Development Strategy and Problems of Democratisation in a Peripheral Country

The Bangladesh Experience

Anu Muhammad
Although national elections are taking place regularly since 1991, the democratic process in Bangladesh is still in a vulnerable state. This paper attempts to understand the nature of socio-economic development that has become dominant in the country and also to understand whether this has links with the fragility of the democratic process. It argues that the peripheral status of the country is very important to look at to find constraints to develop institutions that are essential to have a strong foundation of the democratic polity.

Introduction

Bangladesh inherited economy, administration, legal system and socio-physical infrastructure from Pakistan, but people struggled for an independent state to have different development paradigm and socio-political relations. High expectations for quick and all-embracing development of the economy and democratisation of the society were not unusual in a newly independent state of Bangladesh especially after the long struggle for emancipation and the war of liberation in 1971.

However, the thirty-five years experience since independence presents a different scenario. During the period, Bangladesh has gone through several socio-economic changes and reforms. The country is now more open and integrated with the global economy and more under global governance too. Despite these changes, Bangladesh remains a poverty stricken country and a weak democracy. On the other hand, a new super rich class has emerged through the ‘primitive’ nature of accumulation. Violence and grabbing of common properties have risen with the growth in GDP and increasing resource potential.

Although national elections are taking place regularly since 1991, the democratic process is still in a vulnerable state. This paper attempts to understand the nature of socio-economic development that has become dominant in the country and also to understand whether this has links with the fragility of the democratic process. I would like to argue that the peripheral status of the country is very important to look at to find constraints to develop institutions that are essential to have a strong foundation of the democratic polity.

Historical perspective

The road map to Bangladesh’s emergence as a nation state began with the partitioning of British India into India and Pakistan in 1947. At that time, Pakistan consisted of two geographically separate territories. The Eastern part, later became Bangladesh, had been suffering from regional and ethnic discrimination in different forms. From the very beginning, Pakistan has been highly dependent on a military-civil bureaucracy. Instability in civil governments and perpetual military rule were a reflection of that. Its client position was defined by the Pakistan-US military pact and by a long and decisive involvement of US consultants in shaping Pakistan’s planning, development and institutions.

Although formal military rule started in Pakistan in 1958, the military had exerted power since the beginning because of the country’s fragile civil rule and institutions. Martial law, therefore, “was brought about by men who were already participants in the existing political system and who had institutional bases of power within that system. Long before the coup, the military had been working as a silent partner in the civil-military bureaucratic coalition that held the key decision-making power in the country” (Jahan, 1972, 52).

This concentration of political power was well suited with the concentration of economic power. By 1968, the distribution of resources showed a highly skewed picture. According to the then chief economist of Pakistan Planning Commission, “66% of all industrial profits, 97% of the insurance funds, and 80% of the banks in the country were controlled by some twenty families.”(1) And all these twenty families were from West Pakistan.

Economic disparities along with regional and ethnic discrimination had given birth to a long democratic struggle in the then East Pakistan. That struggle turned into a nine month long decisive armed struggle in 1971 when the (west) Pakistani military junta started a barbaric military operation, including genocide, rape, and loot, on the people of East Pakistan. The junta went for total repression in order to stop the possibility of transferring power to the newly elected parliament, the majority of which was from the eastern part, now Bangladesh.

Global Agenda: Local Shaping

After independence, Bangladesh failed to alter the power matrix in social and economic fields that had prevailed in Pakistan, also in the British period. The structures and hierarchies of civil and military institutions, created during the British rule, were kept intact in Bangladesh; similarly, the legal and judicial systems remained untouched; and the land administration, despite land reform measures taken in 1972 and 1984, remained unchanged.

Moreover, the economic front has gone through an increasing assertion of ‘neo-liberal’ ideology what we can call ‘economic fundamentalism’. Despite the existence of elected parliaments and ‘vibrant civil society’, the increasing authority of the Global Institutions (GI), G-7 countries and their decisive involvement in policy formulation and implementation have obstructed the process of transparency, people’s participation and the effective system of accountability.(2) On the contrary, this phenomenon helped a highly corrupt lumpen ruling class to grow and govern.

The ‘development’ projects and programmes sponsored by the GIs that have played a key role in accelerating the process of marketisation, privatisation of the economy and its deeper integration with the centre economies include:(i) the Green Revolution (ii) Structural Adjustment Program (iii) Poverty Alleviation Programs (iv) GATT agreement (v) Foreign aid supported trade, technical assistance, reform, consultancy, training and education. The current Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) is the latest in the series.(3) These programmes and projects also have played and continue to play a crucial role in determining the societal shape and class composition, and in creating a strong support base for the anti-democratic hegemony. The resultants have close links with the vulnerability of the democratic polity and institutions in the country (see Table 1 for the ‘development’ records).

Table-1: Programs initiated in Bangladesh by global institutions in different periods

Period

Programs initiated

Significance

1950s and after

Foreign aid, education and training program, Krug mission, and water resource projects.

Structures on rivers, canals, and khals.

New generation of experts, skill manpower dependent on aid-consultancy.

1960s and after

Green Revolution.

Mono crop and increasing market orientation of agriculture. Ecological imbalances, contamination of water and land.

1970s and after

Poverty Alleviation Programs, NGOs.

New institutions and civil society compatible with the philosophy of GIs.

1980s and after

Structural Adjustment Program (SAP)

De-industrialization, de-regulation, privatisation, trade liberalisation and expansion of service sector.

1990s

GATT Agreement

Opening up common properties to the profit making activities.

2001 and after

Poverty Reduction Strategic Paper (PRSP)

Sugar coated ‘Structural Adjustment Program’.

Socio-Economic Development: Formation and Erosion(4)

At the time of independence, both rural and urban societies of the country were mostly composed of small owners: petty traders, low and middle-income professionals, small and medium farmers, small entrepreneurs. Except large farmers and jotedars, a big propertied class based on industry or on trade was almost non-existent. That societal composition has radically changed during the last three decades. Big propertied multimillionaires have grown to thousands in this period and new occupations related to the service sector emerged. However, studies reveal that this super rich class has either little or negative relations with the growth of manufacturing (Siddiqui, 1995).

Agriculture accounted for the largest share of both the labour force and of GDP in the early 1970s. After three decades, agriculture’s proportion in GDP came down by one-third, but manufacturing could not capture the dominant position in the process (GOB, 2006). The service sector, as a whole, has emerged as the single largest sector contributing more than half of the GDP. The growth of Malls has gained absolute authority over dismantled big mills.(5)

However, there are differences in different sub-sectors within the manufacturing sector (see table 2). A positive growth is seen for the export-oriented ones and for construction, while a negative growth is recorded for the old large manufacturing units in the country. Since the early 1980s, many of the old enterprises, public and private, were closed or downsized and gradually replaced by the export-oriented ones.(6) Due to the closure of many large-scale factories, mainly in jute, paper, sugar and steel industries, and sickness of medium and small enterprises, the number of industrial workforce shrunk, despite new entry in export-oriented garment industries and Export Processing Zones (EPZ).

Table 2: Ups and Downs within Manufacturing Sector

Growth Pole

Industries

Significance

Positive growth, High range (more than 10%)

Cement, MS Rod

Construction boom: real estate and super markets.

Positive growth, Low range (less than 10%)

Garments, Tea, Beverage, Soap and detergent

Leather and leather products

Production for global market and new consumer items.

Negative growth. High range

Jute Textiles, Fertilizer

Public sector, large unit. Home market.

Negative growth, Low range

Sugar, Paper, Iron & Steel

Public sector, large unit. Home market.

Source: Based on data in Bakht (2000)

Bangladesh’s external trade has increased manifold since independence. Both import and export have expanded, although the trade gap remains high, as the volume of imports has increased faster than that of exports. The increase in imports took place consistently with reform measures to liberalize them, i.e., lowering import duty and removing trade and non-trade barriers. Garments capture the single largest share in export earnings, where most of the workers are women and ill-paid.

The participation of women in economic activities outside household has been expanding since the early 1980s. Both push and pull factors contributed in this. On the one hand, family-level income has often faced severe crisis due to a decline in the real wage and stagnation in the demand for male labour. Such crises have pushed female members of the family to work outside the family domain. On the other hand, export-oriented industries (e.g., garments sector, shrimp farming) and other similar activities, the informal sector and the growing urban demand for different types of cottage goods and jobs constituted a demand for women labourers.

Export-oriented production of shrimps and other agricultural goods also expanded since the late 1970s. Other market-oriented production and processing activities also grew fast, not only in crop production, but spread to other areas as a result of institutional, financial and other incentives and support. Commercial production increased significantly related to Poultry, Dairy and Fisheries since the early 1980s.  NGO micro credit contributed significantly to market oriented activities of low-income rural people.(7)

In Bangladesh, “NGO” means not merely a non-governmental organization; it means a type of development agency that is funded by foreign donors. The growth of NGOs in Bangladesh has been spectacular in the last two decades. The NGO model of development, that includes group formation, the target group approach, participatory development and micro credit, has added a new dimension to development thinking and practice.(8) Since the early 1980s micro credit operations started getting priority among some NGOs and by the early 1990s it became the main focus of most of the NGOs. In the process, the NGOs became polarized between a few very big NGOs and many small, where the small ones acted as subcontractors for the big.

Poverty alleviation has always been the ‘top objective’ of successive governments, global agencies and NGOs. Nevertheless, the number of population living under the income poverty line increased from 50 million in 1972 to 68 million in 2006. On the other hand, inequality has also increased during this period. In 1983/84, the lowest 5 per cent of the population held 1.17 per cent of national income, but it came down further to 0.67 per cent in 2004, while the share increased for the highest 5 percent from 18.30 percent to 30.66 percent of national income during the same period (GOB, 2005).  This poverty scenario along with rising inequality explains the growing rural-urban migration and the increasing number of slums in major cities.

In contrast, the share of ‘black'(9) economic activities has risen significantly too. This particular economy encompasses bribery, crime, production and trade of arms, employment of professional criminals, child and women trafficking, repressive sex trade, grabbing, illegal commissions, leakage from diverse government projects, commission from secret contracts with foreign companies. The rise of the super rich and mafia lords and their domination over policy-makers make the task easy for the foreign corporates and global institutions to sell their agenda. Privatisation of common property and public goods is one of their favourites.

While constitutional commitments stand for ensuring education and health care for all as the state’s responsibility, the state has been busy in implementing the ‘reform’ programmes to privatise everything including education, healthcare and utility services. That clearly means that those policies are dominant which are aimed at throwing the vast majority of the people to the mercy of profiteers, local and foreign. 

Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) was very small and limited to some selected areas until the early 1990s in the country. The first big project was the Karnaphuli Fertilizer Company (KAFCO) that was a bad deal and proved a liability for the country. Since then the interests of Multinational Corporations (MNCs) for investment in gas, electricity, port, hybrid and telecommunication increased. Many contracts, mostly without people’s knowledge, were signed in oil-gas-coal resources, telecommunication and power sectors. Due to irrational and harmful terms and conditions, most of these contracts in FDI are already exposed as burdensome for the economy(10). Experts and people in general started questioning the unequal and harmful nature of these contracts, especially for natural resources. Recently a big mass uprising forced the government to cancel a disastrous project signed earlier secretly with British-Australian companies.(11)

Growth and Erosion, Affluence and Poverty 

After thirty-five years we, therefore, find Bangladesh as more marketised, more globalised, and more urbanised; and, has a good number of super rich and increased number of uprooted poor people. We also find an increasing role of international agencies in the governance of the state, along with the increasing presence of funding organizations including NGOs. Although the country is being dominated by a power oligarchy, the role of the state in major policy formulation is rather marginal. A lack of transparency and accountability is very usual in local and foreign contracts. Criminal activities including grabbing public resources have become a main mode of capital accumulation. This has also gained strength in determining the course of mainstream politics. The pattern of development therefore needs demystification. Table-3 presents a rise and fall matrix.

Table –3: Rise and fall scenario with the “Globalisation” and “Modernisation” process

ON THE INCREASE

ON THE DECREASE/in CRISIS

Super Market

Manufacturing enterprises

Car Shop

Machine Factories

Hybrid seed, mechanization

Local variety, bio-diversity

Water resource projects

Safe water, water bodies

High rise building

General housing

NGOs and projects

Local/National initiative

Foreign investment in service sector, oil gas.

Foreign investment in viable manufacturing

Religious institutions

Library and science organizations

Private English medium educational institutions including commercial expensive coaching centres and Madrasha (Madressa).

Public schools/colleges/universities

People under poverty line

Sustainable employment opportunity

Urban population

Real income/wage

Working women

Women’s income/wage/security

Private expensive clinics, diagnostic centres

General health opportunities

Degree holder people

Scientists, Social scientists, Physicians….

Crime

Security

Rural-urban and outward migration

Capacity utilization of human  & material resources

Communication technology

General scientific and technological foundation

Consumerism

Proportion of locally produced goods

Consultancy

Independent research on science, technology & social science

Criminal and hidden (‘black’) economy

Productive and sustainable initiatives

In the last thirty years, Bangladesh had plenty of development projects and accumulated a huge international debt for attaining this development. During this process, a number of consultancy firms, think tanks and thousands of NGOs emerged, and many experts in different fields were born. Poverty alleviation projects gave enough affluence to foreign-local consultants, bureaucrats, and researchers. Agriculture and Water development projects made enough business for international and national construction firms, bureaucrats, consultants and agribusiness corporate bodies. Energy and power development projects ensured disastrous investments and quick high profits for the MNCs. Research and education programs have succeeded in creating an ideological hegemony by giving birth to a lot of clone intellectuals and experts. Affluence and poverty, potential and vulnerability have grown parallelly. This is the context where a real democracy cannot grow. Rather it suffers from nutrition and appears as weak, fragmented and distorted one. That is what we are witnessing today.

Development, Political Power and Religion in Politics

During the last three decades, Bangladesh has experienced different forms of governments: civil and military, parliamentary and presidential. Emergency was declared twice (1974 and 1987), Martial Law was promulgated twice (1975 and 1982). During the period, two presidents were killed (1975, 1981). Since 1991, elected governments have been ruling the country. A form of non-party caretaker government was also introduced in 1991 to run elections well. Since 1973, the constitution has gone through many amendments through which it has become more undemocratic and communal. In the same process, religion has gained an increasing space in political discourses and state policies.

In Bangladesh, like many other countries, people are mostly strong believers in religion, though there are many differences among them in maintaining religious faith, in expression and in formal practices. Differences appear in different sects, in different income groups with rural or urban setting and also in gender. No religion, therefore, should be read as single and universal. Every religion includes many religions in itself. The same religion appears differently in aspiration, vision and also practice of different sections of people according to their socio-economic and political positions. People, the toiling masses, have their faith, they take the religion as ‘heart of the heartless world’, they treat God as their last resort, they express their love to God and also accuse ‘him’ for not extending ‘support’ when it is very necessary. But ruling classes’ perception of God is different. They assume God and religion to be saviours of power, of powerful people and their authority based on plunder and crime.

It is all the more important to note that people in Bangladesh have always maintained their religious faith separated from their political decisions. If we reread political history of Bangladesh, we will find several crucial facts in this regard. People did not ask to bring religion into politics, but that happened. They did not ask to give general amnesty to the war criminals that was given in 1973. They even did not ask to establish Islam as the state religion that was established in 1988. Those were imposed on the people on the plea that people needed religion very badly. If we note the period of those events, it will possibly give a contrary picture. It was not the people but the rulers who needed religion as a shield. Whenever the ruling class failed miserably or faced disillusion and anger of the people, they used religion as a shield for their survival. The following table is an attempt to summarise the context of the ruling class/es’ use of religion.

Table: 4 Can we find any correspondence between the pattern of ‘development’ and Politics?

Policies to bring religion into politics

Corresponding  eco-socio-political scenario

1973-74: General amnesty to the war criminals those were mostly members of the Jamat.

: Rehabilitation of collaborator bureaucrat, army officers, in different levels.

: Establishment of Islamic Foundation.

: Beginning of increase in expenditure in Madrasha education.

1973-74: Erosion of the high popularity of Sheikh Mujib and credibility of the Awami League government.

: Bangladesh became member of the OIC.

: World Bank-IMF began their ‘development’ operations.

: Price rise, fall in the production index.

1974: Activities of the communal-fundamentalist forces began under the banner of religious ‘non-political’ forum.

1974: Large-scale famine, nearly one million died.

1975: Secularism as a state principle was removed.

: Prohibition of religion-based politics was removed.

1975: Bloody military coup. Sheikh Mujib and his family members were brutally killed.

: Relationship with the West was improved further.

1978: the leader of Jamat and top war criminal Golam Azam was permitted by the military government to come into Bangladesh and lead his party.

1976-8: Privatisation and patronage with sate resources began.

 : A new big propertied class, little related with productive activities became visible.

1982-85: Commercialisation of Pirs (religious leaders). Use of religion in business, politics increased more than ever.

1985-89: Expenditure on religious institution continues to increase.

: Madrasha teachers’ federation was strengthened under the leadership of one of the leading war criminals with the patronage from military government.

1982: martial law.

1983-84: student resistance against military rule and strong workers’ movement

1982-89: Plundering of state resources, crime, accumulation of black money went to the top. Deindustrialisation.

1985-1990: Stagnation in productive sectors. Rise in unemployment,

: Domination of WB-IMF- ‘Donor’ agencies increased

1988: Islam became the state-religion

1987-88: Countrywide strong mass movement. Voterless election conducted under autocratic government.

1990: communal riot instigated by the government organizations

1990: Countrywide anti-autocratic movement.

1991: Alliance of Jamat with BNP in Election.

1991: BNP came into power with the support from Jamat, the party led by war criminal.

1992: communal riot.

1992: movement intensified against war criminals

1993-94: Fatwa against women, writers, and scientists intensified with protection from administration.

1993-94: GATT agreement. 5000 factories closed. 1 lakh workers were retrenched. PSCs signed with international oil companies against national interests.

1994-95: Alliance between ‘secular’ party Awami league and Jamat.

1994…marketisation and globalisation of economy intensified.

1996…: Awami League in power. No attempt to de-communalise constitution. Encourage madrasha.

1996…Old policies continued.

1997…Use of religion in power increased. Alliance between BNP and Jamat. Terrorist attacks on rallies, religious places, and cultural programmes festivals started in 1999.

1997… More PSCs signed. Privatisation continued. Magurchara blowout in UNOCAL gas field caused huge losses to Bangladesh

2001…BNP in alliance with Jamat and Islamic Oikyo Jote in power.

: Secret agreements with the US on ‘anti-terrorist’ measures.

: Terrorist attacks continued.

: State sponsored killing in the name of anti-terrorist measures increased.

2001… Closure of big public sector enterprises. More privatisation of Banks, utility services.

: Plunder, grabbing, disastrous contracts with MNCs continued.

: Mass uprising against disastrous foreign contracts and plunder.

There is a strong trend to see the strengthening of religion-based political forces as a counterforce to the present modernisation paradigm or globalisation process. But there are various instances by which we can draw opposite inferences. Experiences show that, in most of the cases these political groups, monarchs or religious leaders had been empowered by the global neo-liberal regimes like the US to counter democratic and socialist projects. The above table reveals that the regimes in Bangladesh which blindly followed the diktats of global institutions for adjusting the economy according to the needs and strategic steps of global corporates and local grabbers, are the same which have brought religion into politics and have created space for religion-based political forces.

The socio-economic programmes of major parties known as Islamists are not incompatible with the principles of corporate market economy. Many of the leaders and patrons of these parties are members of the big business community; they have Banks, Insurance companies and other service sector businesses including NGOs. What these parties want is to ensure a religious command over the capitalist economy, a fusion of capitalism with God. This approach is similar to the BJP in India or White Christian supremacist in the west. That brings an ideology that accepts discrimination, repression and exploitation; and does not encourage diversity, differences and disagreements. All in the name of God.

Constitution and Vulnerability of the Democratic process

One may feel good to see that despite the power takeover by the military twice, the constitution of 1972 was never dissolved, as it happened in Pakistan. But the constitution has gone through several surgical operations to adjust with these power changes. The number of amendments eventually made the constitution totally different from the original one. If we look into those changes three important points can be identified. Those are: (1) no major amendments of the constitution (one party system, Indemnity law, legalization of martial law, legalization of religion-based politics, to allow war criminals to do politics, state religion) came into being through popular demand or popular movement (2) except the first one, all other changes were made by the non-elected governments which came into being by force and later on were legitimised. And (3) except the first one, none of these changes, including other anti-people laws, were repealed by later ‘elected’ governments.

It is logical at this point to raise question that whether power comes from the constitution or does the constitution take shape according to the nature of power? Our experiences clearly show that constitution has always been used according to the needs of the ruling class/es, and thereby turned into a paper of convenience.

Commitments made in the constitution are systematically turned into mere rhetoric in the process. For example, while the constitutional commitment commands the state not to “discriminate against any citizen on grounds only of religion, race, caste, sex or place of birth”, discriminating laws are preserved and patronized by people in power, and for the same reason, religion is being used to legitimise the undemocratic polity. The real policies – economic-legal-political – contradict, defeat and put those commitments in cold storage.

Sources of the vulnerability of the democratisation process in peripheral countries like Bangladesh are, therefore, manifold:

First, the very foundation of peripheral capitalism is fragile despite an organized system of wealth accumulation. This process has brought a mad race among the plunderers. On the other hand, the peripheral status of the country gives an immense authority to the global agencies to shape economy and polity. All major economic policies have been formulated in line with the strategic framework of these global agencies, i.e., the World Bank, IMF or ADB, without any knowledge or consent of the people. The nation state is reduced to an implementing agency of policies formulated elsewhere with increasing coercive power. How can one expect the development of democratic institutions in this setting?

Second, unlike many other peripheral countries, Bangladesh has been enjoying a ‘democratic’ rule, i.e., elected governments under a parliamentary system since 1991. Nevertheless, the parliament was never allowed to lead the country; not to formulate, not even discuss on crucial policies determining the fate of the country.

Third, capital accumulation process takes a primitive form in most of the cases – i.e., grabbing, looting and illegal economic activities become dominant in economy. Therefore, persons enjoying power supersede institutions and law of the land. They also enjoy support from global institutions. That creates conditions to raise godfathers or mafia lords obstructing the democratic exercises as well.

Conclusion: Beyond the Present

Bangladesh, like many other countries, has high potential to develop in every way. It has human and material resources necessary to ensure sustainable development and to provide people a decent life. Bureaucratic global institutions, which enjoy authority but do not bear any responsibility, have been playing decisive role in determining the country’s development strategy. The policies on industry, agriculture, natural resources, power, education, health, trade, environment, poverty, women, telecommunication, which are endorsed by different governments are nothing but formal versions of the policies outlined much earlier by the above bodies, not accountable to the people of this land. The lumpen ruling class has been fattened, strengthened and internationalised by the support of the global institutions at the expense of the people and the environment.

In different phases of history, Bangladeshi people have proved their potential and as well as urge to build a real democratic society. But as we have already discussed that these attempts had been obstructed, along with other things, by the development strategy designed to serve global corporate and local grabbers. The development strategy aimed at profiteering and plundering for few at the cost of the lives of many and environmental disaster, resulted in growing resources and increasing deprivation, dazzling cities with increasing slums, high rise buildings and projects by destroying ecological balances. In order to keep this system intact, democratic principles and institutions have been systematically damaged by the local-global partnership. Vulnerability and fragility of democratic processes are the net outcomes.

The vision of a society where people will have the opportunity to develop their potential, will have authority over their lives and resources and will be treated as human being irrespective of gender, profession, religious belief, colour, caste, nationality is an integral part of the democratic polity. Therefore it is crucial to build up ideas and struggle against the dominant ideology and power that glorify inequality, discrimination and humiliating life of the majority, along with perpetuating vulgar consumerism of the minority. This vision of society will be able to give us a real identity of human being that goes strongly against any fascist, racist, communal, sexist ideology and their coercive political agencies. People of Bangladesh are in different ways struggling to build the counter hegemony. To fulfil a real democratic potential these struggles against many odds are the hope to go beyond the present scenario.

Anu Muhammad is a Professor in the Department of Economics at Jahangirnagar University in Dhaka.

References

Bakht (2000). Zaid Bakht: “Growth Performance of the Manufacturing Sector: A review of the Revised Industrial GDP under SNA  `93” in Abu Abdullah(ed), 2000: Bangladesh Economy 2000, Selected Issues, BIDS.

BBS (2002). Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics: Household Expenditure Survey.

GOB (2001, 2005 and 2006). Government of Bangladesh: Bangladesh Economic Review, June.

Jahan (1972).  Rounaq Jahan (1972): Pakistan Failure in National Integration, Columbia University Press.

Muhammad (2000). Anu Muhammad: Bangladesher Unnyan Songkot ebong NGO Model, (Crisis of Development and NGO Model in Bangladesh) 2nd edition, Protik, Dhaka.

Muhammad (2002). Anu Muhammad: “Closure of Adamjee Jute Mills: Victory of Anti-industrial development Project?” Economic And Political Weekly September 21-27.

Muhammad (2003). Anu Muhammad: “Bangladesh’s Integration into Global Capitalist System: Policy Direction and the Role of Global Institutions”, in Matiur Rahman (ed) Globalisation, Environmental Crisis and Social Change in Bangladesh, UPL, Dhaka.

Muhammad (2004). Anu Muhammad:  “Foreign Direct Investment and Utilization of Natural Gas in Bangladesh” in http://www.networkideas.org/featart/jul2004/fa26_FDI_Gas.htm

Muhammad (2006). Anu Muhammad:  “Globalization and Peripheral Capitalism: Bangladesh experience.”Economic and Political Weekly, 15-21 April.

Muhammad et al (2003). Anu Muhammad, Nurul Huq and Amir Hossain: “Manufacturing in Bangladesh: Growth, Stagnation and Erosion”, Journal   of Economic Review, Jahangirnagar University, June.

Roundtable (1997). The Daily Star Roundtable in association with Prince of Wales Business Leaders Forum(PWBLF): Towards a Creative Business-NGO Partnership, Daily Star.

Siddiqui (1995). Kamal Siddiqui et al: Social Formation in Dhaka City, UPL, Dhaka.

Sobhan (1982). Rehman Sobhan:The Crisis of External Dependence, UPL, Dhaka.

WB (1999). World Bank: Foreign Direct Investment in Bangladesh: Issues of long run Sustainability, October.


NOTES:


(1) Mahbub ul Haq, Chief Economist, Pakistan Planning Commission, quoted in Jahan (1972), p.60.

(2) These institutions include the World Bank (WB), International Monetary Fund (IMF), Asian Development Bank (ADB), United Nations development Program (UNDP), United States Agency for International Aid (USAID). Usually these institutions are known as donor agencies, which is misleading.

(3) For a detailed analysis of these programmes and the roles of global institutions in Bangladesh, see Muhammad (2003).

(4) This part is elaborated in Muhammad (2006).

(5) For analysis of how development projects led to the closure of the biggest jute mill, see Muhammad (2002).

(6) Governments have consistently been expanding incentives for export-oriented industries and foreign investment since 1978. A detailed picture of the manufacturing sector can be found in Muhammad et al (2003).

(7) The main focus of NGO activities was, thus, summarised by an official of BRAC, a leading NGO in Bangladesh:We link the poor to the market’. (Roundtable, 1997)

(8) For analysis on the NGO model working in Bangladesh and its shifts overtime see Muhammad (2000)

(9) Traditionally, ‘black’ economy is used to denote illegal, criminal and hidden economic activities. The use of ‘black’ to denote bad reflects a racist attitude; therefore this usage should be changed.

(10) For analysis of FDI in the gas sector, see Muhammad (2004); and for the World Bank’s assessment, see WB (1999).

(11) For details on the project and mass uprising, see recent articles posted in http://www.meghbarta.org/

States of Emergency

CG

The Late Indira Gandhi started the venerable tradition in Indian politics of pointing to the external forces that were trying to destabilize India. The only way to remain coherent as India, it was claimed was to vote for the gai bachhda (the Cow and Calf election symbol) and leave the rest to Mrs Gandhi’s wisdom. As the climax to the Singur controversy appears to be over, we can wait for the denouement, so we are beginning to hear voices now to wrap it all up. It appears that the CPIM is the only hope for the dalits and Muslims and anything that questions the manner in which the CPIM crafts its political and economic agendas and implements them is going to open the doors for the ‘right’ that is the BJP.

These arguments deserve to be considered in all seriousness. The trouble is not with the economic model, nor with human rights violations nor with plain old electoral and ideological rivalries. The trouble in very simple words is with the way the CPIM’s electoral base has changed. The party lost the votes of agricultural wage laborers and industrial working class and the Muslims in Bengal while gaining rural salaried and rural rich and urban middle class votes. This shift in its class base has serious implications for the party itself. The party more than anyone else knows what this means right down to the scale of the polling booth.

The question then is how is the party intending to recover these votes? It has several options to do this: as has been done in many states where aggressive reforms were pursued, these voters or at least their mobilizers in the form of party cadres can be bribed with various government schemes where everyone gets a small cut in the pie. This works very well in the short run. But beyond one or two elections the novelty wears off. It could look for newly mobilized social classes to join its support base, by mobilizing women, sections of Muslims, carve out new segments from old categories and provide them sops to switch their loyalties. If the party looks beyond the immediate electoral calculations, then the contours of the political and economic challenge ahead would look very different. But we can return to it later because for the moment, the main concern appears to be how to remain in power.

The trouble with framing the problem as one of how to keep the CPIM in power is that it simply jumps the gun by assuming that the only way to do politics is to get into the seat of power. So, we begin to assume from here on that the only way to keep the BJP in check is for the CPIM to get in power. But let us look at what the real dynamics of that would be. The only way for the CPIM to get into power was to cut into the BJP’s social base which is the middle class. But having done that, can the CPIM then speak to its middle class constituents about what is good economic policy? Or will it be driven by the desires and aspirations of that class?

Singur is an excellent example of those desires and aspirations. We have not seen such condensation of desire over any other object in public view since the Mandir. The Chief Minister says we cannot go back on this because “I persuaded Tata like anything and now I will not be able to raise my head again”. Tata says, “If someone holds a gun to my head he has to shoot or take away the gun, I am not going to move my head”. How did things come to such an emotional head? Is it that the deviant left is conspiring with right to derail legitimate and correct path to ‘socialism’ or is it that the opposition from multiple sources actually bring into sharper focus the nascent middle class desire for a better life at whatever cost?

Industrialization, economic growth, development, these are empty words. Their content is political, emotional and social and thus has to be struggled over. The CPIM in Bengal tried to take the short cut and run into rough weather. Whether the party has the capacity to learn from the experience and think over how to fight these battles in a progressive way is for history to decide. Personally I wouldn’t worry too much about whether fighting the CPIM on this issue is going to help the BJP. Because seriously communalism is not the only game in town. The majority of the massacres of Dalits in India happened under regimes to which the CPIM in no way provided any credible threat. Bihar under Laloo Prasad Yadav, Andhra under NTR and Chandrababu Naidu have been remarkably riot free. In fact it was the internal power struggles of the Congress that resulted in the most horrific riots in Hyderabad and that is the party which is in power at the center now thanks to the CPIM. The point I am making here is not that we are worse off under the Congress than under the BJP. But that the dynamics of communal violence is too complex to be reduced to party banners and rhetorics.

In my view, the big political challenge before the left in India today is that there are all sorts of crazy dynamics unfolding in places which are beyond the pale of the state to resolve. Thus one possibility is that progressive parliamentary political parties which are a product of that state have to work hard to stretch their imaginations to play a critical role in non-state domains. But that calls for a radical reengineering of the party organizational structures themselves. This has happened to a miniscule extent in Kerala although it ended up in intense power struggles within the party.

The other possibility is that the unrest and turmoil in the non-state domain will find its own leadership and goals and at least for the moment, it will appear to be completely incoherent. Now it will appear to bring together Medha and Mamata and Rajnath Singh and Dipankar Bhattacharya, and then again it could bring together a group of tribals and NGOs and a parochial movement for a smaller state in another region.

Mrs. Gandhi’s invoked the external foe, precisely at the moment when the first rumblings of the centrifugal forces from the regions began to be heard in Indian politics and responded to it by declaring external emergency and soon followed it up with declaration of the internal emergency. Now as these regional centrifugal forces get entangled in the global dynamics, there will be more such inventions of external and internal emergencies and the state responses will be much more complicated. History, it seems, has a way of repeating itself, but will the second time be a mere farce or a worse tragedy than the first time, depends entirely on us.

People’s Movements in Orissa face Political Repression

Saswat Pattanayak

One year ago, on January 2, 2006, I was in Orissa covering the most barbaric and shameful epoch in the aftermath of Kalinga Nagar incidents. 12 tribals were murdered by the Orissa state police, because they were protesting against the illegal, and inhuman encroachment of their sweet little homes by a profit-mongering private industry giant. As many as 13 industrial plants had been declared to be set up in Kalinga Nagar itself, resulting in evacuation of thousands of indigenous people from their own lands, sans adequate compensations, relocation benefits, education or healthcare assurances, let alone alternative residences. Countless people were left in the lurch because one private company got greedier and bought the conscience of few dozens of political opportunists. And when the people were told that their villages were going to be leveled –meaning, their carefully worshiped houses were to be razed off the grounds without seeking any of their approvals, some tribals thought they should protest.

After all, it was through constant revolutionary struggles of the common masses, that Orissa had been wrested from its kings and the colonialists to emerge as the first independent province formed on linguistic basis in modern India’s history.

Right to self-determination has been inherent in Orissa’s history–from the ages of the Kalinga War to the days of Kalinga Nagar. Just the way, the Kalinga War was fought with bloodbath, Kalinga Nagar met the similar fate. Entirely innocent people, yet valiant and brave, unarmed to fight the ancient and modern emperors, protested for sure, and paid the price.

It has been an annual ritual in Orissa, economically one of the poorest states of India. Its working class people doubly oppressed – by the military-industrial nexus of the government in power, and by the educated and elite section of its own population that dance to the tunes of opportunism and betray the poor people’s causes.

Despite the odds, when tribals staged a non-violent protest, the police state, under obligation from industry pimps, opened fire and murdered them mercilessly. And this, despite the very fresh memories of killings of tribals in Rayagada done under the same BJP-BJD regime led by Naveen Patnaik.

Sitting pretty on his father and Orissa’s ex-Chief Minister Biju Patnaik’s land-grabbing anti-people legacies, Naveen has been the most ruthless curse on a peaceful people. Enacting personality politics to project Biju as a savior, the current CM has been turning massive onslaughts on every form of criticism that exists in the state today, with an inherited arrogance that has rare parallel. He completes his troika of misfortunes, after Kashipur and Kalinga Nagar, with his approval of Vedanta Alumina Project at Lanjigarh.

Troika of exploitations and how they happened:
Kashipur, Kalinga Nagar and Lanjigarh

When Naveen regime sold off Kashipur to their friends in the Aditya Birla Group and Canadian ALCAN, they had to struggle quite a bit. Months of endured protests by thousands of people organized under different banners were not an easy task to encounter. Along with several activist comrades, I was involved in raising consciousness about Kashipur and found many people showing solidarity with the displaced. In late 2000, the protest movements against Birla Group was gaining consensus among the larger progressive circles. However, the government committed its first blunder by ordering to shoot the completely unarmed tribals Abhilas Jhodia, Raghu Jhodia and Damodar Jhodia in December of that year. Dozens of tribals were critically injured and shot at. Hundreds were arrested illegally.

Arun Shourie, the infamous disinvestment minister had set the trend on behalf of BJP to legalize the most shameful of trades: selling off people’s lands to land-grabbers. Orissa government, the ally of BJP, went one step further. It sold them at dirt cheap prices so that the kickbacks would at least be good. As a result, Kashipur project displaced more than 20,000 people with immediate effect, whereas making mere promises to secure jobs for 1000 people for 20 years. All bauxite resources were put on ransom in this 4,500-cr project that involved few top bureaucrats, politicians and the private industries. They had round tables at Orissa Secretariat and had a feast on the murdered tribals.

This project, part of Utkal Alumina International Limited, forced its way in, despite protests, and widespread discontentment. It even violated the law of land that denied sale of tribal lands to non-tribals for mining purpose. However, the project is on, and the lawmakers and their judiciary colleagues are bedfellows. And unitedly, the ruling class of Orissa bribed by the industrial houses has conveniently shoved aside the people’s demands, and when needed have shot some commoners to silence.

When it came to Kalinga Nagar, the government thought better than to tolerate any flak. No demonstrations, no protests, no opposition – the government decided – it won’t accept any remaining cannons of political democracy. Shoot on sight, Naveen’s style of functioning worked with even greater vigor this time. If democracy meant people’s mandate, the politicians thought they had got the mandate to kill the people. In the most shocking case of mass murder in the recent history of world, Kalinga Nagar resulted in deaths of 12 tribals (and subsequent mutilation of their bodies inside the police station to obstruct post-mortem/identification). All along, in place of health centers and schools – the most needed facilities in the tribal districts, the Orissa government had been building police stations since last four years. Of course the police stations were being constructed near the project sites, so as to provide protection to the business barons, while killing some locales here and there.

Beyond descriptions and doubts, Kalinga Nagar incident was smartly buried. In a plutocracy, the government works for the rich, and so, Orissa government this time too, made all paths clear for its partner in crime: TISCO. The Tata venture in Kalinga Nagar, was done in collaboration with the Orissa Industrial Infrastructure Development Corporation (IDCO). Of course this deal was as corrupt and backhanded as possible.

Biju Patnaik was the epitome of corruption in the post-independent India, and during his last tenure at office, he had acquired the lands of Kalinga Nagar at the cost of Rs 35,000 per acre. His son amassed even larger profits by making a business out of this. He sold the public property to TISCO at Rs 3,50,000 per acre. In return, he paid the people: zilch. Ooops, with some bullets. But to be fair, the families of those who were killed were offered Rs 50,000 as price of the human life. And the compensation for building houses: 10 decimal of land!

Of course, the benevolent Tata loves the power tactics of letting its compliances kill off people when they protest, and it suits its inroads to further the business. Same goes with other steel companies that have been also setting up their firms in the tribal heartlands by evicting the people out, including Neelachal Ispat Nigam Ltd, Jindal Steels, Mesco Steels etc. All of them together have been keeping the political circle happy, and vice versa, in a tradition of tragedies.

The tradition has now extended to an aluminum refinery near our most current focus, Lanjigarh. Very similar to Kashipur developments, the Lanjigarh project has already launched its thumping notes of oppression. The UK-based Sterlite Industries has been excitedly razing off adivasi villages, including Borobhota, Kinari, Kothduar, Sindhabahili, and their agricultural fields in Kalahandi district. In the process, thousands of villagers have been forced to leave their lands.

But this time, the tactics of the government – already being heavily criticized for its high-handedness – are slightly different. It has adopted a two-pronged approach to gain consensus for the Lanjigarh project. Before we go there, let’s assess what’s the worth of this project.

Vedanta and Capitalistic Expansions:

Vedanta which sounds Indian, even Brahminical, is meant to be so. Although based in England, the company has its eyes set only on former British colony India. Not just on a country that was being ripped off by the Empire until few decades back, but also on the poorest state of India. Again, not just on Orissa, but on the poorest district of Orissa.

Gandhi once said in his Talisman about how before we take a step, we should think of the welfare of the poorest of the poor. Now his country has another policy in power: before you take a step, make sure to trample the poorest of the poor to oblivion.

BJP, the party of domestic business houses and NRI investors, had this brilliant idea of disinvesting the existing industries of India which would render millions jobless, and without backbone to protest the injustices. Worse, they had Lord Ram legends to divert the people into becoming communalist monsters. And during those times of Vajpayee, they put BALCO (Bharat Aluminum) on sale. Sterlite comfortably offered a meager $121 million for it. Even Balco labor union had no clue that the company was sold out for this cheap. The union declared strike. Supreme Court of India in its worst of wisdom had declared strikes as illegal (in a country that gained independence through strikes of workers as a major force) and Anil Agarwal got the approval. Again easy. He went ahead and cut off 30% of jobs. Of course without a problem. One of the largest public trusts was now his mansion.

BJP, a party that surprised us all when it splashed every newspaper with full page ads on the very first term of its election campaign, was always funded by Hindu extremists living abroad. The proverbial NRIs always looked forward to their bastion of moneymaking once the command/mixed economy of India took a beating. And for this, they needed the right wing in India to come to power. Even for just one term. Because all one needs to sell the country is a seal.

During Vajpayee’s regime, people like Agarwal made fortunes. Not just Balco. Sterlite got its sweet deals in Hindustan Zinc too – three lead-zinc mines and three smelters! More job cuts, pay cuts. Less labor force, more work, more profits. In business texts, they call it efficiency. To us, possibly it sounds draconic.

Gradually after stabilizing the sale process of India, Agarwal aimed at Vedanta’s mining operations. His stake in Vedanta being $1 billion, it attracted attention of London Stock Exchange, since it happened to be the first Indian mining operation to be listed there. Not to be outwitted, Agarwal had the face of Australian mining magnate Brian Gilbertson to certify the resources of Orissa were good enough. Gilbertson, one of the wealthiest miners in the world, absolutely amazed by the resources said they were heavily undervalued. He said they were way better than any international standard and did not resemble any third world produce.

And so the deal was approved. It had been already struck. Now, everybody’s a winner. Except those that rightfully deserved to win. Those that love their little thatched roofs as much as the bigwigs love their palaces. Those poor that refuse to give up their collective lands and community rivers as much as the rich that would guard to their life their safeguarded mansions and exclusive swimming pools.

Next: Two pronged approach: Vedanta University and Maoism

Master Planning the Working Class Out: Making of an Apartheid City

Lalit Batra

“After two years of marriage, my farmer husband and I were on the verge of starvation in Bengal and left for Delhi to find work. My husband used to make murmura, whereas I worked in 5 kothis. We had no money at the time to educate our children, only our older son studied a little in Delhi. However, over the 25 years in Pushta, we were able to save up and make a house with 3 rooms. When finally we were able to afford food and water and a decent life, we were evicted and thrown to the margins of society. Our house was demolished only after a day’s notice! The police notified us just the day before that the demolition would begin at 10 in the morning, which hardly gave us any time to empty our house of all the stuff. We lost our pucca house and belongings, all earned with our sweat and toil of 25 years.” – Haleema, a 45-year old woman living in Bawana resettlement colony

“The city, or what remains of it or what it will become, is better suited than it has ever been for the accumulation of capital; that is, the accumulation, realization, and distribution of surplus value.” – Henry Lefebvre, The Urban Revolution.

Planned Folly

Master Planners by default have a fetish for orderly spaces. They like smooth, homogeneous, straight-lined, geometrically aligned cities devoid of internal contradictions and differentiation. That is why despite their best intentions they end up abhorring, or at best being puzzled by, the actually existing city. They try and push hard to force fit the real urban into their technocratic schema but the pulsating socio-spatial geography of the city repeatedly refuses to follow the drumbeats of the planning machine. Over, under, along with, on the margins of, in the heart of every planned, ‘intended’ city grows an unplanned, or as Joy Sen would put it, an ‘unintended’ city, which is, but the other side of the planned city. In fact it is as much a creation of the master plan as the planned city itself. The unplanned city is never legitimised. There are times when it is tolerated, even informally recognized. At other times, it is viciously maligned, criminalized and systematically attacked. What happens when depends crucially on the conditions for the production and reproduction of social existence and balance of forces between social classes.

Ever since the ascendancy of the neo-liberal ‘reform’ agenda in early 90s, the capital city of Delhi is witnessing a scenario where not only is the unintended city under siege but the city as intended is also undergoing fundamental transformations. The scope, intensity and pace of this change is so overwhelming that somebody who saw Delhi, say, two decades back, would find it difficult to recognize the present city, except perhaps for Lutyen’s grand boulevards! The most visible markers of this transformation are metro, malls, multiplexes, flyovers, expressways, hotels, five-star hospitals, mega religious structures, gated localities etc. From the point of view of the city’s working poor, people like Haleema and her husband, the change has so far entailed losing their geographical and occupational spaces in the city.

It is in this context that we try to analyse the trajectory of changes in the economic structure of the city in general, and employment patterns in particular over the past half a century. Therein, we locate the ‘vision’ of the Draft Master Plan for Delhi (MPD)-2021.

Before the (Master) Planning Began

Delhi has for long been one of the major economic centres of the country. Even before Independence, it was already emerging as an important operational base for mercantile capital in North India, with several British as well as Indian trading firms establishing their businesses. The wholesale trade in North India in the early 20th century was largely based in and around Delhi. Between 1911-37, several small and medium scale industries mushroomed. Increasing employment opportunities in the city coupled with grinding poverty, breakdown of traditional agricultural system and prevalence of severest forms of feudal and colonial oppression in the countryside, ensured a significant increase in the migration to Delhi. With virtually no housing arrangements being made for these poor migrants, now employed as wage workers in trading and industrial establishments or working as construction workers, coolies, load carriers, sweepers etc., they were forced to either rent rooms in dilapidated katras of the Walled City or squat on outskirts of the city. This process gave the city its first taste of what is called the “slum problem”. In 1924, the slum clearance project for Basti Harphool Singh, the first notified slum area in Delhi, was sanctioned to forcibly move the poor to the Western Extension Area. The British undertook some other “decongestion” exercises also to “beautify” the city and “improve” the surroundings.

The 1941 census showed that in 40 years, between 1901-41, the population of the city had more than doubled to around 0.92 million. Then came Independence, and along with it, Partition, which resulted in an almost overnight influx of more than 0.45 million refugees into the city from across the newly created border. However, these migrants were economically better off, politically more articulate and socially more advanced. This fact, coupled with perhaps the buoyancy of the newly gained independence, ensured their quick rehabilitation. However, in this case too, the size of allotted plots and amenities reflected the economic status of the recipients. This massive influx of people had its corollary in further diversification of economic activities, on the one hand, and severe pressure on civic services, on the other. As a result, 700 people died in 1955 due to a jaundice epidemic caused by the contamination of domestic water supply. This created a lot of ‘concern’ in the official circles about ‘haphazard’ and ‘unplanned’ growth of the city.

Delhi Master Plans: 1962 and 2001

Concerned about the problem of unregulated growth in the city, the Indian state in the early 1960s sought to systematically intervene in Delhi’s growth. The Parliament had already constituted the Delhi Development Authority (DDA) in 1957 in order “to check the haphazard and unplanned growth of Delhi…with its sprawling residential colonies, without proper layouts and without the conveniences of life, and to promote and secure the development of Delhi according to the plan.” Eventually, under the guidance of the Ford Foundation experts, the Town Planning Organisation (TPO) prepared the Master Plan of Delhi (MPD-62), which was notified in 1962 for the next 20 years and the DDA became its implementing agency.

The MPD-62 envisioned the city as a centre of governance, or of residential and communication needs, and did not take into account the possibility of large-scale commercial and industrial activity in the future. On the pattern of modern European cities, separate areas were allocated for housing (43 percent), movement (22), industry (5) and green belt areas (22). For achieving this ‘vision’, the plan aimed at limiting the population to a maximum of 4.6 millions by 1981 which, if unchecked, was projected to go up to 5.6 millions. A complex of strategies were adopted in the plan to achieve this purpose- building a 1.6 km wide green belt around Delhi, diverting the surplus population to seven ring towns in Uttar Pradesh and Haryana, decongestion of the Walled City by relocating the population in New Delhi and Civil Lines, prohibiting a number of heavy and polluting industries etc. There were an estimated 8,000 industrial units located in non-conforming areas in 1961. The plan provided for establishing 48 industrial areas spread over 2,300 hectares for accommodating these industries. But no provisions whatsoever were made for the informal sector, which was quite widespread and vibrant even at that time. According to the MPD-62, the DDA was to be the sole developer for the entire future extension of Delhi. The MPD-62 envisaged Delhi’s urban growth to cover 44,718 ha, out of which 19,182 ha were for residential purposes. The Plan mandated the DDA to provide at least 25 percent of dwelling units (DUs) for the poor.

Perhaps the single most progressive contribution of the MPD-62 was the introduction of a socialized urban land policy. Anticipating the rapid growth of Delhi in the future, the state took upon itself the responsibility of acquiring land in bulk and then redistributing it among various classes of people. The main instruments that have been used in the town planning of Delhi to regulate urban growth and check “haphazardness” have been: (1) Large scale acquisition of land, (2) Disposal of land on leasehold, (3) Restrictions in land use, and (4) Urban land Ceiling. The basic social rationale behind employing these instruments was to save the poor from the vagaries of land market and not letting private sector thrive on price speculation. But their achievements have been absolutely contrary to their proclaimed objectives. Thus, while the MPD-62 sought to construct 0.74 million DUs from 1961 to 1981, there were only 0.54 million DUs available in the end. And slums continued to proliferate because of the unavailability of affordable housing.

The MPD-2001 too sought to implicitly establish a link between employment creation, population growth and haphazard development. The focus was to somehow contain population growth within ‘manageable limits’. It continued with the functionally segregated land use system which was proven to be unsustainable and unproductive. Without giving any explanation as to why the industrial areas proposed in the previous plan were not built, it proposed 18 more industrial areas. The informal sector received recognition in the plan but the provisions made were highly inadequate and oblivious of the sector’s economic logic. So far as housing is concerned, the MPD-2001 estimated that 1.62 million new DUs would be required in the period 1981-2001 – 70 percent would be for the Economically Weaker Section (EWS) and Lower Income Group (LIG). While the DDA could achieve a little more than 60 percent of the target in terms of actually constructing or providing land for housing; the lion’s share of the DUs constructed by the DDA went to the High Income Group (HIG) category. Thus the target for the rich was over-achieved by more than three times, while the shortage of legitimate and affordable housing crowded out the poor even from the EWS and LIG sectors. A 2000 survey by Delhi’s Indian Institute of Technology (IIT) found that the middle and upper-middle income groups occupied 60 percent of the EWS flats and 81 percent of the LIG flats.

Economic Growth, Migration and Population

After Independence, Delhi grew quite rapidly, with its informal sector. Industrialization advanced, commercialisation increased and a great deal of infrastructure building took place in the past 50 years. Delhi’s lower rates of tax and tariff relative to its neighbouring states, with added advantages of better social and physical infrastructure, greatly influenced the decisions with regard to the location of industry and trade. Thus, the industrial investment increased from Rs. 3.88 billions in 1971 to Rs. 63.10 billions in 1996. The number of industrial units rose from 26,000 in 1971 to 1,37,000 in 1999, providing jobs to more than 1.4 million workers. Only 25,000 units are in the conforming industrial zones. The rest are in the non-conforming areas (in 1962, when the first MPD was notified, there were just 8,000 units in these areas).

There has also been a substantial growth in distributive trades. The city today has wholesale markets for 9 types of goods including fruits and vegetables, automotive parts, textiles etc. Apart from being the biggest consumption centre in north India, Delhi with its transportation facilities, lower tax rates, lower Central Sales Tax on re-export of goods, lower wholesales prices etc is a strategic location The area of procurement and distribution extends not only to north India, but for some commodities even to entire India. Thus the number of registered wholesale dealers has increased from 69,469 in 1971 to 0.26 millions and the number of workforce employed in the sector has increased from 0.12 millions in 1951 to 0.67 millions in 1997. Apart from these, construction, transport, communications, and administrative sectors have also expanded quite substantially over the years. Per capita gross state domestic product at current prices rose from Rs. 19,246 in 1993-94 to Rs. 32,407 in 1999-2000, which is more than double the per capita national income.

Along with this tremendous economic growth, the city’s population has also increased dramatically. From a small town of 0.41 million people in 1911, Delhi has today become a giant metropolis of over 13 million people. After 1951 the population of the city has grown by over 50 percent per decade! Migration accounts for much of this growth in population. For example, between 1981-91 migrants contributed almost 50 percent of the population growth. The migrants are mainly from the neighbouring states of Uttar Pradesh (49.91 percent), Haryana (11.82), Rajasthan (6.17), Punjab (5.43) and far off backward states like Bihar (10.99).

Even the National Capital Region Planning Board (NCRPB) admits that the phenomenal growth of Delhi and the underdevelopment outside, or, to be more specific, outside the Delhi Metropolitan Area (consisting of, apart from Delhi, cities like Faridabad, Gurgaon, Sonepat etc. in Haryana and Ghaziabad, Noida etc. in U.P.) is primarily a problem of relationship rather than a problem of scarcity. This outside with its relatively slow growth rate has led to a Metropolis-Satellite duality, with the core extracting the economic surplus from the periphery, while the periphery’s growth if any is mainly responsive to the core’s expanding needs. In other words, the outside regions are essentially drawn into an uneven system tied up by a chain of the ‘Centre-Periphery’ relationship.

Employment Structure

In 2007, Delhi had a workforce of 4.52 millions (32.84 percent of the total population). Out of this 0.57 millions were unemployed. It is significant that between 1992 and 2000 the percentage of unemployed workers shot up from 5.67 percent to 12.73 percent.

The sectoral division of the workforce shows some interesting trends. In 1981, the respective shares in employment of the primary, secondary and tertiary sectors were 3.81, 34.87and 64.72 percent, which by 2001 became 1.74, 28.68 and 69.58 percent. Within the tertiary sector, much of the growth between 1992 and 1999 occurred in the categories, ‘Trade, hotel and restaurant’ (whose share grew from 21.01 percent to 29.05 percent) and ‘Financial and commercial activities’ (from 4.69 percent to 6.40 percent). The percentage of workforce employed in manufacturing, civic administration, health and educational activities has suffered a steep downward trend. The employment in manufacturing declined mainly due to the closure of units from 1996 onwards on the pretext of their being either polluting or operating in the ‘non-conforming’ areas. The number of workers employed in the organized sector rapidly declined, even absolutely – from 0.85 millions in 1994 to 0.84 millions in 2001. On the other hand, the unorganised sector has remained bullish employing 78 percent workers in 1994, which rose to 82 percent in 2001. This clearly shows the direction the city is moving in with regard to its composition.

Housing Situation

Delhi’s population today is about 15 million, out of which about 3 million are living in slum clusters, 4 million in unauthorized colonies, 2.5 million in resettlement colonies and 0.7 million in notified slum areas. Another hundred thousand people are the pavement dwellers. Thus over two-third of the people of Delhi are living in what could be termed as sub-standard settlements. The total area on which the slum clusters are presently established is under 400 hectares. Compare this to the 20,000 hectares and 11,000 hectares set aside by the DDA in the urban and urban extension areas for residential purposes. Instead of coming up with any solution for integrating these 10 million people into the city the government has embarked upon a barbaric drive to rid the city of these people. In the past six years alone over 500,000 people have been uprooted from their habitat and ‘relocated’, if at all, to Delhi’s periphery. In 2004, Yamuna Pushta, the biggest slum cluster of Delhi, was demolished, uprooting over 30,000 families. Only a quarter of those evicted got alternative plots in resettlement colonies of Bawana, Holabi Kalan, Madan Pur Khadar, developed on the outskirts of the city. Apart from causing severe hardships in terms of livelihood, these settlements are devoid of even basic amenities like serviced plots, water, electricity, toilets, schools, health facilities etc.

Moreover the size of the plot allotted to the resettled families too reduced drastically over the years. Initially, in 1956, when the Slum Areas (Clearance and Improvement) Act was passed, the slum dwellers were provided 65 sq. mts. plots with provision for attached toilets, on a hire purchase basis. In 1962, the toilet was removed and leasehold rights were recognized with provision for the leaseholder to access individual facilities. During the Emergency (1975-77), almost 0.9 million people were removed from slum clusters and resettled. This time the plot size came down to 21 sq. mts., and sites and services facilities were provided on a group basis under a hire-purchase regime. At present, the government has a dual scheme for resettlement. Slum dwellers with documents to prove their stay in Delhi before 1990 get 18 sq. mts. and those with documents dated 1990 to 1998 are eligible for 12.5 sq mts. On top of it, the plots are now given on a five to ten years license and slum dwellers have to pay Rs. 7000 for a plot!

Draft MPD-2021

The Draft MPD-2021 aims to make Delhi a “global metropolis and a world class city”. The defining characteristics of this world-class city is discussed at length in the Draft Regional Plan-2021, prepared by the NCPRB in December 2004. Some of the key recommendations of the said plan are as follows:

1. Emphasis on investment for the growth of modern infrastructure and services to make the city eventually an e-governed, e-citizen and e-services city so that Delhi becomes the model e-city of India and a destination of foreign investment.
2. The information revolution is simultaneously transforming many city activities in many ways: changing in some cases non-tradable services into tradable, for example, health, cultural, higher educational services. This necessitates investments in the appropriate sectors.
3. Since retail shopping becomes a key sector relating to the junction and distributional role of cities, to hotels and restaurants and to tourism, strategies to expansion of these facilities, as done in Singapore and Hong Kong should be evolved to make it an important export industry.
4. Development/ delivery of cultural services like museums, histories sites, antiques, theatres, film making, cinemas etc., as part of the activities underpinning tourism and other international travel.
5. Relating to Delhi’s emergence as a leading global city is its role in hosting international conferences and sports events, amongst others, which will necessitate an infrastructure of global standards.
6. Although Delhi may lose manufacturing activity, but will attract services like accountancy, law, advertising, finance, research and development, consultancy etc. for the factories located/relocated in the green field sites in the neighbouring areas.

This is a complete package in itself that lays down in threadbare detail all the ingredients, which would go into the creation of the ‘world class’ city. And the key to building this city would be once again, restriction on employment generation; this time stated much more explicitly than the earlier plans. “No new major economic activities, which may result in the generation of large scale employment (should be permitted in Delhi)”, sternly warns the Master Plan. This is despite the fact that the workforce of Delhi will see an addition of over 2.4 millions in the next 15 years. Add to this over 0.6 million currently unemployed and you have a figure of over 3 million people looking for work and not finding any if the Master Plan turns out to be ‘successful’! Another panacea that has been added this time around is the wholesale privatisation of everything – from land and power generation to health and educational facilities. Thus the task of acquiring and developing land is going to be handed over to the private sector. Over 80 percent of housing, as proposed, will be developed through ‘public-private partnerships’. The entitlements of slum dwellers are being curtailed even further. Though promised 25 sq. mts. of floor space, the dwelling unit is going to be in a multi-storeyed building thus shrinking the land rights of the poor. These limited rights will also be delivered through the agency of ‘public-private partnership’!

All these above mentioned measures suggest a close connection with the ‘opening up’ of the Indian economy. Coupled with the ‘failures’ of the planning process as laid down in the Master Plan, it has created a volatile situation for the working people of Delhi.

Compliance and Violation

If we dig out the ideological underpinnings of Master Planning we find that the modernist vision of the city enshrined in it is completely out of sync with the profound rumblings of the economy, society and polity of a postcolonial Third World country. Thus while the planning sought to fashion Delhi in the image of an orderly bourgeois city with strict spatial segregation of various functions, the exigencies of building a domestic capital base with an emphasis on import substitution ensured that violations of the Plan were not only tolerated but also actively encouraged by the political and administrative elite. Whether it is squatter settlements, unauthorised colonies, small scale industries or informal sector services – the existential necessities of the poor coupled with the requisites of electoral democracy produced an urban space which was, in some senses, a complete subversion of what the Plan stood for. While this process did not guarantee constitutional rights based legal existence for the working class in the city, it nevertheless created a grey zone between legality and illegality where they could, at least as a collective, negotiate their lives in the city.

But in the past two decades the situation has changed. This has a lot to do with the policies of liberalisation, privatisation and globalisation initiated in the 1980-90s. The politics of globalisation depends, among other things, on refashioning and ‘re-forming’ cities in order to make them investment-friendly. Major cities of the Third World are thus sought to be de-linked from real domestic priorities and positioned as nodes in the circulation of global finance capital. This puts a heavy strain on urban land and other resources which are increasingly freed from ‘less productive uses’ such as small scale manufacturing or housing for the poor and deployed for high tech modes of accumulation and consumption, whether material or symbolic, of the affluent. The entire urban space, in this process, becomes a market place where distribution and consumption of global brands take place in the form of a series of spectacles.

The change in governmental and administrative priorities has been brought about by pressures from, on the one hand, global finance capital and, on the other, an increasingly vocal and assertive middle class. Both these forces have attacked the affirmative activities of the welfare state as the root cause of corruption, lawlessness and pollution of city life. The argument goes like this: It is the politicians who have over the years actively encouraged the growth of illegal industries and encroachment on public lands by slum clusters in order to create a captive vote bank and a ready source of income. This has resulted in the law-abiding, tax paying citizens being denied their legitimate rights in the city. So the idea of the reclamation of the rights of citizenry has been directly linked to the further dispossession of the already dispossessed. This has serious implications for the rights of the working people for a better life, as the consolidation of the middle classes around the vision of a ‘Clean and Green Delhi’ creates a social force necessary for further delegitimisation of the working class existence in the city. This conflict renders the role of urban planning in shaping the geographical and occupational fabric of the city quite superfluous as every planned intervention by the state ends up reproducing the original ‘problem’ on an expanded scale.

The Draft Master Plan for Delhi-2021 is both a codification as well as legitimisation of the process of securing the city, along with all its resources – be it land or water or power – for the international as well as the domestic elite. It becomes important, in this context, to see the connections between changes in urban configurations – spatial and occupational – and changes in modes of accumulation reflected in newer forms of commodity production, circulation and consumption. Praxis of this nature will go a long way in identifying both the sites of resistance as well as the actors of resistance against the hegemonic neo-liberal project of global capital.

Lalit Batra is a researcher-activist involved in understanding the processes of urban development in India and organizing the urban poor in Delhi. An earlier version of this article was published in Lalit Batra (ed.), Draft Delhi Master Plan 2021: Blueprint for an Apartheid City, Sanchal Foundation, 2005.

Singur and the Official Left’s Crisis in India

Pratyush Chandra

The Singur events are signs of a crisis borne out of a disjuncture between the Left Front’s pragmatic policies and the legacy of the movement and class interests that empowered it. For a long time, the open eruption of this crisis was evaded by the West Bengal government’s success in convincing its mass base of its ability to manoeuvre state apparatuses for small, yet continuous gains. It justified all its limitations and inefficacy by condemning the faulty centre-state relationship and a larger conspiracy to destabilise limited reformist gains – for instance, those from reforms in the Bargadari system.

The allegation of conspiracy seemed tangible only to the extent that parliamentary politics drives every opposition party to encash the difficulties incumbent governments face – by peddling popular grievances for advantages in electoral competition. This is the way a representative democracy disperses and defuses challenges to its stability. For illustration, one needs to just review the history of the exit-entry of governments and their economic policies over the past 20 years. There were economic grievances that contributed to the opposition’s success in destabilizing governments and forming alternative ones, yet there was a remarkable continuity in economic and financial policies. Because of the Indian State’s ability to contain popular opposition within the precincts of electoral democracy – the ritual of elections – it could evade any fundamental political economic crisis and did not have to deter from its neoliberal commitments.

Once the Left in West Bengal chose to play by the rules of parliamentary democracy, it faced the continuous threat of defeat in electoral competition. The internalisation of the need to evade this threat transformed its character, thus leading it to aspire beyond being a class party of workers and peasants. It had to become an all people’s party – a party that could internalise the dynamo of the status quo, negotiating between diverse, dynamic and antagonistic interests. In other parts of the country too the rise of coalition politics and the possibility of electing representatives decisively regimented the official left’s radical rhetoric.

A cosmetic radicalism though is advantageous in the states where it is the incumbent power. It can mobilise its traditional class base, by playing on victimhood, by ritualistic national strikes etc. The patent logic of the West Bengal government has been that in the absence of a friendly centre, it can do nothing but make the best out of the adverse conditions. Alongside, it has been increasingly using the threat of capital flight to justify its concurrence with the national economic policies.

Behind these usual mechanics of stabilizing its position in the representative democratic set-up resides an essential dilemma or crisis for the official left. The historical legacy of the peasants and workers’ movements that congealed its rule and continue to provide it stability has been both a boon and a bane. This has gravely severed its ability to use traditional means of state coercion for containing its mass base, forcing an informal accommodation or para-legalisation of the Left’s traditional mass organizations – their transformation into ideological state apparatuses. Herein lies the danger.

Once these organizations are identified with the officialdom, the grassroots are increasingly alienated and the scope for their independent assertion amplifies. In the history of Bengal’s left, this has happened many times – the most formidable one was definitely the Naxalbari movement. Another example was the self-organization of the Kanoria Jute Mill workers beyond bankrupt bureaucratic trade unionism in the mid-1990s. Singur is the latest case.

One can definitely question the motives of mainstream non-left political parties – like the Congress, Trinamool (TMC) and Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), which compete with the Left Front to represent the interests of the neo-rich and landed gentry (which includes many absentee landowners) owning bigger portions of land, using ‘kishans’ – hired labours, bargadars, etc for cultivation. (EPW, Nov 18, 2006) This class, who the West Bengal government claims have consented to land alienation in Singur, joins such movements essentially to obtain various kinds of concessions – a higher price for giving up land to the State and perhaps also for increasing the price for future real estate speculation around the upcoming industrial belt. Moreover, until now the Left Front has succeeded in representing these class interests, which are the main offsprings of the limited agrarian and other economic reforms during its rule. But as opportunism is intrinsic to these interests, they are determined to utilise every available mechanism to gain concessions from the regime. Singur is a test case for the official Left’s pragmatism – being a local agency for reproducing the general conditions of capitalist accumulation, the Left Front government has to articulate larger neoliberal capitalist designs within the local hegemonic set-up, i.e., it will have to facilitate the representation of local hegemonies within “neoliberal state” apparatuses.

But there is a larger section of the landless, poor peasantry and those frequenting nearby towns for work; for them, the struggles like that of Singur are existential ones. There have been instances of reverse migration also with the closing down of traditional industries. These sections do not possess any faith in neoliberal industrialisation based on flexible, informal and mechanised labour processes. Recently in many parts of the country, these sections of rural poor have been the object and subject of radical mobilisations. It is the fear of their politicisation at the wake of its drive for competitive industrialisation, which is the real worry for the accommodated left in West Bengal, especially the CPM, which has traditionally resisted the mobilisation of the landless in the state, even by its own outfit.

However, the efficacy of capitalist parliamentarianism – the political arrangement suitable for the (post)modern “Eden of the innate rights of man” – lies in reducing class conflicts to lobby politics and competition for representation. Hence, the effective status quoist strategy would be to pose the systemic crisis merely as a temporary crisis of representation. The Left Front and the official opposition in the form of Trinamool and other mainstream parliamentary parties are effectively cooperating in this task. Efforts in this regard include the way the Singur struggle is being projected in corporate media and in political statements – as a Mamata-Buddhadeb tussle or even as manipulation by rival corporate interests etc. In order to make this strategy vital, the interests (rentier, concessionary or compensational) of local hegemonic classes need to be posed as universal and representative. This could happen only by subjugating the existential, need-based interests of rural poor and proletarians – these interests question the very logic of development within capitalism. Thus their subjugation through within-the-system representation effectively counters whatever counter-hegemonic potential such struggles have. The attempt to reduce the whole struggle to the issues of compensation and other kinds of concessions is part of this strategy. This allows an escape route for both the government and the official opposition – so that symbolic gestures negotiated between these parties can be posed as successes, which can be eventually played as trump cards in electoral competition.

Only the liberation of local struggles from such accommodation can decisively shape the continuity and effectiveness of counter-hegemonic mobilisations and struggles. But this requires radical segments within these struggles not to fall for the cosiness of politics based on vertically homogenised interests, as by default they are hegemonic.

This article has been published in a modified form in The Times of India, December 28, 2006 under the title, The Lost Left.

Why Condemning Israel and the Zionist Lobby is so Important

James Petras

“It’s no great secret why the Jewish agencies continue to trumpet support for the discredited policies of this failed administration. They see defense of Israel as their number-one goal, trumping all other items on the agenda. That single-mindedness binds them ever closer to a White House that has made combating Islamic terrorism its signature campaign. The campaign’s effects on the world have been catastrophic. But that is no concern of the Jewish agencies.” – December 8, 2006 statement by JJ Goldberg, editor of Forward (the leading Jewish weekly in the United States)

Introduction

Many Jewish writers, including those who are somewhat critical of Israel, have raised pointed questions about our critique of the Zionist power configuration (ZPC) in the United States and what they wrongly claim are our singular harsh critique of the state of Israel. Some of these accusers claim to see signs of ‘latent anti-Semitism’, others, of a more ‘leftist’ coloration, deny the influential role of the ZPC arguing that US foreign policy is a product of geo-politics or the interests of big oil. With the recent publication of several widely circulated texts, highly critical of the power of the Zionist ‘lobby’, several liberal pro-Israel publicists generously conceded that it is a topic that should be debated (and not automatically stigmatized and dismissed) and perhaps be ‘taken into account.’

ZPC Deniers: Phony Arguments for Fake Claims

The main claims of ZPC deniers take several tacks: Some claim that the ZPC is just ‘another lobby’ like the Chamber of Commerce, the Sierra Club or the Society for the Protection of Goldfish. Others claim that by focusing mainly on Israel and by inference the ‘Lobby’, the critics of Zionism ignore the equally violent abuses of rulers, regimes and states elsewhere. This ‘exclusive focus’ on Israel, the deniers of ZPC argue, reveals a latent or overt anti-Semitism. They propose that human rights advocates condemn all human rights abusers everywhere (at the same time and with the same emphasis?). Others still argue that Israel is a democracy – at least outside of the Occupied Territories (OT) – and therefore is not as condemnable as other human rights violators and should be ‘credited’ for its civic virtues along with its human rights failings. Finally others still claim that, because of the Holocaust and ‘History-of-Two-Thousand-Years-of-Persecution’, criticism of Jewish-funded and led pro-Israel lobbies should be handled with great prudence, making it clear that one criticizes only specific abuses, investigates all charges – especially those from Arab/Palestinian/United Nations/European/Human Rights sources – and recognizes that Israeli public opinion, the press and even the Courts or sectors of them may also be critical of regime policies.

These objections to treating the Israeli-Palestinian-Arab conflict and the activities of Zionist Lobbies as central to peace and war serve to dilute, dissipate and deflate criticism and organized political activity directed at the ZPC and its directors in Israel.

The response of the critics of Israel and the ZPC to these attacks has been weak at best and cowardly at worst. Some critics have responded that their criticism is only directed toward a specific policy or leader, or to Israeli policies in the OT and that they recognize Israel is a democracy, that it requires secure borders, and that it is in the interests of the Israeli ‘people’ to lower their security barriers. Others argue that their criticism is directed at securing Israeli interests, influencing the Zionist Lobby or to opening a debate. They claim that the views of ‘most’ Jews in the US are not represented by the 52 organizations that make up the Presidents of the Major Jewish Organizations of America, or the thousands of PACs, local federations, professional associations and weekly publications which speak with one voice as unconditional supporters of every twist and turn in the policy of the Zionist State.

There are numerous similar lines of criticism, which basically avoid the fundamental issues raised by the Israeli state and the ZPC, and which we are obliged to address. The reason that criticism and action directed against Israel and the ZPC is of central importance today in any discussion of US foreign policy, especially (but not exclusively) of Middle East policy and US domestic policymaking is that they play a decisive role and have a world-historic impact on the present and future of world peace and social justice. We turn now to examine the ‘big questions’ facing Americans as a result of the power of Israel in the United States.

The Big Questions Raised by the ZPC and Israeli Power in the USA
War or Peace

Critical study of the lead up to the US invasion of Iraq, US involvement in providing arms to Israel (cluster bombs, two-ton bunker buster bombs and satellite surveillance intelligence) prior to, during and after Israel’s abortive invasion of Lebanon, Washington’s backing of the starvation blockade of the Palestinian people and the White House and Congress’ demands for sanctions and war against Iran are directly linked to Israeli state policy and its Zionist policy-makers in the Executive branch and US Congress. One needs to look no further than the documents, testimony and reports of AIPAC and the Presidents of the Major American Jewish Organizations to observe their claims of success in authoring legislation, providing (falsified) intelligence, engaging in espionage (AIPAC) and turning documents over to Israeli intelligence (now dubbed ‘free speech’ by liberal Zionists).

If, as the overwhelming evidence indicates, the ZPC played a major role in the major wars of our time, wars capable of igniting new armed conflicts, then it ill behooves us to dilute the role of the Zionist/Jewish Lobby in promoting future US wars. Given Israel’s militarist-theocratic approach to territorial aggrandizement and its announced plans for future wars with Iran and Syria, and given the fact that the ZPC acts as an unquestioning and highly disciplined transmission belt for the Israeli state, then US citizens opposed to present and future US engagement in Middle East wars must confront the ZPC and its Israeli mentors. Moreover, given the extended links among the Islamic nations, the Israel/ZPC proposed ‘new wars’ with Iran will result in Global wars. Hence what is at stake in confronting the ZPC are questions which go beyond the Israeli-Palestine peace process, or even regional Middle East conflicts: it involves the big question of World Peace or War.

Democracy or Authoritarianism

Without the bluster and public hearings of former Senator Joseph McCarthy, the Jewish Lobby has systematically undermined the principal pillars of our fragile democracy. While the US Congress, media, academics, retired military and public figures are free to criticize the President, any criticism of Israel, much less the Jewish Lobby, is met with vicious attacks in all the op-ed pages of major newspapers by an army of pro-Israeli ‘expert’ propagandists, demands for firings, purges and expulsions of the critics from their positions or denial of promotions or new appointments. In the face of any prominent critic calling into question the Lobby’s role in shaping US policy to suit Israel’s interests, the entire apparatus (from local Jewish federations, AIPAC, the Presidents of Major American Jewish Organizations etc) go into action – smearing, insulting and stigmatizing the critics as ‘anti-Semites’. By denying free speech and public debate through campaigns of calumny and real and threatened repercussions the Jewish Lobby has denied Americans one of their more basic freedoms and constitutional rights.

The massive, sustained and well-financed hate campaigns directed at any congressional candidate critical of Israel effectively eliminates free speech among the political elite. The overwhelming influence of wealthy Jewish contributors to both parties – but especially the Democrats – results in the effective screening out of any candidate who might question any part of the Lobby’s Israel agenda. The takeover of Democratic campaign finance by two ultra-Zionist zealots, Senator Charles Schumer and Israeli-American Congressman Rahm Emanuel ensured that every candidate was totally subordinated to the Lobby’s unconditional support of Israel. The result is that there is no Congressional debate, let alone investigation, over the key role of prominent Zionists in the Pentagon involved in fabricating reports on Iraq’s ‘weapons of mass destruction’, and in designing and executing the war and the disastrous occupation policy. The Lobby’s ideologues posing as Middle East ‘experts’ dominate the op-ed and editorial pages of all the major newspapers (Wall Street Journal, New York Times, Los Angeles Times, Washington Post). In their pose as Middle East experts, they propagandize the Israeli line on the major television networks (CBS, NBC,ABC, Fox, and CNN) and their radio affiliates. The Lobby has played a prominent role in supporting and implementing highly repressive legislation like the Patriot Act and the Military Commission Act as well as modifying anti-corruption legislation to allow the Lobby to finance congressional ‘educational’ junkets to Israel. The head of Homeland Security with its over 150,000 functionaries and multi-billion dollar budget is none other than Zionist fanatic Michael Chertoff, head persecutor of Islamic charity organizations, Palestinian relief organizations and other ethnic Middle Eastern or Moslem constituencies in the US, which potentially might challenge the Lobby’s pro-Israel agenda.

The biggest threat to democracy in its fullest sense of the word – the right to debate, to elect, to legislate free of coercion – is found in the organized efforts of the Zionist lobby, to repress public debate, control candidate selection and campaigning, direct repressive legislation and security agencies against electoral constituencies opposing the Lobby’s agenda for Israel. No other lobby or political action group has as much sustained and direct influence over the political process – including the media, congressional debate and voting, candidate selection and financing of congressional allocation of foreign aid and Middle East agendas as the organized Zionist Power Configuration (ZPC) and its indirect spokespeople heading key Congressional positions. A first step toward reversing the erosion of our democratic freedoms is recognizing and publicly exposing the ZPC’s nefarious organizational and financial activities and moving forward toward neutralizing their efforts.

Their Foreign Policy or Ours?

Intimately and directly related to the loss of democratic freedoms and a direct consequence of the Jewish lobby’s influence over the political process is the making of US Middle East policy and who benefits from it. The entire political effort of the Lobby (its spending, ethnic baiting, censorship and travel junkets) is directed toward controlling US foreign policy and, through US power, to influence the policy of US allies, clients and adversaries in Europe, Asia and the Middle East. The Lobby’s systematic curtailment of our democratic freedoms is intimately related to our own inability to influence our nation’s foreign policy. Our majoritarian position against the Iraq War, the repudiation of the main executioner of the War (the White House) and our horror in the face of the Israeli invasion of Lebanon and destruction of Gaza are totally neutralized by Zionist influence over Congressional and White House policymakers. The recently victorious Congressional Democrats repudiate their electorate and follow the advice and dictates of the pro-Zionist leadership (Nancy Pelosi, Harry Reid, Rahm Emmanuel, Stephan Israel and others) by backing an escalation of troops and an increase in military spending for the war in Iraq. Bush follows the war policy against Iran proposed by the zealous Zionist fanatics in the American Enterprise Institute, repudiating the diplomatic proposals of the bi-partisan Baker Commission. Congress quadruples US arms stored in Israel (supposedly for dual use) in the aftermath of Israel’s bombing of Southern Lebanon with one million anti-personnel bomblets from cluster bombs in direct defiance of US electoral opinion. While hundreds of millions of undernourished women and children suffer and die in Africa, Latin America and Asia, the Lobby ensures that over half of US foreign aid goes to Israeli Jews with per capita incomes of over $22,000 USD.

No other organized political action group or public relations firm acting on behalf of the Cuban and Venezuelan exiles or Arab, African, Chinese or European Union states comes remotely near the influence of the Zionist lobby in shaping US policy to serve the interest of Israel.

While the Lobby speaks for less than 2% of the US electorate, its influence on foreign policy far exceeds the great majority who have neither comparable organizational nor financial muscle to impose their views.

Never in the history of the US republic or empire has a powerful but tiny minority been able to wield so much influence in using out nation’s military and economic power and diplomatic arm-twisting in the service of a foreign government. Neither the Francophiles during the American Revolution, the Anglophiles in the Civil War and the German Bund in the run-up to World War Two, nor the (anti-China) Nationalist Taiwan Lobby possessed the organizational power and sustained political influence that the ZPC has on US foreign and domestic policy at the service of the State of Israel.

Confronting the Lobby Matters

The question of the power of the Lobby over US policies of war or peace, authoritarianism or democracy and over who defines the interests served by US foreign policy obviously go far beyond the politics of the Middle East, the Israeli-colonial land grabs in Palestine and even the savage occupation of Iraq. The playing out of Zionist influence over the greatest military power in the world, with the most far-reaching set of client states, military bases, deadly weapons and decisive voice in international bodies (IMF/World Bank/United Nations Security Council) means that the Lobby has a means to leverage its reach in most regions of the world. This leverage power extends over a range of issues, from defending the fortunes of murderous Russian-Jewish gangster oligarchs, to bludgeoning European allies of the US to complicity with Israel’s ethnic cleansing of Palestine.

The ZPC represents a basic threat to our existence as a sovereign state and our ability to influence whom we elect and what agendas and interests our representatives will pursue. Even worse, by serving Israeli interests, we are becoming complicit with a State whose Supreme Court legalizes political assassinations across national boundaries, torture, systematic violations of international law and a regime which repudiates United Nations resolutions and unilaterally invades and bombs its neighbors and practices military colonist expansionism. In a word Israel resonates and feeds into the most retrograde tendencies and brutal practices of contemporary American politics. In this sense the Lobby through its media, Congressional influence and think tanks is creating an Israeli look-alike. Like Israel, the US has established its own Pentagon assassination teams; like Israel, it invades and colonizes Iraq; like Israel, it violates and rejects any constitutional or international legal restraints and systematically tortures accused but untried prisoners.

Because of these fundamental considerations, we cannot oblige our Jewish ‘progressive’ colleagues and compatriots and refrain from confronting the Zionist Lobby with force and urgency. Too many of our freedoms are at stake; too little time is left before they succeed in securing a greater military escalation; too little of our sovereignty remains in the face of the concerted effort by the Lobby and its Middle Eastern ‘expert-ideologues’ to push and shove us into a new and more devastating war with Iran at the behest of Israel’s pursuit of Middle East dominance.

No other country, abuser or not, of human rights, with or without electoral systems, has the influence over our domestic and foreign policy as does the state of Israel. No other Lobby has the kind of financial power and organizational reach as the Jewish Lobby in eroding our domestic political freedoms or our war-making powers. For those reasons alone, it stands to reason, that we American have a necessity to put our fight against Israel and its Lobby at the very top of our political agenda. It is not because Israel has the worst human rights agenda in the world – other states have even worst democratic credentials – but because of its role in promoting its US supporters to degrade our democratic principles, robbing us of our freedom to debate and our sovereignty to decide our own interests. The Lobby puts the military and budgetary resources of the Empire at the service of Greater Israel – and that results in the worst human rights in the world.

Democratic, just and peaceful responses to the Big Questions that face Americans, Europeans, Muslims, Jews and other peoples of the world passes through the defeat and dismantlement of the Israeli-directed Zionist Power Configuration in America. Nothing less will allow us to engage in an open debate on the alternatives to repression at home and imperialism abroad.

James Petras is a Bartle Professor (Emeritus) of Sociology at Binghamton University, New York, USA. He is one of the most respected Marxists among the radical circles around the globe. His works on imperialism and new rural movements of the landless and poor peasantry have greatly influenced political activists and analysts in Africa, Asia and Latin America. He has worked with the Brazilian landless workers’ movement and the unemployed workers’ movement in Argentina. His latest work is The Power of Israel in the United States (Clarity Press, 2006)

Gunga Din: Creating an Illusion of Permanence

Priyanka Srivastava

The 1939 Hollywood film, Gunga Din, is based on a short poem by Rudyard Kipling, which was published in 1892. This poem narrates the story of a low-caste bhishti (water career), Gunga Din, who lost his life while fulfilling his duty of quenching the thirst of wounded soldiers in the British Indian Army. Producer RKO and director George Stevens of Hollywood made a swashbuckler, cinematic version of the poem. This high-adventure drama is located in the rugged region of the North-West Frontier Provinces (NWFP) of the late nineteenth century colonial India. The screen adaptation of Kipling’s poem illustrates a breathtaking tale of three adventurous British Sergeants and their ‘low witted’ Indian water bearer’s fight against a vicious gang of thugs, a supposedly religious cult of ritualistic stranglers in colonial India who worshiped the ferocious Hindu goddess, Kali. These three confident British officers are assigned the task of eliminating thugee in NWFP.

Apart from being a brave protector of the Raj, one of these officers, Sergeant Cutter is also a gold digger. Gunga Din convinces him to make the dangerous journey to a mysterious temple and claim its hidden treasures. However, upon reaching this temple, Sergeant Cutter discovers that it is actually a hiding place for thugs. Rest of the film is a tale of the three Sergeants’ determination, shrewdness and bravery in fighting the ‘savage’ thugs. The developed cinematic representation of Kipling’s short verse was remarkable for its magnitude, sophisticated cinematography, engaging performances, and a tight, suspense-filled script. This cinematic text, however, is equally important for its specific portrayal of British and Indian characters as well as its emphasis on the ‘civilizing’ role of the empire.

Although it was produced in Hollywood, Gunga Din represented a dominant British discourse regarding the empire and Indian society. In view of the nineteenth century liberal, utilitarian and Evangelical reformers, India was a land of stationary and superstitious religions and cultures. In this context, the primitive practices of sutee and thugee were often cited to underline the characteristics of a ‘bloodthirsty’ and ‘irrational’ people. Such constructions created a hierarchy of the civilizations, situating Britain at top while India was placed at the bottom. British imperial ideology thus deployed its superior position to legitimize its colonization of India as a moral mission, which would civilize and modernize India. In this sense, Gunga Din’s most striking twist to Kipling’s poem is the depiction of a resurrection of the thugee cult. This addition to the main narrative not only gave a sensational angle to the film but also confirmed India’s supposed insularity to forces of progress. Along with the cinematic shots of snakes, elephants, and the references to buried treasures, this emphasis on thugee conjures an exotic and inherently ‘different’ image of the orient.

In one of the opening sequences, a British Colonel tells his subordinates that thugee was a murderous, Hindu religious cult that had spread throughout India and Ceylon whereas historically it was limited mainly to central India. These factual errors apart, the existence of thugee as a coherent and specifically religious cult, different from other bands of dacoits, is still a debatable question among historians. In the early nineteenth century, its members included landless peasants and unemployed people who were forced to adopt criminal methods as a survival strategy. However, in colonial records, thugee was defined as a specific cult whose presence was another example of natives’ ‘barbarity’. Its supposed elimination by a British soldier and administrator Sir W H Sleeman illustrated the British empire’s enlightening role in India. In this context, the film’s central narrative around thugee has certain important implications. The fictitious reincarnation of thugee in Gunga Din frames colonial India as a timeless and stagnant society. One of the scenes shows a group of thugs damaging telegraph wires and forcefully driving away the inhabitants of a village, which depicts them as a threat to modernity and colonial order. In contrast, the discipline, shrewdness and concerns of British army men show their determination to protect the colony against such retrogressive forces. In many ways thus, this film could be compared with American journalist Katherine Mayo’s 1927 book, Mother India, which provided graphic details of Indian ‘savagery’ and ‘backwardness.’ While this highly circulated book stimulated waves of angry rejoinders from Indian nationalist leaders in both Britain and the US it reestablished the Raj as a necessary evil and a ‘civilizing mission’. Both Gunga Din and Mother India emphasized colonial people’s backwardness and thus held them responsible for their own political subjugation.

Moreover, it is not accidental that the thugs and their leader, Guru, are shown using the nationalist and revolutionary jargons of the early twentieth century anti-imperialist struggles. The film deliberately superimposes nationalist consciousness onto a criminal group to undermine the growing mass appeal of both Gandhian nationalist and socialist revolutionary organizations of the 1920s and 30s. For example, the leader of the thugs is a replica of Gandhi. Although actor Eduardo Ciannelli’s muscular frame makes him unfit to play a look alike of Gandhi, his loin cloth, shaved head, bamboo staff, slightly bended body as well as the language of sacrifice and nationalism consistently remind viewers of the Congress leader. Moreover, many militant nationalist leaders, particularly those coming from Bengal and Maharashtra, were followers of Hindu goddess Kali and Bhawani. Gunga Din’s depiction of Kali’s followers as a sinister lot effectively ridicules such revolutionary movements as nothing but primitive and diabolical designs against western forces of progress and modernity.

Since the beginning of the nationalist opposition of its rule in India, the empire had frequently projected itself as a champion of the interests of the Muslims and lower castes. The images of Hindu thugs’ attack on Muslim villages reinforced minorities’ anxieties about a hegemonic Hindu nationalism. Although the Hindu nationalist underpinnings of the Indian National Congress are undeniable, in the particular context of the NWFP, Gunga Din undermined the efforts of the Red Shirts and the Indian National Congress for building a common front against British Imperialism. The portrayal of dalit water career, Gunga Din reflects a same patronizing attitude. Although the sergeants frequently use verbal violence against the “untouchable” and lower-ranked bhishti, their condescending behavior to him simultaneously shows the white man’s greater capability to accommodate the outcasts of Indian society. In reality, the post 1857 British policies consciously aimed at forming alliances with the upper castes and aristocratic sections of Indian society. The non-ranked, lower position of dalit Gunga Din is a reflection of this upper caste bias in imperial institutions including the army. Apparently Gunga Din aspired to become a soldier in the army, an ambition which merely creates comic situations in the film. Therefore, despite a positive depiction of the raj, the film clearly shows that the caste biases of ‘civilized’ British officers were hardly different from the views of ‘uncivilized’, upper caste/class Indians.

Cinema studies scholars frequently point out that a strong and successful cinematic history takes artistic liberties to produce a less academic and more marketable narrative. However, such creative adjustments should be balanced, tolerant, and thoughtful. Gunga Din could be judged as an authentic film in its depiction of imperial army and attitudes of some British officers about India and Indians. However, it thoroughly ignores Indian people’s anti-imperialist struggles and represents an apologetic perspective on the Raj. The emphasis on Hindu nationalism and the overwhelming shots of Indian army men killing and chasing away the thugs (rebels) show the division among Indians. In the late 1930s a worldwide economic depression and Indian nationalist demands had substantially weakened the British Empire. In this backdrop empire films such as Gunga Din emphasized the military aspect of the empire, creating a false consciousness of imperial control over the colony, an illusion of permanence.

Priyanka Srivastava is a graduate student at the Department of History, University of Cincinnati. Her doctoral research focuses on labor and gender history of South Asia.

Media and the Indian State: On the Draft Broadcasting Services Regulation Bill, 2006

Pothik Ghosh

I am afraid I am going to have to admit that I shall somewhat complicate this discussion. And I begin doing that by asking – would it suffice for the Indian Left – both its communist and non-communist variants alike – to protest against the current government proposal to bring in a broadcasting bill that seeks to limit the ‘free’ media’s operations? If the intended broadcasting bill is an act of state censorship – which it most certainly is – would it do for the Indian Left to simply see it as such and resist it? In other words, shouldn”t we on the Left, before we take a definite political position against the proposal, understand the tension within a system of which both the government and the media are integral parts? Only when we are able to comprehend this systemic tension would our praxis become a really interventionist critique of the political economy of the mass media. To put it broadly, the principal concerns of the proposed bill are regulation of market-share of TV companies to purportedly prevent media monopolies from coming up, so that homogenisation of opinion can be checked. After all, shouldn’t the state in a capitalist democracy like ours be concerned about homogenisation of opinion, and be sensitive to the question of consumer choice? Of course, given the sameness of the content on most of our TV channels, choice is really an illusion. An illusion that is intrinsic to the political economy of the mass media. But more of that later. Coming back to where we were:

The state’s intent, in proposing the bill, is to putatively articulate the wishes, demands and concerns of those social groups, whose concerns either find no reflection in, or are undermined and/or contradicted by, programming on cable TV channels, which articulate the concerns of the hegemonic classes. We can sense in this a dialectical tension between two visions of hegemony: One which considers that the project of hegemonisation is complete. And the other, represented in this case by the government, which thinks that the hegemony of the ruling classes is yet to be conclusively established. So, the current move to bring in the bill is meant to emphasise the fact that the state is as much concerned and bothered about those social groups, which do not ‘identify’ with the interests of the ruling classes, as the ruling classes themselves as also those who have accepted their ideological hegemony despite the fact that their interests do not really converge with those of the ruling classes.

(In fact, when we say that a particular group does or does not identify with the interests of the ruling classes we must qualify that by saying that some groups identify with the interests of the system more than others. For, the political economy of capital excludes identities, commodities, ideas, cultures to the extent that it orders them in a hierarchy of exchange values. But since things higher up in the hierarchy valorise themselves by transferring value from things, different from them occupying the lower tiers, nothing, from the point of view of the total system, is excluded. We can safely say that capitalism creates hierarchical exclusion of difference even as it includes those differences productively! The bourgeois social formation, which is civil society in common parlance, is constituted by a differential hierarchy of social relations or relations of production.)

To come back to the government gesture of proposing the broadcast bill: In this gesture of the state, at any rate a sizeable section of it, lies the will of the ruling ideology – not class since the latter is too internally fragmented and heterogeneous an entity – to hegemonise.

But this tension, or contradiction, between two visions of ideological hegemony of the ruling classes has two possible syntheses, or to borrow from Hegel, ‘aufhebung’. The first unity of opposites is obviously the will to hegemonise. It is positive, present and status-quoist. The second dialectic, and this is our main concern, is critical, absent and revolutionary. That, in this instance, must be seen as a Marxian overturning of the Hegelian dialectic.

It is the will to construct a counter-hegemony, or to be more precise a counter-ideological position. This is the will we on the Left have to extract from the consensus that is being articulated by the government to bring the bill to control the freemarket of the free media. Let’s understand this better. The strand of the government gesture to bring in the broadcast bill, which in what it manifests – as we well truly know – is the will of the ruling classes to hegemonise on the larger political terrain. But it seeks to do so in the name of demand for more choice from among certain social sections lower down in the systemic hierarchy. It is the essence of this demand for more choice from among those social sections, which the Marxists must comprehend. In the Marxist’s revolutionary scheme, this social demand must be first seen, and then articulated, as being inflected with its negative, counter-ideological and autonomously political desire to reject and unravel the law-constituting gesture of the ruling classes to dominate – through ideological hegemony and consensus or direct coercion, or a combination of both.

Of course, if we were to deal with this within the conceptually segmented domain of the mass media the Left should read in this positive demand for certain kind of TV programmes over others, the absent or sedimented desire to disavow, even challenge, the anti-dialogic spirit intrinsic to the mass media, thanks to the larger political economy within which it is situated and, at the same time, facilitates.

Another aspect, which is brought out by this tension between two visions of the ruling classes, is the idea of the autonomization of the executive. That is, when the state ceases to be a mere executive representative of the ruling class, and becomes an independent entity in itself. Virtually a class for itself, whose decisions are often at variance and in conflict with those of the dominant social class. This happens when polity is faced with, what some Marxists have called the “crisis of representation”. This crisis of representation, together with the autonomization of the executive, has been very evident in India and some other post-colonial Asian nation-states for at least the past few decades. That is typical of a fascist conjuncture. This crisis of representation happens when the ruling class, and in fact the entire social formation created by and enabling its political economy, is deeply fractured and becomes too internally differentiated to articulate a single cohesive set of interests and ideologies. In other words, the ideological hegemony of the ruling classes collapses and various contending ideologies, facilitating various sectional interests, come to fore. The state then steps in to fill the hegemonical vacuum by asserting its independent coercive and administrative role. It does so by playing one class against the other – the bourgeoisie against the proletariat; the petty bourgeoisie against the proletariat; the proletariat against the peasantry; and the petty bourgeoisie against the big bourgeoisie.

This means two things:
a. The state’s interests are independent of the interest of all social classes, though it may at times converge with one, at another with the other.

b. Its interests are best served by preserving the current political economy of exchange value and its attendant system of differential inclusion. Consequently, it does everything except unravel the socio-economic origins of the system.

Let us go back to the broadcast bill in the light of this analysis. To the extent that it seeks to curb the power of an influential section of the dominant classes (the media barons); through executive fiat, it indicates the crisis of representation. (1)

I repeat once again that the political economy of the modern state, whatever be its form, is a capitalist political economy of valorisation through value transfer, which creates an anti-dialogic, stratified system of productive inclusion. Given this political economy of the state and its various attendant political and social institutions, it would be too much to expect that this tension would, objectively on its own, have a revolutionary, critical resolution. As a matter of fact, the absence of any progressive subjective political intervention would most likely resolve it in favour of the status quo: a continuous extension of the hegemonic project of the ruling classes and their ruling ideology.

That revolutionary subjectivity will, however, have to be premised on a critical understanding of the political economy and ideological character of the mass media. The Left must understand that this radical subjectivity would be most effectively deployed when the subjectivity is fully seized of the crisis of representation. Mostly, people resist the state, but without any new paradigm of politics that would seek to understand the state as a function of a certain type of political economy; a certain mode of production; and a certain structure of social relations. Such resistance is, therefore, doomed to be plotted in terms of the status quo of social relations. Thus capturing state power inevitably becomes, for them, an end-in-itself. Every such act of resistance, as a result, ends with some sections of those resisting being absorbed into the state. Those who are not absorbed, again align with those who are preparing to launch a fresh assault against the might of the new state. And thus the vicious cycle continues.

The preponderant tendency of the state is to close itself and exclude others, but it can never do so completely because, objectively, there’s a counter-tendency in it to deal with others and include them, if only in a hierarchical fashion and if only to oppress and exploit them in order to transfer value and accumulate capital in all its ‘materialised’ and ‘dematerialised’ forms – cultural capital, social capital, political power, money and so forth. The modern state, as a consequence, remains precariously open to challenge. This tension results in it being forced to reflect the demands of those who are lower down in the systemic hierarchy, and who through resistance are trying to move upwards, or to-wards the centre of it all. But since this demand is articulated by the state; and also because the demand itself is inscribed within the paradigm of modern political power and form of state, even in its resistance it ultimately fails to articulate itself without distorting its counter-ideological, critical essence – the essence, which wants to escape the mediatory appearance of the prevailing political economy and its ideological-ethical framework.

So, the UPA government has, through its gesture of proposing the broadcast bill, articulated the ‘aam aadmi’s’ mandate, which demands of it more choice as a consumer. Something that monopolising media houses would obviously be loath to grant them. But this manifest demand and mandate are distorted by the mediation of the politics of state power, its ideologies and institutions, and, most fundamentally, its political economy. It would be the Marxian Left’s task to cut through the clutter and recover what the appearance of this mandate, or this demand has distorted beyond recognition.

Now let’s see where this approach of unmasking disguised and alienated political-economic/ideological categories can lead us to in the segmented domain of the mass media. Once we accept this approach, media can be seen to be answering affirmatively to only one of these two questions: Is it meant to aid leisure, and ideological indoctrination and/or skilling of workers by purveying programmes that are passively consumed by them as part and parcel of the reified ritual to socially re-produce themselves? Or, is it a zone where pleasure intersects with critique to produce a radical rupture with the prevailing political economy in both its content and form, which are entwined thoroughly with each other? The question that we on the Left should choose to answer in the affirmative is clear.

To understand the fundamental difference between these visions of the media, we need to simply remember what French filmmaker Goddard had once said: “TV transmits, while cinema expresses.” Here, of course, we must also understand that for Goddard TV is the epitome of the bourgeois mass media purveying entertainment, ideologies and skills, while cinema is the supreme expression of what a left-wing cultural-political resistance against such a mass media and its political economy ought to be. For Goddard, TV transmits things as they are, and that transmission is meant to be passively recognised, received and consumed as reality by its intended viewers for entertainment and/or ‘education’. Cinema, on the other hand, is to express that reality. In other words, it is meant to reflect upon and investigate as to how this reality is constituted. Not just that, it also ends up provoking the audience, too, to participate in that reflection and probe. That implies engagement and active participation of the audience. It is this vision of Goddard’s cinema that has to permeate the Left’s cultural-political discourse and its vision of an alternative media.

This kind of cultural politics of resistance has a long and rich legacy.

A. First, of course, is the anti-narrative films of Goddard himself. His cinema is known to suddenly rupture the narrative and take recourse to various devices and tropes that lead to reflection on the reality that the narrative is seeking to capture or depict.

B. And then, of course, there is Brecht, whose debt Goddard has acknowledged time and again, and whose idea and practice of epic theatre did to culture and aesthetics what Marx’s did to politics and political economy. In his epic theatre Brecht sought to alienate the audience from the play, by interrupting its narrative through use of various devices like melodrama, documentary film clips, newspaper cuttings, actual audio recordings of historical events, etc, in order to unearth and foreground the various processes that constitute and contextualise the reality being depicted in his plays. His intention: to destroy the cathartic consumption of theatre, and the reality it represents, by a passive audience; and provoke that audience into thinking about how reality is historically constituted. His didactic approach was meant to provoke audiences into a dialogue with the producer so that they become active participants in the process of producing the plays, and by extension the reality outside theatre itself. Brecht was actually known to have rewritten many of his plays by taking into account the reactions and responses of politically engaged German workers, who were his primary audience.

C. South American Augusto Boal has taken this Brechtian experiment a step further. His plays of the theatre-of-the-oppressed vintage are produced in a fashion that it provokes the audience not just to reflect on how the narrative is constituted but to actually become part of the play and start participating in it.

D. Filmmaker John Abraham’s Odessa film club experiment closer home in Kerala is also another example of how the audiences of cinema can become its producers. Abraham and Odessa made some films successfully with money raised from poor villagers, radical intellectuals and the urban underclass, who often enough also became its cast and supplied their intellectual inputs, too, to the making of those films.

Eventually, however, Odessa has significantly been diminished and it is a pale shadow of its past. There’s, however, a moral to this story of Odessa’s diminution. A moral that the Left, particularly its cultural political practitioners would do good to learn by heart. Odessa succeeded only till that time when there was a certain kind of active, left-wing, anti-systemic consensus at work. As soon as that politics went into retreat there were few if any takers for an experiment like the Odessa. This means that cultural-aesthetic practices, like the ones just mentioned, have radical implications in terms of critiquing the prevalent system and its political economy. But those implications have to be actualised through active political praxis.

In the absence of such praxis, these experiments are doomed to be reified into aesthetic-cultural artefacts or forms, by the market’s Ricardian logic of value ascription through demand and supply. These experiments become yet another commodity/ideology that the bourgeois mass media includes in its hierarchical jungle of commodities, ideologies and brands.

The Delhi-based Public Service Broadcasting Trust (PSBT) is a good example of illustrating this. The PSBT’s efforts are geared towards producing short films, both documentaries and features, that the ‘public’ would ‘actually’ want to see. It has even gone so far as to produce films by filmmakers drawn from local communities and with participant-actors taken from those communities for those communities as well as others like them. But then, the PSBT is a kind of an NGO that looks at people’s media and its practices purely in cultural terms, and is completely divorced from a larger anti-systemic political movement and its political-economic critique. As a result, most of its films and programmes are telecast by the Doordarshan. In other words, the PSBT has to depend on government assistance and subsidy to realise and propagate its purportedly progressive cultural-political vision. In the process, the PSBT programmes, too, have willy-nilly fallen prey to the market’s logic of TRP ratings, ad revenue, branding and so forth. Consequently, they are condemned to either survive precariously as government-subsidised arte-facts of good culture, which can disappear any moment, just like the National Film Development Corporation (NFDC) of India-sponsored art-house cinema; or they go beyond the pale of lei-sure-driven mass media to become highly prized cultural commodities, which are accessed by a privileged few to indulge their supposedly non-utilitarian pleasures. This, according to Theodor Adorno, is precisely how the culture industry creates the reified domains of mass culture and high culture, in which the latter category absorbs everything that is avant-garde and radical, cutting of larger society’s access to them, completely defanging them in the process.

That is not to say those ‘good cultural’ programmes and art-house movies should not be there. (Albeit one must admit that a lot of those NFDC-sponsored films were ponderous, pretentious, junk with no real cultural-aesthetic merit and political use.) The point is to see how they can thrive even in the bourgeois mass media, whether owned by the state or private players.

Such programming can be made viable only by going beyond the market principle of demand and supply; or, more precisely, the split between the active producer and the passive consumer-audience. That would be possible only when media and art are transformed into a de-commodified zone of political resistance and political-economic critique. For, a media that seeks to transform the passive audience into active participant-producer will have to situate itself within, and simultaneously drive, a larger political movement that critiques and seeks to transform the political economy of exchange value and value transfer, which through creation of differential hierarchies privileges oppressive and pedagogic determination of identities, over an open dialogue.

Only when such larger politics frames our protest against state censorship or our demand for transparent regulation would they be effective in becoming something more than effete editorials written by well-meaning editorial writers in the mainline press.

Such a political approach also implies, and I believe that’s by now clear, the creation of alternative media, and popular cultural-political initiatives that want to change the world, not merely interpret it. Such initiatives, of which the alternative media would be the instrumentality, would be a movement that intends to heal the producer-consumer breach, and turn passive audiences into active participants in the production of politics, and a horizontal, non-hierarchical political economy of non-exploitation.

Such cultural-political initiatives must not, however, be confused with reified models of Soviet-style socialist realism and Proletkult. We already have far too much of useless, status-quoist ‘janwadi’ cultural-political artefacts, like the hoary street theatre, being churned out by various cultural fronts of equally various communist parties. Instead, we would do well to recall Walter Benjamin’s words: “Rather than ask, ‘What is the attitude of a work (of art) to the relations of production of its time?’ I should like to ask, ‘What is its position within them.'” No longer do the cultural-political initiatives of the Indian Left exhibit their original awareness of how their techniques of production, or the forms of representation that resulted from those production processes are in sync with the socialisation of production that this left seeks to establish.

To put it briefly let’s modify a little a maxim of historian E. P. Thompson: “There can be no culture without struggle.” Certainly not for the Marxists.

But this politics of struggle is not just somewhere outside. It is, in fact, situated, on point where the inside inflects with the outside. The inside in this case being people like us: journalists yes, but more importantly media workers.

I’m not very experienced in matters organisational and will, therefore, refrain from trying to come up with an organisational plan. But I will certainly stress the need for a media workers” organisation, which would contemplate its revolutionary politics in terms of struggles within their place of work. These struggles must not focus merely on gaining more wages and/or more time for leisure, but, more importantly in this conjuncture, control over their production process.

Pothik Ghosh is a professional journalist with The Economic Times. He has long been involved with various grassroots organisational efforts and Marxist study circles in India.

Notes:

(1) The “crisis of representation” has been explicated well by Marx in his ‘The 18th Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte’; and later by August Thalheimer and Trotsky while theoretically dealing with the ascendancy of Nazism. The resemblance with India of the past, at least, three decades is uncanny.

Singur in Context: Capital flight or Flight of Fancy?

CG

Comrade Budhadeb Bhattacharjee is a man in a hurry – he has to undo the pyrrhic victory of the labor-peasant movement in West Bengal: capital flight. He thought he got it fixed when he had the party and the government machinery close in on Singur, to evict people, erect a barricade and encircle the site. A technique developed in the bygone labor militancy days – gherao (encirclement) came in handy even in distancing oneself from its fruit! Who knew! There was perhaps a fleeting smile on his face, a sigh of relief as now that the site is secured, it is only a political matter of dealing with the Banerjees, Patkars and Roys. But pesky Tapasi Malik came along to ruin it all. The teenage daughter of one of the evicted landless workers strayed into the site at night to relieve herself and ended up as a smoldering corpse in a pit, the stench waking up her folks. Any sensible woman would have known better than to venture into such territory so there must be an explanation – other than the unlikely fact that she was just a teenager who was not very sensible. With 14 per cent of all crime in India being rape or dowry related, Indian policemen do not need any lessons in creative writing. So the wheels of imagination began to spin: Tapasi had slipped out of her home for an illicit rendezvous with a jealous lover and pick your choice: 1) she committed suicide shortly after 2) the jealous lover along with his drunken friends raped and murdered her.

This is not exactly a laughing matter anymore. History and geography are serious business and if we get one wrong we get the other wrong too. So lets get to the bottom of it. According to Comrade Budhadeb Bhattacharjee and his party, and oddly enough according to any number of economists and politicians of all ideological pursuasions, Bengal experienced a flight of capital ever since the Left Front came to power in 1977. The left and the right diverge from that point on: if you are on the left, Bengal survived by enhancing agricultural productivity, taking over sick industries and selling power to neighboring states while Kolkata itself languished in interminable power outages. If you are on the right, then Bengal drove out industries, indoctrinated youth and captured all key institutions. Both agree, with some important differences over specific details, however, that Kolkata must be restored to its past glory as an entrepot to investments and to surplus extraction. It must be the port through which it will all flow in and out as majestically as the Ganges. Implanting the Tata people’s car plant on the Singur farmlands is the latest in that direction. (Did I just say that? You are right. The Ganges only flows out. But of course, this is different. Things will also flow in here and it will be good for the entire Eastern India because we will have downstream vendors, and suppliers. Don’t ask me which way is downstream because it is really hard to tell these days.)

Let us not waste time on the disagreements between the left and the right and instead look at what the left and the right agree on – namely the self evident fact that capital fled Bengal because of labor militancy. The most astounding thing about this ‘fact’ is that it is as if it were happening in outerspace and had nothing at all to do with the politics and economics and history of India. Little seems to be the need to explain what exactly was this labor militancy about. Where did capital fly to? How did it fly? But since such questions require an intimate detailed knowledge of Bengal, let us start the story from some other place to at least locate this outer space object in some relation to other objects in space. The Communist Party of India-Marxist (CPIM) came to power in Bengal at a peculiar moment in India. It was when an all-round anti-Congressism based on an aversion to its flirtation with the authoritarian Brazilian path to development, and a frustration with the singular failure of national coalitions found expression through the rising regional bourgeoisie whatever that word means – mostly rich and middle farmers, government employees, contractors, professionals, small and medium industrialists and so on. The specific configurations of these regional formations varied from state to state depending on local agrarian histories and the implications of caste identities in successive rounds of modernization. If it called itself NT Rama Rao in Andhra Pradesh, it called itself Lalu Prasad Yadav in Bihar, it called itself Bhindranwale in Punjab just as it called itself Sharad Pawar in Maharashtra. This was truly a historic period in the Indian political economy. First and second generation sarkari employees were preparing to retire and look for avenues to invest their savings in the cities. Restless agrarian rich were moving into the cities. Some centrally owned public sector industries were slowly getting into trouble even as others especially in the electronics and communications sector began to thrive and supported a number of ancillaries. It was an economy in which older privately owned industries were getting into trouble because of technological outdatedness and changes in supply chains. In short in certain sectors industrialists were truly looking for labor trouble so they could legitimately pack up. What we know about these developments is mostly locked in the archives of area studies centers all over India with piles of MA, MPhil and PhD dissertations with microlevel local data.

Within this socio political dynamism in the state, the fight in Bengal as everywhere else was for regional autonomy, a freedom from the center – a process that Achin Vanaik described in a quaintly Newtonian metaphor: centrifugal and centripetal forces. What makes this a uniquely leftist endeavor is not clear but it is quite charming how many leftists would be offended if you were to suggest to them that this anti-center, anti-Congress trait was nothing peculiar to the Left. But perhaps we can press the comparison a little further to the actual strategies of the regional leaders. Most of the regional leaders faced a twin challenge: to wrest some degree of political autonomy from the center and curb threats posed by various Marxist-Leninist (ML) groups’ militant rural mobilizations. To this end, all of them experimented with political institutions, administrative structures and police strategies. The large section of rural voters who were restless under the Congress networks of feudal power and yet were urbane enough not to be attracted to the ML was the main target for the emerging regional leadership. In incorporating these sections into their politics, all the regional leaders followed similar patterns: tinker with panchayati and district political institutions to create appropriate avenues that would be accessible to these sections and not to the Congress, rustle up policy and administrative recipes to create stakes for these voters in the productivity of land – through sharecropper registrations, power subsidies, borewell subsidies and so on. Sharecropper registration data from Bengal villages overlaid with voting patterns over two or three successive elections in Bengal should reveal a pretty clear picture. But even without all that gimmickry, Pranab Bardhan and his colleagues demonstrate how sharecropper registration in Bengal was most intensive in villages where the left and right held equal power. Villages which were left strongholds reveal a pretty low level of sharecropper registration. Given their shared project of wresting autonomy from the center the regional leaders made common cause against the Congress, and came to each other’s rescue in national politics – Indira Gandhi’s nasty habit of using gubernatorial services to dismiss troublesome chief ministers was one issue that rallied together the left and the right in a remarkable way. Yet faced first with a crafty statesman in Indira Gandhi, and then her charismatic son, they also made pragmatic compromises with the center on an individual basis. Among other things, the Sarkaria Commission on center state relations was one of the major accomplishments of the solidarity among these regional leaders. So if this is at least in part the history of Bengal CPIM, why does it all sound so garbled? It is because the Bengal CPIM faces a challenge that no other regional leader faces: it has to tell a story of regional success, but it has to also tell it in national terms. That is the origin of the story of labor militancy. To acknowledge that Bengal CPIM is simply a cadre based regional operation to undermine the Congress party would make it sound parochial – something that does not suit the refined culture of its leadership. Hence it has to be packaged as a universal struggle against capital rather than a parochial fight against the Congress. This is why the CPIM’s cadre operations, capture of institutions, its day to day struggles and its police operations against Naxalites all these have to be packaged as labor militancy. Ordinary stories of mill closures because of ordinary reasons and ordinary collusions between union leaders and mill managements, and mundane stories of government will simply not do. It has to be the universal labor militancy. That is how Bengal’s elite distinguishes itself from the other regional elite.

After the launch of the economic reforms, the need for a united struggle against the center was largely gone. During the first five years itself, they started using their respective capacities to send MPs to the center to negotiate concessions to their own regions but in the second round of reforms this became an established practice in Indian politics. In fact, the political power of the regions was so striking that even the World Bank could not resist using it effectively. One powerful chief minister who commands sufficient MPs to threaten the central government is worth a dozen zealous bureaucrats at the center… so long as that chief minister is plied with enough funds to restructure the state’s economy, the central government will stay steady on reforms course. Bengal was not above this new dynamic of interregional competition for investments.

Against this backdrop, let us look at the actual history of Bengal’s industrial decline. Regardless of Comrade Budhadeb Bhattacharjee’s penchant to blame it on labor militancy, industrial decline of Bengal started soon after independence, as most of the investors in Bengal were foreigners. As these industries slowly packed up, the commanding heights economy centered in Delhi’s bureaucratic control, industrial finance clusters being located in Bombay proved disadvantageous to Bengal. The most pernicious of the policy interventions from Delhi was the freight equalization policy which effectively meant that eastern mining areas – Bengal, Bihar, Orissa all began losing to the southern states. Ever since the Left Front came to power in 1977, it largely blamed its industrial decline on discrimination by the center. While there is no clear evidence to establish this, substantial amounts of research based on time series data shows that mandays lost due to lockouts in Bengal is a significant proportion of the total mandays lost due to labor unrest.

A quick search indicates very little about how and where and when capital actually fled from Bengal because of labor militancy although everyone repeats it these days and it has actually begun to sound quite nice. “We are the guys who threw out capital and now we can do business as equals.” Regardless, it is possible to discern some patterns in inflows and growth elsewhere. During the 1980s in other states some of the public sector undertakings nurtured a fair amount of experimentation and growth especially in new industries like electronics, pharmaceuticals and so on. In the 1990s many of these came apart with workers being sent home with retrenchment packages, and senior level scientists and engineers walking away with technical knowhow. Using the social capital gained via their careers in these companies some of them sourced work, supply chains and work orders from abroad from Europe and the US – while some of them remained kitchen top pharmaceuticals and guest room data processing outfits, a few of them managed to grow into large corporations. To what extent this happened in Bengal is not clear. Available evidence suggests that the state did pretty well in attracting FDI in the post reforms period. It did alright in attracting the medium industry. It didn’t do too well with the sunrise industries and didn’t do too well with national big capital. Labor militancy cannot explain all this variation. As we have already seen, if some of it had to do with the ability of the regional leaders to negotiate with the center, some had to do with geohistoric inequities of the commanding heights economy, and some had to do with the social policies of the state government such as training the right kind of manpower, some had to do with corporate strategies and yet some of it was just contingent factors. If it is such a complex story even without any intimate knowledge of Bengal, why does everyone so glibly agree that labor militancy resulted in capital flight in Bengal? Why do statements ‘we must industrialize or we will perish’ sound right even when their blindness is so obvious? What kind of industry? What kind of labor? What kind of militancy and what kind of flight? Where to?

Part of the explanation could lie in CPIM’s need to distinguish itself from the run of the mill regional leaders. Part of it in Bengal’s nostalgia for its colonial industrial past. If that were all, there would be no reason to complain. Who could grudge the old comrade a touch of fancy? The trouble really is the consequence of that claim to inheritance of labor militancy gives the CPIM, the moral authority that is denied all other regional leaders to discipline workers and peasants now. It can conveniently wrap up a range of projects from real estate and retail to water privatization all in the industrialization blanket along with rising aspirations of the new middle class, the rent seeking behavior of politicians and bureaucrats and the recommendations of its international consultants. Bengal needs industrialization because for 25 years we have experienced capital flight due to labor militancy. If Kolkata develops East India develops. It is in that flight of fancy – rather than in the flight of capital that Tapasi’s death seems like a complicated case which needs creative scripting to suit the occasion. Why? Ask her mother. Tapasi died because she did not know that for Eastern India to develop she had to control her bladder!