaged assets opened up new channels of investments, for the broker-mortgage firms, the issuers and insurers of asset based securities (ABS), investment banks who readily purchased and repackaged the ABS, and other financial institutions. Each, by acquiring an asset, were able to leverage by obtaining credit against the latter.

As the process continued, a large number of people with low incomes were now endowed with a mortgaged property and a liability to pay monthly instalments, usually to the broker mortgager-cum-bank who organised the deal. These assets were backed by loans which later were discovered as ‘sub-prime’, with the mortgaged collaterals subject to valuation in a sliding market and with little accountability of the borrowing parties, many of whom were not even bankable in terms of conventional practices. The initial euphoria, fed by the rising property prices on the one hand and the eagerness on part of the financial community to profit by using the securitisation route which temporarily shifted the risk to counterparties, did work as long as the former lasted. The business, as led by investment banks, as mentioned earlier, was outside the purview of the Fed, and the SEC did not find any reason to interfere.

To follow the sequence that led to the recent sub-prime crisis of the US we provide below a rough sketch of the possible links in the system:

SenDiagram

The above schema of sub-prime loans which prompted the upswing in the asset market failed to work within a few years. High property prices of the mid-1990s made possible the advances against mortgaged houses at interest rates higher than the market rate to low income borrowers who had very little credentials in the financial market. Repackaging of these to back securities (which exchanged hands to generate further assets and sources of credit) finally proved to be an Achilles’ heel by impairing the credentials of the entire financial system in the USA and elsewhere. Use of futures and other derivatives (swaps, options etc.) augmented the scale of operations by making it possible to bid on positions in the security market with small margins of the final transaction until full payment when the contract matured.

To recapitulate the sequence as above, it may be worthwhile to follow the following stages of the upswing in the financial market and the subsequent stages of the reversal:

The Build-up of the Boom

1. Loans advanced by banks, via broker-dealers of mortgages, to borrowers in housing markets at sub-prime rates. Borrowers committed to regular instalments to parties as above.

2. Mortgaged assets get repackaged by issuers of securities as collateralised debt obligations (CDOs) which are the ABSs (or mortgage backed securities) sold to investment banks who sell these to other financial institutions.

3. Market prices of these financial assets determine the returns to the investor.

The Approach to the Crash 

1. Drop in property prices, house-owners fail to service debt, announce foreclosure of the mortgage deal.

2. Issuers of ABS and investment banks face losses due to non-payment by borrowers, facing losses which are aggravated by sharp declines in ABS prices in the market.

3. Losses for other FIs who hold such assets as above.

The sequence is also captured by the following formulation:

q= f(A,r) where f’A and  f’r are  positive as long as ∂A and ∂r are both positive.

Thus dq = r. f’A + A. f’r < 0  when  ∂A and ∂r are both negative, which, as mentioned above, is likely in the downturn.

Symbols used include
q : average  return on ABS
A: average market value of ABS
r : the initial rate of average down-payments on mortgaged houses

To continue, a major financial crisis in the US first hit the hedge fund Long Term Capital Management (LTCM) in September 1998 when it was rescued by the Fed which injected $3.6 billion to help out its excessive leverage ratio. A sense of doubts and failing trusts continued and intensified over the next decade until it reached a climax by the third quarter of 2008 when two major investment banks (Fannie Fae and Fredie Mac) were taken over by the Treasury and another major investment bank, AIG, was recapitalised by the Treasury with an injection of $85 billion against 80% equity stake with AIG, all happening in the first two weeks of September 2008. The AIG deal was to protect the biggest insurance agency and investment bank in the country which by this time owned a trillion dollar assets spread over 130 countries and a $441 billion exposure to credit default swaps. Loans by the Treasury to AIG were supposed to carry a rate of interest of 11.5%, to be paid back by selling its assets within two years. In between another big investment bank, the Lehman Brothers, went bankrupt on September 12. By September 11, funds injected by the Fed in the financial market were around $900 billion, a sum which has kept on rising by each day as the market fell further. The latest move by the Treasury to pump in a huge sum of $700 billion and its ratification by the US legislators and even the rate cuts by most central banks in OECD is yet to bring about a reversal of the downswing in asset valuations and a general recessionary trend in the global economy. A steep rise in call money rates for inter-bank lending and a sharp fall in yield on US Treasury bonds, considered so long as safe investment, are aspects which speak for themselves. In all, the story reflects a scene of greed and miscalculation as is typical when it ends with a ponzi strategy.

How does it affect the Indian Economy?

As with other developing countries which today are closely integrated with overseas markets, India at the moment faces considerable risk of a severe downturn as a consequence of the global financial crisis. The reasons include at least the following factors which we briefly mention below: First, the free play of FII investors since 1993 when India’s stock markets were thrown open to such investors. Speculatory flows as above have been responsible for phenomenal expansions in the country’s stock markets, with capitalisation as well as P/E ratios moving up to unprecedented levels.(5) Second, the extensive use of derivatives on a legal basis in security exchanges and as OTCs led to rapid increases in their use, especially after 1992, when much of these were legalised. Derivative trading in the futures market has been at least six times the turnovers in spot trading at the National Stock Exchange till the meltdown started in these markets.(6) Third, foreign presence in the capital market has been prominent, especially with FII inflows in the secondary markets for stocks, which not only contributed to the rising turnovers but also to vulnerability in terms of sudden flight of capital. The rising level of official reserves, to the extent propped up by these inflows, are already facing a depletion. These have also affected the exchange rate of the rupee, currently heading a downward spin, despite efforts on part of the monetary authorities to manage the rate. Fourth, with both banks and corporates having a considerable exposure in the global equity market it remains one of the imponderables as to how much the balance-sheet of these financial and industrial units would be damaged by the global financial melt-down.(7) Finally, with the onset of recessionary forces in the real sector of the advanced nations, export markets will be generally hard hit for countries like India. Also the expanding jobs and services, as are related to the outsourcing by foreign companies and the Business Processing Organisations (BPOs) as well as the subsidiaries, would get a jolt.

One ought to feel positive about the economy with the confidence and positive thinking on the part of policy-makers in India, currently devising ways to avoid the contagion effects for the domestic economy. It may not be as simple and easy, however, for the country to come out unscathed in the current global scenario which has been described as financial tsunami! It is even less likely that the world’s financial markets and its economies will be immune to such shocks in future if the prevailing norms of de-regulated finance remain unchanged. After all, even a top billionare like Warren Buffet (8) was convinced to make a statement in 2002 that “…derivatives are financial weapons of mass destruction, carrying dangers that, while now latent, are potentially lethal”!

Sunanda Sen is a prominent economist from India, who has extensively worked on issues in development, economic history, international trade and finance. She was a professor at the Centre for Economic Studies and Planning at the Jawaharlal Nehru University (1973 to 2000). She is currently a visiting professor at the Academy of Third World Studies, Jamia Millia Islamia, New Delhi. She is also associated with the Institute for Studies in Industrial Development, New Delhi. Her recent works include, Colonies and the Empire: India, 1890-1914 (Calcutta: Orient Longman, 1992), Financial Fragility, Debt and Economic Reforms (London: Macmillan, 1996), Finance and Development: R C Dutt Lectures in Political Economy (Calcutta: Orient Longman, 1998),Trade and Dependence: Essays on the Indian Economy (Delhi: Sage India, 2000), Global Finance at Risk: On Real Stagnation and Instability (London: Palgrave-Macmillan Publishers, 2003) and Globalisation and Development (Delhi: National Book Trust, 2007).

Notes:

(1) Hyman P Minsky, Stabilizing an Unstable Economy, Yale University Press, New Haven (1986).

(2) See for an elaboration, Sunanda Sen, Global Finance at Risk: On Real Stagnation and Instability, Palgrave Macmillan (2003) and Oxford University Press (2004).

(3) L. Randall Wray, “Financial Markets Meltdown: What can we learn from Minsky?”, Public Policy Brief No 94, The Levy Economics Institute of Bard College (2008).

(4) Gary Dymski, “Financial Risk and Governance in the Neoliberal Area”, University of California Center Sacramento, mimeo (2008).

(5) See for details, Sunanda Sen, “De-regulated Finance and the Indian Economy”, in Alternative Economic Survey, India 2007-2008: Decline of the Developmental State, Daanish Books (2008).

(6) Ibid.

(7) This aspect has been discussed in Sunanda Sen, “Labour in De-regulated Financial Markets”, in Philip Arestis and Luiz DePaula (ed) Global finance and Emerging Markets,  Elgar (2008).

(8) Berkshire Hathaway 2002 Annual Report, p. 15.

Neoliberalism and Hindutva – Fascism, Free Markets and the Restructuring of Indian Capitalism

 Shankar Gopalakrishnan

Over the 1980s and 1990s we witnessed the simultaneous rise of two reactionary political projects, Hindutva and neoliberalism, to a position of dominance in India. Such a combination is not unusual, in that neoliberalism is usually allied with and promoted by socially reactionary forces (such as the hyper-nationalism of the “bureaucratic-authoritarian” dictatorships in Latin America, the implicit racism and jingoism of Thatcher and Reagan, etc.). Yet the Indian experience, while sharing this broad tendency, also contains some very distinct characteristics.

We on the left have tended to understand this simultaneous rise as a straightforward cause-effect relationship. Hindutva is seen as an effort by neoliberalism, or perhaps more broadly by capitalism, to divert attention from class conflict, to divide and weaken working class struggles and to deflect class-driven anxieties on to minority communities. This approach is problematic in two senses. First, it does not explain why Hindutva organisations are able to develop a mass base, except to the extent that they are seen to be appealing to “historical identity” or “emotive” issues. This is undoubtedly true. But it is also insufficient, for by definition any right wing project will appeal to “emotions”; it does not take our understanding of the actual appeal of Hindutva forward. Second, it fails to provide us much understanding of why this specific historical conjuncture has taken place. Hindutva is seen as simply an “available” reactionary ideology that capital has picked up for its purposes.

In this context, this paper attempts a sketch of a different approach. I seek to argue that, for reasons specific to Indian capitalism at this historical moment, what we might call the political projects of Hindutva and neoliberalism share certain socio-political agendas. This shared agenda extends at times to a tactical alliance of the two, where both seek to exploit their “common ground” in order to achieve a restructuring of the Indian polity. Moreover, this alliance has already had a considerable impact on large parts of the discursive and political landscape of India – an impact that has not yet been seriously challenged.

It should be noted that my argument here is neither that this shared agenda was inevitable, nor that it precludes alliances between neoliberalism and other political forces in India. The analysis postulates that this is a historically specific development, shaped by political circumstances, the current balance of forces and the choices made by political actors. Yet, this is also not an alliance based purely on expediency. These projects have shared a logic whose validity is not infinite – in the sense that it will eventually break down under the weight of its contradictions – but is also not entirely non-existent.(1)

Theoretical Approach

Poulantzas’ Concept of Individualisation

This paper draws on three different theoretical concepts for its argument. The first is Nicos Poulantzas’ (1978) analysis of the relationship between capitalist states and “individualisation.” Incorporating Foucault’s analysis into a Marxist framework, he argues that the capitalist state constructs a concept of the “individual” – the “juridical-political person” – as an isolated entity, identical to all other individuals but disconnected from them, whose only connection/unity is represented by the state. As he puts it, the “centralised, bureaucratised State installs this atomization and, as a representative State laying claim to national sovereignty and the popular will, it represents the unity of a body (people-nation) that is split into formally equivalent monads.”

The projection of the “individual” is not merely an automatic reflection of the fact that capitalist society is built around commodity relations. Rather, the dispossession of the producer and the creation of capitalist relations of production generate a “material frame of reference” that makes the individual the centre point of social relations. The state, in turn, “inscribes itself” into this frame of reference, representing both the frame’s ideological unity – the “nation-state” – and its system of organization/regulation. In this sense, it is the state that in fact realises the material frame of reference and gives it social substance. The state then actively participates in perpetuating this situation by constantly constructing and reconstructing the “individual.” “Individualisation constitutes the material expression in capitalist bodies of the existing relations of production and the social division of labour; and it is equally the material effect of state practices and techniques forging and subordinating this (political) body.”

Thus, creating and projecting the “individual” is the centre of the active process by which capitalist relations of production are constituted and reconstituted by the capitalist state. As a result, the concept of the individual becomes “the original ground of classes in their capitalist specificity.” The “individual” forms the conceptual terrain on which class relationships within capitalism are defined.

Poulantzas’ argument, however, assumes that this process is complete in all existing capitalist democratic states. What happens when this remains incomplete? Can the individualisation process itself become a site of social struggle? These questions form the basis for some of the explorations here.

Hegemony

The second analysis that is drawn upon is Gramsci’s familiar concept of “hegemony”, the combination of force with “intellectual and moral leadership” that builds the sense that the ruling “historical bloc” (of one or multiple class fractions) represents the “general interest.” As Gramsci (1971) says, “the dominant group is coordinated concretely with the general interests of the subordinate groups, and the life of the State is conceived of as a continuous process of formation and superseding of unstable equilibria (on the juridical plane) between the interests of the fundamental group and those of the subordinate groups – equilibria in which the interests of the dominant group prevail, but only up to a certain point, i.e. stopping short of narrowly corporate economic interest.”

Three aspects of the concept of hegemony will be critical to our analysis here. First, hegemony is never total, and always contains within itself instabilities and contradictions. Maintaining hegemony requires a constant effort by the ruling bloc: “the maintenance of hegemony involves taking systematic account of popular interests and demands, shifting position and making compromises … to maintain support and alliances”.(2)

Second, hegemony is not simply deceit. Rather, it is material and concrete. It is built around channelling genuine social contradictions in a manner that supports the continued dominance of the ruling bloc. This is naturally impossible to fully achieve, and it is for this reason that hegemony is partial and unstable. If we look at hegemony this way, the analytical focus shifts away from whether a particular ideological project is “false” or is geared towards dividing and weakening the working class or the oppressed. Indeed, both these statements would be true of any ruling class political project. Rather, to understand the functioning of hegemony, analysis would focus on the process by which the interests of the subordinate classes arecoordinated with those of the ruling bloc.

Third, implicit in Gramsci’s analysis is that the generation of hegemony is neither an automatic nor a spontaneous process. Hegemony is instead the result of conscious political action by an organised formation – the “totalitarian” party. In The Modern Prince (1971), Gramsci describes a “totalitarian” party as one that seeks to replace the state as the “neutral body” of society.(3) It attempts to build a hegemonic “national-popular” will whereby it identifies the interests of its leading class with those of the rest of society. Analysing such a party requires understanding first the objective social forces that it is responding to, followed by the degree and nature of self-understanding of its leading classes. The most “political phase” in any such party’s development is reached when it succeeds in “posing all the questions around which the struggle rages not on a corporate but on a ‘universal’ plane, and thus creating the hegemony of a fundamental social group over a series of subordinate groups.” It is important to note that this method of analysis does not require that the party succeed in creating this hegemony – only that it attempts to do so.

Petty Commodity Production

The third concept relied upon here is that of the existence and persistence of what has variously been called “petty commodity production” (Bernstein 2001), or “non-capitalist commodity production”.(4) In this case, unlike in “pure” capitalist production relations, the “agents of this form of production are capitalists and workers at the same time because they own or have access to means of production and employ their own labour” (Bernstein 2001). Such production is by no means “outside” capitalism. It is first and foremostcommodity production, in that it is production shaped as part of a commodity and market relationship, and such producers are dependent on commodity relationships for survival. It is therefore shaped, controlled and in some measure produced by capitalism, and is an integral part of the capitalist social formation. Moreover, as Bernstein (2003) emphasises elsewhere, the role that such production plays in the social division of labour is generally in flux. Spaces for petty commodity production are continually created, destroyed and recreated within the capitalist formation.

It might be objected that this is in no way a new conception. Marxist analysis has long used the term “petty bourgeois” to refer to what seems a similar class. That term is consciously avoided here for two reasons. First, it has now become analytically imprecise and has been applied across the board to many social sectors, some of whom would overlap with petty commodity production and some of whom would not. Second, it is generally considered a “transitional” class, a residual in the social formation. However, Bernstein, Paranjape and a growing body of other Marxist literature has highlighted the reproduction and at times expansion of petty commodity production as a key aspect of modern capitalism.
Finally, the focus here on petty commodity producers is not intended to imply that such producers are not “workers” or that petty commodity production is not, for many such producers, a form of disguised wage labour. It is aimed rather at examining the political implications of such forms of production within Indian capitalism, and their interaction with attempts at constructing hegemonic projects in the Indian polity.

Indian Capitalism and Petty Commodity Production

Petty commodity production clearly plays a major role in the Indian economy (though it is no longer the major site of capital accumulation). Census data shows a consistent pattern of a majority of Indians reporting themselves as “self-employed”, a category which would largely overlap with petty commodity producers in the sense described above. The vast majority of landholding agriculturists in particular fall within this category, excepting a small minority of capitalist farmers. In urban areas, most small enterprises share these characteristics.

Such petty commodity production is constantly subjected to the pressure of class differentiation. In agricultural areas, poor peasants face a reproduction squeeze that drives them further and further into proletarianisation. The small number of rich peasants – until the neoliberal era – aspired, and in some areas succeeded, in making the transition to agricultural capitalism. Similar tendencies operate in urban areas. Such pressures have however not destroyed petty commodity production as a sector of the capitalist economy, a state of affairs that is in fact true of peasantries around the world.(5)

The Indian economy thus can be described as a capitalist economy where the majority of people exist in class positions shaped, if not necessarily defined, by petty commodity production. This state of affairs is generally seen as an outcome of the historical legacy of distorted capitalism and colonial intervention. In addition, however, there is a proximate cause, in the form of conscious state policy and political action in the decades since Independence. Indeed, if we adopt a heterodox reading of India’s planned economy, it could be argued that a major goal of state policy has been to shape the relationship between capital and petty commodity production in India – and that part of this shaping has been a dual relationship of “shielding” and deliberate subordination of petty commodity production.

Partha Chatterjee (1998) and Corbridge and Harriss (2000) have argued that the planned mixed economy was a “passive revolution” initiated by the Indian bourgeoisie, a result of its inability to tackle the continued power of the landlord classes in the first decades after Independence. Certain elements of these policies, many of which still continue, had a clear relevance not only to the landlord classes but to spheres of petty commodity production. Some measures appeared intended to “protect” and perpetuate these systems of production: for instance, reservations for small-scale industries, the peculiarities and numerical limits of Indian labour law, some aspects of priority sector lending and the promotion of cooperatives. These had the net effect of erecting barriers to transformation into capitalist enterprises, hence encouraging capital and most producers to either disguise themselves as petty commodity producers or engage in ‘outsourcing’ of production to such producers. Yet, simultaneously, various other mechanisms operated to ensure the continued extraction of surplus from such sectors: unequal exchange through agricultural price fixing, the relative failure of institutional lending, the allocation of space in urban areas, etc. Such surplus extraction at times shaded into the forms now described as “accumulation by dispossession” (Harvey 2003), but not to the extent of threatening the continued existence of petty commodity production.

The result has been an active state contribution to the perpetuation of a large but dominated sphere of petty commodity production. The reason why this occurred is out of my scope here, but for the purposes of our present argument it is sufficient to consider its consequences for India’s polity. In particular, the persistence of petty commodity production has been a major contributing factor – though not the sole one – in the prominence of “social structures of accumulation”, namely institutions such as caste, gender, religious community, geography and kinship networks, in the regulation of Indian capitalism (Harriss-White 2003). Indeed, petty commodity production in India is marked by the relative absence of direct, formal state intervention in most production processes. State action plays a key role in shaping such production, but does so indirectly, or at times “perversely.”

One key result of such processes is that the tendency towards individualisation, which Poulantzas identifies as central to the function of the capitalist state, has always been highly contested, incomplete and dysfunctional in the Indian context. The construction of the “individual” as the isolated but identical monad exists in a kind of continual dialectical battle with other concepts of social actors and social relations. This impact is not limited only to those engaged in commodity production or who have access to means of production. “Workers” – in the limited sense of those with little or no access to means of production at all (6) – find wage employment overwhelmingly with those who are themselves petty commodity producers, and hence they too are integrated into the ideological-material-regulatory complex that marks such production in India.

Since the concept of the individual is central to the definition of social relations in a capitalist state, this in turn has had an impact on the ground of political struggle around class in India. As Harriss-White and Gooptu (2001) put it in the context of unorganised sector labour, in India the struggle of workers is as much a “struggle over class” as it is a “struggle between classes.” The same can be extended to the struggles of most petty commodity producers. The large-scale presence of petty commodity production thus feeds into the domination of the Indian political scene by political forces consisting of “cross-class” alliances (commonly described as “populist” in left analyses).

The Movements of the 1980s

Against this background, one can attempt a historical analysis of the rise of Hindutva and neoliberalism. The analysis here begins with the decade of the 1980s. As both an ideological tendency and as an organised political force, Hindutva is of course far older than this decade. But it is in these years that it emerged as a dominant mass force in Indian politics. Similarly, while there have liberalist ideological tendencies in some fringe elements of Indian politics from Independence onwards, liberalism – and, post 1991, neoliberalism – emerges as a powerful political project in India only in this decade.

Why might this have been the case? The 1980s were a period of major upheaval in the Indian polity, witnessing an upsurge of new political forces. These included the “social movements”, the new regional parties, the armed uprisings in several major areas of India’s periphery (Kashmir, Assam, and Punjab) and eventually the Mandal mobilisations. In some ways these mobilisations shared nothing in common except that they exploded into the “vacuum” left by the declining coherence of the Indian state and the Congress party. Yet the largest of the movements in the Indian mainland – the regional parties, the “new farmers’ movements” and the Mandal mobilisations – did have one common characteristic. This was the dominant, or at least leading, presence of “rich peasant” groups.

Zamindari abolition and the Green Revolution had contributed by the early 1980s to the creation of a small class of capitalist farmers and a larger, though less clearly defined, class of ‘rich farmers’ in most States in India (excepting the Northeast). The impact of such trends was already visible in the fragmentation and organisational decline of the Congress from the late 1960s (Vanaik 1990). In the 1980s, these classes formed the bedrock of regional parties such as the TDP, the INLD, the SAD or the Samajwadi Party, as well as the leading sections of both the farmers’ movements and the subsequent OBC mobilisations.

In the terms of the argument here, these were social groups at the upper end of petty commodity production, often either having become fully capitalist or on the verge of doing so. These groups faced two primary problems in the 1980s. First, the gradual shift in terms of trade against agriculture through the decade threatened their ability to transition to capitalist agriculture, and in some cases even their ability to reproduce their current conditions of existence. Second, the rise of these communities was not reflected in a concomitant change in political power – which remained in the hands of the urban bourgeoisie.

Simultaneously, other petty commodity producers were subject to an increasing reproduction squeeze, as the state loosened its controls on big capital at precisely the time when their dependence on the market had increased (see below and Bernstein 2001). The “new farmers’ movements” offer a clear illustration of the result. For instance the Shetkari Sanghatna, the largest “new farmers movement” after Tikait’s, built its entire mobilisation on the question of agricultural prices. Though led and dominated by rich peasants, this organisation succeeded in building a mass base among middle and even poorer peasants through its advocacy of higher prices (Dhanagare 1995). This issue concerned most agricultural petty commodity producers, even those who might be net purchasers of agricultural goods, for it defined their relationship with the market economy – a relationship that had become increasingly precarious. Though the Sanghatna leadership explicitly claimed to be in favour of a withdrawal of the state from agricultural and the end of “socialist” regulation on agricultural production, its entire mobilisational universe was built around the assumption of state regulation of prices. When such state regulation did indeed collapse after 1991, the organisation effectively collapsed shortly afterwards.

While such demands were rarely so clearly stated elsewhere, one theme remained: based on a perception of shared interests across petty commodity producers, the parties/movements/organisations demanded that the state allocate more resources, subsidies, and other such supports to their forms of production – and particularly their rich farmer classes. This was converted into logics that made sense across the spectrum of petty commodity production, affected as it was in varying degrees by state investment and regulation. This demand for a “tilt” in the state machinery proved effective at mobilising large sections of petty commodity producers, generating powerful political “waves” that swept aside the Congress in much of mainland India.

Each of these political formations foregrounded the state as the main target of its demands, and thus implicitly as the agent of social transformation – while simultaneously weakening faith in the ability of the state to deliver on these demands. Moreover, the discourse around the state presented it as an arbiter between the interests of communities: a “populist” concept that gained a material foundation through the common interests of petty commodity producers.

Meanwhile, as the state and the Congress party weakened under these demands, other movements – such as the Dalit and tribal movements – also expanded and grew.  Many of these other organisations used the same vocabulary as the larger organisations, reinforcing this conceptual framework as the “common sense” of Indian politics.

Regulations on Capital in the 1980s

Simultaneously, however, the other side of this equation was also changing. Until the 1970s, India’s big bourgeoisie had built monopolistic large corporations through a symbiotic relationship with the state bureaucracy, relying on state regulation to provide them with captive markets. Now, these capitals also began to chafe at the state system, with the continued small size of their markets becoming an obstacle to their growth. State regulation also blocked them from easily absorbing smaller capitals and non-capitalist commodity producers. The post-1980 Congress regime gradually began to change regulatory policies in order to meet this demand. In 1985 the government promulgated a “New Economic Policy”, with tax cuts, lower import duties, export tax breaks and relaxed licensing requirements. The result was a boom in growth, which in turn pushed the Indian economy into a higher growth cycle that it has – on average – maintained ever since (Corbridge and Harriss 2000, Rodrik and Subramaniam 2004).

These two simultaneous but contradictory trends – an increase in demands on the state machinery for support to petty commodity producers, and pressure to relax its restraints on capital – led to an unusual economic conjuncture. As the economy entered its “boom” period, state expenditure and deficit financing also rose greatly, resulting in a rapid rise in rural investment. Rural employment grew, agricultural real wages rose, and income poverty decreased at a more rapid rate than either before or since (Ghosh and Chandrasekhar 2000). This ‘boom’ however was highly vulnerable, built around borrowing from NRI’s and local sources. The resulting dependence on external finance capital was sufficient to trigger the 1991 “crisis”, where sudden withdrawal of volatile funds led to a balance of payments crunch. This “crisis” – generated through capital flight – provided neoliberalism with its entry point, which we will return to below.

Hindutva As a Dominant Class Project

It was in this context of general ‘prosperity’, between roughly 1985 and 1992, that the Hindutva organisations undertook an incredibly rapid mass expansion. In 1984, the Sangh Parivar was still a relatively marginal entity, riding on the dying halo of the JP movement. By 1992, it could stake a credible claim to being India’s largest organised political force (7), and the spectre of fascism was haunting the country. Such an extraordinary growth is unmatched by any other political force in independent India’s history.

In itself, this historical conjuncture should make one doubt theories that seek to explain Hindutva as a “distraction” from the “distress” of the working class. Nor is it a response to a crisis of capitalism, as is sometimes argued by analogy with theories of classical European fascism. On the face of it, the economic evidence shows neither crisis nor an absolute increase in distress among the poor or the working class. Indeed, it shows the opposite. The rise of the Sangh hence cannot be reduced to, or simply read off from, the prevailing economic circumstances.

Such an explanation however requires a shift in emphasis from analyses of Hindutva as a predominantlycultural-ideological phenomenon, which has been the most common approach taken by its opponents. Such analyses focus on the ideological aspects of “Hindu nationalism”, approaching it by asking questions regarding the appeal of such reactionary chauvinism in this political conjuncture. This helps analyse the mass appeal of Hindutva, and also provides ammunition to counter its propaganda and hate politics. But it does not necessarily completely explain the actual growth of the Sangh Parivar. The Sangh Parivar is not merely a vehicle of Hindu chauvinism – it is the most successful political organisation in India today. Its expansion has been the result of conscious political action, not merely automatic or unconscious cultural propagation. Indeed, the Parivar is an excellent example of a “totalitarian party”, in the Gramscian sense explored above. The growth of Hindutva is inseparable from the growth of the Parivar as an organisation.

From this angle, the Sangh has to be analysed as a party. It is necessary to look the manner in which the Parivar translates the dominant class interests that it projects into “universal” interests of other social sectors. This question turns also crucially on the manner in which the Sangh organises itself, for it is through such operations – as argued below – that it projects its actions as a response to social contradictions. This approach neither replaces nor negates the importance of deconstructing the hate politics of Hindutva; rather, it aims to complement it.

The Appeal of the Sangh Parivar to Dominant Class Interests

From the days of the Jan Sangh until the early 1980s, the Sangh Parivar had a relatively clearly defined mass base. The Jan Sangh, and then the BJP, was described as the “brahmin-baniya party”, with little following in rural areas and an inability to capture either the support of urban elites or the working class. Its party positions were a fairly direct reflection of the class position of its supporters, mainly members of the trading class. It favoured external protectionism and internal trade liberalisation, reflecting its members’ interests in unfettered access to domestic markets combined with restrictions on international competition. It opposed trade unions and workers’ struggles and promoted reactionary and jingoistic nationalism. In this sense it was indeed a “petty bourgeois” party in the usual sense. Outside the party, the Sangh Parivar had established most of its current front organisations by the early 1960s, but they remained small.

The Parivar underwent its first wave of post independence growth, both in membership and in stature, during the JP movement, sharing in the popular anti-Emergency sentiment.  But it was only in the 1980s that it truly emerged to become a major political force among the country’s elite and big capital. Simultaneously, and primarily through the Ayodhya movement, it grew into a huge mass force.

At this time, there were some obvious benefits to capital in supporting Hindutva mobilisation. Many of these have already been discussed extensively in the literature. Ideologically, Hindutva was an antidote to the “subaltern” mobilisations of Mandal and the regional parties. It delegitimised class and caste struggle and instead promoted notions of “harmony.” It is in this sense that Corbridge and Harriss (2000) have identified Hindutva as an “elite revolt” against the other mobilisations.
However, there is arguably a further element in the appeal that the Sangh Parivar enjoyed among the ruling class bloc – one which was specifically important in this time. The other movements of the time projected a politics of “communities” competing for state resources and control of the state machinery. Such politics had the effect, at the national level, of further contesting and undermining any effort at individualisation in the Indian polity. It explicitly foregrounded the notion that the polity of the country was a fractured one, built not around identical monads finding their unity in the state, but on contesting, frequently internally divided communities.  In this manner it was indeed a class contestation – though a partial and contradictory one – rooted in the particular positions of petty commodity producers.

This was not a threat to Indian capital as such. As said earlier, individualisation has been a contested process throughout India’s recent history, and moreover petty commodity production – and the ideological systems associated with it – is a fundamental feature of Indian capitalism. Yet, it is arguable that the particular type of contestation witnessed in the 1980s was seen as a challenge. It was during this period, particularly the second half of the decade, that big capital in India had begun to push for opportunities to expand into new markets. The “reforms” of the mid 1980s served precisely this purpose. But, the contestation of individualisation embodied in the other movements of this decade threatened the coherence of the national state, whose active intervention was increasingly vital for such “reforms.” Indeed, these movements demanded precisely the kind of state action that capital increasingly found anathema – increased segmentation of markets, dictation of state spending by democratic politics and state interference in decisions by private capitalists. Finally, expansion by capital in this period also depended on cultural-ideological factors such as a common understanding of unified markets and commodity exchange in rural areas. This was an understanding that was lacking at the time (Rajagopal 1999), and was directly threatened by the promotion of community identities.

It is in this context that a much deeper appeal of Hindutva becomes apparent. To see this, let us examine some of the internal elements of Hindutva ideology, and in particular its approach to its own cadre and supporters. This approach is in no sense limited to merely anti-minority hate politics. Rather, it contains a very specific concept of the relationship between individual, society and state, an approach that is of particular interest in light of the prevailing political situation. Some of the key elements of this are as follows (8):

  • Reduction of social processes to individual choice: Like most organicist ideologies (and in a strong parallel to Gandhianism), Hindutva reduces social developments to questions of individual choice. Thus the Parivar aims to solve Hindu society’s problems by inculcating ‘correct values’ in upper caste men, as exemplified by M.S. Golwalkar’s declaration that “there is a ‘crisis of character’ in our country”; social problems are due to individuals’ “demoniac ways” (Golwalkar 1979). Other Sangh Parivar leaders have made countless similar statements. The remaking of society depends on whether every person can be made a “good Hindu.” What is a good Hindu is, in turn, defined by the Sangh.
  • The state exists only as the expression and guarantor of a collectivity founded around a transcendent principle: The ideal state is the guarantor of the Hindu rashtra, a “nation” that exists as an organic and harmonious unity between “Hindus.” The concept of “Hindu” here is linked on the one hand to the normative notion of the “good Hindu” discussed above, and on the other to the Sangh itself (see below). The Hindu nation is defined by the principles that it claims to adhere to. As Deendayal Upadhyaya (1979) once put it, “the state is brought into existence to protect the nation, and to maintain conditions in which the ideals of the nation can be translated into reality.” These ideals constitute the nation’s “soul”, and the “laws that help manifest [this soul] are termed dharma.” “A state cannot be without dharma nor can it be indifferent to dharma, just as fire cannot be without heat” (Upadhyaya 1979).
  • Divisions within this collectivity are unnecessary and pathological; the only division that is of importance is the line between “society” and its Other, the foreigner. All divisions “within” society are the work of malignant outsiders or foreigners, aimed at breaking up the unity and harmony of the Hindu nation. Thus D.B. Thengadi once claimed that “in our system… [social sectors] form an infinite spiral with no inner conflicts and no tensions” (Thengadi 1979). Sangh leaders frequently draw analogies between society and the ‘harmony’ of the human body (see e.g. Golwalkar 1979).

    As for those outside this nation, some of them are inferiors in need of education. As Golwalkar (1979) said, the  RSS must “discourage people pursuing demoniac ways…[and inspire them] to develop their divine nature.” This includes those too “ignorant” to understand their role in Hindu society, a description that is applied particularly to adivasis. But in case education does not work, Golwalkar continues, “we may have to use sanctions of force also in our endeavour.” ‘Outsiders’ thus have a clear choice: they can swear allegiance to Hindutva and join ‘society’, or they can retain their beliefs, thereby confirming their ‘foreignness’ and making them fit for destruction.

  • It is the Sangh that both constitutes and represents the Hindu nation. The Sangh is not merely an organisation of Hindus – it is the Hindu nation itself. As a Marathi textbook for ekal vidyalaya teachers puts it (9):

    “The aim of the Sangh is to organise the entire Hindu society, and not just to have a Hindu organisation within the ambit of this society. Had it been the latter, then the Sangh too would have added one more number to the already existing thousands of creeds. Though started as an institution, the aim of the Sangh is to expand so extensively that each and every individual and traditional social institutions like family, caste, profession, educational and religious institutions etc., are all to be ultimately engulfed into its system. The goal before the Sangh is to have an organised Hindu society in which all its constituents and institutions function in harmony and co-ordination, just as in the body organs”.

I have gone into these principles in some detail for two reasons. Firstly, there are strong resonances between these principles and neoliberalism, which will be discussed later. Secondly, and more importantly, there is a striking similarity between these tenets and the individualisation process that Poulantzas outlines as one of the functions of the capitalist state. Hindutva, like most authoritarian ideologies, is as much about the production of an essentialised individuality as it is about a totalising notion of the state/community. Hindutva projects a vision of individuals as a collection of monads – “good Hindus” – with nothing to distinguish the one from the other, or to connect the one to the other, except a single legitimate collectivity: the Sangh. This is explicitly a normative vision, not a descriptive one. Such a society is the ideal, and it will be the effort of the Sangh to achieve it.

In this sense, Hindutva’s understanding of the ideal society is in fact precisely the capitalist state’s vision – reified to a level that it becomes unrecognisable within the parameters of bourgeois democracy.(10) And it was precisely at this level that the Hindutva ideological project was fundamentally opposed to the ideological bases of the other movements of the 1980s. It is arguable that Indian capital endorsed Hindutva because, as a hegemonic project, it directly sought the breaking down of the collectivities that the 1980s’ movements had made the central feature of Indian politics. Such collectivities had become an increasing obstacle to the upholding of commodity relations as the organising principle of capitalist society.

It was this that translated into the vocal elite endorsement of the Sangh Parivar as a “nationalist” organisation, one pitted against “sectional” and “vested” interests. Most striking of all was the description of the Ayodhya movement as the creator of a “modern India” (Rajagopal 2001, BJP 1991). Indeed, contrary to much of the analysis of Hindutva as a “reaction” against “modernity”, the Sangh and its cohorts have always been very clear that – in their vision – it is Hindutva itself that promotes “modernity” in India. And from the viewpoint of capital, this was correct, for it would indeed help to create that truly “modern” vision: an ideologically individualist society.

The Ayodhya Movement and Hindutva’s Mass Base

Yet, while this argument may help explain the dominant interests being expressed by the project of Hindutva, we are still left with the question of how this project became hegemonic – or, more crudely, how it succeeded in building a mass base. For that, a closer examination of the Ayodhya movement is necessary.

There is no precise data on the nature of mass participation in the Ayodhya movement, but from available information it appears that its strongest bases were in urban areas, among the urban poor, and in small towns. Urban peripheries also saw strong participation, as well as some rural areas in Uttar Pradesh and Madhya Pradesh. However, it does not seem to have enjoyed a strong base in most rural areas. The organised working class in many urban areas supported the movement but were not active participants or leaders. Geographically the movement was most active in Maharashtra, Gujarat and the Hindi-speaking States, though it had support elsewhere as well.

Even this vague mapping throws up an interesting hypothesis: it appears that the Ayodhya movement mobilised precisely the social sectors that did not fully participate in the other 1980s’ movements. But these sectors also included large numbers of petty commodity producers, particularly in the case of the urban poor. At this time of an increasing shift in favour of large capital, such persons were subject to the same intensifying reproduction squeeze as all other petty commodity producers. Further, they now included in their ranks the increasing numbers of those who lost formal employment as part of the first waves of liberalisation-induced deindustrialisation. At the time this was a geographically specific phenomenon, but one particularly striking example is the textile mills of Bombay and Ahmedabad – many of whose workers, at least in the case of Ahmedabad, subsequently became rabid supporters of the Sangh.

Yet, despite the fact that their circumstances were similar to those of the mass base of most of the 1980s’ movements, these social sectors lacked political formations that could represent their demands in a time of increasing insecurity. One can hypothesise that two reasons fed into this vacuum. First, no corresponding social element to the “rich farmer” groups, which played the leading role elsewhere, existed in many of these contexts. Second, the state’s role was also far more complex and indirect, particularly in urban areas. The populist articulation of a shared “community”, led by large producers but with shared demands on the state, could hence not be formed. Producers were instead fragmented, directly facing the pressures of class differentiation and proletarianisation. Moreover, as the 1980s wore on, the inability of the other 1980s’ movements to produce results for most of their members led increasingly to disillusionment even in areas where such movements were strong. It is indeed true that these social sectors faced a crisis; but it was apolitical crisis, not an economic one.

Building Mass Support

It is in this context that the Hindutva organisations undertook their mass expansion drive. Until this period, the Sangh had focused largely on cadre building and indoctrination as its main method of organisation. Such organising built a core of dedicated cadres with a large geographical reach, but could not undertake mass expansion, especially outside the caste and class lines that defined the traditional strongholds of the Parivar’s organisations.

In the early part of the decade, the organisation undertook a series of changes. In particular, the RSS chose to foreground the VHP – and, later in the decade, the BJP – as the frontline Sangh Parivar organisations. Having been “relaunched” between 1979 and 1981, the VHP began a rapid expansion around 1984 (Jaffrelot 1999). The organisation led a series of mobilisations around the conversion of Dalits to Islam in Meenakshipuram (Tamil Nadu), the Shah Bano case, and the “Ekatmata Yatras.” Mobilisation now began to revolve around temple-building, social service and the yatras, with the last becoming the primary mode of mass action. As Rajagopal (2001) puts it, “there was a shift away from sectarian view of organising, with indoctrination as its aim and daily drill as its chief method, to a far more pragmatic approach that emphasised mobilisation over indoctrination, and political effect over organisational discipline.”

These new modes of organising had a very different impact from the old. They rested on offering various “gains” that corresponded to different contradictions facing different sectors. Unlike the other 1980s’ movements, however, these “gains” were not about state support or political patronage. Instead, they were specifically geared towards concrete, immediate benefits and responses to the contradictions faced by these social sectors at the time.

Some examples are as follows. For adivasis in Madhya Pradesh – a community largely lacking in political organisation but nonetheless increasingly commoditised – the Vanvasi Kalyan Ashram offered direct access to hostels, schools, medical centres, etc. (and later became the nucleus of a more formal system of recruitment described in the last section). More than eight hundred schools were opened by the VHP in 1983 alone, mostly in tribal areas. Between 1978 to 1983, the number of full time activists in the VKA increased by six times, with most of their activities concerned with “service” (Jaffrelot 1999). Similar tactics were used with Dalits. Thus in the early 1980s, the VHP came out with a plan to build 100 temples in SC areas of Tamil Nadu (ibid.). Such temple building was to be a standard tactic throughout the decade, providing a way to channel funds into target areas and offering both employment and charity. In addition, for adivasis and Dalits specific economic contradictions with minorities were frequently exploited. One Ghaziabad riot in 1990, for instance, was triggered by the VHP essentially utilising a balmiki leader’s tensions with Muslims over land in the outskirts of the town, the area to which both had been banished by caste Hindu pressures (Basu 1996). Meanwhile, on the other side of the caste spectrum, the urban upper caste youth who formed a significant proportion of the “shock troops” of the Parivar gained both employment/financial support and the ability to implicitly target the OBC mobilisation that threatened their access to state employment (Jaffrelot 1999, Basu 1996).

In addition to these direct material gains, the Sangh movement also offered a more intangible – but arguably still material – gain by creating new public spaces that were accessible to traditionally marginalised sectors. The movement offered access to higher steps on the social hierarchy by simultaneously aiming to retain its high caste character and “respectability” while allowing entry to those earlier excluded. This strategy was applied to various social sectors. Thus Dalits were specifically wooed by the VHP in the early 1980s; many of the new temples were specifically designed as public eating spaces for cross-caste meals. Dalits were also made carriers of the “holy water” in the Ekatmata Yatras (Jaffrelot 1999), and more generally both Dalits and lower castes were allowed access to ritual spaces traditionally denied to them (Rajagopal 2001).

For women, as is attested by a large body of literature on the gender aspects of Hindutva (11), such access to new spaces and possibilities of political action was perhaps the biggest attraction of the movement. The Sangh offered a “safe” avenue of political action that permitted women, particularly women of lower middle class households, to participate in politics without facing family opposition. Moreover it sometimes even raised, in a conservative and reactionary manner, issues such as sexual harassment and pornography (Basu 2001).

Such access to space leads both to a sense of psychological empowerment and also to more immediate gains, through membership in a privileged group including economically wealthy and powerful individuals. The VHP and VKA’s networks in Madhya Pradesh, for instance, were largely funded by local wealthy traders and former royal families. This was later added to by increasing donations from urban elites and from NRI’s, who soon became a key funding source for the movement. The enormous amount of money that poured into the movement from such sources allowed them to offer both direct and indirect benefits to those who participated. Soon the VHP came to be known, in the RSS hierarchy, as the organisation aimed at the middle castes, the urban lower middle class, and similar social sectors of the kind described above.

Finally, during the latter half of this phase, access to these political spaces also meant participation in violence – and the financial, personal and psychological gains that follow on the use of violence against minority communities has been amply documented. Given the tilt of the state machinery towards the Hindutva organisations, such violence also often could be engaged in with impunity.

The Material-Ideological “Bargain”

In this sense, the movement offered both enhanced security and the prospect of social mobility. The ability to make these offers was crucially linked to the support given to the movement by capital, the state and the upper castes. None of these advantages could be offered by the other 1980s’ movements, who did not enjoy such support.

But this was an offer that came with a bargain. The gains on offer accrued not to the class or the community, but to the individual, and the person had to self-constitute themselves as an individual by abandoning all other markers of identity. As seen above, acceptance of Hindutva ideology and organisational methods brought this as its strongest implication. Thus Dalits and adivasis were explicitly or implicitly forbidden to raise issues of discrimination against their communities. The Sangh women’s organisations neither permitted nor encouraged raising of issues of women’s rights (Sarkar 2001). In the present day, teachers in the Vanvasi Kalyan Ashram’s ekal vidyalaya schools are asked to renounce any party affiliation, any caste identity and any commitment to any “sectional interest” other than that of “Bharat” (see below and Gopalakrishnan and Sreenivasa 2007 for more details). In short, supporters and – at a much more intense level – cadres of the movement were required to discard all identities except their standing as an individual, “good Hindu.”

The Commodification of Politics

Such methods of individualisation were then reinforced by wider discursive tactics of the movement itself. Rajagopal (1999) has argued that one of the key innovations of the Sangh Parivar in the 1980s was the conscious use of political marketing, the re-constitution of political action as consumption. The decision to utilise yatras as the most visible mobilisation vehicle was central to this strategy, and this was combined with the mass marketing of items like stickers, tridents, clothes and pictures. Available statistics show striking evidence of this.  Jaffrelot (1999) notes how, in three days of the Ekatmata Yatra in 1983, 6,000 images of Bharat Mata and more than 70,000 bottles of “holy water” were sold. The Ram Shilanyas in 1989 was performed with the use of bricks sent by villages across the country, and involved a cash contribution of Rs. 1.25 by every individual who joined the ceremonies around the bricks. According to the VHP’s statistics, more than 83 million rupees were collected. The yatras themselves became giant symbolic exercises, advertising the chosen few symbols of the movement (Ram; the trident; the colour saffron; the bricks) in a kind of mass cultural outpouring.

Political action in India has been historically associated with charismatic leadership, or at most with traditional party membership (as in the Communist organisations). The Ayodhya movement instead promoted a kind offetishisation of such political relationships and of political action itself, converting one’s relationship with a physical object or a symbol into the essence of one’s relationship with the movement. Purchasing a sticker or a flag became a method of participating; participating in pujas for bricks and images was a mode of political mobilisation.

The use of symbols in this manner functioned synergistically with the expansion of corporate advertising and marketing into rural India, as both converged on the importance of the “brand” as a basis of action (Rajagopal 1999). The Hindutva movement explicitly tried to convert their politics into a “brand” – and endorsement of that brand through purchase, exhibition or worship constituted the act of political support for the movement. But what is a brand other than a reification of the commodity concept itself? In this way, the Ayodhya movement operated through a discourse of commoditisation of politics. Political action was integrated withconsumption.

This analysis is not meant to claim that hate politics and Hindu chauvinism were irrelevant to the Hindutva mobilisation. They were no doubt the cultural categories and political tropes that formed the substance of the ideology. But the importance of the “Hindu community” was not a result of invocation of religious identity alone. Rather, this exploration postulates that it built on a partial satisfaction of the material-ideological needs of its cadre and its base – while simultaneously converting those needs into a driving force for individualisation and the restructuring of social relations in favour of capital. This partial coordination of interests between capital and large sections of petty commodity producers then becomes a dialectical part of the sense of “identity” of those involved. Hindu “identity” was thus politically reconstructed to mean individualised support for the movement, membership in its organisations and participation in its violence. In this sense, the movement was as much about rebuilding “Hindu” society as it was about targeting minorities.

The Entry of Neoliberalism 

The remainder of this paper concerns the Indian polity after the start of reforms in 1991, with the rise to total dominance of the neoliberal project in India. To evaluate the relationship between neoliberalism and Hindutva in this context, we have first to evaluate Indian neoliberalism itself, both as an economic phenomenon and as a political project.

There are in a sense two sides to Indian neoliberalism. On the one hand, the glaring triumph of neoliberal policies and their endorsement by practically all major political parties across the political spectrum indicates the strength of neoliberal ideology as a shaping force of state action in the country. This is the analysis that most of us on the left share, and it reflects the massive defeats inflicted on the left in the last two decades.

But at the same time, Indian neoliberalism has some peculiar weaknesses. One such weakness is reflected in the policy trajectory that neoliberalism has taken in India. In the first decade, the primary focus was on regulatory liberalisation, trade liberalisation, capital account liberalisation and state rollback – namely the “classical” neoliberal model followed in most nations. But such reforms, essentially aimed at strengthening the power of finance capital, ran into growing obstacles. Those that remained confined to finance and industrial spheres, such as capital account liberalisation, went ahead with relatively fewer hitches. Others that were essentially reallocation of resources within the state, such as budget cuts, also have proceeded rapidly. But those that directly affected petty commodity producers, or the small number of capitalist producers in the agricultural sector – such as food subsidies, the public procurement and distribution system, or complete import liberalisation – have been partly or completely blocked. The PDS has been converted into the “targeted PDS” and thus severely maimed, but it has not been dismantled. Similarly tariff cuts have greatly harmed agricultural producers, but they have not been as total as they were in many other parts of the world.

It is arguable that this weakness reflects the nature of Indian capitalism and the continuing relationship between Indian capital and petty commodity producers. The existence of petty commodity producers is simultaneously a requirement for and a fetter on Indian capitalism, both as a result of democratic politics and through its material relationship with capital. Indeed, the vast majority of production in India, even that in the so-called organised sector, involves some degree of involvement of petty commodity producers. In this sense, incidentally, the neoliberal emphasis on informalisation and “outsourcing” is hardly new to Indian capitalism.

Hence, neoliberalism has required a recalibration in India. This recalibration has become increasingly apparent in the last seven or eight years. In this period, the major new initiatives in Indian neoliberalism have been in the area of what David Harvey (2003) described as “accumulation by dispossession” (or “accumulation by encroachment”, to refer to Prabhat Patnaik’s (2005) slightly more accurate description of events in India). These include liberalisation of mining, the accelerated growth in infrastructure sectors, privatisation of natural resources, and the creation of Special Economic Zones. Also in this category are the brutal judiciary-driven assaults on forest dwellers, urban workers and urban petty traders/producers. As is argued by the theory of accumulation by dispossession, these initiatives are aimed at directly expropriating petty commodity producers (as well as subsistence producers, in a few contexts) rather than eliminating them through market forces. By forcibly stripping these producers of their means of production, they result in mass proletarianisation and super-accumulation for the beneficiary capitals.

Unlike the blocked “reforms”, however, such moves towards accumulation by dispossession are unlikely to lead to the elimination of most, or even a significant portion, of petty commodity producers. They still only affect a relatively small number of producers as compared to the Indian economy as a whole. Rather than an effort at destroying petty commodity production, they can more accurately be seen as the most visible vanguard of a drive for intensified extraction of surplus from the latter – a drive whose most widespread manifestation is the crisis of reproduction in agriculture. This crisis, while also accelerating proletarianisation among the poor peasantry, is impacting producers in direct proportion to the degree of their commoditisation – meaning that the so-called “middle peasantry”, who were simultaneously the most vulnerable and the most commoditised, are being hit the hardest.

Thus, whereas petty commodity production cannot be totally eliminated, it can be more intensely subjugated and made more vulnerable to intensified extraction. Under neoliberalism, Indian capitalism has proven to prefer a more shrunken, dominated space for petty commodity production than in the earlier model. This intensified extraction is in turn made possible by the shift in capital accumulation towards larger producers and the organised sector. It is in this context that the political project of neoliberalism has developed.

Indian Neoliberalism as a Political Project

The failure to implement the “typical” package of neoliberal reforms in India is only one facet of Indian neoliberalism’s weakness. The other becomes immediately apparent if we compare India to Thatcherite Britain, Reagan’s America, or the Latin American dictatorships. In India, neoliberalism is not a mass political project. No political party or organised political force (such as the army in Latin America) has adopted neoliberalism as such as a part of its ideology. To this day, with the very significant exception of Gujarat (to which we will return), no political party has won elections with anything resembling an open endorsement of neoliberal policies. Moreover, other than a generic celebration of consumption and consumption-fuelled aspirations, even popular vernacular media rarely articulates the ideological principles of neoliberalism.(12)

Indian neoliberalism has thus largely failed to build itself into a truly hegemonic project. This is in sharp contrast to Thatcherism, for instance, which built a popular base by using neoliberal ideology to refract genuine contradictions of social democracy (Hall 1979).

In Gramsci’s terms, Indian neoliberalism lacks a “totalitarian party”; it is an ideology without an organisation, except parts of the state machinery itself.

Why this is the case is a far larger question. At an ideological level, by comparison with Thatcherism, it can be seen that the contradictions experienced by most Indians cannot be easily reduced to the formulae of state over-regulation. The continued presence of the state as both supporter and opponent of petty production prevents an easy attack on it as an external imposition. The discourses of the 1980s remain far too powerful to be swept aside, giving rise to endless laments from neoliberal ideologues about “vote bank” politics and the inability of the Indian masses to understand the wisdom of the “market.”

This political failure in turn becomes an obstacle to the subjugation of petty producers. It is clear that if Indian capital found the discourses of the 1980s’ movements a fetter on their expansion, neoliberalism does so at a far more intense level. Such politics directly opposes the blanket liberalisation, regulatory withdrawal and speculative freedom that are so central to the neoliberal project. Moreover, in the Indian context, the persistence of such politics blocks the wholesale subjugation of petty commodity producers and hinders the ability of capital to impose its will on the Indian polity. As such, if neoliberalism is to politically succeed in reshaping India’s society and polity as it wishes, it requires a stronger foundation on which to attack such politics.

Relations Between Neoliberalism and Hindutva 

It is at this point that it becomes apparent that neoliberalism has a strong common agenda with the other project discussed here – Hindutva. This is not in any sense to downplay the obvious differences and tensions between the two projects (most centrally around their conceptions of “freedom”). It also bears repeating that this does not imply that an alliance between the two was or is “inevitable.” Yet, as living political projects, shaped in a dialectical relationship with their social foundations, their common goals offer a space that can be exploited. It is from this perspective that we can understand the gradual growth of the alliance between Hindutva and neoliberalism that developed over the 1990s.

How does such an alliance operate? A good starting point is to note discursive dynamics in the English media. As an ideological site largely internal to the ruling class, the English media is an ideal location for ruling class organic intellectuals to play out negotiations between ideological projects. By observing media discourse, we can then identify the degree to which political projects are finding shared ground.

It is hence striking to note that over the last fifteen years, the English media has shifted to strongly emphasise the ideological resonances between neoliberalism, Hindutva and individualisation. This can be seen if, in a similar manner to the outline of Hindutva conceptions made above, we also outline the conceptions of neoliberalism on these issues:

  • Reduction of social processes to individual choice: In neoliberal ideology, all action in all social spheres is built around “utility-maximising” individuals. Despite being portrayed as a descriptive concept, this is in fact a normative one. The ‘failure’ of individuals to behave as “rational” utility maximisers is attributed to “perverse incentives” from either state or society, which is condemned as both immoral and irrational. In this sense, the utility maximising individual is the equivalent of the “good Hindu” in Hindutva – both the centre of the social order and the ideal that that order aspires to produce.
  • The state exists as the expression and guarantor, not of individual or collective rights, but of a supreme principle: The place of Hindu rashtra is in this case taken by “the market”. The ideal state is the night watchman, the guarantor of the “market” – the only legitimate collective social activity. The state should ideally be the market’s guarantor against interference, nothing less and nothing more. In fact, it is particularly striking that one finds precisely the same phrase – “night watchman” – being used by the Sangh intellectual Dattopant Thengadi (1979) to describe the state.
  • Divisions within society are unnecessary and pathological; the only division that is of importance is the line between “society” and its Other. In neoliberalism, “civil society” – the social counterpart of the economic concept of the “market” – is the only legitimate social institution (a concept taken even further with the notion of “social capital”). As in Hindutva, classes, castes and other identities are fictions, with their roots in malign state interference and “political meddling.” In neoliberalism, the state itself takes the place of the “foreigner.” Welfare agencies, the bureaucracy, the legislature, political parties – all are ‘outside’ society and responsible for its “pathological” divisions. Political actors are socially illegitimate, and for both Hindutva and the neoliberals there is no worse crime than to “politicise” social issues.

Simply listing these principles already makes it apparent that they have become shrill themes in much English media coverage. Perhaps the best example is the reservations “debate.” Caste-based reservations are attacked on the ground that they violate the principles of individual “merit”, as per the first principle. Since the state’s role is to guarantee these principles and not interfere with them, the state is attacked for “meddling” with “meritocracy” rather than doing its job and providing infrastructure, education, etc. Finally, the reservations policy is attacked for “dividing” society along “caste lines” and its roots are seen as being “vote bank” politics. Yet, even though it would be totally contrary to neoliberal principles, much of the English media is happy to advocate economic reservations – which have long formed part of the individualised “social uplift” agenda preached by the Sangh Parivar, projecting reservations as charity rather than social justice. This inconsistency is a hallmark of the effort at finding shared ground.

In an earlier paper (13), I have explored other examples of how these principles play out in operation. Moreover, the media is not only concerned with emphasising the common areas between the two agendas – it has also become a site for de-emphasising and reshaping those aspects that are not in harmony between the two projects. Thus, both in the view of the media and in reality, the Sangh Parivar has backpedaled on those of its issues that are not of interest to neoliberals: swadeshi, most of all, but also such issues as Akhand Bharat, Article 370, the universal civil code, etc. The Sangh’s earlier emphasis on “austerity” has also been quietly forgotten. The media in turn projects this as the gradual “moderation” of the Hindutva forces as they join the “mainstream.”

Similar policy accommodations on the part of neoliberal ideologues are also visible on a close reading. Some of them include:

  • The continual and peculiar emphasis in Indian neoliberalism on “national self-confidence.” This is foreign to neoliberal ideology as such. Rather, it is a notion that clearly owes a great deal to Hindutva’s promotion of the concept of a “national self” that is weakened and sapped by its internal divisions. It is not an accident that exactly the same terminology  – “awakening”, “newfound confidence”, “assertiveness” – that was used by the Sangh Parivar to describe the Ayodhya movement is now used by neoliberals to describe India post 1991.
  • The endorsement of economic reservations, as described above.
  • The attitude towards NRI’s, seen as a kind of “vanguard” of both projects. NRI’s are projected as ideal Indians, representatives of what ‘India’ could achieve if Indians were ‘good’ individuals following correct social ‘values’. There could hardly be any message that neoliberalism and Hindutva agree upon more.

An Institutional and Political Alliance

These discursive adjustments form the face of a much deeper and growing relationship.(14) Such collaboration reached its most visible form at the national level during the NDA regime, when the Sangh Parivar and neoliberal ideologues cooperatively attempted to develop political praxis, institutional structures and hegemonic ideologies that allowed them to reap the advantages of a mutual alliance.

Among these moves were the accelerated privatisation of education, intensified repression of social movements and the opening of the Indian economy to NRI-driven foreign investment. The two projects also promoted “anti-terrorism” as the single most important agenda of the Indian state, while attempting to dissolve its commitment to any forms of “social justice”. The 2004 election campaign, with its celebration of “India Shining”, was a particularly evocative reflection of this alliance – India was shining because it was “growing” both economically and in “self-confidence” as a Hindu nation.

Meanwhile the Sangh Parivar, utilising its access to even enormous amounts of funds (significant amounts of which were either state or foreign-generated), institutionalised and formalised the “bargain” described above. The new pattern of expansion relied on the Sangh’s “seva” arms, which expanded enormously during the NDA regime. By the end of the NDA period, Vidya Bharati, the RSS educational organisation, was running – and still continues to run – the country’s largest private school network. Sangh Parivar outfits emerged as the largest “NGO’s” working in the tribal areas (Vanvasi Kalyan Ashram and its allies). In Orissa and in Gujarat, cadre recruitment grew on a massive scale through “relief” operations in the wake of the 1999 cyclone and the 2001 earthquake respectively.(15)

A key example of these new practices is the “ekal vidyalayas” in tribal areas, possibly the largest Sangh Parivar cadre recruitment activity today.(16) As per their website, there are 26,314 ekal vidyalayas in operation at the time of writing (17), but the actual number is likely to be far larger. In these schools, young tribal men and women are hired as acharyas (teachers), given brief ‘training’ and a curriculum, and asked to take regular classes for children out of school. In practice, neither the curriculum nor the training nor the student population is clear. There is no infrastructure other than irregular textbooks. Even where the acharya ceases to function, they at times carry on drawing their salary.

As such, the schoolchildren do not seem to be the target of the scheme. Rather, the acharyas themselves appear to be the main goal. One obvious attraction is the stable salary (between Rs. 300 and Rs. 500). Second, the appeals in the training are mostly not concerned with overt Hindutva or even Hindu appeals. Instead, the focus is on social service, the need for gaon vikas, and the problems of “division” introduced by ‘politics’. The youth are forbidden to join any political party or any social movement of the area. The stress of the ekal vidyalaya progam is on apolitical social service – which in our society is a high status occupation. Thus the program offers a combination of material security through the salary, and of social mobility by earning respect of those with higher social stature while participating in a high status social occupation.

But, once again, the “bargain” requires the acharya to choose individualisation and depoliticisation, except through their commitment to the Sangh. Thus, ekal vidyalayas and other Sangh ‘seva’ activities build a committed grassroots cadre for whom the “bargain” mentioned earlier is now given a formal, very concrete form: benefits to individuals who perform, and the fear of the loss of all such benefits and a return to being a ‘non-entity’ if one fails.

Such a cadre in turn benefits Indian capital in general and neoliberalism in particular, in exchange for which funds are provided, media access guaranteed and state support (even under the UPA) more or less constant. The result is to make it easier to counter a 1980s’ style of politics, greatly weakening the capacity of petty commodity producers to resist the attack on their livelihoods.

2004 and After

The experiment was partly cut short by the 2004 elections. However hegemonic the aspirations of the neoliberal-Hindutva alliance were, it had failed to achieve real hegemony in the electoral realm. But its successor, the UPA, has become a classic instance of a neoliberal regime that is not backed by an organised political force. It has pursued a schizophrenic political program, whose contradictions have offered space for some small popular gains along with an avalanche of neoliberal policies. It will also almost certainly become an example of how Indian neoliberalism, in the absence of a “totalitarian” party as its ally, devours the support base of its own regime.

A sharp contrast to this situation is the 2007 Gujarat elections, where arguably the Sangh-neoliberal alliance has had its first major and resounding victory. Bankrolled by big capital, publicly proclaimed to be the saviour of both business and nation, the Sangh rode to power against a fragmented opposition speaking the language and raising the issues of the 1980s – caste divides, farmers’ suicides and tribal distress, in addition to tokenistic ‘secularism.’ The Gujarat verdict was built around two simultaneous phenomena. The first was the total dominance of capital, with state support, over both the working class and petty commodity producers, who are at the mercy of big capital in the State. The resulting insecurity and constant sense of threat was fed off of by the Sangh, whose “bargain” became ever-more attractive in this context. The result was the Sangh-driven organisational destruction of all other political formations, whose cadres were poached or coopted into Sangh formations (those who would not, or could not, were repressed or killed). In this context, there was no serious opposition; the Sangh has indeed effectively achieved hegemony, and the totalitarian party has reached fruition.

This is not the only form these collaborations have taken. In Chhattisgarh, a different kind of collaboration has created Salwa Judum, a state supported militia formed by an unholy alliance between the security forces, the Vanvasi Kalyan Ashram (whose cadres are known to be closely involved) and corporate pressure for mineral extraction. Operating in the southern districts of Dantewada and Bijapur, the Salwa Judum has killed hundreds of adivasis and driven lakhs of people from their homes in the name of fighting the Maoists. The militia is mostly led by the elite among the adivasi communities of the area, those who are, in that sense, most commoditised and most accessible to the offers made by the state/Sangh/capital combine. Even as per official figures, more than 600 villages have been emptied of their population; their residents have either fled into the jungles or are trapped in horrific “relief camps” being run by the State government. There are credible allegations that at least part of the motivation for doing this is to ease the handing over of the land to mining corporations. Wiping out the Maoists, among the most dangerous defenders of petty commodity and subsistence production, is no doubt also a goal for Indian capital – and of course for the Sangh.

Whereas Gujarat is India’s most capitalist state, Chhattisgarh is probably among the least. A truly hegemonic form of this alliance cannot take place here, for the degree of commoditisation is insufficient. Hence the balance within hegemony shifts towards force and away from consent, and the form it takes is that of direct, brutal violence – accumulation by dispossession in the most inhuman manner.

Conclusion and Implications for Left Praxis

Neither of these experiments is immediately replicable at the national level, but we do left politics a serious disservice if we therefore dismiss the danger. We have long allowed ourselves to be comforted with descriptions of the Indian right as peddlers of false notions, fraudulent demagogues building castles in the air around “Hindu rashtra” and “India Shining.” In particular, we have believed that Hindutva is primarily an exercise in identity-based chauvinism, a hate politics targeting minorities through propaganda and disinformation. We have seen our role in tackling this threat as primarily being one of awareness raising, enlightenment and education.

The argument here has been that this interpretation of historical processes is incorrect. The Sangh in particular has achieved its incredible growth because it is a truly totalitarian party of the ruling class: responding to the needs of multiple social sectors, while presenting solutions to those needs in forms that correspond to the interests of the ruling classes. Fighting such projects cannot be limited to awareness raising alone. They must be confronted as organisations, to hinder and undermine their ability to offer the material-ideological ‘bargain’ that operates at their very foundation.

When the UPA government falls in 2009, as it is almost certain to do, there will be another chance for neoliberal-Hindutva alliances to explore their full possibilities at the national level. The situation is ripe for such politics to blossom again. At this time, if we do not fight the Sangh on the political level, we not only hinder the battle for ‘secularism’, we provide Indian neoliberalism with an extremely powerful ally. One can even speculate that the one cannot be defeated without at least weakening the other.

Notes

(1) This paper builds on the arguments made in an earlier paper (Gopalakrishnan 2006) but also modifies and attempts to place those arguments in a larger context.

(2) Jessop (1982).

(3) The term “totalitarian” is used by Gramsci’s translators as it is the most direct equivalent of the Italian term. However, the term is not meant to carry the negative implications or historical allusions to Nazism that it carries in English.

(4) Personal communication from Suhas Paranjape. Paranjape also describes two other spheres of production – household and subsistence – that are also very much a part of contemporary capitalist societies, but do not themselves rely on “pure” capitalist relations of production. It should be noted that the term “petty commodity production” is used here to avoid the confusion induced by the term “non-capitalist commodity production”, which seems to imply that this form of production is “external” to capitalism. But the former term is also somewhat misleading, in that such production is not “petty” in any physical sense – neither at an individual level nor in terms of its role in the larger social formation.

(5) Bernstein (2001, 2003).

(6) As said earlier, many petty commodity producers are effectively engaged in disguised wage labour in any case.

(7) The Congress may at the time have had more members than the BJP, but it is doubtful that the Congress and its fronts could together match the numbers of the Sangh Parivar as a whole.

(8) More detailed arguments on these points, and textual evidence from Hindutva texts to support them, can be found in Gopalakrishnan (2006).

(9) This quote is taken from a textbook distributed to adivasi “acharyas” (teachers) in ekal vidyalayas in Thane District, Maharashtra.

(10) I am not attempting to argue here that all capitalism is essentially authoritarian, or that all bourgeois democracies will inevitably culminate in fascism. Rather, I am extending Poulantzas’ argument that representative democracy and the concept of human rights – counterposed to fascism and authoritarianism as the quintessential achievements of liberal capitalism – are in fact the result and the manifestation of class struggle (Poulantzas 1978). He argues that the class struggle, when expressed on the terrain of the capitalist state, is manifested in the form of individual rights. Thus there is no inbuilt check against authoritarianism in the capitalist state, but the very ubiquity of the class struggle means that the actually existing authoritarian states are the result of exceptional social configurations.

(11) See for instance Jeffery and Basu (2001).

(12) With the exception of some films such as Guru or the Tamil blockbuster Sivaji.

(13) Gopalakrishnan (2006).

(14) I have made a more detailed exploration of some examples of these principles have playing out in the English media elsewhere (Gopalakrishnan 2006).

(15) For more details, see In Bad Faith: British Charity and Hindu Extremism , by AWAAZ – South Asia Watch.

(16) More details on this can be found in Gopalakrishnan and Sreenivasa (2007).

(17) http://ekalindia.org , last accessed on July 5th, 2008.

Bibliography

Basu, Amrita (1996). “Mass Movement or Elite Conspiracy?  The Puzzle of Hindu Nationalism”, in David Ludden (ed.)  Making India Hindu. New Delhi: Oxford University Press.

Bernstein, Henry (2001). “‘The Peasantry’ in Global Capitalism: Who, Where and Why?”, Socialist Register 2001.

Bernstein, Henry (2003). “Farewell to the Peasantry”, Transformation 52. Durban: University of Kwa-Zulu Natal.

Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) (1991). Election Manifesto 1991. New Delhi: Bharatiya Janata Party.

Chatterjee, Partha (1998). “Development Planning and the Indian State”, in T.J. Byres (ed.) The State, Development Planning and Liberalisation in India. New Delhi: Oxford University Press.

Corbridge, Stuart and John Harriss (2000). Reinventing India: Liberalisation, Hindu Nationalism and Popular Democracy.  Cambridge: Polity Press.

Dhanagare, D.N (1995). “The Class Character and Politics of Farmers’ Movement in Maharashtra during the 1980s”, in Tom Brass (ed.) New Farmers’ Movements in India.  Essex: Frank Cass.

Ghosh, Jayati and C.P. Chandrasekhar (2000). The Market That Failed. New Delhi: Leftword.

Golwalkar, M.S. (‘Guruji’) (1979).  “Integral Man”, in D. Upadhyaya, M.S. Golwalkar and D.B. Thengadi. The Integral Approach.  New Delhi: Deendayal Research Institute.

Gopalakrishnan, Shankar (2006).  “Defining, Constructing and Policing a ‘New India’: Exploring the Relationship Between Neoliberalism and Hindutva”, Economic and Political Weekly, June 30.

Gopalakrishnan, Shankar and Priya Sreenivasa (2007). “Carnivorous Flower: Bringing Adivasis Within the ‘Communal’ Fold”, Combat Law, May – June. New Delhi: Human Rights Law Network.

Gramsci, Antonio (1971).  Selections from the Prison Notebooks.  London: Lawrence and Wishart.

Hall, Stuart (1979). “The Great Moving Right Show”, Marxism Today, January.

Harriss-White (2003). India Working: Essays on Society and Economy.  Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Harriss-White, Barbara and Nandini Gooptu (2001).  “Mapping India’s World of Unorganized Labour”, Socialist Register 2001.

Harvey, David (2003). “New Imperialism: Accumulation By Dispossession”, Socialist Register 2004, pp. 63-87.

Jaffrelot, Christopher (1999). The Hindu Nationalist Movement and Indian Politics. New Delhi: Penguin India.

Jeffery, Patricia and Amrita Basu (eds.) (2001).  Resisting the Sacred and the Secular: Women’s Activism and Politicised Religion in South Asia.  New Delhi: Kali for Women.

Patnaik, Prabhat (2005). “The Economics of the New Phase of Imperialism”, Macroscan.org , August 26.

Poulantzas, Nicos (1978). State, Power, Socialism. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. (Tr. Patrick Camiller, reprinted by Verso in 2000).

Rajagopal, Arvind (1999).  “Brand Logics and the Cultural Forms of Political Society in India”, Social Text, 17:3.

Rajagopal, Arvind (2001).  Politics After Television: Religious Nationalism and the Reshaping of the Indian Public.  Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Rodrik, Dani and Subramaniam, Arvind (2004).  “From ‘Hindu Growth’ to Productivity Surge: The Mystery of the Indian Growth Transition”, NBER Working Paper 10376, March.

Sarkar, Tanika (2001).  “Women, Community and Nation”, in Patricia Jeffery and Amrita Basu (eds.) Resisting the Sacred and the Secular: Women’s Activism and Politicised Religion in South Asia.  New Delhi: Kali for Women.

Thengadi, D.B. (1979).  “Integral Humanism – A Study”, in D. Upadhyaya, M.S. Golwalkar and D.B. Thengadi.The Integral Approach.   New Delhi: Deendayal Research Institute.

Upadhyaya, Deenadayal (1979).  “Integral Humanism”, in D. Upadhyaya, M.S. Golwalkar and D.B. Thengadi.The Integral Approach.   New Delhi: Deendayal Research Institute.

Upadhyaya, Deenadayal (1979b).  “Harmony Between the Individual and the Collectivity”, in D. Upadhyaya, M.S. Golwalkar and D.B. Thengadi. The Integral Approach.   New Delhi: Deendayal Research Institute.

Vanaik, Achin (1990).  The Painful Transition: Bourgeois Democracy in India.  London: Verso.

Capital and capitalists nannied by the states: An Interview with Amiya Kumar Bagchi

Amiya K Bagchi“Capital and capitalists will continue to be nannied by the states they control, unless the crisis intensifies the struggles of workers and peasants to change this horrendously unjust and murderous social and political order. Nor will borrowers of recapitalized banks or the insured of the US company AIG benefit from lower interest rates, better access to credit or insurance or less discriminatory insurance rates. The new managers will be busy guarding the capital of their respective managed entities. Unless the rulers are made to see that money market instruments are not the proper vehicles to deliver affordable credit or insurance to the poor and are forced to carry out the structural changes needed to embody that perspective in practice, the old order will continue when the recession subsides.”  

Radical Notes: Can you explain the nature of the current crisis and how it developed?

Amiya Kumar Bagchi (AKB): A full explanation of the current crisis will be a book-length study. The immediate causes of the crisis can be put as follows: (a) unbridled financial liberalization, the most significant components of which have been the further elaboration of derivatives, including securitized products, increasing the non-transparency of the financial market, (b) the effective demolition of the distinction between deposit banks specializing in loans and investment banks, (c) conversion of the dollar into virtually the sole source of global liquidity, even while keeping a major fraction of the world’s economies in a condition of endemic deficiency of effective demand and (d) the rapid emergence of housing and related markets as sectors of the most intense speculative activity.

Radical Notes: As an economic historian, do you find any uniqueness in the present crisis in comparison to the past ones?

AKB: Capitalism has been racked by speculative crises, almost from the moment of its birth. One of the earliest of such crises was the Tulip Mania in the Netherlands in the 1630s. The second speculative crisis in order of occurrence was the crisis of 1720-21 centring around the so-called Mississippi project in France and the South Sea Company in England: this crisis threatened to engulf much of Western Europe at the time. If we take England only, there were severe banking crises in almost every decade from the 1820s , with the Baring Crisis of 1890-91, characterizing the last decade. In that crisis, the inability of Baring Bros to meet its obligations arising out of its over-exposure to loans to the Argentine government threatened to involve the whole British financial system. That is arguably the first time that the Bank of England acted as the lender of last resort. (Baring Bros collapsed in 1995, as a result of Nick Leeson, its bureau chief in Singapore, losing his bet on movements of Nekkei and the firm’s capital of £800 million disappeared). Then you have the biggest financial crisis of the twentieth century, namely, the Great Depression of the 1930s, which really ended with the onset of World War II that saw the stepping up of military and other public expenditure to unprecedented heights.

But as any student of history knows, you never step into the same stream twice. Capitalism in particular has been like a super-chameleon, transforming not only its colour but also its apparent structural relations every few decades. The changes preceding the current crisis are no exception. The uniqueness of the crisis can probably be described as a situation in which governments, so-called specialists in finance not only ignored the totally non-transparent manner in which banks, investment brokers and non-bank financial institutions carried on their business, but positively cheered them in the belief that this was the way to create wealth. One of the most ironic symbols of this atmosphere is the compilation and celebration of the growth of wealth of the ‘High Net Value Individuals’ (HNVIs) by Merrill Lynch, a firm that had to merge with Bank of America in order to stave off bankruptcy.

Radical Notes: Can we understand the present crisis as a crisis of imperialism and the US hegemony?

AKB:
 Yes, we can. But we must remember that other G7 countries are also implicated in the US hegemony, and even China’s current pattern of growth is symbiotically related to US hegemony. Whether the crisis will lead to a decline in the murderousness of the US military operations remains an open question. As I have argued earlier, capital wants to win in competition, if necessary in the last instance by using armed conflict. The prospect of a USA threatened with the loss of hegemony using its fearsome arsenal of weapons of mass destruction is mind-numbing.

Radical Notes: How do you assess the impact of the crisis on the developing countries?

AKB:
 In many developing countries, there are no real stock markets and even if there are, their operations do not have much of an impact on firms which are often too small to be able to raise money in the stock market. In many of them, earlier depredations of imperialism, its domestic collaborators and its agencies such as the IMF and the World Bank have led to the exclusion of most economic agents from formal credit markets. The so-called success of micro-credit agencies in Bangladesh, for example, was built not only on loans extended by foreign lenders but also on the destruction of public sector banking by local businessmen defaulting on their loans. Organizations blessed by the World Bank and foreign donors fished in such turbid waters.

The direct effect of the present crisis on such countries may not be great. But they will suffer through the further decline in the demand for their output in foreign and domestic markets because of the global recession. The countries, which have depended greatly on foreign capital for stimulation of their economies such as India, will also suffer through minor or major currency crises and the downsizing of the transactional enterprises operating in those countries and badly affected by the crisis. In the immediate future, the most distressing effect for the common people will continue to be the loss of employment in construction, services and the manufacturing sector and the high cost of food grains, induced by underinvestment in agriculture in developing countries, speculation in commodities by the big finance houses and others and the diversion of cropland to the highly subsidized biofuel in developed market economies, especially the USA.

Radical Notes: A recent report says that India and China – which are considered by many as the bulwark of capitalist growth in the 21st century – have witnessed the steepest market declines between December 2007 and September 2008. They “have lost almost 51% of market capitalization, or m-cap, and this figure could be much higher if the declines of the last fortnight are taken into account.” As latest reports indicate, industries in India, especially the aviation industry, have already started shifting the brunt of the crisis on labour, through various means. Do you think these developments are indications toward a full-fledged crisis around the corner?

AKB: As far as China is concerned, the slide in stock prices will not have a major effect on the economy, because stocks traded in the Shanghai market provide finance only to a small fraction of firms in the Chinese economy. But the effect on India is obvious not only from the retrenchments already announced by aviation companies and IT firms but also by the continued outflow of FII funds from India and consequent decline in the value of the Indian rupee. The Indian manufacturing sector was already showing a downward trend in fiscal 2007-08, and that trend has strengthened in recent weeks as shown by the Index of Industrial Production (IIP). It is disingenuous of the Finance Minister to call the IIP “not very reliable” when his government has done so much to massage the official statistics so as to produce a favourable picture of its performance in the economic field.

Radical Notes: The Reserve Bank of India (RBI) too is taking measures to ensure liquidity and boost confidence. As a historian of India’s banking sector, how do you assess India’s financial-structural ability to withstand such crisis at this juncture? How much do you think the neo-liberal policies that subsequent governments have pursued eroded this ability?

AKB: Fortunately, despite all the attempts of successive governments at the Centre since 1991 to force the pace of ‘economic reforms’, the worst of their designs could not be carried through. These include full capital account convertibility, complete privatisation of the banking and insurance sectors, and total abolition of the distinction between banks and non-banking finance companies. Every time either major international crises or electoral compulsions have stayed their hand. In 1997 and this time around, financial crisis in Asia and the global financial crisis have prevented the enforcement of capital account convertibility. The strength of Indian public sector banks compared with their private counterparts is there for all to see. The worst development under the neo-liberal regime is the naked play of money and communalism in determining the positions all major centrist or right-wing parties have adopted. Another major casualty has been the fiscal stance of the state. It will take quite an effort to get the rich to pay their taxes and to stop the indulgence the state has displayed towards punters and hot money merchants in the financial sector. The quality of Indian democracy has been further sullied under the neo-liberal regime. Hence the ability of the regime to handle the resolution of the crisis in national interest has been badly impaired.

Radical Notes: Various commentators have suggested that the bailing out strategies of different governments throughout the world has ultimately brought the state back in. What is the merit of such conclusion? Can we see this return of the state as just a moment, for which Milton Friedman once said the role of government is “to do something that market cannot do for itself”?

AKB: Yes, the state has been brought in but only to save the illegitimate earnings of the crony capitalists. Will Mr Richard Fuld, CEO of Lehman Bros, be made to disgorge the nearly $500 million he earned from his stock options and bonuses? In the financial year 2007-08 alone, according to Forbes.com, Fuld earned $71.50 million and in the preceding 5 years he had earned $354 million. When Lehman applied for Chapter 11 bankruptcy, Fuld took $22 million from the firm as retirement benefit. What applies to the top managers of  Lehman also applies to those of Wachovia and Merrill Lynch, to UBS of Switzerland which is being recapitalized by the Swiss government or Northern Rock, the hosing mortgage bank, which has been bailed out by the Bank of England. In 2004, I published an article with the self-explanatory title, “Nanny state for capital and Social Darwinism for Labour” (Indian Journal of Labour Economics, 47(1), January-March). Capital and capitalists will continue to be nannied by the states they control, unless the crisis intensifies the struggles of workers and peasants to change this horrendously unjust and murderous social and political order. Nor will borrowers of recapitalized banks or the insured of the US company AIG benefit from lower interest rates, better access to credit or insurance or less discriminatory insurance rates. The new managers will be busy guarding the capital of their respective managed entities. Unless the rulers are made to see that money market instruments are not the proper vehicles to deliver affordable credit or insurance to the poor and are forced to carry out the structural changes needed to embody that perspective in practice, the old order will continue when the recession subsides.

Amiya Kumar Bagchi is India’s foremost political economist and economic historian. He is the Director of the Institute of Development Studies Kolkata. He was a member of the State Planning Board until 2005, Government of West Bengal and was recently Chairman of a committee appointed by the Government of West Bengal to report on the finances of the government during the Tenth Five Year Plan period. He acted as the official historian of The State Bank of India until 1997. His recent works include (co-edited with Gary A.Dymski) Capture and Exclude: Developing Economies and the Poor in Global Finance, Tulika, New Delhi, 2007, The Perilous Passage: Mankind and the Global Ascendancy of Capital, Rowman and Littlefield, Lanham, Maryland, USA, 2005, The Developmental State in History and in the Twentieth Century, Regency Publications, New Delhi, 2004, and  Capital and Labour Re-defined: India and the Third World, Tulika, New Delhi and Anthem Press, London, 2002.

Fictitious Capital and Real Compacts

Anitra Nelson

Perhaps we need a Marxian to sort out the world’s financial woes. The insights of Karl Marx on capitalist crises, especially speculation and financial crises, were sophisticated for his time. Indeed, this nineteenth century communist revolutionary called financial assets and loans ‘fictitious capital’ or ‘imaginary wealth’ as distinct from ‘real capital’  – industrial or productive capital – such as factories and commodity stocks.

The first part of this article discusses Marx’s concepts of crises and fictitious capital in the current international financial climate. It relies on my doctoral study, which was published in 1999, Marx’s Concept of Money: the god of commodities (Routledge, London). Many contemporary commentators focus on what might be done to remedy the situation. Instead the second part starts from the premise that the current crisis illustrates the very destructive and inhumane nature of capitalism and argues for instituting a humane and ecologically sustainable world without money. This second part draws from my site – Money Free Zone.

Fictitious capital

Marx stressed that stocks and shares are often exchanged at ‘prices’ at variance with the value of the real assets that they represent. In other words, financial capital circulates relatively autonomously of the productive process from which it arises and on which it depends, an endless tango, contributing to capitalist cycles and financial crises.

The current speculative boom in the USA has focused on housing investments. A pass-the-parcel style of lending evolved. Lenders were so cocky that borrowers would repay unabated, successive interests enthusiastically bought in down the line through mortgage-backed securities. This has led to a domino-like fall of credit once repayments seized up and as defaults rose. Hyman Minsky (1) has elaborated on this model of lending and its role in capitalist crises.

Repayments were jeopardised by wild lending practices, which meant that home loans were provided to many borrowers who had little hope of repaying. In a neo-conservative policy climate, it was assumed that the market, lending institutions, would price such loans for risk (through insurance). Though less severe than in the USA, in Australia lending was characterised by greater quantities and varieties of household credit (see Steve Keen’s Oz Debtwatch site ). This kind of lending has strongly contributed to the current international financial crisis, in terms of over-speculation.

In Capital III Marx writes that when a sufficient proportion of capitalists invest, i.e. lend, without receiving repayments plus interest or profits, a generalised crisis will evolve of the dimensions we are now experiencing:

“If the reproduction process has reached the flourishing stage that precedes that of overexertion, commercial credit undergoes a very great expansion… the point when jobbers first enter the picture on a notable scale, operating without reserve capital or even without capital at all, i.e. completely on money credit… Interest now rises… It reaches its maximum again as soon as the new crisis breaks out, credit suddenly dries up, payments congeal, the reproduction process is paralysed and… there is an almost absolute lack of loan capital…(2)

With mortgage-backed securities both borrower and lender rely on the houses’ maintaining their value. Everything is inclined to tumble if either house prices fall or borrowers’ incomes are threatened enough to compromise their ability to keep making loan repayments. In fact, defaults and falling prices tend to stimulate one another, setting up a negative dynamic. This has happened in New Zealand, Australia, the USA and the UK.

Capital: money begetting more money

Basically, all investment lays bets on future returns. Investment is always a gamble. Indeed the rationale for capitalists’ making profits is embedded in return for risk. If the risk doesn’t pay off, they lose their money. So be it. Of course, this accepted reward for risk is turned on its head if those responsible for over-lending are ‘bailed-out’ by the US and so many other, including Australian, governments.

In Marx’s time similar dilemmas raised the same quibbles:

“…where the entire interconnection of the reproduction process rests on credit, a crisis must evidently break out if credit is suddenly withdrawn and only cash payment is accepted, in the form of a violent scramble for means of payment. At first glance, therefore, the entire crisis presents itself as simply a credit and monetary crisis… On top of this, however, a tremendous number of… purely fraudulent deals, which now come to light and explode; as well as unsuccessful speculations conducted with borrowed capital… It is clear that this entire artificial system of forced expansion of the reproduction process cannot be cured by now allowing one bank, e.g. the Bank of England, to give all the swindlers the capital they lack in paper money… Moreover, everything here appears upside down, since in this paper world the real price and its real elements are nowhere to be seen… This distortion is particularly evident in centres such as London, where the monetary business of an entire country is concentrated…”.(3)

Today, of course, we have an international economy and one of the prime financial centres in question is Wall Street, New York.

However, as Marx stressed, the irony of the ideal of the individual in capitalism is in the omnipotence of the economic system over capitalists and workers and the dependence of our whole society and politics on growth. Thus we cannot afford to let the swindlers go to hell, because they will drag us there with them (while we cling to capitalism).

Material bases for crises

For Marx, economic crises were endemic and exogenous features of capitalism, which occurred at any time of substantial or widespread interruption to the production or circulation of commodities. Because capitalists act independently, indeed competitively, the result is a constant tendency to crises. Demand and supply is unorganised at every level (individual firms, particular sectors and national capital) and there is the constant necessity for generalised growth, based on profits (invested capital), which might not eventuate.

Thus the precarious material bases of capitalism sensitised the system to crises resulting from imbalances of demand and supply between different sectors of production, overproduction or underconsumption (workers not being paid enough to buy the products they create) and speculation. Speculation or unwise investment appears after the fact in all these cases. At the same time, overinvestment – too many people wanting to invest and gain returns from the available capitalist activities – also leads to bubbles or boom. Then they burst or bust. So, while poor regulation or lack of regulation of lending institutions might exaggerate a crisis, no specific regulation of banks could avert the general and constant phenomenon of capitalist crises.

Today, too, many commentators are arguing that throwing money at Wall Street and lenders not only means throwing proverbial good money after bad but might not solve the problem because it is not simply a credit crisis. One argument has been that the ‘bail out’ must provide ‘little’ people with mortgage repayment support, not for reasons of social justice but because such support is critical in material terms to overcome the basis of the crisis. Home purchasers must be supported so they can keep repaying their mortgages and keep the lenders solvent. This way the crisis finds some floor, or safety net.

These arguments accord with Marx’s materialist analysis, which was based on the exploitation of workers by investors, entrepreneurs and managers. Marx’s materialism was centred in human behaviour; the economic categories of profits and growth were social creations dependent on slave-like deliverance of commodity and service-producing labour to capitalists. This system requires the constant ritual of work for monetary pay, money in a sense circulating effort, assets standing for past labour.

Rising house prices

The last decade of burgeoning household debt in Australia has been accompanied by rising residential house prices. A mainstream analysis suggests too few houses and apartments, the need for government to open up and service more land and high-rise buildings in cities. This analysis fails to refer to inequities within our country, namely rising numbers of households that have two houses, such as families with holiday houses and a second house inhabited by student children.

Current mainstream analyses also tend to deflect attention from the most interesting aspect of the current lending boom – pushing up house prices, in effect incorporating speculation within ordinary households. In Australia, as house prices have risen to levels which have alarmed the International Monetary Fund, rents have increased strongly too.

Today, in Australia, paying for a home and superannuation complicates worker-employer relations. You could say that each worker has become a bit of a capitalist. Or, you could reason that workers not only get paid less than the value of the result of their work but also pay substantial proportions of their wages back to capitalists in the form of borrowing for larger and more expensive homes and by mandatory investments in superannuation.

Thus, workers are even more exploited in invisible or contradictory ways. Tenants link into the same structure – there is no escape. However, Marx was not the first to recognise that the game is one of mutual hostages. Around half of the finance lent by Australian banks today goes to, and comes from, mortgagors. If they were alive now, the authors of the Communist Manifesto, Marx and Engels, might well rally: ‘Borrowers of all countries unite…'(4)

Real compacts (v. fictitious capital)

Part of the reason that I chose Marx’s concept of money as the subject of a doctoral study related to my experiences as an activist, especially in the women’s liberation and environmental movements, and reflection that the basic building block of the capitalist system is money. By the end of that study, which involved reading many people’s ideas about what money was – and how it ‘worked’! – I decided that the only way forward was to dispense with money altogether. Some of those thoughts were expressed in an article published in 2001 – ‘The poverty of money: Marxian insights for ecological economists’ (Ecological Economics36, 499-511). Late last year I brought together my thoughts about experiences in cooperatives and with permaculture, and from reading and discussions on utopian and other literature at a site – Money Free Zone.

The Compact site calls for a ‘compact’ society. Compact means both ‘an agreement’ and ‘small and efficient’. The argument is that money-free social relations, a ‘compact society’, will enable, embody and reproduce fairness, equity and sustainability. In a compact society our everyday practices will be modest and effective, minimising resource and energy use to meet simple and basic needs. We need to even out the inequalities between people within regions and between regions.

The idea is that formal collective agreements, compacts, will enable us to act in concert, to avoid some people’s activities undermining other people’s efforts. Networks of compacts will form the basis of compact neighbourhoods, compact communities, compact regions and a planetary compact society.

Visions and strategies for establishing sustainable practices proliferate but are in conflict with economic prerogatives that still dominate decision-making and actions. Capitalist practices are based on trade, exchanging goods and services for money, and producing goods and services for trade. The whole production process and decisions about how and what to produce are centred on the market.

This market logic uses monetary calculations. It is as if money is our common god, our central value, and provides the principles for all our main relationships and activities. Within this mainstream perspective, even sustainability initiatives must be ‘economic’, an example being the dominance of ‘triple bottom line’ approaches. Thus the world is still seen through capitalist eyes: fragmented in units in accordance with economic criteria and credentials, i.e. profitability.

Current sustainability initiatives are failing because really sustainable practices require that non-monetary values, principles and relations rule our decision-making and activities. To be sustainable we need to treat everything according to their use-value and use-value efficiencies, i.e. minimising needs and environmental impacts, and use-values must include ecological values.

Thus we must dispense with the market requirement of monetary values and calculations, i.e. capitalist determinations and complications, structuring business around assets and flows, credits and debits. Ecological processes and dynamics are hard enough to understand and manage without overlaying needs to make production and exchange sensible in terms of markets.

The concept of ‘compact’ is akin to ‘contract’ but involves none of the monetary values and financial risks common in contracts. Compacts have the potential to provide the political and economic building blocks of a world without monetary relations and values. Compacts would commonly involve at least two parties that agree, for instance, to share the use-rights and responsibilities of a resource base or to provide one another with goods and or services. In other words compacts would express agreements over the use and management of resources necessary to enable people to exist modestly and to share responsibilities as stewards of the earth and all its natural communities.

Compacts and networks offer viable forms for people to take and share direct power. Compacts would encompass all kinds of activities, including collective production and spheres of exchange, organised locally and in local-to-local networks. Thus we refer to a ‘compact movement’ as networks of socially fair compacts between groups and individuals, compacts that respect environmental sustainability and that will merge to form a dynamic path to rational, humane and sustainable livelihoods.

Many people have some relationships and practices consistent with a vision of compact communities. A ‘compact movement’ is already apparent in individual acts and voluntary associations as people place humane and environmental principles and values above monetary, capitalist ones. Generalising such values and formalising them in compacts will create alternative forms of governance, ultimately a global compact society.

This vision is not wholly new: many liberation philosophies point in the direction of a planetary compact society. Anarchism, permaculture, humanism and communism give priority to equity and fairness between people along with living in modest and sustainable ways, respecting nature. Associated principles and values have been expressed in the writings and actions of many philosophers and activists. However, a key distinction of the compact vision from numerous others is that production and exchange on the basis of people’s and planetary (ecological) needs will take place without using money, or monetary values, principles and relationships.

Networks refer to the internal communications and relations between members within compacts as well as external connections comprising further compacts and other kinds of relations supporting compacts. For instance, a household would be organised by way of a compact which, in turn, would be a member of other compacts specifically formed to sustain the household and to help its members to sustain other people within their neighbourhood comprising people and the local natural and built environment.

Current capitalist practices contradict universal human rights to basic needs such as food, clothing, shelter, safety and care. Every activity involves monetary considerations at some level, shackling direct and sensible responses to human and environmental needs. Non-monetary compacts and networks would work directly with available human skills and effort, and energy and materials assessed in terms of their use-values.

Every human being would have a right to basic needs and would be a member of compacts designed to fulfil those needs at the same time as belonging to networks that would make them responsible for fulfilling other people’s basic needs and care for the local environment. Planning and distribution formalised in compacts would be facilitated using electronic communication, which would link households with neighbourhood precincts and broader, sub-bioregional communities and bioregional networks.

Compacts and networks would be diverse, fulfilling a variety of purposes for numerous members. As basic ways of organising, formal compacts would offer robust and stable forms for local to global organisation of all kinds of activities, from those directed at fulfilling basic needs and wants to cultural and recreational ones. Permaculture and alternative, appropriate, technologies for generating energy and extracting and processing resources offer ready-made ways to proceed.

Some people would need to resettle according to the natural opportunities and limits of local and regional environments. Even so, place-based living would allow for mobility outside local groups, especially for members with skills and knowledge to share. Non-monetary exchange has always relied on customary rights and responsibilities with local and personal variations associated with social and environmental circumstances and developments. Non-monetary exchange will involve compacts and networks that allow groups to have access to basic needs and wants from outside the local area when necessary.

The deficiencies of local collective self-sufficiency and production for direct use-values can be overcome through low levels of exchange enabled by e-communication, negotiated on terms specific to the potential and limits of the people and landscape in question. Thus spheres of exchange would be minimal and formal and either of mutual advantage to two exchanging individuals or communities or involve multilateral benefits to many individuals or communities.

Strategies

The transition to a world without money – which is only to say that the conditions are laid for humans to establish communities based on social justice and environmental sustainability – would be created by, on the one hand, diminishing production and exchange based on a monetary, capitalist rationale and, on the other hand, progressively taking over production and exchange using non-monetary compacts. Collectively, our actions would weaken a reliance on capitalist practices and strengthen networks of compacts as alternative forms of governance, production and exchange.

Permaculture (permanent, sustainable agricultural practices and principles of designing sustainable livelihoods) offers ways to think about, plan, strategise and act to create a world that is socially just as well as environmentally sustainable. Permaculture emphasises self-reliance, production for direct use, minimising exchanges and concentrating them in the local area, working collectively and with nature rather than competitively and to control nature.

Monetary exchanges and production for the market must be re-modelled into exchanges that focus not only on the use-values of the produced and exchanged goods and services but also on the parties to such exchanges. Thus production and exchanges would be formally planned, centre on collective sufficiency based on bioregions managed for environmental sustainability and would involve production and exchange only marginally for identified, specific, external groups and environments.

Sustainability requires the end of the market, production for trade, and trade. Instead, we must care for the earth, care for people, and share the surplus.


Dr Anitra Nelson
 is a writer, researcher and filmmaker who lives in the Blue Mountains (New South Wales, Australia). Currently she is a Senior Research Associate at RMIT University (Melbourne), researching mortgage default in Australia. Since her PhD, Marx’s Concept of Money: the god of commodities , was published in 1999 by Routledge (London) she contributed a chapter to Marx’s Theory of Money: Modern Appraisals (Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), edited by Fred Moseley, and concentrated her studies on ecological sustainability. Most recently, she has jointly authored, with Frans Timmerman, ‘2020’, a review of Australia’s options for cutting carbon emissions (D!ssent, #27, Spring 2008: 47-52) and edited and contributed chapters to Steering Sustainability in an Urbanizing World: policy, practice and performance (Ashgate, London, 2007).

Notes

(1) For more on Minsky and his financial instability hypothesis, see –http://cepa.newschool.edu/het/profiles/minsky.htm

(2) K. Marx (1981, orig. 1894) Capital: A Critique of Political Economy Volume III [David Fernbach translation] Penguin Books Harmondsworth: 619-20. [Chapter 30, if reading another edition.]

(3) Ibid: 621-22.

(4) Following the final paragraph of K. Marx & F. Engels (1847-48) The Manifesto of the Communist Party, often referred to as The Communist Manifesto. In a recent Australian edition published by Ivy Press (Wingfield, South Australia) in their Manifesto Series with an introductory critique by David Boyle, this paragraph (70) reads:

“The Communists disdain to conceal their views and aims. They openly declare that their ends can be attained only by the forcible overthrow of all existing social conditions. Let the ruling classes tremble at a communist revolution. The proletarians have nothing to lose but their chains. They have a world to win. WORKERS OF ALL COUNTRIES, UNITE!”