The Ongoing Political Struggle in India

‘The Dangers Are Great, the Possibilities Immense’1

Saroj Giri , Monthly Review

"What made Spence dangerous to the bourgeoisie was not that he was a proletarian nor that he had ideas opposed to private property but that he was both." — Peter Linebaugh.2

‘Poorest of the Poor’ and Politics

It is always easy to criticize and dismiss an argument in its weakest formulation.  Attacking the policies of the security-centric Indian state establishment, particularly the Home Minister, today does not need much daring.  So let us instead take the benign, almost humanist utterance of the Prime Minister in his address to state police chiefs in September 2009: don’t forget, he said, that the Maoist movement has support among the poorest of the poor in the country.  Those on the left opposing the impending armed state offensive often invoke this quote from the PM to buttress their point about how these are really poor people, innocent civilians and ordinary villagers who will suffer if the offensive is undertaken.3

But when you look at the repressive face of the Indian state gearing up for the offensive, it is almost unbelievable that it is garnering all its strength to take on such poor suffering beings as constitute the adivasis of Central India!  Is it only because the state is repressive in nature that it finds the poorest of the poor so dangerous or is it that they are ‘actually’ dangerous?  Why does the same state, sometimes so benign with a progressive constitution, which also promotes NREGA (National Rural Employment Guarantee Act), which also provides, even if most grudgingly, different rights, want to put its foot down in this case to eliminate the ‘problem’?  Surely then the poorest of the poor must be dangerous people, there must be something about them, something fantastic, invisible to a flat, humanist, do-good perspective, which only sees them as ‘suffering’ and in need of ‘rights’!4  What is the power they have, which the mighty Indian state fears and wants to eliminate as soon as they can?  I mean, one has to understand the power they have as precisely the poorest of the poor, in fact, over and above being Maoists or supporting Maoists.

The state fears not their guns, not their violence, not their taxing the local population, not that they will be another parallel power structure.  What the state and Indian democracy fears is precisely that they are the poorest of the poor, that they have nothing to lose (and hence cannot be bought over or assimilated) and hence can launch and be the motive force for an unrelenting political transformation beyond their immediate grievances, the loss of their land or livelihood.  Indeed the Maoist movement, or any adivasi formation engaged in armed struggle, does not even have a list of demands that can possibly be fulfilled or addressed by the government.  A dynamic seems to be unfolding where they are not willing to settle down with even say ‘peace with justice’ but, like those who ‘have nothing to lose but their chains’, are aiming for ‘a world to win’.5  Surely if you are waging a war without any specific demands, you must be aiming for the world — a war waged by those who have no place in the world.6

Thus the Indian state does not fear this one Dantewada — in fact it has left Dantewada festering with the ‘Maoist virus’ for several years and only now is planning a decisive assault.  It does and can tolerate it; a lot of people in fact think of the Maoists as just another power structure which acts at the behest of this or that power group, or on their own, doing extortion and so on, which means that the Maoists as only an armed group could be tolerated and assimilated.

However, if the poorest of the poor, as Maoists, are aiming for a world to win, then, fair enough, the Indian state must fear not this one (isolated) Dantewada as a local event, but that there can be not just one but two, three, many Dantewadas.  Tebhaga, Telegana, Naxalbari, Srikakulam, Jharkhand, Dantewada, Lalgarh — aren’t these the many Dantewadas spread over India’s recent history?  What if they were to come up simultaneously in different parts of the country — all at the same time?  After all, these are people with ‘global ambitions’, present in neighbouring Nepal, who want to overthrow the Indian state  singing the Internationale, are not only talking about tribal identity or tribal rights, support the nationality struggles in the North-East and Kashmir and hence have a much larger agenda, if not vision.  If this ‘virus’ spreads this will not only weaken the Indian state politically, which it already has, but also militarily.  Naxalbari in 1967 inaugurated this emergence of the poorest of the poor as precisely such a political subject: this legacy continues today in so many different forms all across the country but it is as part of the Maoist movement that the struggle against the ruling order has come to a head.

Innocent Civilian or Political Subject?

Large sections of the left seem to understand the repressive nature of the state and capital but not the political subjectivity of the poorest of the poor.  A moral, almost subjectivist critique of the state as to its repressive ‘nature’ is however a bit too invested in presenting the poor as victims or innocent civilians — who then get preserved as that all along.  Most denunciations of the state’s impending armed offensive therefore derive their power and legitimacy in being able to present the poor as victims or at best only protecting his homestead against rapacious corporates backed by the state.  Or at best that they have been forced to take up guns since they had no other means, since they could not wait any longer for the state to deliver goods and services.  There is a refusal to accept that the poorest of the poor might have short-circuited themselves out of being either the beneficiaries of some benign, welfare state or being just victims or innocent civilians.

Against this humanitarianism of sections of the left, it is precisely the conjugation of poor and political which needs to be imagined and asserted, and which the ruling classes fear.7  Referring to the radicalism of Tommy Spence, a proletarian in 18th century England, scholar Peter Linebaugh states that "what made Spence dangerous to the bourgeoisie was not that he was a proletarian nor that he had ideas opposed to private property but that he was both".8  Here is the formula, if you like: you can be rich and radical but not poor and radical — the ideal combination allowed in today’s rights-based capitalism is poor and needy.

Is the refusal or inability to view the poorest of the poor as political subjects another instance of how we can all gleefully laugh at Fukuyama’s end of history thesis and yet it is bloody difficult to actually make history today?  Any attempt to make (universal?) history, we are sternly warned, will involve the use of force, violence, a party and will perhaps lead us to a totalitarian state. . . .  So, we are told, the poorest of the poor are not a problem as such, it is their articulation as political subjects, as Maoists or Naxals, which is the problem, carrying the seeds of totalitarianism.  And yet it is around the Maoist movement today that the political struggle of the poorest of the poor against the ruling order has sharpened and assumed new heights.

It is against the ‘repression’ of the political subjectivity of the poorest of the poor that we perhaps need to assert that they are not just fighting a battle to save their livelihood and resources and the armed offensive is not just going to kill and clear them from the way — rather the poorest of the poor in rising up are actually passing a verdict on the very political system and democracy in this country and the armed offensive is actually not just the voice of big capital but more fundamentally reveals the true nature of what passes for democracy in India.  It is clear how it is today misleading to attack only Chidambaram and the hawks in the Home Ministry, IB and the Jungle Warfare vultures.  It might be only the Chattisgarh DGP Vishwa Ranjan who openly calls for finishing the Maoists LTTE-style, but there seems to be a silent but wider consensus.  None of the major political parties have launched any agitation in support of the poorest of the poor.  Much like the Gujarat pogrom in 2002 or the numerous aerial bombings and killings in the North East, the present armed offensive can take place and Indian democracy will still go about its routinised, sterile normalcy.  Indian democracy itself stands exposed as so many times earlier: the question today is whether or not we are willing to go with the political struggle against it that is raging in front of us.

More symptomatic is the fact that the right-wing Hindu parties, apart from some media-savvy strident declarations to go trample the Maoists challenging the Indian state, have been unable to convert it into a political plank for populist political gimmicks.  When for example the Kashmiri movement gets active the BJP will publicly call upon the government to crush the movement there by sending the army, trying to mobilize support on this basis.  On the Dantewada issue even the right wing is not too invested in publicly declaring or inciting war — the Naxal or Maoist issue with its poorest of the poor base is a tricky one, and Indian democracy feels frail to the core here.  The best defense then is to present the militant adivasis and the Maoist movement  as only challenging the actions and omissions of the Indian state and not really questioning the very idea of India, going much beyond the pet Hindu-Muslim question, secularism, and other more familiar obsessions.

People have pointed out that the adivasis, due to the wrong policies of the state, have become Maoist by default.9  What is more revealing is however the assumption that the poorest of the poor must always (by default?) only be interested in livelihood issues, implicitly assuming that they cannot go beyond them and get political.  ‘Innocent trapped civilians’ soon enough feeds into a narrative where they are dependent on the support of the urban middle class left who can alone engage in politics by reaching out to them beyond its own interests.  The default assumption seems to be that the poorest of the poor can be fully deserving of ‘rights’ and access to resources but they cannot be political — as though they are put in place, this far and no more!

The problem for the state is not just that the poorest of the poor are sitting over rich resources and mining treasure which they refuse to give up but that they are political, that they are, if I dare conflate, ‘Maoist’.  Those on the left who are calling for peace, for ‘peace with justice’, find it extremely important to make the distinction between ordinary civilians or adivasis and Maoists.  This distinction is both important and real.  However, it looks like this distinction often derives from the refusal to accept that the poorest of the poor today carry the promise of a political revolution.  Dantewada, Lalgarh — aren’t the political struggle around them today in some ways decisive for the prospects of political change and social transformation?  Does one see only ‘violence’ and ‘armed conflict’, or only ‘livelihood issues’ and ‘resource grabbing by MNCs’, or ‘Maoist intolerance’ there, or a much larger political struggle which can inaugurate a wider mobilization of revolutionary forces across the country?  Do the Maoists on their part see only expansion of their control and more areas to rule over, or do they see the possibility of radical change?

If therefore the Lalgarhs and Dantewadas are arenas sharpening the political struggle in the country, and not just looming humanitarian disasters due to ‘armed conflict’, then different struggles and resistance movements taking place in the country must therefore coalesce around this central fault line weakening the ruling classes, daring them to come out with some of their last lines of self-preservation.  Pressure on the government to withdraw the armed offensive must be part of a larger, internal political solidarity with the ongoing movement, with the objective of taking it to a higher level.

Question of Violence and Political Struggle

What one should deeply ponder here is then why, particularly given that the Maoists do not have a base in urban areas, other left parties engaged in resistance refuse to align themselves with the resistance thrown down by the Maoists in different parts of the country.  Thus for example the use of violence by the Maoists becomes such an important problem that one refuses to accentuate the political crisis for the Indian political order inaugurated by Dantewada today and instead sees only an impending humanitarian disaster in Dantewada.  The poorest of the poor are seen only as in need for humanitarian help and goods and services: separating them from the ‘violent’, ‘intolerant’ Maoists only allows large sections of the left to overlook and indeed trash the political subjectivity of the poorest of the poor, or make it amenable to the given democratic order.10  But, in fact, the deep roots of the Maoists in the population are evidenced by the inability of the administration to recruit ‘informers’ from among the locals, say in Lalgarh.11

No wonder, in the case of Andhra Pradesh, it was only when the party leadership exposed themselves by coming overground during peace talks that the state was able to target and kill them.  Today, the biggest problem for the state derives from just an opposite reading of the mass base of the Maoists than what the democratic left argues.  One former Cabinet secretary suggesting ways of ‘dealing with the insurgency’ points out that "their (Maoists’) strong points are not their weaponry, but the support from large sections of the tribal community in whose midst and on whose behalf they operate".12  Further, unlike certain left commentators who argue that the Maoists like the LTTE are a mirror image of the present repressive state, a replicative state-in-the-making, the strategists of the Indian state hold that the Maoists are unlike the LTTE which "conducted itself like a state and paid a heavy price for it".13  Clearly, if, as the democratic left believes, it was so easy to separate the Maoists from the civilians, then the Indian state could have by now easily ‘drained the water and killed the fish’.

Overlooking the dynamic political revolutionary process which may have been inaugurated by the present crisis, where the Indian state and political order is forced to shed its democratic cloak and where the democratic legitimacy of the state is being exposed by the state’s own actions, leads directly to treating Dantewada and Lalgarh as just like some cesspools of violence and counter-violence, of some irrational forces working themselves out and hence needing the intervention of sane, democratic citizens of civil society.  While it is true that the masses in these areas are not already ‘making history’, it is as of today far more than a struggle over economic resources, livelihood issues, or jal, jangal, jamin (Water, Forest, Land).14

The Tatas and Essars are of course out there to grab resources from the adivasis and the armed offensive is related to the interests of big capital.  But this does not mean that the fight of the adivasis is only to protect ‘their’ resources, that they cannot go beyond ‘livelihood issues’ and the ‘struggle for survival’ and in fact inaugurate a larger political struggle in the country.15  Actually it is not they who cannot go beyond these issues, beyond livelihood issues, but it is large sections of the left and progressive persons who cannot.16  In reaching out (who are we to reach out, do we not have our own political struggle at hand?  An element of performance is unmistakable here) to the trapped innocent civilians in Dantewada, we are trying to block from view the fact that they are actually reaching out to us, calling on us to join their struggle, by going beyond the livelihood issues and jal jangal jamin that we are bent on offering them.  These sections of the left think that Dantewada and Lalgarh areas are or just waiting to become cesspools of violence and conflict; they do not see them as possible cauldrons of change that have dared and trashed Indian democracy and the existing political system — and proposed an alternative political system.

Ruling class strategists like KPS Gill seem aware of this when he states that the "Naxalites ideologue believe that they have an alternative political model to offer".17  Clearly, the poorest of the poor have thrown the ball in the court of the privileged democratic forces of the country, urging them to join a political struggle shorn of the political imbecility and juvenile belief in the nature and possibilities of the present democratic order.  Is the democratic left in the country willing to accept that the poorest of the poor can try to rewrite the history of the country?  Is that also considered too ambitious a project to be undertaken by the ‘masses’, in a country whose history has always been decided by the elite, by Nehru-Gandhi-Jinnah-Patel in round-table conferences?

And it is here that the otherwise legitimate question of use of violence seems like so much bickering to justify the refusal to accept the political content of the Maoist movement and the political challenge to the very nature of Indian democracy they put up today.  Otherwise, it is an absolutely legitimate question to talk about violence and killings, the idea of the absolute worth of human life, the dangerous idea of ‘the enemy of the people’ and so on.  Also the question of capital punishment itself must be debated thoroughly.  One cannot dismiss this as just a bourgeois deviation as some Maoist utterances tend to do.  However, it becomes ‘bourgeois’ precisely when these problems become a way to avoid the fundamental question of the political struggle, when it becomes the sole basis of judging the Maoist movement as a whole.  For, at the end of the day, it is only against the background of the advancing political struggle that such questions can be addressed and not merely by calls ‘to eschew violence’ or abstract talk of the dehumanizing effects of violence.

Thus it is that the problem posed by the Maoists or the impending armed state offensive must and perhaps can be addressed in the course of the intensification of the ongoing political struggle.  More Dantewadas, more Lalgarhs, more Naxalbaris — that is the solution.  This need not necessarily mean more of the Maoists, more of the Maoists in the present form — one cannot rule out the transformation of the existing political forces or of the Maoists themselves.  This cannot but involve more resistance at all levels, working class mobilization, middle class mobilization in the towns and cities, anti-caste struggles, gender struggles and so on.

Nietzschean Abyss

In pointing out how engaging in violence can suck Maoists into a vortex of violence, into a repressive movement, Sujato Bhadro quotes Nietzsche about how if you look into the abyss for too long the abyss starts staring back at you (‘Open Letter to the Maoists’).18  Bhadra is right so far as it goes; however, why does he assume that the only abyss is the one of the state?  Is there some other ‘abyss’ which we can gaze at apart from the state and which in staring back at us will mould or determine us, or at least show us the political way out?  That is, what if Dantewada or Lalgarh or the Maoist movement is not just a mirror image of the abyss of the state but is something in its own right as well, an alternative to the present political order?

Indeed I myself am waiting for that moment when the Nietschean wish will be fulfilled: if Dantewada and the areas of the impending offensive are like an abyss and we are looking at it, all our eyes are pinned on it, then when will the moment come when the abyss will start looking back at us, so that the broad left will then relate to the revolutionary struggle without the mediation of the existing state and its ‘progressive’ determinations?  We cannot really look at this abyss, we cannot go there or even visit ‘those areas’.  Reports say that security forces keep a strict check on entry and exit in those areas.  Chattisgarh DGP Vishwa Ranjan talks of ‘strategic hamletting’ in order to corner the rebels shorn of the support of the villagers: ‘drain the water to kill the fish’.  Nobody is allowed to enter those areas.  Even those fact-finding teams who visit seem to come with the all too familiar story of suffering, trapped civilians, but nothing really of these civilians as political agents imagining a different society.

Why can we not be allowed to go meet and be with the poorest of the poor?  What is it about them that, even when a Gandhian organization works with them, it creates problems?  Is the state stupid or is it just repressive in blocking off any contact with the ‘trapped masses’?  But it looks like that the state has a point and is being politically perceptive here, since its class interests are directly at stake.  Now it seems that, when a Gandhian goes and works with the adivasis in those areas, the Gandhian himself starts transforming!19  In fact some protagonists of non-violent struggles have severe problems with some of the Gandhians in Chattisgarh who go soft on Maoist violence!  Has the Gandhian Himanshu Kumar, working in Chattisgarh for a long time, gone soft on Maoist violence, it is asked.  Are the pro-Maoist poorest of the poor politically astute enough to morph the Gandhian into something like a Maoist Gandhian, if not a Gandhian Maoist?

I mean, what are we trying to do when we say that we must reach out to them?  Are we not trying to protect ourselves from what they can teach us?  We have a fear, and I wonder to what extent civil society activism in favour of doing something for the trapped civilians secretly derives its energy from blocking what they can offer us, how this activism sustains our unconscious refusal to join the ranks of the revolutionary forces.  We either look only at the state, albeit with stern accusing eyes, or we look at the revolutionary masses by sanitizing them into innocent, trapped civilians — we are avoiding something there, saving ourselves in our present existence and preempting the advance of the revolution if there is one.  We are scared that abyss will start staring back at us.

The state too does not want that we should be able to look at that abyss for too long — for the abyss starts staring back at us.  Thus all that we can possibly know today is that the people there are trapped, they are suffering and so on.  We heard the same thing about the civilians trapped in Darfur, in Sri Lanka, in Colombia.  Indeed the same thing was also told about even tsunami victims, that they need immediate goods and services, food, shelter and so on.  Thus the Dantewada adivasis as an undifferentiated, homogenized category of ‘trapped and suffering’ we already know: indeed that is part of the dominant humanitarian discourse.  But, what else about them?  This is where we cannot but acknowledge that the poorest of the poor in the Maoist movement have today thankfully lost their ‘innocence’, as they are on the cusp of transforming themselves into a political subject, placed as they are in the central vortex of the political, class struggle in the country.

K. Balagopal criticized the Maoists for being unable to make a dent in national politics, with a biting comment: "you can hold a gun to a landlord’s head but Special Economic Zones or the Indo-US Nuclear Deal have no head to put a gun to".20  Maoists of course are unable to do many things and have a very long way to go.  However, while the statement is true as far as it goes, but what if one is not really opposing this or that policy of the state like SEZ or the Deal but challenging social relations as such that support the existing state structure and political order?  (The CPI(Marxist) opposes the Deal, does it not?!)  Does Balagopal suggest that there is no relationship between transforming social relations at the ‘local’ (he lets out a dismissive attitude to the local as opposed to the national) level and fighting so-called national issues?  It is his inability to see the connection between the head of a landlord in some nondescript remote village and the more refined machinations of bourgeois democracy, between the landless labourer with a gun and a revolutionary political subjectivity, that led Balgopal to argue that Maoists are not interested in "defeating the state politically but (only) mobilizing against it militarily".

Balagopal was not just arguing, like the Nepali Maoist critique of the Indian Maoists, that the struggle was stagnating and not able to transform say from guerilla zone to base area with a strategic view of advancing the revolution.  In spite of his most brilliant insights into the inner dynamics of the Maoist movement, Balagopal never gave up the dichotomies he set between the local and the national, the military and the political, and the poor fighting for their rights and the poor as a political subject.  His work is thrillingly good since, even with his thorough knowledge of the flesh and nerves of the movement, he still upheld these dichotomies without ever tripping!  Here again we hit upon the problem of separating political subjectivity from the poorest of the poor and their struggles that are apparently only local and livelihood-based and not national and political, no matter whether they are carrying a gun or not.

Deep Roots in the Masses

The state would rather take the blame of having massacred innocent civilians, understood to start with as ‘collateral damage’ (yet further — this time verbal — ‘aid’ from the U.S. military), and lose some of its democratic legitimacy, than allow this virus to spread.  For this virus can potentially turn into a larger political crisis.  The emergence of one two many Dantewadas would involve transforming the present struggle in Dantewada into a political struggle, into a rallying point for the entire revolutionary forces in the country.  Not allowing us access into the political reality of the struggle, to contain the political struggle, is a foremost task for the Indian state.  The Indian state would rather go ahead with the armed offensive, killing whoever comes in its way, than allow this political struggle to intensify.  Now if the Maoists turn out to be no political threat, if they convert soon enough into another power structure negotiating and compromising, then it’s another matter.

But if at all Dantewada presents a real political challenge to the ruling order today, if the Maoists are the advanced detachment of the sharpest political struggle, then any state in its senses would go ahead with its armed offensive — or not go ahead, for reasons of effectivity, since it might miserably fail.  In which case, the only way out for a progressive outcome is to look for ways for the Dantewada stalemate to inaugurate a higher political crisis for the ruling order.  KPS Gill predicts that the Indian state will get stuck in a war against its own people, the way the United States got stuck in Afghanistan.  Progressive publications are highlighting it as a real possibility, thus further challenging the armed state offensive and calling for peace and negotiations.  What Gill does not realize is that while the Indian state might get stuck, Dantewada might not; it might replicate itself elsewhere, everywhere.  The Maoists are not the Indian security forces, the masses are not just ‘combatants’ — it is a political struggle.

Now in so many ways a discursive field is being created today which in an innocuous way seeks to define a political field that precludes the emergence of a higher political struggle and wants to isolate it into something akin to a humanitarian crisis.21  If the hawkish state wants to do a LTTE to the Maoists, the humanitarian discourse too already anticipates, in a hidebound manner, a similar humanitarian crisis as in Jaffna possibly unfolding here.  The possibility of a radical political situation emerging is not only not anticipated here but the humanitarians, in not anticipating it, seem invested in not allowing it to emerge in the first place.  Like a pseudo originary moment, the very coinage of an ‘armed offensive’ elicits this understanding of the Dantewada crisis as primarily military, draining the politics from it and thereby framing the Maoists too as more or less only an armed group.  Attempts to isolate the Maoists from the ordinary civilians and masses further fuel this narrative as an armed conflict between groups with civilians as collateral damage.  Human rights discourse of the ‘innocent civilian’ reinforces this idea since it treats them as collateral to the political struggle and only ‘suffering beings’ waiting for peace and a constant supply of goods and services.

One of the ways in which the emergence of the adivasi Maoist as a political subject is precluded is portrayals of ‘democratic struggles’ as political and the violent struggle as militaristic, ‘undemocratic’ and even less than political – totally missing the point about how a political struggle can and does assume violent forms.  Thus a ‘political solution’ to the crisis here need not be restricted to just attending to the humanitarian needs of the population.  Such an understanding of a ‘political solution’ obscures from view how the poorest of the poor are, perhaps even in their subjective understanding, a political subject willing to fight the political struggle, fight the political battle, indeed become the most advanced detachment today of revolutionary transformation in the country.  Far from being militaristic, when the poorest of the poor take up arms and fight a political battle, fight the combined and so long hidden fist of capital and state, it leads to an ultimate confrontation which does not displace the political question but actually takes it to its final resolution.  The question is: are broad sections of the left ready to tread this path?

One of the ways in which Maoists as a political force are blocked from view is through not allowing the gaze, so that we do not even know what the Maoists are thinking.  How are the Maoists viewing this armed state offensive?  For one, they do not view it as a misadventure that the state is about to launch and which will further erode the democratic basis of the state.  Instead, this is, CPI(Maoist) argues, "the planned State Onslaught on mass movements in general and in particular on the revolutionary masses, CPI(Maoist) Party and its armed detachment".22  The Maoists do not view the impending offensive in military terms alone and instead understand it politically.  Mass resistance against the offensive is upheld without however giving up the revolutionary political struggle.  They write, "while the PLGA forces are preparing to heroically resist the enemy, the Party and its mass organizations must seek to mobilise all possible forces to resist and fight back this impending attack.  The aim of the enemy is to isolate us from the masses to facilitate the attacks, with the least protest by the progressive and democratic forces in the country.  Our aim must be to prevent this enemy encirclement by building deep roots in the masses".23

Building deep roots in the masses is considered part of the same process as strengthening and preparing the PLGA.  That is why the state’s strategy is ‘draining the water to kill the fish’.  Maoist statements suggest that they do not view the armed offensive as only a military confrontation: and they know that getting isolated from the masses will only help the state eliminate them.  Further they seem keen to reach out to a wider section of mass movements and resistance.24

However, broad sections of left seem oblivious of the possibilities of integrating themselves with the political struggle unleashed by the Maoist movement.  Their gaze is obsessively fixed on the state, invested into exposing its militaristic designs but without seeking to mobilize the vast masses of people in the country in tune with the advanced detachment which is the revolutionary masses of Dantewada.  Thus either the democratic left looks towards the state, or, when it looks towards the revolutionary masses, it sees only innocent civilians, victims waiting for the intervention of middle class activists.  The present thrust of the peace initiatives today impedes the development of a revolutionary situation in the country, the sharpening of the political struggle through mobilization of different resistance movements in the country in support of the resistance in Dantewada.

Poor Home Minister?

Are we not putting too much pressure on the Home Minister in attacking him for concentrating on the military solution to the Maoist problem?  Are we not missing something vital — a kind of coded message which we need to unpack for the good of all, rather than the minister himself and the larger Indian state?  What if the minister is actually admitting that Indian democracy and its political system has run its full course and is teetering at its end, so that there is no democratic card in the arsenal now that can be equal to the task of keeping the Maoists at bay — so that the military solution is apt?  While those criticizing the minister for adopting security-centric and not development-centric solutions might still believe in Indian democracy and its potential to keep the Maoists at bay, he and those within the system know exactly how much worth ‘our democracy’, or the socio-economic approach, is.

It looks like even ‘our’ best democratic policies are no match for the Maoist strategy of revolutionary armed struggle which seems more endearing to vast masses of people than say the decentralization policy or empowerment of gram sabhas or social policies like NREGA.  Social movements with a clear non-Naxal, non-Maoist lineage today display serious exhaustion, if not failure.  Maoists teach the masses that it is right to rebel, that Indian independence is a blackmail, that the real independence is yet to come, that Gandhi was a reactionary, that, quoting Mao, ‘without a people’s army the people have nothing’.  Now what is a ‘democratic response’ to this which can be worked out by remaining within the Indian Constitution or channeled through social movements?  The Home Minister has a real problem at hand.  Between some rozgar yojana (employment rights) or ‘forest rights’ or getting 100 days of work, and being in the people’s army, the choice seems obvious for ‘the poorest of the poor’.

The Indian state can at best offer two square meals a day; the Maoists are offering a festival for the masses.  Recall the armed action of the masses led by the Maoists in Lalgarh on June 15, 2009, we saw pictures of women and ordinary villagers, in public, openly celebrating as the house of the CPIM leader was being violently demolished.  Didn’t the West Bengal government, after the ‘flushing out’ operation of the joint security forces, do all that a government can do in order to reach the tribals with welfare packages and deals?  Did that bring down the support for the Maoists?  Buddhadev Bhattacharya made it mandatory for all secretaries to go camp in god-forsaken Lalgarh to sincerely find out the problems of the people — and they most unwillingly did.  But that did not wean the masses away from the Maoists.

Thus the present Indian democracy has run its course and is tottering under the Maoist menace.  The present war need not necessarily lead merely to violence and counter-violence and the loss of the middle ground.  Bereft of its democratic trappings, the state is revealing itself as no more than repressive deadweight against any real political change and so is at its weakest, politically speaking.  A radical social and political transformation is therefore a real possibility today.

In other words, it might today actually be an option to push the tottering Indian democratic and state order, including our beautiful secular democracy, into the dustbin of history and initiate a revolutionary process of transformation and change.  In which case, of course, one is talking about a ‘moving’ middle ground and a moving Maoist movement which can then merge at some point — totally isolating the military, security and growth-centric state.  Given that the poor home minister is as much as admitting that the Indian political system is irredeemable and it can only respond with a military solution, is it not time for the real left to step in not to save the decaying system but to precipitate its collapse and the emergence of a better socio-economic dispensation?  A ‘higher’ middle ground will necessarily involve unshackling our attachment to the democracy within the bounds of the repressive state, and instead pitch in for a new political future against this state order.

Bhagat Singh and his comrades once thought of a social and economic revolution, and not merely political independence.  It is an unfulfilled task.  But while the Maoists are surely the torchbearers of change are they a credible political force to usher in a revolutionary transformation of Indian society and state?  One cannot dismiss the possibility that the Maoist movement can transform itself from being what looks like only a local political power struggle and come to articulate the search for a political alternative to the present socio-economic order and state system in the country today.

And it is here that the democratic and dissident left, including the very committed rights activists, will have a crucial role to play.  Unless a democratic rights perspective, calling for an end to the military option, is in so many visible and invisible ways woven around the willingness to look for a political alternative to the present Indian state order, including its sham democracy, the possibility of the present state-Maoist struggle leading to merely a violent outcome will remain.  The choice is clear: military option or political alternative?  That is, as a Maoist document points out, this is a time of both great dangers and immense possibilities.

Beyond Maoist?

In turning towards the state and primarily and sometimes solely invested in exposing the state (on its own grounds), what you obscure is the possibility of a wider consolidation of revolutionary democratic forces.  As a good instance of how you hear only what you want or like to hear, what today is not being heard and is totally obscured is that the Maoists, the poorest of the poor, are in fact calling upon all progressive democratic forces to unite to defeat the central government offensive: it is they who are trying to reach out to you even as you try to overlook it through your humanitarian concern for them.  Or else Ganapathy is merely being rhetorical when he openly calls upon all to unite: "By building the broadest fighting front, and by adopting appropriate tactics of combining the militant mass political movement with armed resistance of the people and our PLGA (People’s Liberation Guerilla Army), we will defeat the massive offensive by the Central-state forces".25

Here of course the crucial contention will be if the armed resistance and the PLGA can be accepted as legitimate political actors by other left and democratic forces.  But the fact of the matter is that for the Indian state and capital today, and not just its repressive armed wing, the armed resistance and the PLGA stand as a major stumbling block providing stiff resistance everywhere they exist.  It does not at all seem preposterous to suggest that the adivasis under the leadership of the Maoists today have precipitated a political struggle where capital and state are forced to come out in their true unholy nexus disregarding all supposed democratic credentials and rule of law.

Numerous activists and commentators have pointed out how the interests of big capital are what really drives the actions of the state, given that the entire region is resource rich and contains enormous mine deposits.  The convergence of capital and state is clearly visible in the political struggle today.  It is the achievement of the Maoist movement and its work for years in the area that state and capital are forced to give up all pretense of democracy, rule of law and business as usual.  State and capital today stand exposed in their bare exploitative, oppressive essence.

The point is that the oppressive nature of capital and the state do not reveal itself spontaneously, particularly to the vast masses of people.  It is in places like Dantewada and Lalgarh that people have not only understood this nature of the ruling order but actually are willing to fight against it without any recourse to the democratic pretensions of this order.  This makes the masses here and the Maoists an advanced detachment particularly now that such a sharp political struggle has created a crisis of national proportions.  It is for these reasons that the PLGA, locked in the thick of political struggle, cannot be rejected as just a structure of violence or merely replicating the state.

Further, this is where the Indian state is weakest today.  This is where large masses of the people have rejected the Indian state and its democracy, forcing it to come out to use armed force against its own civilian population, like a mafia state which everybody hates and hence must survive on the use of force and repression.  This means that we should not only rush to the defence of the one front, Dantewada or Lalgarh, in the political, class struggle today but also replicate similar and not so similar bases elsewhere in the country.  If not jettisoned, our humanist ‘concern’ (which somehow always readily gets pretentious) for the ‘trapped masses’ should be strategically used to democratically corner the state with a clear eye on converting the Dantewada experiment into a nationwide phenomenon.

Now the Maoists themselves have not been astute in expanding their struggle, in reaching out to urban masses, in overcoming their often sectarian attitudes and obsolete work methods and thinking.  They do not seem to know what they can do to broaden the struggle in urban areas, relate to other political forces, respond to the more sophisticated machinations of ‘democracy’ and so on.  Ideally, on a less rigorous note, one can say that the best for revolution in South Asia would be to combine the ‘flexibility’ of the Nepali Maoists with the ‘dogmatism’ of the Indian Maoists.  But the Maoists are willing to change, if not subjectively, but, as we saw in Lalgarh and elsewhere, at least through force of circumstances.  And change they must.  However, what is of crucial importance is the larger revolutionary process of which the Maoists themselves are no arbiters nor even masters but only the more advanced elements and that too, so far, in the present conjuncture.

 

1  ‘Build the Broadest Possible Front against the Planned State Onslaught’, SUCOMO, CPI(Maoist) Letter on Growing State Terror to Party Members, 10 September 2009.

2  Peter Linebaugh, ‘Jubilating, or How the Atlantic Working Class Used the Biblical Jubilee Against Capitalism, With Some Success’, The New Enclosures, 1990.

3  See Arundhati Roy, for example, who stated that "we should stop thinking about who is justified. . . . You have an army of very poor people being faced down by an army of rich that are corporate-backed.  I am sorry but it is like that.  So you can’t extract morality from the heinous act of violence that each commits against the other" (Times of India, New Delhi, 25 October 2009).

4  The humanitarian perspective which often goes under the name of being political and even left undervalues the poorest of the poor as agents of revolutionary change by framing them as deserving of rights that are no more than ‘animal rights’, rights for survival and to live.  However, as Badiou shows. "if ‘rights of man’ exist, they are surely not rights of life against death, or rights of survival against misery.  They are the rights of the Immortal, affirmed in their own right, or the rights of the Infinite, exercised over the contingency of suffering and death" (Alain Badiou, Ethics: An Essay on the Understanding of Evil, London: Verso, 2001, p. 12).  This in some ways opens the way to the idea of the proletariat, of being both poor and radical, class-for-itself.

5  Perhaps this is why they were not upholding the kind of democracy that Santosh Rana upholds when he points out how Maoists did not allow the functioning of democratic bodies and local self-government organs and instead replaced them with ‘people’s committees’.  Unlike for the Maoists, it was important for Rana "to activate Panchayats and to exercise control over them through Gram Sansads and to demand more financial and administrative power in the hands of the Panchayats" (Santosh Rana, ‘A People’s Uprising Destroyed by the Maoists’, Kafila, 11 July 2009.

6  Different groups and radical organizations have put forth demands like withdrawal of big companies, cancellations of land transfer MOUs and so on from the area, but the Maoists do not work by presenting any specific demands for the government to fulfill.

7  You can of course be rich and radical, but you must not then side with the poor and radical.  Isn’t that the reason why Kobad Ghandy, apparently from a well-off family, was indulged in by the media giving him massive coverage and yet consigned behind bars?

8  Linebaugh, op. cit.

9  Sudha Bharadwaj informs us of "200,000 by-default Naxalites" (‘The Situation in Dantewada, Chattisgarh Today‘, Sanhati, 21 September 2009.

10  Indeed just looking at the manner in which the Indian state intelligence has been unable to infiltrate the ranks of the Maoists by bribing local adivasis shows the deep roots they have with the civilian population.  Several officials have expressed their frustration over this lack of infiltration.  Part of the reason why the state is going for an all-out offensive in spite of all the dangers it involves for its own legitimacy is precisely the substantial mass base of the Maoists.

11  In Lalgarh a senior state officer was quoted as stating that "unless we have local sources, it is going to be extremely difficult to identify the Maoists, who have mingled with the villagers.  Although these (new) men are from Lalgarh, we haven’t got people from the core area.  Those villages are still out of bounds (for the state)" (Telegraph, 26 June 2009).

12  B. Raman, ‘Dealing with Maoist Insurgency’, Global Geopolitics Net, 28 October 2009.

13  Ibid.  For treatment of Maoists as mirror image of the present State, see for example Adita Nigam, ‘Mass Politics, Violence and the Radical Intellectual’, Kafila, 27 October 2009.

14  That is, they want to go beyond the progressive position of ‘peace with justice’.

15  That way the Maoist movement has no ‘demands’ listed for any government or power to fulfill, so that the problem can be solved.  It is interesting how other left or civil society groups tend to substitute for this by throwing their own demands almost on behalf of the adivasis or Maoists!  These are mostly calls for withdrawal of big capital mining and industrial projects, tribal rights over forests, ending Salwa Judum vigilante groups and so on.

16  This is the problem with say demands of ML groups like that of Santosh Rana who want to fight for tribal autonomy and identity, like their demand for an autonomous council in Lalgarh region.  These are demands that can be addressed by the state and hence to that extent potentially involves dilution of the level of political struggle existing today.  Rana seems to be missing the point when he criticizes the Maoists for not allowing identity demands to be taken up.  Indeed Kanu Sanyal went to the extent of calling the Lalgarh uprising as an ethnic, identity-based uprising.  There is an insistence on denying the political content of these movements and bringing them into some kind of a negotiable plane vis-à-vis the state and the present democratic order.  See Open Letters Between the PCC CPI(ML) and CPI(Maoist), Sanhati, April-May 2009.

17  Interview with KPS Gill, Tehelka, 24 October 2009.

18  Sujato Bhadra, ‘Open Letter to the Maoists’, Radical Notes, 26 September 2009.

19  Himanshu from the Vanvasi Chetana Ashram apparently has ‘changed’, become far less critical of Maoist violence and critiques only state violence!

20  K. Balagopal, ‘Reflections on Violence and Non-violence in Political Movements in India’, South Asia Citizens Web, January 2009.

21  K. Balagopal critiqued the Maoists for being unable to make a dent in politics, in national politics.

22  ‘Build Broadest Possible Front’ op. cit.

23  Ibid.

24  See the CPI(Maoists)’s various appeals to other revolutionary and democratic forces and parties.

25  Interview with Ganapathy, Supreme Commander, CPI(Maoist), ‘We Shall Certainly Defeat the Government’, Open Magazine, 17 October 2009.


Saroj Giri is Lecturer in Political Science, University of Delhi.

“National contradiction and the chauvinistic oppression still remain”

All through the last three decades of national oppression, war and armed struggle, Puthiya Jananayaka Katchi (New Democratic Party) has functioned as a political party with Marxist leanings. The party’s general secretary S.K. Senthivel, in an interview to inioru.com (The Tamil version of fromnowona.com ), talks about the post-war Sri Lankan Tamil situation.

Inioru.com: The Sri Lankan President announced that war ended on May 19 and terrorism wiped out. How is the post-war scenario in Sri Lanka?

Comrade Senthivel: It is true that the three-decade long war has come to an end and the armed struggle waged from among the Tamils is defeated. The national contradiction and the chauvinistic oppression, which forced the Tamil nationalist struggle to become an armed one, still remain. The war with blood-shed has come to an end. But the political war continues. The burden of the economic crisis is passed onto all sections of the people.

Inioru.com: If so, how is the Mahinda Rajapaksa regime taking the political struggle further?

Com. Senthivel: The government continues with the military oppression against Tamil national minority and its traditional homeland. It is part of the political struggle. The confinement of nearly 300,000 Tamils in barbed-wire fenced camps in northern Sri Lanka and treating them like convicts is also part of the political strategy. Procrastination without offering any political solution is also part of the political struggle. Sri Lankan government projects like ‘Kizhakkin Uthayam’ and ‘Vadakkin Vasantham’ are nothing but eye-washes.

Inioru.com: How is the post-war scenario in southern Sri Lanka? What is the mindset of the Sinhalese public?

Com. Senthivel: The war victory and the decimation of the LTTE leadership have been welcomed by the people of southern Sri Lanka. The fear about Tamils trying to carve out a nation of their own is one reason for this cheer; military attacks by the LTTE on the Sinhalese and their regions constitute another. Majority of the Sinhalese have accepted the war waged by the Mahinda regime and his claim of fighting terror for these reasons. At the same time it cannot be ignored that a section of Sinhalese people want the Sri Lankan government to offer a fair political solution for the Tamil nationality.

The Sri Lankan President is using the military victory to strengthen his position and for his continuance in power. It will take a while before the people get out of the drunkenness with military success. It is only when the horrific arms of the state machinery built up by the war unleashes its violence on the Sinhalese civilians, they will realize the backlash of the war victory.

Inioru.com: If the situation in South is such, can you explain the situation of the Tamils in North and East?

Com. Senthivel: The defeat of the armed struggle has greatly impacted the Tamil population. Sections of Tamils view the Tigers sympathetically and sections are strongly critical of the LTTE. There is also anger that the Tigers have pushed them into a state of severe oppression. When I met a person, more than 60 years old, released from Manik Farm detention camp in Vavuniya on age basis, he used a Tamil proverb that we lost the loincloth in our desire for a silk dhoti (traditional wear of Tamil men on social occasions like weddings). His words reflect not just the plight of the 300,000 Tamils imprisoned behind barbed-wire fences, but the entire Tamil nationality in the North East of the country.

Inioru.com: From a Marxist-Leninist perspective, who do you think is responsible for the present state of affairs?

Com. Senthivel: It cannot be seen as something concerning individuals alone. It has to do with the social structure, the rulers and the ruled in our country. The role of individuals and the leadership of different regimes in the conflict also cannot be ruled out. The seeds of the poisonous tree of ethnic hatred were sown at the beginning of the last century. Colonial rulers provided the environment and sustenance for hatred between the communities. It is the Sinhala Buddhist upper class elite which benefited by being part of the ruling class. On the other hand, the Tamil elite, while claiming to represent the Tamil masses, conducted elitist politics. Both groups never took into account the aspirations of the working classes among the Sinhalese and the Tamils. They used the rhetoric of nationalism to divert people’s attention. The consequences are now directly felt by the Tamil masses and indirectly by the Sinhalese masses.

Inioru.com: Though you identified the racist oppression as the reason behind ethnic conflict, you have always opposed Tamil nationalism. Can you explain why?

Com. Senthivel: Our opposition to Sinhala Buddhist chauvinism emerged from a class perspective. All nationalisms – both chauvinism and narrow nationalism – have a class character. It will be dangerous to speak of any nationalism, hiding its class character. This was the tragedy of Sri Lanka in the last century and it continues to date. So, it is important to examine who upholds nationalism and with what motives.

Inioru.com: Are you saying that Tamil nationalism has not fought chauvinist oppression in the past or in the present?

Com. Senthivel: To say that will be as foolish as trying to conceal a whole pumpkin in a plate of rice. What we have been saying is that Tamil nationalism has never taken a progressive line or formulating its policies and in taking the struggle in that direction. In our opinion, nationalism has a capitalist basis and can mislead the people. All three nationalisms in Sri Lanka – Sinhalese, Tamil and Muslim – are articulated in that fashion. As a result the working people among all these ethnic groups are not only divided but also made to fight with one another on the basis of race, language, religion and region. Tamil nationalist struggles also have the same attitude. This is wrong and reactionary. It is that approach which has led to the present pathetic situation.

Inioru.com: Do you say that nationalism don’t have progressive features at all?

Com. Senthivel: To argue thus is ignorant. Nationalism has its bases and its limits. A nationalism with reactionary features cannot reach these limits or see beyond them. At the same time, nationalism with a progressive features can advance and pass its limits to enter a socialist domain. Such nationalism will identify its friends and foes and will form alliances to oppose the common enemy.

Inioru.com: Your argument may be true for the former Tamil parliamentary leadership. What do you think about the claim that the Tamil militant movements led by the youth adopted Tamil nationalism with a progressive content?

Com. Senthivel: Some of the Tamil nationalist outfits that you are referring to appeared to be progressive in the beginning. But in terms of ideology, they were confused and vacillating. In addressing the inner contradictions of the Tamil society and in their approach towards the Sinhalese people and India, their stance soon deteriorated to reactionary positions. Having claimed that they were using India and the West, they ended up being used by those forces. In the process, they compromised the progressive ideals that they initially claimed to represent and took refuge in the reactionary features of Tamil nationalism. This led to internecine conflicts. Eventually, they became the new agents of parliamentary opportunism, and compromised with the chauvinistic ruling classes.

Inioru.com: What is your view about the claim that unlike other Tamil nationalist outfits which had deteriorated over the years, the Tigers carried forward Tamil nationalism in a different manner?

Com. Senthivel: As for as the LTTE is concerned, it had most of the reactionary features of Tamil nationalism. Likewise it inherited the call for Tamil Eelam from the conservative reactionary Tamil nationalist leadership in the Sri Lankan parliament. On some issues, like the caste contradiction, they made progressive postures but never took the initiative to address or resolve the contradiction. They thought such a step would weaken them. Till the end, they believed in US and the West. They failed to see if people or liberation organizations who genuinely sought liberation anywhere had imperialist forces as allies. Some of the lower level cadres of the LTTE could have individually believed in progressive and anti-imperialist ideals. But the reactionary features of Tamil nationalism were dominant in the thoughts and deeds of the LTTE leadership.

The Tamil nationalist arrogance of the ‘lineage of those that once ruled’ was inherited by the LTTE. This was evident in Amirthalingam who arrogantly upheld the reactionary aspects of Tamil nationalism, and in Prabhakaran who succeeded him. Amirthalingam was unarmed Prabhakaran, and Prabhakaran was armed Amirthalingam. The reactionary Tamil nationalism of the LTTE becomes evident through this. Thus what is evident from thirty years of Tamil struggle is that despite the shift from the parliamentary democratic path to armed struggle, the reactionary trend dominated Tamil nationalism.

Inioru.com: Would the LTTE’s SOS to US President Barack Obama during the last phase of war be an example of the attitude you spoke of.

Com. Senthivel: The perception that the LTTE has been friendly with the US and the West had been there for some time. The elite among the Tamil diaspora in the US and the West constitute a factor influencing such an allegiance. Besides, the belief that they could create a concept of Tamil Eelam on the lines of the creation of the concept of Israel among the Jews and achieve it with the support of the US and the West has been strong among the LTTE ideologues and leaders. LTTE’s appeal to the Obama administration in the last days of the war was strong evidence of that attitude. There is no need to add further to explain their loyalty to the US.

Inioru.com: You have always been dismissive of the demand for a separate Tamil Eelam as an impractical idea. Can you explain the already stated view of your party that it would lead to imperialist infiltration of Sri Lanka?

Com. Senthivel: We, as Marxist Leninists, did not express our rejection only recently. When India played a leading role in the secession of Bangladesh from Pakistan in the early 1970s, an illusion was created that a separate Eelam could be created in a similar fashion. The belief that it could be achieved with the help of India or the West was propagated among the Tamil people. At the time, we forewarned that this idea was impregnated with the danger of foreign infiltration and that it was an impractical idea. But the Tamil nationalist leadership, to increase its numbers in the Parliament, whipped up ethnic and linguistic feelings, and fed the youth with the dream of Tamil Eelam. They built the illusion of Tamil Eelam citing the precedents of Jews and Israel.

Inioru.com: Although you were opposed to the idea of Tamil Eelam, how far did you take your idea to the masses?

Com. Senthivel: We, Marxists-Leninists, have been propagating the impracticality and reactionary nature of Tamil Eelam demand since the early seventies when the idea of Tamil Eelam was put forth. The Marxist-Leninist party headed by comrade N. Sanmugathasan was an influential party among the Tamil people. Trade union struggles were a reason. The period from the mid-sixties to the early seventies was one when struggles against untouchability and casteism led by the Party scored victories. Our party organized several rallies and seminars to emphasise the futility of the demand for Tamil Eelam.

Two debates on the subject were of historic importance. The first on the possibility of Tamil Eelam was at Aanaikkottai organized by the Bharathi Community Centre. M.K. Eelaventhan of the Federal Party (Tamilarasuk Katchi) led the team that argued that a separate Tamil Eelam was possible. The team from the Marxist-Leninist Communist Party led by me argued that it was not possible. A Tamil pundit from the town who judged the event concluded that a separate Tamil Eelam was not possible and said that the Marxist-Leninist team won the debate. This led to perturbation among the public.

The next debate was held at the Chunnakam market grounds between N. Sanmugathasan and V. Dharmalingam, the then MP for Uduvil. ‘Orator’ C. Subramaniam, a popular educationist and Principal of Skandavarodaya College chaired. Comrade Sanmugathasan pointed out that Tamil Eelam demand was “showcasing the moon in the mirror” (simply deceptive) to Tamils. He also detailed why the demand was impractical.

Both debates were held in 1975, before the Tamil Eelam declaration. I.e., the impracticality of the demand for Tamil Eelam and the prospect of foreign intervention were pointed out even before the Tamil Eelam declaration.

Inioru.com: While rejecting the Tamil Eelam demand, what alternative solution did you put forth for the problems of the Tamils?

Com. Senthivel: Our party has all along insisted that the aggravation of the national question could be averted by recognising the unique ethnic, linguistic and cultural features of the Tamil people and providing regional autonomy. Regional autonomy has long been the policy of the Communists. At a time when the Federal Party advocated federation, the Communists resolved at their party congress held at Valvettithurai in 1954 to adopt a policy of regional autonomy. That was adopted as the policy of the whole party. The Tamil nationalist leadership scuttled the idea by appealing to the emotions of the people. The left as a whole emphasised that regional autonomy within the framework of united Sri Lanka should be promoted without fanning ethnic communalism. But history is that both Sinhala chauvinist capitalist political parties (SLFP and UNP) that vied for parliamentary political power acted to wreck the achievement of such a solution.

Inioru.com: How do you react to the charges that the leftists of Sri Lanka were not sincere in addressing the national question?

Com. Senthivel: The rightist Tamil nationalists lump together the entire left in this fashion to blame the Left as a whole. Till the mid-1960s, the leftists in this country had been sincere on the nationality question. When the Hill Country Tamils (of Indian origin) were deprived of their citizenship and when the Sinhala Only act was passed and whenever the Tamils, Muslims and the Hill Country Tamils were targeted by the state, the leftists stood by them. But the Tamil leadership did not go with the Left during such crisis situations. After the leftists took to the opportunist parliamentary path, they slipped up and vacillated on several occasions and became voiceless in front of the chauvinistic forces. But there are leftists who kept away from the opportunistic parliamentary path and acted firmly and sincerely on the national question. That part of history has been systematically suppressed. Remarkably, Dr Ravi Vaitheespara, a professor at the Manitoba University in Canada, has researched the role of Leftists in addressing the Tamil national question of Sri Lanka and brought out a number of these facts in his book.

Inioru.com: What was the policy put forth by your party on the national question and what was your agenda?

Com. Senthivel: Our party, the New-Democratic Party, was founded in 1978. The situation then was one in which Sinhala Buddhist chauvinism was thrust forward under the leadership of J.R. Jayawardane in the form of military oppression. It was also the period in which the Tamil nationalist leadership was taken over from the traditional parliamentarians by the armed militant youth movements. Under the conditions, we as a party of the entire working class opposed national oppression. At the same time, we rejected the separatist demand for a Tamil Eelam, as impractical and reactionary. Consequently, the Party emphasised its stand on the theoretical and objective development of a framework based on the right to self-determination to resolve the national question. It urged autonomy for region comprising the North and East which was the traditional homeland of the Tamil people. It also proposed the need for an internal autonomous structure for Muslims, under which their unique features and identity could be preserved. Likewise, it also called for internal autonomous units for Hill Country Tamils. It should be noted that the Second National Congress of the Party stressed the need for such autonomous structures based on the right to self-determination for the Tamil, Muslim and Hill Country Tamil nationalities.

Inioru.com: In this context could you explain the correctness of the stand of your party in defining the national question as the main contradiction?

Com. Senthivel: The determination by the Fourth National Congress of the Party that the national question had developed into the main contradiction was arrived at by studying Sri Lanka’s social contradictions and its ramifications. The national question has been transformed into war and continues without a political solution in a way that it has overtaken the development and intensity of the class contradiction, which is the fundamental contradiction of Sri Lanka. The national question became the main contradiction in a context in which it was sharpened on all fronts. It did not become the main contradiction merely because of the armed conflict between the Sri Lankan Army and the LTTE. To view it thus would be to deny the bases of the national contradiction and to diminish the problems of the Tamil nationality, its existence and future. Even after the decimation of the LTTE leadership and the end of war, the national contradiction persists as the main contradiction. The national question will descend from its position as the main contradiction only when a just and acceptable political solution for the national question is put forward and implemented, constitutionally and in practice. Then the class contradiction will intensify so that the entire people could through class solidarity carry it forward along the line of mass struggle.

Inioru.com: In one of your earlier statements, you had indicated that there were three factors behind the emergence of the national question as the main contradiction and its escalation into armed struggle and war. Could you elaborate on it?

Com. Senthivel: Three sections have contributed to the continuance of the national question as armed struggle and war during the last three decades: (1) the Sinhala Buddhist chauvinist capitalist ruling class forces of feudal origin; (2) the Tamil nationalist leadership which upheld narrow nationalism; (3) the Indian expansionist forces and US and western imperialist forces acting behind the scenes. These three sections thus looked after their class interests as well as their survival and future. Meanwhile it was the workers, peasants, fishermen, the oppressed by caste and other toiling masses who bore the brunt of the conflict of the past three decades.

Inioru.com: The demand for Tamil Eelam has sharpened the contradictions in a pluralist Sri Lanka. Meantime Tamil-Muslim relations have deteriorated. What do you think are the reasons for this?

Com. Senthivel: Tamil – Sinhala relations were wrecked and made hostile by the intensity of the already existing national conflict, Sinhala chauvinist oppression and the parochial attitude of the Tamil nationalists who claimed to oppose it. Subsequently, Tamil-Muslim relations were systematically wrecked. Besides the ruling class conspiracy of ‘divide and rule’ the narrow nationalist approach of Tamil nationalists, especially the conduct of the LTTE, sectarian Tamil nationalism caused it to deteriorate further to the point of hostility. Besides, the Sinhala, Tamil, Hill Country Tamil and Muslim nationalisms each adopted positions on the national question which projected their respective reactionary features. Such policies served the interests of the wealthy upper classes in the respective communities and not the welfare of the people or the cause of national development.

Inioru.com: What was the situation of the Tamils who were oppressed by caste and class amid the Tamil nationalist struggle for Tamil Eelam?

Com. Senthivel: The children of those who declared the demand for Tamil Eelam and the affluent who roared that the “(Tamil) clan that once ruled the land should rule again” went abroad well in time. Those who were depressed by caste were forced to bear the brunt of the war. They bore the burden of the Tamil Eelam struggle. They realize now in terms of caste and class, beyond the bogus rhetoric of Tamil nationalism.

Inioru.com: You spoke of Tamil diaspora. Do you place all on the same footing? Is there not a flip side to displacement too?

Com. Senthivel: The group that I referred to referred to the rich and upper class Tamils who went abroad and not the Tamils who left amid sorrow and misery, because of political oppression in the country and poverty in the family. In the last three decades of conflict, the Tamil diaspora has helped their relations back home and extended help for the common good. That they thus helped to prevent deaths by hunger in the country is a positive aspect. At the same time, the immense sums of money extracted from the Tamil diaspora were spent in wasteful and socially unhelpful ways and for destructive purposes is a negative aspect. While displacement has helped individual families, it has led to losses for the Tamils and to the snapping of the roots that uphold the future.

Inioru.com: What is your proposal for the liberation of Muslims and the Hill Country Tamils?

Com. Senthivel: We do not see the national question in Sri Lanka arising from chauvinist oppression as a matter that concerns not just the Tamils. It also concerns the Muslims and the Hill Country Tamils. So, the political solution should be inclusive of the Muslims and the Hill Country Tamils. Our stated position is that is a precondition for the political solution. The solution should certainly be autonomy with the right to self-determination.

Inioru.com: How do you view the perception that the solution within the framework of united Sri Lanka is impossible since a majority of the Sinhalese are under the spell of the chauvinist illusion?

Com. Senthivel: The Sinhalese are trapped by that illusion owing to the machinations of the ruling classes of Sri Lanka. Geopolitical factors and sustained campaigns by chauvinists too have contributed to it. Under the conditions policies need to be put forward based on the people of Sri Lanka and the prosperous future of Sri Lanka, transcending ideologies and practices relating to ethnicity, religion and language. Although it is a difficult task, a new foundation based on experience has to be laid among the Sinhala, Tamil, Muslim and Hill Country Tamil nationalities and other national minorities. It should be an approach of multi-ethnic nationalism. That will take a lot of faith and effort.

Inioru.com: You referred to India, US and the West as one of the three elements that contributed to the 30 years of conflict. Can you explain their roles?

Com. Senthivel: When the demand for Tamil Eelam was put forward as the Vaddukoddai declaration in 1976, those behind it reposed faith in India to achieve their goal. They also expected the support of the US and the West for the purpose. India, the US and the West covertly endorsed the demand and the emergence of the armed Tamil youth behind the demand. These powers sought to materialise their long term expectations through it. Their activities included: (1) diverting the Tamil youth from the leftist and revolutionary thought process which developed in the 1960s; (2) destroying the young generation among the Tamils with potential to evolve into a revolutionary force; (3) establishing their respective politico-economic-cultural dominance by escalating the conflict; (4) increasing the sale of weaponry.

One taking a socio-historic view of the 30 years of war will not find it hard to recognise these features.

Inioru.com: What is your view of China’s role in the conflict or its infiltration?

Com. Senthivel: As I said earlier, the rivalry of India, US and the West had been most important in the 30 years of conflict. That China, in accordance with its change of track from a socialist economy, has actively sought to reinforce its position in Sri Lanka through the government. China has a string of activities from arms sales to development schemes. But so far they do not match in extent the motives and moves of India, US and the West are against invasion of any external force, be it China or Pakistan. But it is clear that the Chinese threat is being magnified as pretext to strengthen their foothold in Sri Lanka. Our position is that we will reject and oppose any form of foreign forces of domination entering into the country. China and Pakistan are not exceptions.

Inioru.com: Can you elaborate on your party’s agenda based on Marxism Leninism to address the national question of Sri Lanka?

Com. Senthivel: The Party has already clarified it in terms of its Marxist Leninist stand. Based on it, it has proposed a path for the resolution of the national question of Sri Lanka. It has categorized the Tamil people’s struggle as belonging to three periods and proposed the path for the fourth period: (1) the period from the Ramanathan-Arunachalam brothers to G.G. Ponnambalam ending with the rejection of the 50-50 power sharing demand;

(2) S.J.V. Chelvanayakam’s period since the Federal Party demanded a federal system of government to a change in their demand for a separate Tamil Eelam;

(3) the 30 years during which Tamil youth took to armed struggle to win their demand for Tamil Eelam and the struggle met with destruction recently under the leadership of V. Prabhakaran. (4) The fourth stage should be one in which the struggle should be led by toiling masses including workers, peasants, fishermen, and those oppressed by caste as a mass struggle. Its aim can only be to achieve autonomy for the Tamils and Muslims in a merged North-East that constitutes their traditional homeland with the right to self-determination within the framework of united Sri Lanka that will unite the people. In this fourth stage in which the people determine their own fate, it should be explained and impressed upon the Sinhalese people that autonomy and self determination do not mean secession and that they are based on equality and unity and the independence and prosperity of the whole of the country. It should be explained that they, thus, include the rights and aspirations of the Tamils, Muslims and Hill Country Tamils. Sinhalese democratic, progressive forces should be brought into this struggle in a way that they play an important role. It is this that the Party has clearly pointed out to be the path to be taken by the Tamils to resolve the national question.

Inioru.com: What is your view of the proposed Trans-national Tamil Eelam Government?

Com. Senthivel: The concept of setting up a trans-national government of Tamil Eelam is not the wish of the entire Tamil diaspora. It is the wish of those who consider themselves to belong to the Tamil upper class elite that once ruled the land. This seems to be inspired by the Zionist dream of the formation of Israel. In which case, it will have the backing and conspiratorial advice of imperialism. It will once again drive the Sri Lankan Tamils into a dangerous situation and negate their just struggle and the just political solution that could be achieved through that struggle. Decisions on the future policy and course of struggle of the Tamil people should be based on their past experience in their own land, and not something decided and imposed by the wealthy elite among the diaspora.

250,000 Tamils have been killed in the course of the last three decades for the impractical demand of Tamil Eelam. Nearly 50,000 youth belonging to various Tamil militant movements died as militants in the name of liberation. Many thousands are still imprisoned. Around 500,000 people live as displaced persons. 300,000 people are living a life of misery in barbed-wire fenced IDP camps. People have lost property worth many billions of rupees in the course of these thirty years. More than 100,000 women who have lost their husbands and children in the North and the East live in agony. Many thousands of people are maimed and crippled.

The misery and the impact of all this destruction and the blood stains have not gone away. There are no solutions or proposals to address these problems. In this situation, some want to form a “trans-national government of Tamil Eelam”. If they would only come to the Vanni or the North to propose it, they will know the consequences.

Inioru.com: Finally, to what extent do you think that the Tamil people will accept and implement the policies put forward by your party?

Com. Senthivel: It is true that, in a hardened conservative environment of the Tamil people, the impact of the thinking of the capitalist elitist class with feudal lineage is strong even in politics. Yet there are among them the exploited working classes and those who are oppressed and denied social justice, based on caste. Among them the Party has a strong support base. We are firm and confident that we will expand that base and popularise our policies among all the people.

But it is a major challenge requiring swimming against the current. It is our duty and responsibility as a Marxist-Leninist part, to identify correctly the social contradictions and put forward the appropriate path of struggle based on the appropriate policies. To accept and carry them forward concerns the people. In this matter, we cannot deal with the people in the way that the militant movements led by Tamil youth or the LTTE did. That will not be the Marxist-Leninist approach, nor will it be moral. We will take carry forward our mass-based political work patiently and steadily among the people, based on past experience and practice. We have faith in this approach.

What is Maoism?

Bernard D’Mello, Monthly Review

The Maoist movement in India is a direct consequence of the tragedy of India ruled by her big bourgeoisie and governed by parties co-opted by that class-fraction.  The movement now threatens the accumulation of capital in its areas of influence, prompting the Indian state to intensify its barbaric counter-insurgency strategy to throttle it.  In trying to understand what is going on, and, in turn, to re-imagine what the practice of radical democratic politics could be, it might help if, for a moment, we step aside and reflect over the questions: What is Maoism?  What of its origins and development?  What went before its advent?  What are its flaws?  Where is it going?  Where should it be going, given its legacy?  As I write at this lovely time of the festival of lights — Diwali — in India, I hope to bring back into the glow this body of thought and practice that the stenographers of power have consciously, deliberately distorted.  I am fully aware that those whose job it is to transcribe the opinion of the dominant classes will — having already presupposed what Maoism is all about — accuse me of pushing an ideological agenda, and will dismiss what I have to say as illegitimate.  Nevertheless, let me persist.

. . . (A) Marxism stripped of its revolutionary essence is a contradiction in terms with no reason for being and no power to survive. — Paul M Sweezy (1983: 7)

Anuradha Ghandy (Anu as we knew her) was a member of the central committee of the Communist Party of India (Maoist) [CPI (Maoist)].  Early on, she developed a sense of obligation to the poor; she joined them in their struggle for bread and roses, the fight for a richer and a fuller life for all.  Tragically, cerebral malaria took her away in April last year.  What is this spirit that made her selflessly adopt the cause of the damned of the Indian earth — the exploited, the oppressed, and the dominated — as her own?  The risks of joining the Maoist long march seem far too dangerous to most people, but not for her — bold, courageous and decisive, yet kind, gentle and considerate.  Perhaps her days were numbered, marked as she was on the dossiers of the Indian state’s repressive apparatus as one of the most wanted "left-wing extremists".  That oppressive, brutal structure has been executing a barbaric counter-insurgency strategy — designed to maintain the status quo — against the Maoist movement in India.  What is it that is driving the Indian state, hell-bent as it is to cripple and maim the spirit that inspires persons like Anu?  Practically the whole Indian polity — from the semi-fascist Bharatiya Janata Party to the main affiliate of the parliamentary left, the Communist Party of India (Marxist) — have pitched in against the Maoists, backing a massive planned escalation of the deployment of paramilitary-cum-armed-police, this time with logistical support from the military, to crush the rebels.  It seems that sections of monopoly capital — including ArcelorMittal, the Essar Group, Vedanta Resources, Tata Steel, POSCO, and the Sajjan Jindal Group — have given an ultimatum to the state governments concerned and the union government that they will dump their proposed mining/industrial/SEZ projects if the local resistance to their business plans are not crippled once and for all.

Righteous indignation against "left-wing extremism" has reached a crescendo, buttressed as it is by sections of the commercial media, with images and profiles (dished out to the fourth estate by anti-terrorist squad officers) of apprehended revolutionists a source of excitement for TV audiences.  A year and a half ago, my son — lanky, unkempt, his hair dishevelled — came home from school one day to tell us that his teacher called him a Naxalite (what the Maoists are popularly called).  I asked him, "How did you react?"  He queried, "Daddy, who are these guys, these Naxalites?"  I answered, "Well, they are rebels who resent the deep injustice meted out to the poor."  He responded, "Well then, I feel proud to be called a Naxalite".  The boy is still very young, but he will soon approach that wonderful time of his life when his urge to understand what is going on in the country and the world will be unquenchable.  More recently, a malicious and vengeful advertisement by the home ministry in the newspapers painted the Maoists as "cold-blooded criminals".  Maybe it is time for me to consider how I will answer his question: What is Maoism?

An answer to such a query requires a stepwise approach to finding first answers to questions such as: What is Marxism?  What is Leninism?  What is Stalinism?  Only then, can one get to understand what Maoism is all about.  For, after all, Mao’s Marxism undoubtedly stemmed from the Leninist school; he applied Marxism, Leninism (the latter, a school of Marxism in the age of imperialism) and Stalinism (a decomposed form of Leninism which he also struggled to overcome and go beyond), as a method of analysis of the social reality of China.  But more, he intervened in that reality through conscious social political action guided by Marxist theory and from the late 1920s to the end of the 1960s continuously learnt from events, thus making possible an enrichment of the original.

What has come to be known as Maoism had its material roots in China’s underdevelopment, the failed practice of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in the urban areas in the 1920s, and its subsequent peasant-cum-guerrilla-based movement in the countryside.  Theoretically, and in practice, Mao’s Marxism was enriched by overcoming and going beyond Stalin’s mechanical interpretation of Marx’s theory of history.  And, Mao constantly applied Marx’s "materialist dialectics" in helping to understand and resolve multiple "contradictions" — internal conflicts tending to split what is functionally united — with the likely outcome following from the reciprocal actions of the opposing tendencies.  It is the fusion of all of this with the original Marxism and Leninism that constitutes Maoism.  Like Marxism, at its best, it is a comprehensive world view, a method of analysis and a guide to practice, not a set of dogmas.  What then is meant by the Maoist dictum "learn truth from practice"?

With this preview, we are now in a position to move on.  At the outset itself, let me say that while I speak solely for myself, I make no claim whatsoever to originality.  I wrote this piece as a self-clarifying exercise and submitted it for publication in the hope that it might help others like me, striving to be educated about matters that are not academic.

What Is Marxism?

In searching for an answer to this question, I can do no better than what the Monthly Review has taught me.  In one of the founder-editor’s words (Sweezy 1985: 2):

Marxism is above all, a comprehensive world view, what Germans call a Weltanschauung — a body of philosophical, economic, political, sociological, scientific . . . principles, all interrelated and together forming an independent and largely self-sufficient intellectual structure. . . .  It is a guide to life and social practice, and in the long run its validity can only be judged by its fruits.

In its view, prior to the development of capitalism, civilization had been impossible without exploitation; the social surplus appropriated was (1985: 3-4)

concentrated in the hands of a few, so that luxury, wealth, civilization at one pole was necessarily matched by poverty, misery, and degradation at the other.

It was into such a world that capitalism was born . . . incomparably the most productive and in that sense progressive society the world had ever seen.  . . . [I]ndeed, for the first time ever it made possible a society in which exploitation and the concentration of the surplus in the hands of a few was no longer the necessary condition for civilization.

Now humanity faced . . . a prospect without precedent.  Would it go forward to a new and higher, non-exploitative form of civilization . . . or would the exploitation of the many by the few continue to be the way of human life?

Marx believed that . . . capitalism . . . would never be able to make use of . . . [society’s productive forces] for the benefit of the workers who he thought were on their way to becoming the majority of the population. . . .  Sooner or later . . . the workers would become conscious of their real class interests, organize themselves into a powerful revolutionary force, seize power from the capitalists, and begin the transition to a communist society from which exploitation and classes would finally be abolished.

It hasn’t worked out that way.  Workers in the more developed capitalist countries were able to make enough gains by struggle within the system to forestall the emergence of a revolutionary consciousness.  A significant part of these gains came at the expense of dependent and exploited countries of the third world, which were thereby prevented from using their resources for their own independent development.  As a result, the centre of revolutionary struggle shifted from the advanced to the retarded parts of the capitalist world.

At this point, it must be said that while Marxists share a conception of reality, they differ in many respects in explaining the world and in assessing it.  Also, the intellectual structure created by the founders of Marxism — Marx and Engels — has been significantly modified and adapted, as it no doubt should, with advances in human knowledge and understanding, and with the development of capitalism into a global system.  But, and of course, its scientific validity should be judged in the first instance by its contributions to the ability to explain reality.

However, there’s something even more exacting — in the very long run, Marxism has to be judged by the fruits of its project of taking humanity along the road towards equality, cooperation, community, and solidarity.  We should have done this earlier, but it is now apt to bring into focus the most crucial character of Marxism, something, following Sweezy, we alluded to in the beginning of this article.  The whole purpose of constructing and re-constructing its distinctive intellectual structure to understand the world was and is so that this exercise may lay the basis of changing society for the better.  This is stated most succinctly in Marx’s 1845 Theses on Feuerbach: "The philosophers have only interpreted the world; the point however is to change it."  But integrating theory and practice (developing a strategy and a set of tactics for changing the world for the better and implementing them) is far more difficult and messy a project.

Marx and Engels wrote The Communist Manifesto in December 1847 and January 1848, but they never even attempted to define, let alone provide, any blueprint of the transitional society (their followers called it socialism) which would in time — that was the expectation — evolve asymptotically towards communism, never really reaching it.  As Sweezy has it, in Marx and Engels’ conception, the transitional society ("socialism")1 would begin its existence as "primarily a negation of capitalism which would develop its own positive identity (communism) through a revolutionary struggle in which the proletariat would remake society and in the process remake itself" (1983: 2-3).

But, frankly, the proletariat in the developed capitalist countries, for reasons already mentioned, was increasingly losing its quality as the source and carrier of revolutionary practice.  The development of the working class, the advance of human capability — always at the very centre of the forces of production — was not perceived by the workers as being hindered by the relations of production; the latter was not discerned as intolerable by the workers as long as they were able to extract better terms from capital through their struggles (strikes, etc) within the confines of the system.  Why should they then bear the risk of losing what they were gaining in the present when what they could gain by revolting against the system was highly uncertain and far away in the future?  In other words, Marx and Engels didn’t blame the workers for the lack of a revolutionary consciousness; the objective conditions weren’t there for its germination.

What then of early Marxism (it was not called Marxism is Marx’s time, but for convenience we are designating even that period within its scope) in its mistaken expectation, drawn mainly from its analysis of the living and working conditions of the working class (in Engels’ The Condition of the Working Class in England, written in late 1844, early 1845 when he was 24) and the logic of Marx’s the famous 1859 Preface to A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy that that class in the advanced capitalist countries would eventually, sooner or later, revolt and emancipate itself?  The at first spontaneous, and later on organised, struggles of the workers, led by the parties of the left, were eventually able to force the ruling class and its political representatives to bring in the factory laws and various social legislations, and implement them, which convinced the workers that things could get better even within the confines of capitalism.  In this, no doubt the surplus from the toilers in the colonies/neo-colonies/semi-colonies/dependent countries (the "periphery"), shared not only between the local elites and the ruling classes in the "centre", but also to an extent, by the working classes there, helped provide part of the cushion.  As a result capital at the "centre" got richer and stronger too.

Marx and Engels didn’t take all of these developments into account and so proved wrong in their expectations of a socialist Europe.  But, to his great credit, Marx did brilliantly take account of — besides the massive expropriation in Britain through the enclosures — capitalism’s pillage, in its mercantilist phase, of what later came to be called the "periphery" or the third world, in Part VIII of Capital, Volume 1, entitled "The So-Called Primitive Accumulation".  He also did not ignore "unequal exchange" — through siphoning a part of the surplus created in production via funds used by a distinct class for trade in commodities (merchant capital) — with the periphery, in the competitive phase of capitalism.  Basically, merchant capital played a crucial role in the periphery, albeit as an appendage of industrial capital at the centre (Kay 1975).  Marx had not the opportunity to re-orient his theory of accumulation to take account of what had begun to happen at the end of his life, the emergence of capitalism as a global system with the ushering in of monopoly capitalism.  But, we have it from Sweezy (1967: 16) that he was fully aware of the causal relationship between the development of capitalism at the "centre", in his day, in Europe and the development of underdevelopment in the "periphery".  Early Marxism however proved inadequate in elaborating a theory of accumulation on a world scale that would explain the functioning of capitalism as a global system.  All the same, Marx suggested a way of analysing capitalism — how capital got its wealth from the pillage of the "periphery", from expropriation through the enclosures, from the surplus labour of workers in the past, and from the acquisition of smaller and weaker units of capital; how the superstructure (the state, the legal system, the dominant ideology and culture) was adapted and modified to facilitate all of this; and with what potentialities.  That method was "materialist dialectics", which was applied by the best of his followers — two of whom were Lenin and Mao — to understand the ever-changing world and to intervene to change it for the better.

Meanwhile, the parties leading the various working class movements in Europe, members of the Second International, continued to pay lip service to the cause of proletarian revolution.  But, soon they were exposed for what they really had become when in 1914 they supported their respective governments in the war, an act demonstrating nothing less than the self-destruction of internationalism, and the quashing of many a hope of proletarian revolution.  With the possibility of the workers making significant economic, social and political gains within the confines of capitalism at the "centre", Marxism was "revised", re-fashioned by Eduard Bernstein and others to empty it of its revolutionary content.  Of course, this was not Marxism anymore, but given the objective conditions in Europe, the "revisionist" doctrine took the place of the revolutionary one there.

What Is Leninism?  What Is Stalinism?

It was in these the worst of times that Lenin, a thoroughly orthodox Marxist, struck a momentous chord on the political stage with his pamphlet, Imperialism: The Highest Stage of Capitalism (1916), explaining the war then raging in terms of a division of the world into separate spheres of influence and the inter-capitalist struggles for its re-division.  Lenin’s purpose was limited mainly to explain the nature of the war then underway and what should be done by socialists leading the working class.  Lenin urged that rather than fighting and killing each other in this imperialist war, the workers must be convinced to convert the imperialist war into a civil war to overthrow their respective bourgeoisies.  The impact of accumulation on a world scale in shaping the nature of "underdevelopment" of the "periphery" and, in turn, the accumulation of capital at the "centre" — and the consciousness of the working class there — were not the focus.

Instead, in Lenin’s view, the super-profits of monopoly capital were, among other things, used to bribe an upper stratum of the working class — thereby creating an "aristocracy" of labour — and some leaders of the working class movements.  Lenin thus blamed the political leaderships of the social-democratic parties leading the movements of their respective working classes and their betrayal of the majority of their respective proletariats.  The fact that the objective conditions in Europe had changed, which thwarted the permeation of a revolutionary consciousness in the workers on the continent, eluded him.  But it may be said — on the whole — of Lenin and the Bolsheviks that in the course of their practice they rescued Marxism from those of its adherents who mistakenly and mechanically interpreted Marx as a "historical determinist".

But let me explain the Marxist position.  A "determinist" way of thinking argues that history and the given conditions existing on the ground uniquely determine what is likely to happen next.  In pure contrast, a "voluntarist" point of view holds that almost anything can happen subject to the will and positive resolve of effective leaders and the resolute support they get from their followers.  In my view, Marxism is neither "determinist" nor "voluntarist" — in its conception, at any given moment there are a range of possible outcomes, determined both by history and the existing conditions and context.  The actual outcome from among this set will depend on social action.  That is, which particular intermediate goal the leaders choose from the range of possibilities ("strategy"), and whether they and their supporters go about trying to achieve that result with appropriate tactics and respond "correctly" to the course of events that unfold.  Clearly, Lenin — and Stalin, and Trotsky, we might add — put great weight on patterns of leadership — centralized direction by a revolutionary elite.  Mao did not disagree with this, but from experience emphasized the necessity of honest and correct feedback from the party rank and file and the masses.

Stalin has called Leninism the Marxism of the era of "imperialism" and "proletarian dictatorship".  But he is one who evokes deep anguish among many socialists.  On the one hand, he was the only top leader among the Bolsheviks who came from the wretched of the earth (his father was a poor cobbler and his mother was of poor peasant-serf stock), fortunate to have been educated at a religious seminary; it was under his leadership that the Soviet Union and its Red Army vanquished the might of the German armed forces in the Second World War to safeguard humanity from fascism.  And as long as he lived it was possible to believe (mistakenly, in the view of some) in the existence of a global co-ordinated movement in active revolutionary conflict with capitalism and imperialism.  But, on the other hand, he consigned Leninism and socialism to the grave — that which is not democratic can never be socialist.  Indeed, as Harry Braverman (1969: 54) put it:

The destruction of the old Bolshevik Party closed innumerable possibilities to the Soviet Union, and it is hard to envision them all.  [And, in a footnote, he adds] Stalin did not stop with the annihilation of the left and the right oppositions, led respectively by Trotsky and Bukharin.  He turned on his own faction, and, as Khrushchev told the Twentieth Congress, executed 98 of 139 (70 percent) of the Central Committee selected at the Seventeenth Congress in 1934.

Paresh Chattopadhyay (2005) argues that the very notion of socialism in Lenin and the other early Bolsheviks’ (before Stalin’s consolidation of power) was completely at odds with that of Marx.  The suggestion seems to be that, given this original flaw, and economic and social backwardness, it was only a matter of time before the ruling elite in the Soviet Union metamorphosed into a ruling class, legitimizing its authoritarian (and, in this view, exploitative) rule in the name of Marxism.  Certainly, as a result, Marxism and Leninism have been discredited in the eyes of many.  After all, following the seizure of power in October 1917, didn’t the means begin to shape the very ends to eventually overwhelm the socialist aspiration?  However, I think one should take account of what has come to be called "Lenin’s last struggle" — warning of serious danger from the growth of a ruling bureaucracy and from the "crudity" of Stalin.  Beyond this, it seems to me, and I have come to believe this, that given the existence of class, patriarchy, racism (and caste, one might add) over millennia, power and compulsion are deeply rooted in social reality; indeed, they have almost become part of the basic inherited (but not unchangeable) human condition, which leads one to make a very strong case for civil and democratic rights and liberties (these have been gained through historic struggles waged by the underdogs) that should not be allowed to be abrogated come what may.

For our purpose over here, however, it would be pertinent to briefly mention the way Lenin conceived of the revolution in "backward" capitalist Russia where, in his analysis, the bourgeoisie and its political representatives were incapable of bringing about the "bourgeois-democratic revolution" — overthrowing czarism and seizing and dismantling the feudal estates — making it imperative that the working class in alliance with the peasants take over that task, only to quickly move on to the next stage, that of socialist revolution.  In all of this, the worker-peasant alliance was to be led by the vanguard party.  Lenin’s conception of such a party then becomes germane — its purpose was to politically organise and bring revolutionary ideas to the working class, more generally, the masses, and lead the revolution to establish a "dictatorship of the proletariat".  Marx had conceptualized the latter as a system in which, following the seizure of power, this would be the regime in which the proletariat would "not only exercise the sort of hegemony hitherto exercised by the bourgeoisie", but a "form of government, with the working class actually governing, and fulfilling many of the tasks hitherto performed by the state", and Lenin fully endorsed this view (Miliband 2000: 151).  Of course, in Lenin’s way of thinking, the dictatorship of the proletariat was to be exercised by the workers under the guidance of the vanguard party.

The latter evolved over time — in the conditions imposed by illegality, inner-party organisation was different in 1902 from that following 1905, and then February 1917, when a mass-based party adhering to "democratic centralism" was seen to fit the bill.  Democratic centralism was conceived as an inner-party organisational principle and practice where the various factions within the party strictly adhere to the guideline "freedom of discussion, unity of action" (Johnstone 2000: 135).  Of course, what happened in practice was the stamping out of the democratic component; in 1921, factions were virtually outlawed, something Stalin is said to have taken advantage of to ultimately secure his domination of the party (Johnstone 2000a: 408-409).  In parallel, the dictatorship of the proletariat — conceived as a dictatorship over the former ruling classes, but a democratic role model as far as the masses were concerned — came to be "widely associated with the dictatorship of the party and the state over the whole of society, including the proletariat" (Miliband 2000: 152), which came to be associated with Stalinism.

Stalinism — a decomposed version of Leninism closely associated with the regime in the Soviet Union from the late 1920s to the time of Stalin’s death in 1953 — has to be seen, as Ralph Miliband rightly emphasised, in the context of Russian history (2000a: 517).  However, given the constraint of brevity, we can, at most, only list its principal characteristics, drawing largely — but not uncritically — from Miliband (Ibid: 517-19):

  • the outlook that it is possible to build "socialism in one country";
  • the opinion that under socialism there must be a very strong state;
  • the view that class struggle intensifies with the advance of socialism;
  • the cult of personality, with an obsessive focus on the supreme leader’s will;
  • forced collectivisation and rapid industrialisation;
  • crude suppression of dissent, and of critical intelligence and free discussion within the party;
  • the "political" trials and the purges, and elimination of most of the major figures of the Bolshevik Revolution;
  • the forced-labour camps where thousands of ordinary people suffered complete ruin (recalling this makes me cry);
  • opposition to fascism and a decisive contribution to the Allied victory over it; and,
  • the discrediting of Marxism-Leninism because of a mechanical interpretation of it, and its stamping as official state ideology to legitimise elite/ruling-class power.

All the same, it seems that Lenin’s aspiration and vision of the socialist state — as expressed in State and Revolution, written in the summer of 1917 — after the seizure of power was inspired by Marx’s lauding of the 1871 Paris Commune and drawing lessons from it about the future socialist "state".  Marx was emphatic that the working class, after taking power, should not simply take control of the existing structure, institutions and machinery of the old state, all of which had to be "smashed" and replaced by a state of a radically new type.  As Ralph Miliband (2000b: 524) sets forth Marx’s depiction of the credo of the Commune, which Lenin seems to have accepted, and the role of the party envisaged by the latter in his tract, State and Revolution:

[All state officials] would be elected, be subject to recall at any time and their salary would be fixed at the level of workers’ wages.  Representative institutions would be retained, but the representatives would be closely and constantly controlled by their electors, and also subject to recall.  In effect, the proletarian majority was intended not only to rule but actually to govern in a regime which amounted to the exercise of semi-direct popular power.

A very remarkable feature of State and Revolution, given the importance Lenin always attributed to the role of the party, is the quite subsidiary role it is allotted in this instance.

But Lenin’s vision of the socialist state "did not survive the Bolshevik seizure of power".  Yet, he "never formally renounced the perspectives which had inspired State and Revolution".  Can we thus conclude that Lenin wanted "the creation of a society in which the state would be strictly subordinated to the rule and self-government of the people" (Miliband 2000b: 525)?  The contrast between theory and practice, in this respect, couldn’t have been starker.  Frankly, one has to clearly distinguish between what one says and what one does.  After all, what happened to the Congress of Soviets — soviets which had the potential to be self-governing organs of the workers and the peasants — that had arisen almost spontaneously from the movement of February 1917?  By the summer of 1918 the soviets had no more than a mere formal existence.  The main institution of the dictatorship of the proletariat, the Soviets of Workers’ and Soldiers’ Deputies (independent of any one party), took the back seat, with the party leadership at the steering (Miliband 1970).  Indeed, the dictatorship of the proletariat was deemed impossible except through the leadership of the single party; socialist pluralism too got precluded (Ibid).  But, to be fair, it is important though to note that Lenin, in his last writings, expressed the need to create the basis for popular self-governance, for which, he felt, there must be a genuine revolution, where culture flowers among the people.  Was he then calling for a "cultural revolution", something that Mao launched in China in 1966 with the aim of "preventing capitalist restoration" (Thomson 1970: 125)?

Maoism: Evolution and Development2

Millennia are too long: Let us dispute over mornings and evenings. — Mao Zedong (1963)

The conventional wisdom of the day presents Mao as some kind of a "monster", for instance, in Jung Chang and Jon Halliday’s 2005 book, Mao: The Unknown Story, which, in its obsessive intent to denigrate Mao, is least concerned with the known facts about the man (Gao 2008: chapters 4 and 5).  Indeed, in Li Zhisui’s The Private Life of Chairman Mao, he is made out to be a "monstrous lecher" by a doctor, bent on disparaging Mao, shabbily doctoring the facts (Gao 2008: chapter 6).  It is evident that a "battle for China’s past" is underway, with the elite intelligentsia leading the attack.  The latter are Chinese, who were the victims, real or imagined, direct or indirect, of the Cultural Revolution, and some leading lights in the "China Studies" field the world over, who have always been prone to somersaults depending on the direction of the political wind in Washington.  For instance, their positions have shifted from "disparaging" during the period of Cold War hostility to "grudgingly complementary" following Sino-US détente in the early 1970s, and then to "Mao-was-all-wrong; Mao-is-to-blame" with the great reversal in China in the post-Mao period when the official view turned anti-Maoist, and the ideology of neo-liberalism took hold.3

The credo of objectivity that is repeatedly claimed is a myth.  It is not surprising that in a world where "the ideas of the ruling class are in every epoch the ruling ideas", the views of the beneficiaries of the cultural revolution, the peasants and the workers, who gained in terms of education, healthcare and other aspects of social welfare, as well as the "voice" they got in the fields and the factories and in the political arena, are not being heard (Gao 2008).

With this necessary communication of the side I lean on, let me then get to the origins of Maoism, which got its lease on life in the immediate aftermath of the eventual rejection of the disastrous line of "united front from within" (leading to restraints on organisational independence), which was virtually forced on the CCP by the Third International (the Comintern) in 1923.  It was claimed by the latter that the Kuomintang (KMT), led by Chang Kai-shek (after Sun Yat-sen died in March 1925), represented the "revolutionary national bourgeoisie" of China.  This alliance was supposed to produce national liberation and the bourgeois-democratic revolution (revolution led by the bourgeoisie in alliance with the workers and peasants) but led only to the disastrous defeat of the communists at the hands of Chang’s counterrevolution in 1927, leading to the civil war (1928-35).

But even in defeat there was a silver lining: no doubt the Chang-led KMT controlled the bulk of the armed forces; but the Fourth Army deserted in August 1927 to join the communists, which led to the founding of the Red Army.  A new leadership of the CCP gradually began to coalesce around Mao; however, it was only by around 1932 that this budding "Maoist" authority gained legitimacy and the CCP could forge, and refine over time, its own strategy and path to achieve the goals of the "new democratic revolution" (NDR).

For our purpose over here, it must be mentioned that the Comintern had mechanically extended Marx’s historical analysis of the transition from feudalism to capitalism in Europe to the colonies/semi-colonies/neo-colonies, merely adding that imperialism had allied there with the feudalists to maintain and consolidate its power.  It was then assumed that the national bourgeoisie would take the lead in the struggle against imperialism and feudalism/semi-feudalism, and therefore it was the duty of the communists there to rally the masses in support of such a project, for it would lead to national independence and bourgeois democracy, without which the struggle for socialism would have had to be indefinitely postponed.  But, as we have seen, such a policy led to the disastrous defeat of the communists in China in 1927.  The so-called national bourgeoisie proved to be nothing but the ally of imperialism against the communists.

It was the CCP under Mao that most effectively challenged the Comintern line by refusing to surrender control and leadership to those who could not be relied upon to carry through to the very end the struggle for genuine national independence or the fight against feudalism/semi-feudalism.  The quality of the leadership was crucially important (Sweezy 1976: 10).  It adopted the strategy of protracted people’s war (PPW), which relied on the peasants, built rural base areas, carried out "land to the tiller" and other social policies (for instance, dealing with the gender question through the mobilization of women in the countryside) in these areas (run democratically as miniature, self-reliant states), thereby building up a political mass base in the countryside to finally encircle and "capture" the cities.

Here it needs to be emphasised that it was only during the anti-Japanese resistance (1937-45), when the contradiction between Japanese imperialism and national independence became the principal one (playing the leading role), relegating the fight between feudalism and the masses to a secondary and subordinate position, that the CCP managed to shift nationalist opinion progressively in its favour.  It was in this period that it overcame its confinement in the rural areas to move on to the national stage, extend the PPW and capture the popular imagination.  The CCP could not have successfully "captured" the cities, but for the massive nationalist upsurge in the course of the anti-Japanese resistance turning decisively in its favour due to its correct handling of the unity and struggle between nationalism and anti-imperialism, leading on to the successful completion of the NDR.4

At the core of the NDR was opposition to the transformation of the society under the leadership of the bourgeoisie and its political representatives.  The NDR — unambiguously led by the communist party — suppressed the big bourgeoisie because, even as it retained private capitalist enterprise, it was primarily meant to create the prerequisites for socialism.

At the heart of the course of the NDR, from 1927 to 1949, was the building of base areas, involving the following (Gurley1976: 70-71):

  • achieving victory in the political struggle, thereby establishing the basis for running a miniature state in the base area;
  • winning the economic struggle — land to the tiller, land investigation, promotion of mutual aid and cooperation, and achieving the development of the productive forces (the material means of production and human capabilities) in agriculture and small industry; and
  • carrying out the cultural and ideological struggle, with a great deal of overlapping among the three.

All of this — whether political, economic, or cultural and ideological — entailed following the "mass line", which is a distinctive feature of Maoism.  This is a method of involving the masses in how, for instance, each of the above is to be done and then implementing what had been decided upon with their participation.  The party leaders thereby correctly understand the opinions of the people and so fashion the required policies in a manner the masses will support and actively implement.  Mao summed this up pithily as: "from the masses, to the masses".  Indeed, in the process of participating in the "land to the tiller", land investigation, and in the ideological struggles, the people understood the local class structure and the ideas and institutions bolstering the status quo (Gurley 1976: 71-72).

This brings us to three crucial dimensions of Maoist theory and practice in trying to enrich the democratic process in the Leninist vanguard party, the mass organizations, and the society.  In the Maoist conception of the vanguard party, just like in Lenin’s, centralised guidance by a revolutionary elite is at the core, and this elite leadership is drawn from intellectuals, workers and peasants, with the difference that workers and peasants are sought to be represented, over time, in greater proportion.  What is however distinctive in Mao is the conscious effort to fuse the inner-party organisational principle of democratic centralism ("freedom of discussion, unity of action") with the mass line ("from the masses, to the masses"), the mass organisations under party leadership providing the crucial link between the two.  However, a word over here about the claim of the vanguard party being led by the proletariat might be in order.  Here, as Benjamin Schwartz (1977: 26) explains, in Maoism, the term "proletarian" refers to a set of moral qualities — "self-abnegation, limitless sacrifice to the needs of the collectivity, guerrilla-like self-reliance, unflagging energy . . . iron discipline, etc" — as the norm of true collectivist behaviour.  Proletarian leadership then comes to be constituted by a set of intellectuals, workers and peasants who excel in these moral requirements.

We are thus beginning to grasp some distinctive features of Maoism — the conception of NDR as opposed to that of bourgeois-democratic revolution; PPW; "base areas" and the way they are established; the principal contradiction (which may change over time) steering the course of the PPW; and, democratic centralism plus the mass line.  It is then time to introduce what may indeed be the differentia specifica of Maoism, best done by illustration from Maoist practice in China.  We have already alluded to the idea that the road to socialism was already entered upon and struggles to persist on that road were undertaken early on in the new democratic stage of the revolution itself.  We said that the big bourgeoisie is suppressed during the NDR itself in order to lay the ground — create the pre-conditions — for socialism.  Why?

Socialists, more than others, are well aware that there are definite limits to the compatibility of capitalism and democracy, that is, if the latter is understood as government in accordance with the will of the people (Sweezy 1980).  But from a capitalist point of view, such democracy is acceptable and considered viable only if the majority continues to believe that the capitalist system is the best for them, or that there is no alternative but to live with it.  The moment this belief erodes, democracy becomes a potential danger to capitalism, best illustrated by the case of Chile, where, following the coming into office in 1970 of a party pledged to begin the transition to socialism, the big bourgeoisie collaborated with Washington and the military took over to save capitalism there (Sweezy 1980).  To circumvent such a reaction, a new type of democracy ("new democracy") — a type of democracy that doesn’t preclude the transition to socialism if the majority want it — has to be created, for which, the big bourgeoisie has to be suppressed.  In effect, the NDR doesn’t do away with capitalism, but it confiscates the property of the imperialists and the big bourgeoisie — those at the apex of wealth, power and privilege — and hence stymies the anti-democratic opposition to socialism from their representatives and backers.

But let us elaborate upon the Maoist idea of steps within the new democratic stage, steps in the transition to socialism, and steps within the socialist stage itself, and the thought that the pre-conditions of a subsequent step/stage in the process of progressive change must be created within the step/stage that has to be transited from.  The land reform program leading in steps to communes can be used as an apt illustration.  It may be best to take William Hinton’s books, Fanshen: A Documentary of Revolution in a Chinese Village (1966) and Shenfan: The Continuing Revolution in a Chinese Village (1983), which together provide a rich documentary account of the land reform in Long Bow village of Shanxi province during 1946-48, onward to the formation of mutual aid teams, and from 1953, the merging of those teams into "elementary cooperatives", and from there to advanced cooperatives and further on into communes, and tracing developments up to 1971.  They tell a whole lot of facts, even those that contradict what the author is trying to argue; it is difficult to even propose a framework to look at this whole social canvas.  However, fortunately, subsequently Hinton has helped provide such an enabling structure (1994; 2002; 2004), though he also revised his assessment of the Cultural Revolution following the publication of Shenfan (Pugh 2005).

Perhaps it would be best to begin where Fanshen concludes (Hinton 1966: 603):

Land reform, by creating basic equality among rural producers, only presented the producers with a choice of roads: private enterprise on the land leading to capitalism, or collective enterprise on the land leading to socialism.

The book, however, does bring some thoughts to mind and I cannot resist expressing one or two.  As is well known, Hinton’s first story of Long Bow offers a "microcosm" of the upheavals in China that overthrew semi-feudalism in the countryside.  On the one hand, it throws light on what a poor peasant has to go through in a bad year and how he/she feels when there is no surplus to pay the rent, interest and amortization, and yet he/she then has to part with the grain that would have kept his/her family from hunger and starvation, and to know that that very landlord and/or moneylender-trader had collaborated with the Japanese during 1937-45.  On the other, one can understand why a close bond may develop between the poor peasant and the village-level party person when the former knows that latter considers himself/herself accountable to the poor peasants’ league and the village congress.

There is one more important insight that comes from Fanshen — that when one extracts rent and interest, and what is lost in "unequal exchange" from the net output of the poor peasant household, especially in a bad year, what remains is not even what wage labour would have got, that is, if one were to impute the respective wage rates for family labour.  This suggests exploitation of a greater order under semi-feudalism than under backward capitalism, if both are at the same technological level.  Marx had also referred to this, albeit, in a different context, when he discussed the plight of the Irish tenant farmer.  This leads one to a dispute with those scholars, including Benjamin Schwartz (1951: 4) who hold that the CCP, though successfully having come to power essentially on the strength of its organisation of the peasantry, and not that of the urban proletariat, had inaugurated in China the "decomposition" of Marxism that Lenin began in Russia, and thus, the opposite of the significant innovation that some have attributed to it.  Given Marx’s remarks on the Irish tenant farmer, I would doubt that he would have agreed with this view.

Let us then get to Shenfan.  In 1948 itself, the peasants had begun to form mutual aid teams where a small number of households pooled resources other than land (tools, implements, draft power, occasional labour) but still cultivated the land on an individual basis.  Then in 1953 the formation of elementary cooperatives got underway, in which land as well as other resources were pooled, but individual ownership rights were maintained.  Incomes were based partly on property ownership and partly on labour time committed to cooperative production in ratios set to garner majority local support.  Here dividends had to be paid on the assets, including land, made available, but the complaint of the middle and rich peasants was that this was not as much as they would otherwise have got, that is, if they had cultivated individually by hiring in labour.  But when crop yields began to increase because of more intensive use of labour in the cooperative mode, the conflict regarding how to divide the income as between the labour contributed and the assets pooled became sharper (Hinton 1983:142-43).  The resolution usually took the form of moving from something like a labour to capital share of 40:60 to 60:40, for, over time, it was living labour that had created the addition to assets.  A time would then come when the new assets created by labour overwhelm the original assets pooled at the time of the formation of the cooperative, when it then became appropriate to abolish the capital share of the net output, that is, move to "advanced cooperatives".

The latter entailed a definite socialist advance, involving all peasant households being incorporated in such producer cooperatives, with common ownership of all productive resources.  As Hinton (1994: 6-7) puts it:

When the new capital created by living labour surpasses and finally overwhelms the old capital with which the group started out, then rewarding old shareholders with disproportionate payments amounts to exploitation, a transfer of wealth from those who create it by hard labour to those who own the original shares and may, currently, not labour at all.

Of course, with one more step on the collective ladder, the advanced cooperatives were turned into larger units of collective economy and government — the communes.  The point however is that in each step of the ladder leading up to collectivization, the preconditions of the next step were introduced, which helped resolve the old contradictions and smoothed the transition to the next step/stage.

But, it is alleged that the strategy of the Great Leap Forward (GLF) (1958-61), the organisation of the people’s communes, and the left deviations of that period led to a massive famine in which up to 30 million people are said to have died.5  Then, there have been the excessive violence and the personal tragedies of the Cultural Revolution (CR).  For both, the excesses of the GLF and the CR, Mao and Maoism have been held entirely responsible.  Hinton however disagrees.  To get to the truth, he explains the context — that of "protracted political warfare" (Hinton 2004: 51).  The NDR was a revolution of a new type, new in that it was meant to create the preconditions for the socialist road, unlike bourgeois-democratic revolutions that open the road to capitalism.  Following 1949, however, the resolution of the contradictions with semi-feudalism and imperialism brought the contradiction between capitalism and the Chinese working people to the fore — the latter became the principal contradiction.

Right from the time of the launch of the NDR, the CCP had been divided into two major factions — a "proletarian" one, headed by Mao, and a "bourgeois" one, headed by Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping; pre-liberation, the former was based in the liberated areas, while the latter was in the KMT-dominated cities.  After liberation in 1949, the two factions "merged as one organisationally, but they never did merge ideologically" (Hinton 2004: 54).  This led to a fundamental split over development strategy and policy ever since Mao took China decisively on to the socialist road.  It was on the eve of the GLF that Mao declared on 27 February 1957 ("On the Correction Handling of Contradictions among the People"): ". . .the question of which will win out, socialism or capitalism, is still not settled".  As Hinton put it: "No policy, from either side, could be applied without contest", which meant extreme friction between the two factions (Ibid: 55).  He goes on (Ibid: 56-59):

To blame Mao, then, for the struggle that ensued and for its outcome is unwarranted, unrealistic, and unhistorical.  Mao did what needed to be done given his social base [the rural poor and the workers in the alliance he cultivated], while Liu did what he had to given his social base.  After a decade of conflict things came to a head in the Cultural Revolution.  . . . Mao had the upper hand politically.  He was able to speak directly and mobilise hundreds of millions of peasants and workers.  But Liu had the upper hand organisationally. . . .

. . . in 1958, . . . severe disruption . . . coupled with very bad weather in 1959, ’60, and ’61 . . . produce(d) a shortage of crops, hunger, and even starvation.  Mao’s initiatives failed temporarily but were well conceived. . . .

. . . During the Cultural Revolution similar extremes arose.  . . . However, the movement as a whole was a great creative departure in history.  It was not a plot, not a purge, but a mass mobilisation whereby people were inspired to intervene, to screen and supervise their cadres and form new popular committees to exercise control at the grassroots and higher.

. . . The principal contradiction of the times was the class struggle between the working class and the capitalist class expressed in the party centre . . . [U]nless it was resolved in the interest of the working class the socialist revolution would founder. . . . [T]he method must be to mobilize the common people to seize power from below in order to establish leading bodies, democratically elected6 organs of power was . . . summed up by the phrase "bombard the headquarters" . . . [T]he target of the Cultural Revolution [was] "party people in authority taking the capitalist road".

Basically, in order to resolve the contradiction between the "proletarian line" and the "bourgeois line" within the party in favour of the former, the Maoists, in the CR, tried to plant the seeds of a later stage of socialism in the earlier stage itself, thus doing away with a mechanical separation of the two stages and concentrating instead on their interrelations (Magdoff 1975: 53).  The two stages of socialism, supposed to follow chronologically, are the phase where distribution of the social product is according to the principle "from each according to her/his abilities, to each according to her/his work" followed by the phase where distribution is according to the norm "from each according to her/his abilities, to each according to her/his needs".  Magdoff (1975: 53-54) explains that Maoists focus on the interrelations between the two and therefore emphasise the need to create the preconditions for the transition within the earlier phase itself, the main prerequisites being the way the social product is distributed and a change in human relations.  If one doesn’t do this, the inequalities produced and reproduced by the current stage will lead to the emergence and consolidation of a new privileged elite that will gradually transform itself into a new ruling class.  And, they derive their justification of this with reference to Marx’s Critique of the Gotha Programme, with its forceful description of the necessary persistence of inequality in a socialist (but not communist) society.  One can thus understand why the major concerns during the CR were "measures that tend[ed] to reduce differences arising from the division of labour between city and country, manual and mental labour, and management and employees", knowing very well that their attainment was "in the far distant future and will involve many political struggles in the years ahead" (Ibid: 54).

It is then clear that Maoists reject Stalin’s mechanical interpretation of Marx’s 1859 Preface to A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy as a deterministic theory of history.  Mao accused Stalin of emphasising only the forces of production (the means of production and human capability) to the neglect of the relations of production (relations at work, and ownership relations that bestow control over the forces of production and the product), and the superstructure (institutions such as the state, the family, religion, education, and the law, and culture and ideology).  Even among the productive forces, Stalin — Mao alleges — in a relative sense neglected the growth of human capability, which should have constituted the core of the forces of production.  Again, Stalin essentially viewed the direction of causation as a one-way route from change in the forces of production to alteration in the relations of production, and thereon to revamp of the superstructure (Mao 1977).

Mao instead argued that elements of the superstructure are transformed only with a considerable lag; the old culture hangs on long after the material base of the economy is radically altered.  But, if a conscious effort is made to change the elements of the superstructure, this, in turn, affects the economic base (the productive forces and the relations of production).  Hence, Mao was bent on ushering in the people’s communes even before the modernisation of agriculture, for, in his view, changing the relations of production and elements of the superstructure would, in turn, spur the productive forces.  Hence, also the stress upon the stifling economic effects of the prevailing class structure of the factories during the CR, or of the domination of landlords and "comprador-bureaucrat" capitalists in the pre-liberation period, or on the liberating effects of smashing the superstructure (for example, Confucian culture) (Howe and Walker 1977: pp 176-77; Gurley 1976: chapter 2).  How apparently open-ended the interrelations among and between the forces of production, the relations of production, and the superstructure are in Mao’s conception of Marx’s theory of history!

Marrying the Various Strands

We have seen in this essay that, at its best, Marxism leads one to expect a close interrelationship between theory and practice; where either is scarce the other will be acutely disadvantaged.  Maoism, by and large, has privileged practice over theory — it views practice as the foundation of theory.  But what does the Maoist dictum "seek truth from practice mean"?  At its best, and if one reads Mao’s July 1937 definitive On Practice: On the Relation between Knowledge and Practice, Between Knowing and Doing, he takes on both, the dogmatists and the empiricists, the "right opportunists" and the "leftists".  As he puts it: "Practice [‘class struggle, political life, scientific and artistic pursuits’], knowledge, again practice, and again knowledge.  This form repeats itself in endless cycles, and with each cycle the content of practice and knowledge rises to a higher level".  And, in his outstanding August 1937 essay On Contradiction he holds that contradictions — the struggle between functionally united opposites — cause continual change.  Development stems from the resolution of contradictions and strategy involves choice of the form of struggle most suited to resolve a contradiction.  But the desired qualitative alteration can be brought only through a series of stages, where the existing stage is impregnated with the hybrid seeds of the subsequent one, thereby dissolving the salient contradictions of the former and ushering in the latter.  Mao’s Marxism was of the Leninist school, albeit tending closer to its Stalinist version (which, as we have seen, is a decomposed version of Leninism), but struggling to overcome and go beyond Stalinism.

We have traversed a wide canvas with some wild strokes, covering the ground from Marxism to Leninism, and from there to its Stalinist revision, and then to Maoism in terms of its evolution and development in China from the late 1920s to the late 1960s, focussing on its differentiae specifica.  The latter, we have found, are:

  • the poor peasantry of the interior of a backward capitalist/semi-feudal society rather than the urban proletariat constitute the mass support base of the movement;
  • theory of revolution by stages as well as uninterrupted revolution, implying a close link between successive stages;
  • the stage of NDR, which makes capitalism much more compatible with democracy, thereby aiding the transition to socialism;
  • the path and strategy of PPW, which relies on the peasants, builds rural base areas, carries out "land to the tiller" and other social policies in these areas (run democratically as miniature, self-reliant states) thereby building up a political mass base in the countryside to finally encircle and capture the cities;
  • the conception of "base areas" and the way to establishing them;
  • "capturing" (winning mass support in) the cities by demonstrating a brand of nationalism that is genuinely anti-imperialist, thereby re-orienting an existing mass nationalist upsurge (as during the anti-Japanese resistance, 1937-45 in China) in favour of the completion of the NDR;
  • democratic centralism plus the "mass line", ensuring that "democracy" doesn’t take a backseat to "centralism" and making sure the people are involved in policy making and its implementation;
  • the central idea that contradictions — the struggle between functionally united opposites — at each stage drive the process of development on the way to socialism, which is sought to be brought about in a series of stages, where the existing stage, at the right time, is impregnated with the hybrid seeds of the subsequent one, thereby dissolving the salient contradictions of the former and ushering in the latter;
  • open-ended interrelations among and between the forces of production, the relations of production, and the superstructure; and
  • the idea that political, managerial, and bureaucratic power-holders entrench themselves as a ruling elite and, over a period of time, assume the position of a new exploiting class, and that the people have to be constantly mobilised to struggle against this tendency.

"Materialist dialectics" as a way of thinking and a guide to doing was a powerful tool in Mao’s hands, but its weaknesses were perhaps inherent in its very strengths; in the end, the very method led him to hugely overestimate the pace of change and vastly underestimate the obstacles to change.  Marx too fell into the same trap when his very method of analysis led him to believe that revolution was around the corner, immensely underrating the huge barriers to progressive change.  Does the very application of the method of materialist dialectics lead its practitioners to err on the side of "voluntarism" in their practice?

If one looks forward from the vantage point of 1969 — the year marks the beginning of the end of the Maoist era — the great reversal from "socialism" to capitalism (Sharma, ed. 2007) lay ahead.  But 1969 also affords a good look back in time.  It might help to begin from an incident from Mao’s childhood when he was in school, which he related to the American journalist Edgar Snow (1972).  One day he and his fellow students were witness to the decapitated heads of rebels strung to the city’s gates as a warning.  The insurrectionists had led starving peasants in an uprising to find food.  The savage repression of the rebellion was obvious, and the incident left a profound impression on the boy and he never forgot it, deeply resenting the treatment meted out to the rebels.  Clearly, from a very young age Mao came to view the prevailing social order as quite simply intolerable and to expect a revolutionary high tide sooner or later.  "A single spark can start a prairie fire", he told his close comrades in January 1930; twenty years later, he is said to have declared: "The Chinese people have stood up!"  There is a touching story of Mao’s triumphant entry into Beijing which is worth recounting:7

There were a million Chinese present to welcome him.  A large platform, fifteen feet high, had been built at the end of a vast square, and as he mounted the steps from the back, the top of his head appeared and a roar of welcome surged up from a million throats, increasing and increasing as the lone figure came fully into view.  And when Mao . . . saw the vast multitude, he stood for a moment, then suddenly covered his face with both hands and wept.

But in the years after 1949, even in the mid-1960s, as we have seen, the question of whether it will be capitalism or socialism in China was still unsettled.  At the age of 72, the guerrilla in Mao stirred again — better to burn out than to hit the skids.  As Jerome Ch’en (1968: 5), quoting Mao the poet put it:

The Chinese revolution was at a cross-road.  It could "look down the precipices" and beat a retreat or "reach the ninth heaven high. . ." and then "return to merriment and triumphant songs."  The choice, according to the poet, depended entirely upon one’s "will to ascend."

Four years later, all that remained were the embers — the time had come to just fade away.  Not much later, his closest comrades, Zhou Enlai and Zhu De passed away.  The Bard of Avon’s idea that "all the world’s a stage" has acquired the status of a cliché, but it must surely have been one of the great pleasures of Mao’s life to have been on the same stage with the two of them.  The time was now up for one of the greatest Marxist revolutionaries of all time to ascend to the stars to join them: Marx, Engels, Lenin, Trotsky, Stalin, the 20 million soldiers of the Red Army who had died in the war against fascism, the many ordinary peasant-guerrillas of the PLA who sacrificed their lives in the long march to a better world.

Maoism, however, needs to be taken to task; one cannot but ask: Why the peasants and workers didn’t resist the great reversals to capitalism in China and the Soviet Union — the counter-revolutions?  Were these regimes, as long as Mao and Stalin were around, really socialist, as has constantly been the claim of latter-day Maoists?  The truth could only be highly disappointing, that is, if one were to judge Maoism, as is only fair, by the fruits of its project of taking humanity along the road towards equality, cooperation, community, and solidarity.  In China itself, Maoism didn’t succeed on this score — all the united actions of the workers and the poor peasants, all the mass education of the Maoist period, didn’t seem to have brought about their intellectual development to a point where they could take on the "capitalist roaders" after 1978 to uphold the ideas of equality and cooperation as against hierarchy and competition.  Maoism failed to provide a successful working model of socialism in the 20th century.  What’s worse, even as Mao was in his last years, People’s China entered into an accommodation with US imperialism against the Soviet Union — Mao’s On Contradiction was misapplied to justify the arrangement.  In a blatant violation of an important Maoist tenet, nationalism got the better of anti-imperialism when in 1974 Deng Xiaoping used so-called "three worlds’ theory" to rationalise the "right-wing" turn in China’s foreign policy.

But despite all these shortcomings, there can be little doubt that over the longer period, from the late 1920s to the late 1960s, Maoism did something unprecedented in human history — it brought about a drastic redistribution of income and wealth in China; it radically reordered the way Chinese society’s economic surplus was generated and utilised, all for the better.

Mao’s Legacy and the Future of Maoism

It’s time then to talk of Mao’s legacy.  As we have seen, Maoism has a definite view about how to get to socialism, and about what needs to be done to meet the basic needs of everyone in a poor country.  Development is to be on an egalitarian basis — we are all in it together and everyone rises together.  What then of Mao’s legacy, Maoism?  Surely, this is open to all who share his Weltanschauung, his method of analysis — materialist dialectics — his values, his vision, and choose to embark together on the long march to socialism, knowing beforehand that the journey is fraught with considerable peril.  What then of Maoism in India (Ram 1971; Banerjee 1980; Mohanty 1977; Gupta 1993; 2006; Azad 2006), one might ask?  Maoist China did its best to feed, clothe and house everyone, keep them healthy, educate most of them.  Contrast this with the deplorable conditions in India at the end of the 1960s and even today — the tragedy of India ruled by her own big bourgeoisie — and one gets wind as to why there are some in India who look to the Maoist model of development as the way to a richer and fuller life for all.  Anu — whom we started this article with — was one of them.

However, while one may have deep respect for such people, one needs to ask the question: Are the basic path and strategy of revolution that were necessary in China in the 1930s and 1940s right for India in the 21st century?  Well, India differs very significantly from the China of those times, more so in its history, geography, class and social structure, traditions, and in the nature of its "semi-feudalism"/backward capitalism, the accommodation of the big bourgeoisie with imperialism,8 the strength of the repressive apparatus of the state, the nationalities question, and so on.  And, importantly, while Chinese history is replete with periodic widespread peasant uprisings, Indian history, in a comparative sense, is scarce of such rebellions, which perhaps can be explained in terms of caste (Moore 1966: chapters 4, 6, and 9) — it is fundamentally antithetical to any meaningful unity of the exploited and the oppressed.9  Recall that Mao adapted his Marxism-Leninism to the realities of China’s history, China’s potentialities; "learn truth from practice" was his message.  Surely a party like the CPI (Maoist) that stems from a political tendency that, over the last 40 years, has done its best to take the Indian revolution forward might like to take a hard re-look into the abyss that is India — its history, its potentialities.

The Maoists must keep in mind that the scientific validity of the Maoism they uphold will be judged in the first instance in India by its contributions to correctly explaining Indian social reality.  There is a lot they have had a hand in this respect, for instance, in emphasising the parasitical reliance of Indian capital on the state for its self-expansion, expressed in the notion of bureaucrat capital.  Or, in stressing the powerful role of the state in the very making of the Indian big bourgeoisie (of course, the "state’s" fostering of the ruling classes more than the other way round, going back to ancient times, is an insight from the eminent historian D D Kosambi).  The Maoists have also helped us to see the post-1956 official "land reforms" as having led to the partial amalgamation of the old rural landowning classes into a new, broader stratum of rich landowners, those not setting their hands to the plough, including an upper section of the former tenants, all of whom, despite the various markets, have yet to rid themselves of various "semi-feudal" practices and pre-capitalist elements of culture.  Also, it is the Maoists who, in their practice, correctly do not even try to differentiate the rural poor into "agrarian proletariat" or "landless peasantry", knowing very well that the same very poor household can be categorized in one or the other at various points in time.  And, in organising the "agrarian proletariat"/"landless peasantry" along with the poor and middle peasants, and a section of the rich peasants, they insist on factoring in the caste question, despite their knowing how highly problematic and painfully difficult such a getting together can be.  Also, it is the Maoists more than others who first grasped the brutal character of the dominant classes and the leaders of the political parties they have co-opted, the very same categories whose forebears had taken power in the name of Gandhian non-violence.  All this is knowledge essentially derived from their practice.

The CPI (Maoist) has come in for a lot of condemnation for its violent activities, including killings.  The violence however has to be viewed in the context of the undeclared civil war that is underway in the areas of its influence, for instance, in Dantewada in the state of Chhattisgarh (PUDR 2006).  The government is implementing a barbaric counter-insurgency policy, which includes the fostering of a network of informers and combatants among the civilian population, right from the village level upwards: a state-supported, state-sponsored, and even state-organised so-called people’s resistance — called Salwa Judum (SJ) — against the Maoists.  Entire villages have been evacuated and the villagers forcibly dumped into relief camps, and this, in the circumstances of large-scale acquisition of land by private corporations in what is a mineral-rich region.  The last four years have witnessed violent attacks, loot, destruction, intimidation, rape and killing on an unprecedented scale principally by the SJ; indeed, the latter has even forcibly mobilised the displaced into its ranks.  Undoubtedly, the killing is by both sides, but the big difference is that the Maoists, generally when they target specific state representatives, or even informers, they first warn them to desist from the anti-people activity they are undertaking.  Those guilty of rape, torture, deaths in custody, or responsible for "encounter" killings are singled out so that others may, out of fear of such reprisals, desist from acting thus.  As far as the SJ representatives are concerned, any person who joins them is targeted, not because of any personal enmity, but because of the role that the SJ has been playing in the undeclared civil war.

More generally, the violence also has to be seen in the context of the close de facto nexus between economic and political power at the local and regional levels; the dominant classes, through various means, exercise a degree of control over the police and the judiciary, which increases the chances of violent confrontation between the contending classes.10

Those who deliberately, falsely depict the Maoists as "devotees of violence" choose to suppress the fact that the violence of the oppressed (and the Maoists who now lead them) has been always preceded and provoked by the violence of the oppressors (and the state and private forces that back them).  To claim, as some liberals do, that the violence of the oppressed is "morally equivalent" to that of the oppressors is to endorse the reactionary state, which backs the oppressors.  And, in this age of the management of public opinion, the "programming" of what the public thinks, sees and reads, the "facts" that are disseminated are artificially separated from a whole host of other relevant facts, never allowing the public to discern the "real" present.

But, while acknowledging that antagonistic contradictions between hostile class-based organisations will lead to violence, it is a Maoist tenet that guerrilla actions ought to be subordinated to "mass-line" politics — the Maoist guerrillas should give precedence to winning over the mass of the people in their base areas and, in consequence, in the surrounding areas — and work towards a better balance ("proportionality") than ever before between means and ends.  Regarding the resort to violence in the revolution, to the extent that I have absorbed their writings, it would be fair to say that Marx and Engels might not have disagreed with the use of violent methods by the revolutionary forces in India today.  The dominant classes could never be expected to give up their control without employing all the repressive power at their command.  It is useful perhaps to recall that Marx’s response to the "crimes and cruelties alleged" against the "insurgent Hindus" of 1857 was to set out an account of the daily violence "in cold blood" of British rule in India (Marx 1857).

As to the false claim that the Maoists have no mass support in their areas of influence, one has only to listen to perceptive yet sensitive, independent observers who know the situation on the ground.  The state forces are much stronger (as far as armaments and numbers go) than the Maoist guerrillas, and yet the tribal peasants support the latter.  Why do these peasants take the risk of supporting the underdogs, even when they know that, when the guerrillas are vanquished, they, as their supporters, will be at the mercy of the state forces, and will most probably perish?  If, at the risk of death itself, the peasants choose the guerrillas, surely there must be something more significant going on over here.

Besides India, Maoism is a political force to reckon with in Nepal (Bhattarai 2005; 2009; Mage 2005 and 2007; Parvati 2005; Mage and D’Mello 2007; AMR 2008), the Philippines (Sison 1989; 2003), and Peru (Spalding 1992, 1993; Leupp 1993).  The Nepali Maoist leaders have been imaginative — their ideas of some combination of the "Chinese" (triumph in the countryside and spread to the cities) and the "Russian" (victory in the cities and spread to the countryside) models of revolution, and of "21st century democracy" (multi-party competition as long as all agree on the goals of "new democracy") are appealing.  The Unified Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist), given its relative strength vis-a-vis "the enemies" of democracy and their friends and masters outside the borders of that small country (above all in India), seeks to utilize the bourgeois republic as a stage in mustering the force of the impoverished masses and nationalist intermediate strata to proceed towards NDR (Bhattarai and WPRM-Britain 2009).  But these theories are being put to a severe test in practice.

What then of the future of Maoism and the renewal of socialism that it promises?  Frankly, "whatever chance there may have been that the revolutions of the 20th century could or would provide successful working models of socialism" has long since been extinguished; "socialism, we are told, has been tried and failed" (Sweezy 1993: 5).  But, as Marx was the first to show, the obstacles to a better future cannot be meaningfully addressed within the framework of capitalism.  The challenge then is to revive and renew the legacy of socialism.  In this, can Maoism illuminate the way?

Maoism has its roots in Marx who was, above all, a radical democrat — he demanded the reincarnation of community and mass solidarity; he dreamed of the communion of human beings with nature; he stressed the dialectic of liberation; he looked forward to a just society alongside "rich individuality"; and, as Paresh Chattopadhyay (2005) reminds us, he insisted on the removal of commodity exchange, the division of labour, the state. . . .  But, then, Lenin too, in his State and Revolution appeared as a thoroughgoing democrat, though he introduced into his conception of socialism elements that are antithetical to the "association of free individuals" — wage labour and state (Ibid).

Mao and the Chinese Maoists too gave the impression of being revolutionary democrats, that is, if one were to go by the 20 million people marching through the streets of various Chinese cities in the last week of May 1968, the demonstrators mainly chanting the slogan: "long live the revolutionary heritage of the great Paris Commune".  Indeed, Marx’s interpretation of the Commune was then deemed relevant to the revival of the revolution in China, something that found a place in the famous "Sixteen Points" of 8 August 1966 (Meisner 1971; Robinson 1969: 84-96).  "Let a hundred flowers blossom, let a hundred schools of thought contend" was not merely intended policy for the promotion of progress in the arts and sciences, but one of ushering in a flourishing socialist culture — at least that was the claim.

Thus, given the radical democratic streak running from Marx to Mao, the best thing that Maoism could do is to commit to the promise of radical democracy: just as there cannot be liberty in any meaningful sense without equality, for the rich will certainly be more "free" (have more options) than the poor, so there cannot be equality without liberty, for then some may have more political power than others.

So far, all revolutions inspired by Marx have only enjoyed the support or participation of a significant minority.  Can the commitment to radical democracy up the tide to get the help of the majority?  Will the means then be carefully chosen so that they never come to overwhelm the socialist aspiration?

 

Notes

1  Paresh Chattopadhyay, in personal correspondence, draws my attention to the view that Marx spoke of a "political transition period" (not of constituting a distinct "society") from capitalism to communism under the rule of the proletariat; socialism and communism, for him, were simply the alternative names for the same classless society he looked forward to, after capitalism.

2  We think it necessary to be more comprehensive on Maoism because even one of the best dictionaries of Marxist thought (Bottomore 2000), even in its second edition, didn’t have an entry on Maoism, although it, rightly and deservedly, had one on Trotskyism.

3  But even as I make such general remarks, I need to qualify them by stating that within the "China studies" field there have been and are a set of first-rate scholars, some of whom we have learnt a great deal from — Benjamin Schwartz, Stuart Schram, Maurice Meisner, Mark Selden, Carl Riskin, Manoranjan Mohanty, G P Deshpande, Chris Bramall come to mind.  However, as will soon be evident, herein I mainly rely on writers of the Monthly Review School — John Gurley, William Hinton, Harry Magdoff, and others.

4  To his credit, it was Benjamin Schwartz (1951) who first highlighted the shift in the CCP’s strategy (in response to what the party saw as a change in the "principal contradiction") during the course of the anti-Japanese resistance.

5  The figures have been disputed though, among others, by Utsa Patnaik (2004: 10-12) and Joseph Ball (2006).

6  I may be naïve, but given that Mao is said to have had overwhelmingly the people’s and the PLA’s support but the Liu-Deng faction had the upper hand organizationally within the party, Mao could have split the party and gone for a referendum to decide China’s future course — capitalism or socialism — and there would have been little doubt what the result of the plebiscite would have been, the outcome of which would have totally legitimized the socialist road.  Why didn’t he do this?

7  This episode was related by Chou En-lai [Zhou Enlai] to Charlie Chaplin in Geneva during the Korean crisis when the former had come to negotiate an end to the Korean War and the latter had made possible a showing of City Lights to the visiting dignitary (Chaplin 1966: 526, 530).

8  The country has recently witnessed the largest ever Indo-US military exercise on Indian soil.

9  Also, religion, ethnicity and nationality have been divisive cards played by the main political parties and their forebears to divide the toiling masses at the local level in the Indian sub-continent.  The utter criminality of communalist-religious mobilizations and the pogroms unleashed against the main religious minority in India have been the most tragic outcomes of this brand of semi-fascist politics in the recent past.

10  In 1994, I happened to go to the courts in Midnapore town (in Paschim Midnapore district of the Indian state of West Bengal) for some legal matter.  During the long lunch break I was resting in an empty courtroom when two desperately poor tribal men, who seemed to be in a bad condition as a result of torture, were brought by the police into this "court" — as I pretended to sleep, the court clerk, masquerading as the judicial authority (the real guy was probably enjoying his extended siesta at home) passed a summary order in a minute, remanding the accused to further police custody.  I mention this because Lalgarh, in the Jhargram sub-division of the district, and the contiguous Jangalmahal area, is presently one of the epicenters of Maoist revolt, and, if one wants to get to the roots of this local eruption since November last year, the criminal justice system’s deliberate, callous, and continuing discrimination against the poor, the tribal poor in particular, is not unimportant.  It is interesting that at the time of the Indian Rebellion of 1857 Marx, referring to "some of the antecedents which prepared the way for the violent outbreak", quoting from the report of the "Torture Commission at Madras" highlights "the difficulty of obtaining redress which confronts the injured parties".  Marx concludes (1857):

In view of such facts, dispassionate and thoughtful men may perhaps be led to ask whether a people are not justified in attempting to expel the foreign conquerors who have so abused their subjects.  And if the English could do these things in cold blood, is it surprising that the insurgent Hindoos should be guilty, in the fury of revolt and conflict, of crimes and cruelties alleged against them?

What is tragic is that, in a province of independent India governed by the "social-democratic" Communist Party of India (Marxist)-led Left Front government without a break since 1978, there are elements of an essential continuity (with respect to British India in 1857) in the manner in which the criminal justice system functions.

 

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Bernard D’Mello is deputy editor, Economic & Political Weekly, and is a member of the Committee for the Protection of Democratic Rights, Mumbai.  This essay is dedicated to the memory of my first editor, the late Samar Sen (Shômor babu, as we called him), founder-editor of the Kolkata-based weekly, Frontier.  It is also in appreciation of Subhas Aikat whose Kharagpur-based, hand-to-mouth existing Cornerstone Publications brings out an Indian edition of the Monthly Review and books that pose the kind of questions generally shunned by academia.  The essay is my small thanksgiving to all you MR people, past and present, on the occasion of your 60th anniversary.  I thank Paresh Chattopadhyay, N Krishnaji, John Mage, C Rammanohar Reddy, and P A Sebastian for their critical but helpful comments on an earlier draft; the usual disclaimers apply.

Restructuring the Global Division of Labour Amidst Capitalist Crisis

Toronto, October 30, 2009 – Facilitator: Leo Panitch.

Ursula Huws is the author of The Making of a Cybertariat: Real Work in a Virtual World, and the founder and editor of the journal Work Organisation, Labour and Globalisation.

The director of Analytica Social and Economic Research and honorary Professor of International Labour Studies at London Metropolitan University, she is renowned for her pioneering research on the economic and social impacts of technological change, the telemediated relocation of employment and the changing international division of labour, especially in the global service sector.

Courtesy: Socialist Project

Organizing Working Class Communities

Toronto, October 2, 2009 – Steve Williams is co-director of the California based group POWER: People Organized to win Employment Rights, which since the late 1990’s has been one of the most important Worker’s Action Centres in the U.S., and co-authour of the book Towards Land, Work and Power: Charting a Path of Resistance to U.S.-led Imperialism.

Part 1

• Moderated by Stephanie Ross – Prof. Labour Studies, York University.
• Sam Gindin – Visiting Packer Chair in Social Justice at York University.

Organizing Working Class Communities [1/2] from LeftStreamed on Vimeo.

Part 2

• Steve Williams – is co-director of the California based group POWER.

Courtesy: Socialist Project

“Revolution never stops”: Baburam Bhattarai

World People’s Resistance Forum (Britain)

WPRM: Thank you for meeting with us today. In your article in The Worker #4 ‘The Political Economy of the People’s War’ you write that “the transformation of one social system into another, or the destruction of the old by the new, always involves force and a revolutionary leap. The People’s War is such a means of eliminating the old by a new force and of taking a leap towards a new and higher social system.” Why then did the Maoist party enter the peace process and attempt to change society through Constituent Assembly elections?

Baburam Bhattarai: This is a very important question related to the basic tenets of Marxism-Leninism-Maoism (MLM). The basic motive force of history is the contradiction between the existing level of productive forces and the production relations within society. At a certain stage this contradiction sharpens and there is a break with the old relationship and a leap to the new one. We call this social revolution. That leap necessarily confronts a certain force, because every set of productive relations is backed by a state, and the state means basically the organised force of the army. To break with the old mode of production and leap into a new one, you have to break all the relations within the state backed by the army. And that inevitably requires the use of force. This is a law of history and a basic principle of MLM which nobody can revise. If you revise or abandon it then you are no longer a Marxist. There is no question of our party ever ending this basic principle.

By adhering to this basic principle we waged armed Protracted People’s War (PPW) from 1996 to 2006. But after 2006 we made a certain departure in our tactical line. Some people are confused about this and think we have abandoned PPW forever and adopted a peaceful path of social development. This confusion needs to be cleared. What we are saying is that People’s War is a multifaceted war where both the armed and political form of struggle needs to be combined.

Protracted People’s War (PPW) is a military strategy to be adopted in a semi-feudal, semi-colonial context, and, in the different context of imperialism, could be applied in a modified form even in imperialist countries. But basically the theory of PPW as developed by Mao was to be applied in semi-feudal, semi-colonial countries. That’s why the military line adopted in the case of Nepal was basically a line of Protracted People’s War, which we developed through the course of our struggle, applying it very creatively in Nepal for ten years. And we were successful in developing this war from the stage of strategic defensive to the stage of strategic equilibrium and on to the stage of strategic offensive. We basically established the strategic offensive, which means the final stage of capturing state power and which must be meticulously calculated and applied. If you don’t take note of the existing balance of forces, both politically and militarily in the country and outside, firstly it will be difficult to capture state power and secondly even after capturing state power it will be difficult to sustain it. That’s why we introduced certain new features.

People know only the negative part, but what they forget, or what we have been unable to propagate well since the beginning of the PPW, is the new context of world imperialism and the specific geopolitical context of Nepal. In this context, our party decided that we need to adopt some of the features of general insurrection within the strategy of PPW. Therefore the basic strategy will be PPW, but some of the features of general insurrection, which relies on people’s movement in the urban areas and leads to the final insurrection in the city, the tactics of the general insurrection, should also be incorporated within that strategy. This has been the basic question within our party, the Unified Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) [UCPN(M)]. This idea we first introduced in our national unity congress in 1991 and after that when we had our 2nd national conference in 2001. At that time we developed the theory of fusion of PPW and general insurrection to a new level, so that in the specific context of Nepal, while adhering to the basic path of PPW, the tactic of general insurrection should be fused within that strategy. That’s why at that conference we put emphasis on this aspect. But we thought that when we developed this new political line, developed through the course of the People’s War in Nepal, that it needed to be assessed more thoroughly in the international community of Maoists.

We called this one of the features of Prachanda Path, which we regarded as a new development in the theory of MLM. After 2001 we still adhered to the People’s War but we resorted to some of the tactics of general insurrection, that’s why when we were in the People’s War we always talked of political negotiations and we actually had two rounds of political negotiations. During that time we raised the issues of Constituent Assembly, abolition of the monarchy and establishment of a bourgeois democratic republic. These were the tactics we followed while we were in the PPW. Why we did that was because in the specific conditions of Nepal, though we are in the stage of transition from feudalism to capitalism, in our case the feudal system had been basically led by an autocratic monarchy for thousands of years. In most third world countries autocratic monarchy has already been abolished, and in those countries though the basic foundation of society is still semi-feudal, semi-colonial, the political superstructure was led by bourgeois democrats. But in our case even the political superstructure was dominated by the autocratic feudal monarchy, the national bourgeoisie was very weak and they could not carry forward the bourgeois democratic revolution. It was the proletarian party which had to take the lead to abolish the autocratic monarchy and introduce a bourgeois democracy, which could be again transformed through struggle into New Democracy, a proletarian democratic system.

Therefore we adopted these tactics, and after 2001 we followed these tactics and by 2005 we had reached the stage of strategic offensive in the PPW. Then we thought it was time to focus our activity, to shift our activities to the urban areas. By that time we had liberated most of the countryside, where the poor peasantry lives, and under 25% of our population lives in urban areas. There the petty bourgeoisie class and other classes needed to be mobilised if we were to complete the stage of strategic offensive and capture the state in a revolutionary manner. After 2005 we decided to shift our activity to the urban areas, because without mobilising the masses in urban areas we couldn’t complete our strategic offensive, capturing the state. With these tactics in mind we entered into the negotiation process with certain parliamentary parties who were all struggling with the monarchy but which were too weak, their class nature was too weak, they couldn’t struggle with the monarchy and complete the bourgeois democratic revolution. When the autocratic monarchy centralised all state power in a coup, it was easier for us to have an alliance with those bourgeois democratic parties and we made the 12-point understanding. On the basis of that 12-point understanding we launched a mass movement which we called the 2nd mass movement. After the 2nd mass movement there was a huge upsurge of the people and the autocratic monarchy was forced to accept the Constituent Assembly and to step down. After that we made the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, in which we had to make certain compromises. Those compromises were made to abolish the monarchy, hold the Constituent Assembly elections and then move ahead to complete the bourgeois democratic revolution in the country.

There are some ambiguous features in the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. Our understanding, the revolutionary party’s understanding, was that after abolishing the monarchy and establishing a bourgeois democratic republic, the proletarian party would take the initiative and launch forward the struggle towards New Democratic Revolution. We knew the bourgeois forces, after the abolition of the monarchy, would try to resist, and our main contradiction then would be with the bourgeois democratic parties. This we had foreseen. So we have not said that after the abolition of the monarchy we’ll stop there. We never said that. What we have said is that we would align with the bourgeois democratic parties to abolish the monarchy, and after the abolition of the monarchy then the contention would be between the bourgeois forces and the proletarian forces. A new field of struggle would start. That was clearly stated in the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, the subsequent interim constitution and other documents we passed.

After the Constituent Assembly elections, when our party emerged as the largest force and we abolished the monarchy, there was a lot of enthusiasm among the masses of the people. Our party’s tactical line had been correctly implemented. That gave a tremendous force to the basic masses of the people and our support greatly increased. For the time being we cooperated with the interim government also, because by participating in that coalition government we thought we could work within the bureaucracy, within the army, within the police and within the judiciary, in order to build our support base through those state structures, which would help us for future revolutionary activities. With that in mind we participated in the coalition government. After the abolition of the monarchy, when the main contradiction would start with the bourgeois democratic forces, then our struggle took a new turn.

After April 2009 [when Prachanda resigned from government], that phase of the Constituent Assembly and implementation of the bourgeois democratic republic was more or less complete. Our understanding is to now carry on the struggle forwards to complete the New Democratic Revolution. So again we made a tactical shift, showing that from now on our major fight would be with the bourgeois democrat parties who are backed by imperialism and the expansionist forces. With this thinking our party left the government and now we are focusing on the mass movement, so that now we could really practice what we have been preaching. That means the fusion of the strategy of PPW and the tactic of general insurrection. What we have been doing since 2005 is the path of preparation for general insurrection through our work in the urban areas and our participation in the coalition government.

But what one should not forget was that we had never ever surrendered the gains of the PPW, what we had gained during the ten years of struggle. We had formulated the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), we had our base areas, we had a lot of mass support, and all this we have been able to preserve. But we have not been able to convey to our comrades outside the country that the gains of the People’s War were never surrendered. The PLA is still with us, and the arms we collected during that war are still with us within the single-key system, monitored by the United Nations team, but basically the key is with us and the army is with us and we have never surrendered. This shows we have not abandoned the path of PPW. What we have done is suspended that part of the activity for some time and focused more on the urban activities so that we could make a correct balance between the military and political aspects of struggle. After some time we will be able to combine both aspects of PPW and general insurrection to mount a final insurrection to capture state power. We would like to stress that we are still continuing in the path of revolution, but the main features we tried to introduce were to make a fusion between the theory of PPW and the tactic of general insurrection. After coming to the peaceful phase I think whatever confusion there was has been mitigated and people realise we are still on the revolutionary path.

Now we are preparing for the final stage of the completion of the New Democratic Revolution. In a few months when the contradiction will sharpen between the proletarian and bourgeois forces, maybe there will be some intervention from the imperialist and expansionist forces. During that time we may again be forced to have another round of armed clashes. Our party is already aware of that and we have decided to again focus on the basic masses of the people both in urban and rural areas. To strengthen those mass bases we have formed the United National People’s Movement, which will be preparing for both struggle in the urban areas and to strengthen our mass base in the countryside. In the decisive stage of confrontation with the reactionary forces we could again combine our bases in the rural areas and our support in the urban areas for a final assault against the enemy to complete the revolution.

I would like to say we have never abandoned PPW, the only thing is that there has been a tactical shift within the strategy. This is one point. The other point is that being a Maoist we believe in continuous revolution. Revolution never stops. Even when one stage is completed, immediately the new stage should be continued. Only that way can we reach socialism and communism. That is a basic tenet of Maoism. Being a Maoist, this reasoning of continuous revolution can never be abandoned. We are still in the course of PPW, though the tactics have shifted according to the nature of the time. But there is a confusion in the international community of proletarian forces, and we would like to clarify this, but I think this thing can be better done in practice than in words. Anyhow we are confident we can convince our comrades who have some doubts about our activities that we are still pursuing the path of revolution. We will complete the revolution in a new way and we have to show that revolution is possible even in the 21st century. And Nepal can be a model of revolution in the 21st century.

WPRM: Can you explain how the UCPN(M) understands the nature of the state in this transitional period? Can the New Democratic Revolution be completed through the holding of an election?

Baburam Bhattarai: The key question in any revolution is the question of the state. The state is simply an instrument of dictatorship of a certain class. Right now in Nepal the existing state is a dictatorship of the feudal, comprador and bureaucratic capitalist classes. So the task of the revolution is to smash this state and replace it with a New Democratic one. This is the basic objective of the revolution. But in the special case of Nepal, the semi-feudal, semi-colonial state was presided over by an autocratic monarchy and it was being backed by foreign imperialist and expansionist forces. Our party, the UCPN(M), therefore thought it more prudent first to do away with the autocratic monarchy and establish a bourgeois democratic republic and then immediately go towards New Democratic Revolution. Those were the tactics adopted by us. We took the initiative to abolish the monarchy under the leadership of the proletariat which was a tremendous boost for the proletarian forces within our country. It also marginalised the bourgeois democratic forces because they had not taken the lead in that phase of the revolution. After the implementation of these tactics and the abolition of the monarchy, we have established a bourgeois democratic republic in this country, which basically still is a dictatorship of the feudal landlord, comprador and bureaucratic capitalist classes. But politically, since the proletarian forces took the initiative to establish this transitional state, there is contention between the reactionary classes and the progressive classes. A sort of flux has been created, it has not been stabilised. Within this nature of the state, which is in flux, we think it will be easier for the revolutionary forces to intervene and further destabilise the state, putting pressure on it from outside the state which can be smashed to make a New Democratic state.

The nature of the transitional state is, to put it very concisely, in principle a dictatorship of the reactionary forces. But in practice, since the proletarian forces played a leading and decisive role in dismantling the autocratic monarchy and creating this transitional state, the political authority of the progressive, patriotic and proletarian forces is high. So this interim state won’t be very stable and if we can correctly mobilise the masses of people it can easily be overthrown and replaced by a New Democratic state. We think this is a new experiment being carried out in Nepal, it has not happened like in China where they directly implemented the revolutionary policies of the party and overthrew the old state replacing it with a new one. But in our case it has meant cutting up the state part by part, in fact we are devouring it part by part. Ultimately we will be able to smash it and then replace it with a new state. This does not mean we are trying to reform the whole state, indeed the whole state has to be totally displaced by a new state. There is no confusion on our part on this question. But the method of destroying the whole state is partly new in our case because it was presided over by an autocratic monarchy not by bourgeois democratic parties as seen in other third world countries. Because of this specificity of Nepal, this transitional state has been a new thing not seen elsewhere. But our party is very clear on the question that the state needs to be totally destroyed and replaced by the new state. We are working on that line and our party feels that after the formulation of the strategy of People’s War and general insurrection we will be able to finally mobilise the masses of the people in a mass upsurge and insurrection to abolish this state and replace it with a New Democratic one.

WPRM: After the resignation of Chairman Prachanda from the government and the coup by President Yadav over the affair of General Katuwal, the main revisionist party, the CPN-UML, is now leading the government and you are heading the recently formed United National People’s Movement (UNPM). Can you tell us the plan of the party in leading People’s Movement-3 and carrying out insurrection in this situation?

Baburam Bhattarai: As I told you, the basic orientation of our party is to complete the New Democratic Revolution in a new way in Nepal. By firmly sticking to that line we are practicing different tactical shifts. Accordingly, after we completed this task of elections of the Constituent Assembly and the establishment of democratic republic, now our next task is to organise a people’s movement and develop it into an insurrectionary upsurge and complete the New Democratic Revolution. Now we have entered that phase. During this phase we will focus more on organising and mobilising the masses and leading them towards a revolutionary upsurge. That means certain changes in the policy as had been practiced during the People’s War. During that time our focus was on the peasant masses, which was slightly different than the struggle in the urban areas which consists of basically the working class.

To lead this phase of the movement we have set up the new UNPM, which is basically a revolutionary united front of the patriotic, democratic and left forces led by the Communist Party. We have put forward a list of 25 demands related to nationalism, democracy and people’s livelihood. With these demands we have mobilised the masses of people. At a certain stage the contradiction with the bourgeois democratic forces and the imperialist expansionist forces will reach a higher stage. At that time there will be a decisive clash between the reactionary and revolutionary forces. That will be the insurrectionary upsurge. This is the view of the people. So with this in mind we have been organising plans and struggles, mass struggles which we will be carrying out in subsequent months. As Marx and Lenin correctly pointed out, you must believe firmly in the tactics of insurrection. If you have to organise insurrection you have to make a decisive action and take it to the final conclusion. If you can’t do that you will be defeated. To prepare for that decisive struggle you have to move through different stages, that’s why after leaving the government we are now focusing more on the issue of civilian supremacy so we can isolate the militarist section of the reactionaries. Secondly we are focusing on the question of nationalism so we can organise the broad masses of patriotic forces against imperialist and expansionist intervention. Thirdly we are raising the issue of land reform and the basic question of livelihood among the general masses of the people, so that the poor masses of the people and the petty bourgeoisie classes can be organised.

With this in mind we are carrying on a plan in the coming few months, there will be a broad unity of patriotic, democratic and revolutionary forces, which can mount a final struggle against the reactionary forces, the bourgeois democratic forces backed by the foreign imperialist forces. We think this will lead to a proper movement and a final insurrectionary upsurge of the masses of the people. If we are able to play the contradiction between the reactionary forces within the country and the imperialist and expansionist forces outside, then at an opportune moment we can organise an insurrectionary upsurge and be victorious. Therefore we have established the UNPM and put forward protest programs. In the next few months when the contradiction will sharpen among the reactionary forces while making the new constitution, during that time this new movement will arise when the people will finally come to revolt and complete the New Democratic Revolution. This is all I want to say on this for now.

WPRM: In the past you have written of the need to confiscate the land of feudals and the capital of comprador and bureaucrat capitalists, and the party has carried this out to some extent. Is this still the plan of the UCPN(M)?

Baburam Bhattarai: To complete the New Democratic Revolution you have to smash the feudal production relations and culture, that means we have to confiscate the property of the feudal landlords and distribute it to the peasants on the principle of ‘land to the tiller’. This was the basic policy of our party during the People’s War, which we practiced in the rural areas. Nepal is geographically divided between the hilly regions and the plains areas and most of the land is in the plains. But in the plains it was difficult to carry out guerilla warfare, so we just entered there and implemented some land reform policies. Since the plains border India and there is a danger of foreign intervention there, we have never been able to completely practice land reform in those areas. This will only be implemented after the final victory of the revolution. During the People’s War this policy, the principle of ‘land to the tiller’, was practiced more clearly in the hilly areas and partly in the plains areas bordering India. But we subscribe to the policy of abolishing feudal landowners because without making the real tillers of the land, the peasants, the owners of the land, we can’t bring about the land revolution and can’t complete the New Democratic Revolution. So our basic policy remains abolishing the feudal property relations and introducing a socialist-oriented national bourgeois democratic revolution. That is our policy on the question of land.

On the question of capital, for countries like ours, a semi-feudal and semi-colonial country, capital is basically dominated by imperialist capital. In our case Indian expansionist capital in particular. The nature of capital in Nepal at the moment is comprador and bureaucratic. This means it is dependent, you cannot have national independence in the country. That’s why we want to do away with this bureaucratic and comprador capital and convert it into national industrial capital which can subsequently be organised in a socialistic manner. With this policy in mind, we intend after the completion of the revolution to confiscate all this bureaucratic and comprador capital and convert it into national capital which can be reorganised into a socialist mode of production. This is our policy to do away with all the remnants of feudal landlordism, abolition of bureaucratic and comprador capital, and reorganisation of the economy, firstly under a New Democratic line and then in transition towards socialism.

WPRM: The UCPN(M) has brought forward ideas around elections in a New Democratic and socialist state. In your article on ‘The Question of Building a New Type of State’ in The Worker #9, you particularly discuss the need for greater democracy among the people. How will the holding of elections solve the problems generated by the weaknesses of the experience of socialism in the 20th century?

Baburam Bhattarai: This question of democracy and dictatorship is also very important for the communist movement. In principle every state is a dictatorship of a certain class, so-called democracy is also a form of bourgeois dictatorship. This is a basic tenet of MLM and nobody can deny that. But what was practiced in the 20th century in different people’s democracies and socialist countries was, though in theory correct, in practice the real democratic institutions and processes were minimised. Democracy is a class concept, and bourgeois democracy has its own rules, but proletarian democracy also needs to be developed. What happened in the Soviet Union was that the Soviet, a democratic institution, and the working class became very functional, especially during Comrade Stalin’s time. In reality the Soviets couldn’t be very functional and they gradually turned into a bureaucratic state apparatus. After the counter-revolution in the Soviet Union, Comrade Mao Zedong drew certain lessons and he wanted to expand the scope of proletarian democracy. That’s what he practiced during the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution. There were certain new institutions of people’s committees and Red Guards to expand people’s democracy. But this experience was very short and after Comrade Mao died, the counter-revolution in China took place.

Now it is up to the revolutionaries of the 21st century to learn from those lessons of the 20th century and develop a new concept of proletarian democracy. Our party discussed this thoroughly and made a review of the positive and negative aspects of revolution in the 20th century. We came to the conclusion that though the basic concept of MLM on state and democracy remains valid, because the Soviet apparatus was no longer functional, when the Soviet state turned into a bureaucratic state, and with the lesson of Mao’s experiment of Cultural Revolution against that negative experience of the Soviet Union, we have to develop the concept of proletarian democracy further. Our conclusion was that basically we need more room for the masses of the people to supervise and intervene in the state. If that will not happen then after the revolution the initiative of the masses will be diminished, and only the few of the bureaucratic elite will rule over the state in the name of the proletariat and the revolution would not be carried further.

To check this we have to create certain mechanisms whereby the constant mobilising of the masses and the constant vigilance and intervention of the masses is ensured so the state doesn’t turn into a bureaucratic state. To create such an institution one of the ideas is to provide democracy as was practiced during the Paris Commune days, or to again go towards the Soviet model of democracy, or draw lessons from the Cultural Revolution. We want to take lessons from all these three experiences, so our party’s conclusion was that within a socialist framework, within the framework of the dictatorship of the proletariat, competition should be organised among the masses of the people, so the masses will be constantly energised and it will prevent only a few people having a monopoly over the state.

This concept of competition within the framework of socialism, of proletarian dictatorship, we have developed this basic concept. But this is only a general concept, the actual mode of that competition we have still to work out. Our general feeling is still under discussion, we haven’t reached any final conclusion. But we have proposed multi-party competition within the socialist framework. Why do we need many parties? Though the proletarian class is one class, the proletarian consciousness is different, there is uneven consciousness. If there is competition among them then the most revolutionary section will be in a position to lead this process through democratic means. All the masses of the working class can be mobilised, and in such mode of constantly mobilising the masses of people we will limit the chance of degeneration of this democracy into a bureaucratic set-up. That’s why we are thinking one of the options is to allow multi-party competition among the proletarian and progressive classes within the framework of the leadership of the proletariat and a socialist constitutional framework.

This is one of the options that we have proposed but it just a proposal, we haven’t reached any conclusion. This is what I discussed in that article, it is a preliminary article, we have proposed this but I think it needs to be discussed in the international proletarian movement and developed further. Otherwise we will not be able to draw lessons from the failures of the teachings of socialism and proletarian revolution in the 20th century and lead revolution forward into the 21st century. The basic point of departure is still from the Cultural Revolution, where Mao went beyond the traditional framework of the state system and gave more power to the masses of the people to rebel against the bureaucratic system within the party and within the state. That is the general orientation. But the right institutions have not been developed yet. The job of the revolutionaries in the 21st century will be to develop that concept further and to develop certain institutions and procedures whereby the proletarian class gets mobilised to carry forward the revolution. With this is mind, we are putting forward this concept of competition within the New Democratic and socialist state framework.

WPRM: Elections in imperialist countries generally serve not as a way to mobilise the masses but as a formal ritual that people carry out in a very bureaucratic way. Only very seldom does the election actually mobilise people and that is in very specific circumstances, like to some extent the election of Obama in the USA, because people were so opposed to the crimes of the Bush regime. How can you make elections at all for mobilising people and helping people develop their understanding of the class nature of society and the need to push towards socialism when our general experience of elections in imperialist and oppressed countries is that they are a tool for deceiving the masses?

Baburam Bhattarai: The practice of democracy in imperialist counties is a form of bourgeois democracy, a ritual that deceives the masses of people and perpetuates the rule of their class state. But what we are talking about is not organising elections within the bourgeois state, we are talking about after the revolution in a New Democratic or socialistic framework, where there will be certain constitutional provisions whereby the reactionaries, imperialists and criminal forces will not be allowed to participate. Only the progressive forces, the democratic forces and people will be allowed to compete. That is the competition within the New Democratic or socialist framework we are talking about. This is a basic difference. After the revolution, the first thing we will do will be redistribution of property. There will no longer be rich and poor, a big gap between the haves and the have-nots. That way when we organise competition there will be an equal chance for people to compete. But in the given framework of the imperialist and bourgeois democratic system there is a huge gap between the propertied and property-less working class. The competition is so uneven that the property-less working class can never compete with the propertied, the bourgeois and imperialist class. That way, only after carrying out this redistribution of property in a socialistic and New Democratic manner can you organise political competition where there will be a fair chance of everyone to compete on an equal footing. Our idea of competition in a New Democratic and socialist framework is therefore fundamentally different from the formal competition and practice in a bourgeois democratic and imperialist state. The difference in the class nature of the state should be appreciated.

WPRM: You’ve already discussed some aspects of the Cultural Revolution but I would like to go into that in more detail. The Cultural Revolution was the pinnacle of revolution in the 20th century, so what lessons do you and the UCPN(M) take from this?

Baburam Bhattarai: Yes we think the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution was the pinnacle of revolution not only in the 20th century but in the whole history of the liberation of mankind. It is the pinnacle of the development of revolutionary ideas. So all the revolutionaries must make the Cultural Revolution their point of departure and develop the revolutionary idea and plan further.

The basic question of the Cultural Revolution was to continue the revolution under the dictatorship of the proletariat. That was the basic idea. So first you need a dictatorship of the proletarian class, and for that you have to smash the whole state and complete the revolution, that is the first thing we have to do. After the establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat, the working class needs to be constantly mobilised in a continuous revolution. Only then can we prevent the state degenerating into a bureaucratic apparatus. That is the basic idea. That’s why after the negative experiences of the Soviet Union and the initial negative experiences in China, Mao developed this concept of Cultural Revolution, giving the masses the right to rebel. He asked all the oppressed classes and people to rebel against the authority in power and he introduced Red Guards, people’s committees, all-round dictatorship of the proletariat in every field, in politics, economics and society, in cultural space, exercising all-round dictatorship over the bourgeoisie to continue the revolution. This is the fundamental aspect of the Cultural Revolution and this needs to be upheld and developed further.

But in our case since our class has not completed any revolution in the 21st century and there is no revolutionary socialist state in the world, we have to draw lessons from the Cultural Revolution and try to practice them within the revolutionary parties and within the mass organisations, and then after we complete the revolution then we can practice the basic tenets of the Cultural Revolution in the state. This is the basic lesson to be drawn. And what we would like to stress is that without taking the Cultural Revolution as the point of departure we cannot complete the revolution in any country in the present day world and we will not be able to reach socialism and communism if we don’t have this idea of continuous revolution under the dictatorship of the proletariat. This idea of continuous revolution needs to be grasped very firmly. People generally think that once state power has been captured, the revolution is complete. But thinking like this means the initiative of the revolutionary masses will be diminished. That has been a flaw of earlier revolutions. What we need to practice now is the idea that the revolution never stops until all the classes are abolished, the state is abolished, the property system is abolished and we enter a classless and stateless society, or a commune of the masses of people is created. Until that stage is reached revolution never stops. This idea of Cultural Revolution needs to be firmly grasped and we are very serious on this issue.

WPRM: How do you practice Cultural Revolution within the party now?

Baburam Bhattarai: Within the party we allow broad and great democracy. The principle of the Communist Party is democratic centralism. We need centralism to guide the revolution, we need strong leadership, but if that leadership and centralism is not created on the broad foundation of democracy, that is not acceptable. Otherwise that leadership could degenerate into bureaucratic centralism. Right now within our party there are broad divisions on any issue, but the central leadership will mobilise the cadres and masses of people to discuss these issues and only then will the decision be taken. Once the decision is taken it will have to be carried out. But before taking the decision any issue must be broadly discussed so that the great exercise of democracy should be done first and on the basis of that the centralism will be created. Only that kind of centralism will be truly democratic centralism. This is what our party is trying to practice.

WPRM: What about the practice of two-line struggle within the party?

Baburam Bhattarai: Two-line struggle is also related to this question. Two-line struggle is the life of any party because everything is a unity of opposites in this world. Even the party is a unity of opposites. The policy of ‘one divides into two’ also applies to the party. So although there is a contention between proletarian and non-proletarian tendencies within any communist party, so there has to be a proper mechanism to organise a struggle of different tendencies within the party. Therefore two-line struggle needs to be promoted. The only thing is we have to be very careful in handling the two-line struggle. On this issue there are different tendencies within the International Communist Movement. One is very sectarian, once you enter into two-line struggle you always end up with a split. This is a sectarian or ultra-left tendency. The other is a right-revisionist tendency, which is to struggle and always compromise so that the party gets turned into a reformist group.

The correct MLM formulation is unity-struggle-transformation. We should struggle with the aim of achieving a higher level of unity. That’s the aim of the correct handling of two-line struggle in a revolutionary party. And our party has been very successfully conducting this method of two-line struggle with the aim of unity-struggle-transformation. We are interested in mainly transformation. If the aim is not transformation then it is not reaching a higher level of unity and then the two-line struggle always leads to a split. And a split of the proletarian party weakens our class and our ability to carry forward revolution. This lesson needs to be firmly grasped, especially among Maoist revolutionaries in the world today. In the name of carrying out two-line struggle they forget the aspect of reaching a higher level of unity and transformation. In that way the revolutionary parties remain as very small groups and collections and are not able to carry out revolution. I think these lessons, especially from Lenin and Mao, need to be drawn and practiced.

WPRM: As a way of concluding this interview, in the situation of continued pressure and the possibility of intervention from US imperialism and Indian expansionism in particular, do you think that socialism in one country can be developed in Nepal?

Baburam Bhattarai: This question of socialism in one country is a theoretical question to be debated. This is the era of imperialism and proletarian revolution. Imperialism always consists of uneven and unequal development, so revolution within a country is not only a possibility, it is a must, because revolution won’t break out all over the world at the same time. That’s impossible as long as imperialism remains and uneven development is there. This is a basic tenet of Leninism which still holds true and we should grasp it. But in the specific case of a small country like Nepal, sandwiched between the big countries of India and China and being dictated over by US imperialism all over the world, if you don’t have support, international support, or there is no strong revolutionary movement, it will be very difficult to sustain the revolution. It may be possible to carry out the revolution to capture state power, but to sustain the state power and develop in the direction of socialism and communism we will need support from the international proletarian movement. That way the level of international support and international proletarian solidarity is important. After the growing influence of so-called globalisation, imperialist globalisation, the reaches of the imperialist power have gone to every corner of the world. If there is no strong international proletarian organisation to fight against imperialist intervention and domination, it will be difficult to sustain the revolution in one small country.

Keeping this in mind, we must however make revolution in our country, this is a must. But to sustain it and develop it further we need the backing of the international proletarian forces. For that we have to give more importance to internet work and the international community. This need is more important in the case of small countries like Nepal. In fact, in recent months we have been discussing this issue. To complete the revolution in Nepal and sustain it and develop it further, at least in the South Asian context, we need to have strong revolutionary solidarity and we need the backing from the international proletarian movement. We feel the events of the international proletarian movement worldwide and some of the institutions that are being developed are all important, like the Revolutionary Internationalist Movement (RIM), the Coordination Committee of Maoist Parties in South Asia (CCOMPOSA) and the World People’s Resistance Movement (WPRM). These type of organisations are very important for the success of the revolution and to gather support at the international level for the success of our revolution.

WPRM: Thank you for your time.

Baburam Bhattarai: Thank you and lal salam!

Raipur Rally against Displacement, Oct 6 2009

The rally was organised by “Chhattisgarh Visthapan Virodhi Manch” (Chhattisgarh Anti-Displacement Platform), which issued the following leaflet before the rally:

RALLY OF ANTI-DISPLACEMENT MOVEMENTS FROM ALL CHHATTISGARH IN RAIPUR ON 6TH OCTOBER.

The unrelenting loot of the abundant mineral resources of Chhattisgarh – iron ore, coal, limestone, bauxite, and even diamond and uranium has meant the total stranglehold of big corporates – foreign and Indian – over the State’s bureaucracy, polity, and even judiciary.

Multinationals Holcim and Lafarge have gobbled up the Indian cement companies and persist in earning super profits from the illegal exploitation of contract labour; Vedanta can get away with, and is in fact ably assisted by the State administration in, the criminal cover up of murder by negligence of nearly a hundred workers in a recent chimney collapse; Jindal and Monnet specialise in managing the pollution control department and so the Raigarh district, labouring under black clouds, drying water sources and disappearing forest cover, sees public hearing after public hearing where the public is never heard and clearances are granted, (Jairam Ramesh honestly called these environmental public hearings “match fixing” by the companies); a rash of sponge iron factories – mushroom in Raipur; Tata and Essar, with a little help from Collector Sahab, manipulate gram sabhas in the scheduled areas in gross violation of the PESA Act and employ every trick in the game to coerce people to accept compensations for land.

And in Bastar, where the huge ground clearing of 644 villages for “development by mining companies” is being resisted by lakhs of displaced adivasis, living in the jungles and therefore declared “outlawed”, who are struggling for their lands and livelihoods, the State is preparing to launch a full scale war ( now there is even talk of air strikes and American assistance) .

For the toiling people of Chhattisgarh, particularly the peasants and adivasis, this integration into the imperial loot machine that is called ‘development’, has meant displacement on an unimaginable scale. The whole of Raigarh district is dotted with heavily polluting sponge iron, steel and power plants, lorded over by Jindal. In at least half the cases the displaced have not even received the paltry compensations that have been declared their due. Many blocks of this district are notified scheduled areas and in the near vicinity of Reserve Forests, yet…

Not an inch of Jashpur district, from where human trafficking is reported on a large scale, will be left if the prospecting licenses applied by for by Jindal, MCP Kolkata and other companies are granted. Even though the law specifies that the consent of both owner and occupier are to be obtained and Jindal admits in writing that they have not obtained such consent, the entire machinery of the State Revenue department has been thrown into coercing people to grant such consent. Thousands and thousands of square kilometres have been applied for, covering 32 villages of Kunkuri block and 19 villages of Bagicha block, another 7 villages of Jashpur block and so on….

In Kawardha, Bilaspur and Dhamtari, the Reserve Forests to protect tigers, elephants and even snakes are going to be doing away with the poorest of poor of the tribal people including primitive tribes. Lofty promises of alternative land and compensation are meaningless when land rights are not ensured to the tribals before they are displaced as specifically laid down in the Forest Rights Act….

Not that the affluent peasantry are being excepted. 41 and subsequently more, leading to a total of 65 villages, of Raipur district are to be displaced for a glittering new capital region. Of course an international cricket stadium, convention centre, five star hotel complex, gems and jewelry and IT SEZ, and the bungalows of our Hon’ble MLAs (one fourth of whom are now “crorepatis”) are very much “public purpose” enough to justify this displacement. Touts of all colours are working overtime to persuade people to accept that monetary compensation, which may look attractive in a situation of failing agriculture but cannot last beyond a generation, as their fate.

The villages trapped within industrial areas are seeing their communal lands being illegally occupied by companies, and the bastis of the contract labourers who work in those factories are always under the shadow of the bulldozer, deprived of the basic amenities of water, sanitation and electricity. After long struggles these bastis have been included in the municipal bodies and the workers recognised as “citizens”. The villagers of village Chourenga which continuously resisted the setting up a sponge iron plant, are still rotting in jail on false murder charges.

In Rajnandgaon 7 villages are to be displaced for an airbase, presumably part of the State’s war preparations; and in the Raipur-Bilaspur belt, rich in limestone, a number of cement plants are to come up. The earlier bitter experiences of peasants of getting only temporary and contractual jobs during the construction period of plants and then in fact being pitted against outside workers has led to enormous tension with the unemployed rural youth. This is despite the State’s official rehabilitation policy which stipulates only permanent jobs as adequate compensation. Fertile and multi -cropped land is being acquired for the private profit of companies without even a thought of the social costs.

The Gandhian NGO Vanvasi Chetana Ashram which is trying to implement the recommendations of the NHRC to rehabilitate the villagers of 644 villages that have cleared out during the recent “salwa judum” campaign has faced demolition of their ashram, attacks and false cases on their karyakartas under the draconian Chhattisgarh Special Public Safety Act.

In every corner of the State, people are struggling against displacement.

Over the last four months about 20 grass roots peoples organisations from many districts all over Chhattisgarh – Raigarh, Jashpur, Bilaspur, Raipur, Rajnandgaon, Dhamtari, Dharamjaygarh, Dantewada and Korba have joined hands to form a loose front, cutting across traditional party lines, called the “Chhattisgarh Visthapan Virodhi Manch”, which is still growing.

This “Manch” is holding a rally in the capital city Raipur on 6th October, against all odds – despite its constituent organisations being poorly off, and having to brave the use of money power and muscle power against them by the companies.

We also know that the companies will be trying to “manage” the media.

Please come and cover the event, and bring out the voice of the affected villagers from all over Chhattisgarh.

Chhattisgarh Visthapan Virodhi Manch

Some Contacts:
Jameen Bachao Sangharsh Samiti, Jashpur: Mamta Kujoor (09300312328), Bulu Bahan (09424188569);
Adivasi Mazdoor Kisan Ekta Sangathan, Raigarh: Dr. Harihar Patel (09302508974)
Jan Chetana, Raigarh: Ramesh Agrawal (09301011022)
Vanvasi Chetana Ashram, Dantewada: Himanshu Kumar (09425260031)
Chhattisgarh Mukti Morcha (Mazdoor Karyakarta Committee): Ramakant Banjare (09926943917), Sudha Bharadwaj (09926603877)

Workers’ Control – Theory and Experiences

Caracas, October 30, 2007: Produced as part of Centro Internacional Miranda’s Transformative Practice and Human Development, directed by Michael Lebowitz.

Courtesy: Socialist Project, Canada

A Sensible Democratic Alternative to the Proposed Military Offensive

Sanhati

The government’s proposal for large-scale military offensive in Central and parts of Eastern India has been opposed by democratic minded people from across the world. Democratic sections of civil society in India have called for an immediate halt to the government’s military offensive. They have argued that the conflict be resolved through negotiations between the government and the CPI(Maoist). In response, the Home Minister has stated that in a “democracy”, such negotiations can only be held if CPI(Maoist) “abjures violence”. This is, to say the least, disingenuous. As these sorts of conflicts are by definition “asymmetrical”, and since the military might of the Indian state is incomparably superior, it is the responsibility of the government to take the first steps to win over the confidence of the adivasis and the rebels by calling off the military offensive. When the government is sending in thousands of paramilitary troops, encircling key areas and continuing military action on the rebels, asking the rebels and the people to give up arms as a precondition for negotiations, is certain to ensure that no negotiations take place.

Therefore, in order to gain the confidence of the common people that the government is sincere in its intention to end the conflict through negotiations, it needs to take at least the following concrete steps.

1. The military offensive must be immediately and unequivocally called off and all military and paramilitary from the forested and semi-forested areas of Central and Eastern India must be withdrawn. Moreover, in order to create a genuine atmosphere of trust, all state agencies should stop issuing threatening and hostile statements against the CPI(Maoist) and stop harassing its activists and sympathizers. The CPI(Maoist) should also, on its part, reciprocate by suspending all armed activities and desist from issuing threatening statements against anyone.

2. The Unlawful Activity (Prevention) Act and Chhattisgarh Special Public Security Act must be repealed. Also, specifically, the ban on CPI(Maoist) by the government of India should be lifted and the CPI(Maoist) and its frontal organisations, if any, should not be banned by creating some new laws. Political prisoners jailed or in custody for being involved with so-called left extremist activities and hundreds of adivasis/non-adivasis imprisoned using fabricated charges need to be freed unconditionally.

3. All Memoranda of Understanding (MoU-s) signed with different corporations, for the extraction of natural resources from the vast areas of East-Central India, must be revealed and immediately canceled.

4. Salwa Judum and similar bodies must be disbanded. A tribunal be appointed to investigate their atrocities carried out in connivance with the police, para-military forces and government agencies.

5. Negotiations must not be used as a ruse to liquidate activists of the CPI(Maoist) or any people’s movements. To ensure this, the Central and concerned State Government should submit an undertaking to a mediating body, composed of representatives chosen by the government and the CPI(Maoist), that no encounter deaths, armed actions, espionage activity would be carried out during the mutually agreed upon ceasefire.

Most importantly, we reiterate that the crux of this conflict is the neo-liberal model of development pursued by the Indian state, which has been threatening the life and livelihoods of the common people. The government’s declaration that developmental packages will follow the victory over the rebels raises fear that it has plans ready to roll in the kinds of “development” that suit the interests of multinational and domestic big corporations once these regions, rich with natural resources, have been cleansed of political dissent and the entire population has been either killed or displaced and pauperized as a result of the military offensive. If the government does not have any such plans, it should immediately engage in dialogue with people of the regions along with the suspension of military operations.

6. Thus, a wide-ranging debate on the model of development for these regions must be conducted without any delay. Given the stiff opposition by the local population to the development model that is being pushed down their throats by the government, there should not be any attempt to implement any pre-determined “development package”. Rather, there must be a serious initiative to comprehend and document what measures constitute development in the eyes of the local population and what are the ways to implement these measures such that the people concerned are in primary control of this process. Any developmental process and its modalities must be an outcome of such discussions.

7. In view of the above scenario, the government should also immediately repeal the SEZ Act 2005 and stop all the projects that have so far been cleared. It should also address the concerns related to laws of acquisition of land for corporate interests. Moreover, the government must immediately cease all evictions and diversion of forest land, under the guise of industrialisation, resource extraction or conservation, and expeditiously settle rights to forest land and forest produce.

J&K: Time for radical self-determination

Gautam Navlakha

Introduction

Sixty-two years is a long time for learning lessons and to cease being indulgent towards the fallacies and  faults of the Indian state in obfuscating the issue of people’s right to self-determination in Jammu & Kashmir. There is a tendency in India to read wars being carried out inside the country as phenomena that are less than a war. And that is because it takes place within the borders of the ‘nation-state’, where deployment of ‘armed forces of the Union’ is somehow considered legitimate even when it is engaged in brutal suppression of the people. The most ardent supporters of non-violence have had no qualms in acquiescing to this venture in the name of the “nation”, “secularism”, fighting “Islamicist” forces, averting another partition…. And it has been accompanied by a reluctance to grasp the real nature of such wars where casualties occur in the form of ‘encounter’ killings, custodial deaths, enforced disappearances, rapes, search-and-cordon operations, arbitrary detentions, torture. The list is really endless. It is, therefore, hardly surprising that in Jammu and Kashmir the staggering scale of these crimes over nearly two decades have failed to arouse popular revulsion. However, when a non-violent mass agitation took place last year, it shook the Indian state and society to its very core because it pulverised every lie that had been fed to us and it became evident that people wanted to opt out of India. Then the elections to the J&K legislative assembly took place, and a largely malleable Indian media jumped to the conclusion that people had rejected ‘azaadi’. But they were once again left wondering when the voter turnout for the 15th Lok Sabha elections plummeted. (If elections are to be regarded as a barometer for deciphering the people’s mood then it is the turnout in parliamentary elections that should be held as the most important marker of shift in that mood.) And then came the widespread protests against the rape and murder of Nelofer and Asiya in Shopian on May 29, 2009. Once again it became evident that whatever lies Indian spinmeisters have tried to weave, anger against the Indian state continues to simmer. Therefore, it will not do to ignore and devalue aspirations of a people. But, the issue of people wanting to opt out of India is not just an emotional issue. Or, a mere matter of human rights violations. It has an objective basis in the political-economic and environmental dimension, which must inform any search for solution. What are its main contours?

1. 1. According to a statement issued on the floor of the Assembly by the former Deputy Chief Minister on August 1, 2006, there were more than 667,000 security forces in J&K. This is an incredibly high concentration of troops for an area whose total population is less than 12 million. More than half belong to the Indian army. In a meeting with the press on June 17, 2007, the GOC in C of the Northern Command of the India army, Lt. General H S Panang let out that there are 337,000 army personnel in J&K. In other words the ratio of deployment of security force personnel to people is 1 for 18 persons!  This deployment is not only incredibly high but also way out of proportion to the threat posed by armed resistance. India’s army chief is on record saying that only 600 militants operated in entire J&K. But news reports from time to time refer to the threat posed by infiltration. Although, in actual fact, the number of infiltration bids have fallen sharply; in 2001 it was said to be 2,417 but dropped to 537 in 2004, 597 in 2005, 573 in 2006, 535 by 2007. In 2008, according to the army chief, there has been a 65% decline up to July 31, 2008, to 150, as compared to the same period in 2007 (The Times of India, August 23, 2008). The Indian government also claimed more than 75 per cent decline in militancy-related incidents between 1990 and 2008, from 3,500 to 709 incidents, which is officially supposed to mean that the situation is no longer considered critical (1,000+ is the criterion for terming the situation critical).  Firing incidents came down from 671 to 183.  Bomb explosions declined from 1,000 to just 50.  Killings of civilians declined from 914 to 69. (The Times of India, January 25, 2009). Significantly, almost all the civilians killed in 2008 were at the hands of the Indian security forces. For instance, during the agitation last year, 57 persons were killed by the Indian security forces in the Kashmir Valley alone. All this means that fighting armed resistance cannot be an over-riding motive for deployment of troops.

1.2. In counter insurgency warfare there is a blurring of distinction between “(f)ront and rear; strategic and tactical; combatants and non-combatants”.  The Doctrine on sub-conventional warfare of the Indian Army  says that “…the military operations should aim firstly, at neutralizing all hostile elements…and secondly, at transforming the will and attitudes of the people…. However, the manifestation of such a realization can take from a couple of years to decades as attitudes take time to form and to change”. (Pp21-22)

1.3. In plain English this means that people have to be made to give up their aspirations and reconcile themselves to living under an Indian dispensation. But since people are not so easily reconciled, security forces are needed to be deployed in a manner that they can monitor public and private lives of people. And a whole system of informers, gunmen, reward and punishment…instituted. There are reportedly 671 security forces camps in J&K (excluding those in Jammu, Kargil, Leh, Akhnoor and Udhampur). These occupy 100,000 acres.  Besides, it is in the nature of things that when a hostile armed force occupies land, then land adjacent to what is legally transferred also gets annexed. Thus actual land in possession of the Indian security forces is much higher than shown in official records.

1.4. Now the largest source of employment in J&K is agriculture and horticulture. According to the Economic Survey of 2008-09, more than 49 per cent of the people depend on land, one way or another. The biggest source of earning is from horticulture, followed by tourism. But J&K’s dependence on food imports have risen because per capita yields have fallen. For instance, rice yields per hectare fell by 2.78 per cent in  2008-09. In a situation where existing yields are falling, although agriculture forms the main source of livelihood, the question of land becomes critical. For, it concerns both food production and livelihood needs of the people. If the security forces occupy land, which would otherwise be available for cultivation, then, for an economy so dependent on agriculture and horticulture, it amounts to a net loss. Remove this land from cultivation, and one sees a significant decline in earnings and a dwindling in the number of jobs available. What is also eroded, inter-alia, is the opportunity for increasing food output.

1.5. Therefore, involuntary alienation of land, especially cultivable land, will always be a sensitive issue for people. But when land is acquired for armed security personnel who maintain an obtrusive presence among civilians designed to control their public and private lives and, indeed, even “transform their will and attitude”, as is the case in J&K, it compounds the problem. This contributes to increasing J&K’s dependence on New Delhi for its survival. It is worth recalling that in 2008, the Jammu-based agitation had imposed an economic blockade against the Valley, which meant that imports of foodstuffs to the Valley were curtailed. This clearly highlighted the vulnerability of a people who are dependent on the Jammu-Srinagar highway passing through the Banihal pass for their daily needs.  For several weeks Indian security forces failed to clear the highway. It was this that compelled the leadership of the movement to call for the “Muzzafarabad chalo”  (Let us March to Muzzafarabad)  agitation. This lesson ought not to be forgotten.

2.1. Faced with burgeoning public demand for Indian troop reduction in Jammu and Kashmir, the Indian Government constituted three committees in March 2007. An expert committee headed by the defence secretary to look into the question of troop reduction; a review committee headed by M A Ansari to study the Armed Forces (Special) Powers Act as well as the Disturbed Area Act; and a high powered committee headed by the Union minister of defence to study the recommendations of the two panels.

2.2. It was evident that the most important committee was the ‘expert’ committee, headed by the defence secretary. On December 5, 2007, in response to an ‘unstarred’ question  #1672 in the Rajya Sabha, which asked the defence minister to state “whether the committee headed by the defence Secretary…to look into demand of troops reduction in J&K has submitted any report and if so the salient features thereof,”  the answer was:

“The main recommendations pertain to reconciling of the details of the properties occupied by the Security Forces and the rentals paid as also to resolve old cases that have remained unsettled for many years; vacation of public utility services by the security forces such as school buildings, hospitals; the timings of the convoys of the security forces maybe reworked so as to cause least inconvenience to the local population; Dos and Don’ts issued by the Security Forces need to be strictly followed. Implementation of the recommendations is an ongoing process….”

2.3. The conspicuous absence of any reference to ‘troop reduction’ speaks for itself. But also missing were terms such as ‘relocation’ (moving forces from one place to another) and/or ‘restructuring’ (increasing the presence of police and reduce in particular army’s deployment)  or reconfiguration (replacing one force with another i.e. the Army with the Border Security Force, the BSF with the Central Reserve Police Force, and the CRPF with the India  Reserve Battalion). Instead, no more than cosmetic changes were recommended by way of resolving old cases, vacating some buildings and reworking of convoy timings. This amounts to trivialising a popular demand and raises serious doubts about the Indian government’s sincerity to address real issues.

3.1. When Omar Abdullah took over as the new CM, and in fact even during the election campaign, he had made many a promises. Once he came to power the language changed. One of the election promises was ending impunity provided to Indian armed forces under Armed Forces Special Powers Act. Now he claims that impunity will be revoked if the situation “improves”. What is the measure of improvement? And who decides whether it has improved or not? Fact is this decision is not in his hand. It requires New Delhi’s approval. It was left to the Indian home minister to declare on March 18, 2009, that the revocation of the AFSPA is an “old demand” but a “final decision” will be taken after the elections to Indian Parliament. Elections have come and gone and there is little to show for any movement.

3.2. Indian home ministry officials told reporters that it would take two years for the CRPF to hand over control to the local administration. Although it was said that five battalions (bns) of the CRPF will be withdrawn once the Amarnath Yatra (pilgrimage to Amarnath) was over and another five bns, it was said would be pulled out later, the reduction of all of 10 bns or approximately 11,000 personnel out of 667,000 is not a significantly large reduction. [Altogether 16 bns of CRPF (10 from J&K and 6 from NE) 5 bns of BSF and 2 of ITBP will be moved to fight left-wing extremists.] Besides, even if this was accompanied it would be only by replacing the CRPF personnel with a new force, which is called the India Reserve Battalion, from the Indian state of Haryana. [IRB’s are  armed police personnel that each Indian state is helped to raise with financial help extended by the central government and used by the Indian government for deployment wherever it deems necessary.]

3.3. The minister of state for defence also categorically ruled out “thinning” of troops in J&K. In fact, the army opposed dilution or withdrawal of the AFSPA for its personnel in J&K. In response to the MHA’s “phased withdrawal of AFSPA” from districts such as Srinagar, Budgam, Jammu and Kathua, senior army officer told The Times of India (July 8, 2009) that “they (the government) should not rush to assume normalcy has returned, although situation has been brought under control”. The CM also discovered that “we (i.e. J&K state) have over 70 bns of the CRPF and the strength of the state police is not even one-third of it…. So, any rushed decision in this respect can be detrimental to state’s security” (The Asian Age, July 8, 2009). Thus, after promising reduction, including withdrawal of the AFSPA, what is the real situation? Very little has changed.

3.4. Take another example. After the Baramulla firing incident on June 29, 2009, in which four persons were killed in firing by the security forces,  The district commissioner of Baramulla, Lateef ur Zama Deva, wrote a letter to Baramulla based GOC of 19 Infantry Division and GOC of Kilo Force (RR), wherein he wrote that “(t)he J&K police on the basis of deployment shall remain at the forefront at all respective locations brought under curfew with the back up of  army, in standby mode for flag marches and patrolling under the supervision of respective executive magistrates”. The army took strong exception and a senior army officer told Indian Express (2 July, 2009) that “(l)ike in any other place the civil administration makes requisition for Army column. But once the Army comes in it does not work under the magistrate and the problem area is handed over to the Army for a particular task”. Since the task is suppression of a movement, and because this is something which remains incomplete and can take decades to achieve, so long as Indian army remains it will not act under the civilian administration. His seniors did not come to his aid or endorse his stance.

3.5. What about the release of political prisoners? On the issue of releasing detainees New Delhi’s consent  is required. (Even the transfer of senior police officers needs New Delhi’s approval. This became apparent to the CM when he wanted to get rid of some senior police officers who, he claimed, had misled him over the Shopian rape and murder incident.) On taking over as CM he had said that those detained under the PSA during elections would be released. He could not do this. Why? Because he said, on January 15, that, while the list of prisoners was before a committee “but (this) committee now includes a member from central government who is yet to visit Kashmir”. As a matter of fact, Indian home ministry has always been a part of this committee and enjoys veto power over every proposal. In any case, in the past seven months the number of those detained under the dreadful PSA has jumped to 253. Going by the proceedings in the state assembly on August 7, 2009, where a PDP MLA had moved an amendment to section 10 A of the PSA, thereby calling for declaring invalid an order of detention if the grounds mentioned were vague, irrelevant or non-existent, the state law minister found even this mild demand unacceptable. Why? Because, he said, the preventive detention law was needed “for running the state”. He was at least being honest that without arbitrary powers, the hallmark of undemocratic rule, J&K cannot be governed.

3.6. The simple point is that J&K is not just like any other state in the Union of India enjoying additional powers of autonomy under Article 370. It is a “disturbed area” dominated by a hostile military force, which feels it is sufficient to invoke “national security” for every principle of constitutional nicety to be cast aside. Indeed, Article 370, which instead of becoming a mark of internal sovereignty, has became a conduit through which an appointed governor (nominated by the central government) could dismiss even an elected state government and then rule through ordinances and amend the J&K Constitution in such a way that it became legally possible for New Delhi to legislate on matters, which under autonomy were reserved for J&K. For example, between March 7 to September 6, 1986,  i.e., in just six months of governor’s rule in J&K, 29 laws were enacted  all of which extended to New Delhi  powers to enact laws for J&K. A high-powered committee, set up by the pro-India National Conference government of  J&K  in 1996 to look into the subversion of autonomy, also pointed to several “incongruities”. Such as the fact that the constitutional provision for establishing governor’s rule on a state had been undermined in the case of J&K. For, while under the Indian Constitution, the central government can take over powers from the elected state government the term of such can be extended beyond six months only by the upper house of the Indian Parliament. Thus a degree of parliamentary oversight is provided for. But in the case of J&K, central rule requires no such parliamentary approval. As a result, between1990-96 J&K remained under direct central rule without a break. Furthermore, by giving the central government nominee the power to amend the state constitution through ordinances, the legitimacy of the state Constitution, the basis for J&K’s autonomy, was eroded. Lest we forget, democratic practice reserves this right of amendment of Constitution for the people’s representatives. And ordinances/decrees issued by non-elected executives are considered a distinguishing feature of arbitrary, i.e. repressive rule.

4.1. We need to, therefore, appreciate the gamut of dependency relationship that exists between J&K and India to understand how the Indian state perpetuates its control over Kashmir. For instance, the budget for 2009-10 reveals that out of a total non-plan revenue expenditure of Rs 14,949 crore, a sum of Rs 8,126 crore (Rs 6,594 crore for salary and Rs 1,532 crore towards pension) is set aside for salary and pension for the state employees. However, the state’s own revenue generation is only Rs 4,330 crore, i.e., lower than even its salary and pension bill! And yet, the budget proposes to increase recruitment of state employees by 23,000 ( out of which 7,035 will be in the police), fill 7,000 vacancies of Class IV employees and also create 15,000 jobs for returning Kashmiri Pandits.

4.2. The Economic Survey, 2006-07, had earlier noted that “the weakness of J&K state finances arises not from lower revenues but higher expenditures”. The ratio of revenue expenditure to GSDP (Gross State Domestic Product) of J&K at 39.2 per cent is more than twice that for all states average of 17.4 per cent, although only marginally higher than Northeastern states at 38.8 per cent, as computed by the Twelfth Finance Commission. And J&K’s revenue covers only 25 per cent of its expenditure. Which means that J&K’s revenue base is incapable of meeting its own expenditure incurred for maintaining  a huge government apparatus? “Consequently, the index of self-reliance of J&K…is 0.45” (p 230). The ratio of central transfers to total revenues which, at 78.6 per cent for J&K, is twice that for all states at 38.5 per cent, compares with the 67.6 per cent for the NE. But  J&K’s debt to GSDP ratio is higher than others and has been 50 per cent to start with. Thus, more than 50 per cent of J&K’s own revenue goes towards servicing debt.

4.3. However, despite “low own revenues, the public expenditure level of J&K, at 51.4 per cent, in contrast to 20.2 per cent for all (Indian) states is higher than that for all states  as percentage of GSDP and on a per capita basis per capita capital expenditure in J&K of Rs 2,285 is more than three times of all state average of Rs 626, albeit marginally higher than for NE which is Rs 1,924. If revenue expenditure is included then J&K’s total expenditure of Rs 9,661 is not very different from that for NE at Rs 8,637. But it is nearly three times that of all India average of Rs 3,969. And yet, these higher public expenditures in J&K “have not translated into growth mainly for two reasons. The first reason is the higher unit cost of service delivery – the cost of providing schooling to a child or the cost of providing healthcare to a person are typically higher than the all India average because of sparse population density, difficult terrain, poor connectivity and a host of other causes. The second reason is that the beneficial impact of public expenditure spills over beyond J&K as much of the contractors payments are transferred to and purchases are made beyond the state – a phenomenon referred to as ‘missing multiplier’.” (p 232). This is as clear an admission as one will get not only about the limited benefit of public expenditure in J&K but skewed nature of the relationship between India and J&K.

4.4. The Economic Survey, 2006-07, had also noted that  “Centre (i.e., Indian government) has fiscal room available to reduce taxes or increase programme spending – and satisfy its inter-temporal constraint – while the J&K’s only option are to increase taxes or reduce spending in order to achieve fiscal sustainability”. (pp 5) The authors of the Economic Survey advocated a “moratorium on filling vacant posts” (pp 171).  But the government went ahead with “employment intensity growth” in its budget  2007-08, and began to fill vacancies running at 23,000. In addition to that, it began recruitment for 15 battalions of IRB and five battalions of J&K police.  This defeated the very objective of fiscal policy, to reduce government expenditure and thereby reduce financial dependence on grants from India. And this process continues under the budget provisions for 2009-10.

4.5. An argument in favour of such government job creation is that one of the major causes of unrest in J&K is due to a very high incidence of unemployment. Since disputed nature of J&K inhibits private investments in general and industries in particular, there is no option but for the government to create employment. Thus irresolution of the dispute creates a logic that keeps increasing the financial outgo for J&K and pushes up its dependence on New Delhi. This, in turn, creates financial dependence on New Delhi for meeting J&K’s salary bill.

4.6. It is worth recalling that when Ghulam Nabi Azad took over as CM in November 2005, he had claimed that 50 per cent of the 2,73,508 government employees “had no work to do”. If he was speaking the truth then to enlarge government employment, particularly in the unproductive area of recruitment to armed battalions, makes little sense. A bigger and larger government apparatus will continue to dominate the economy, and dependence on New Delhi to cover revenue deficit is likely to go up. Even more disturbing, the size of armed battalions being raised in J&K will continue to raise the scale of unproductive expenditure. How does all this profit the people of J&K?

4.7. Another mark of dependence is in the field of capital expenditure. In 2004, the UPA government had with much fanfare unveiled a Rs 24,000-crore plan. This plan envisaged investing Rs 18,000 crore in the central sector. This included investments in Uri II and Kishanganga Project, Srinagar-Leh road upgradation by Indian army’s BECON and 1,000 micro hydropower stations to be built and managed by the Indian army as part of its ‘Operation Sadbhavna’.  The balance Rs 6,000 crore were given to the state to meet costs of various projects, including salary support for new government jobs created. The strength of government employees, which was less than three in 2004, has risen to 4.5 lakh with 50,000 daily-wage earners. As a result, not only has non-plan expenditure increased but so has the dependence on “handouts”.  Let me illustrate how dependence gets augmented.

4.8. Economic Survey, 2008-09 shows that J&K’s power requirement is 2,120 MW. It generates only 2,318.70 MW out of a 16,200 MW estimated hydel power potential. Of  this 2,318.70 MW, only 758.70 MW was generated by state owned utilities. Even this figure of 758 MW was reached when 450 MW Phase I Baglihar project was recently completed. The balance 1,518 MW is in the central sector. In other words, most projects that exist here do not feed J&K’s own needs. And J&K imports power for which it pays about Rs 2,000 crore. Significantly, the National Hydel Power Corporation which controls Uri I, Salal and Dul Hasti project earned Rs 300 crore as profit for the year ended March 31, 2009. Its coffers will swell once eight more NHPC projects – which includes Kishanganga, Sewa, Nimu Bazgo, Chutak, Uri II and three others that are joint ventures with the state government – are commissioned.

4.9. The J&K government has been lobbying for a long time with New Delhi to transfer 390 MW Salal project, which is free of any encumbrance as it has paid for its cost. That would have enabled J&K to not just reduce its outlay for power purchase, which is running between Rs 1,500-2,000 crore annually but also earn additional revenue. This would have reduced deficit in the power sector, running at Rs 2,000 crore. This deficit is met from special grant from New Delhi.

4.10. On December 22, 2006, a high-powered committee headed by Dr C Rangarajan (chairperson of Prime Minister’s Economic Advisory Council) recommended that 390 MW Dul Hasti  hydro project should be transferred to the state  instead of  the  390 MW Salal project. Dul Hasti in Doda district has been plagued by cost and time over-runs. The project began in 1985. Work was started in 1989 by a French consortium. The project cost then was Rs 1,290 crore. In 1992, when some of their people were abducted, they pulled out. Four years later Jai Prakash Industries was roped in to complete the project by October 2003. The project cost ran to Rs 3,900 crore. Then it was supposed to be completed by end of 2007 but the cost had gone up to Rs 5,200 crore (of which Rs 1,500 crore was interest). It is this project which the panel wanted transferred. The panel had, however, said that this transfer would be at “accessible tariff” and it is for the Centre to compensate the NHPC. One reason for this switch from Salal to Dul Hasti, reportedly, was opposition of some Indian states.  Salal project charges Rs 0.52  per unit sold to UP, Delhi, Haryana and so on. These states did not want the project to be given to J&K because they expected the unit cost charged to them to rise. As of now, Dul Hasti remains with New Delhi.

5.1. Related to this is the issue of water. The Indus Water Treaty (IWT) has been a sore point because over the heads of people of J&K, India and Pakistan came to an agreement whereby Indus, Jhelum and Chenab waters were virtually handed over to Pakistan whereas Sutlej, Ravi and Beas rivers water remained with India. There is no doubt that the interests of the lower riparian state must  be protected. Pakistan depends for its drinking water and irrigation needs up to 77 per cent on the Indus water basin. However, as the upper riparian region, J&K’s rights can also not be ignored. Such is the nature of the agreement that both use of water for irrigation and for harnessing power get restricted because flow of water cannot be interrupted by building reservoir or controlled through placing any impediment in the path of water flow. For instance, because IWT prevents water storage projects, hydel power is generated through run-off-the-river projects that result in reduction of power generation to less than one-third of installed capacity, particularly during winter months. Many political parties in Indian-held J&K have pitched for compensating J&K for the loss, estimated to be over Rs 6,000, incurred by it due to the IWT. It is worth noting that the IWT was signed in 1960 when in neither part of J&K  there was even a semblance of ‘representative’ government.

5.2 .How can J&K protect its interests as an upper riparian party if it is to remain excluded from the IWT? Can a people argue their case unless they enjoy sovereignty?

5.3. The  issue of water sharing has been impacted by another factor. That of melting glaciers and receding snowline, which threatens to expose J&K to environmental catastrophe. The Siachen glacier is threatened by heavy militarisation of what is described as the third pole and forms part of the Indus Water basin. Melting of Kolhai glacier at a rapid pace may turn J&K into a desert.  Prof Syed Iqbal Hasnain conducted an on-the-spot assessment of Kolhai last year and told Greater Kashmir (August 10, 2009) that “(t)he glacier has developed several crevasses and cracks over the years. Human interference, including the Amarnath pilgrimage, is one of the reasons for the glacier’s recession. Gujjars who are putting up in the glacier’s core area are one of the major contributors for its meltdown.”  The news report said that a study on Kolhai glacier conducted by remote sensing by the National Geophysical Research Institute, Hyderabad, revealed that its spatial extent has changed from 19.34 sq km  in 1992 to 17.23 sq km in 2001, a net decrease of 2.11 sq km in 10 years. The long-term impact would be availability of water for drinking and irrigation. Thus Lidder and Sind basins of Jhelum are under threat. And this in turn may further create tensions for enforcement of IWT.

5.4. While experts do refer to increased militarisation or pilgrimage as factor in the melting of glaciers, the main reason behind rapid depletion of those glaciers is downplayed. Both Siachen and Kolhai are exposed to unprecedented human activity in its core as well as its vicinity. For instance, the presence of a brigade-strength military force in Siachen and the supply line to keep them fed, garbage disposed, use of  helicopters for moving men and material is warming the environment at Saltoro ridge. In the case of Kolhai, the phenomenal increase in the number of pilgrims rising from less than 12,000 in 1989 to four lakh this year (which came down from 5.25 lakh in 2008), the huge presence of security forces (no less than 26,000), movement of people, trucks, and helicopters have become the  biggest source of glacial meltdown. While soldiers and pilgrims, particularly in such large numbers, are detrimental to the environment, it is the population in the Valley which suffers its consequence since they depend on Sind and Lidder (which feeds Jhelum) for their drinking water and irrigation  requirement. And yet, the local population has little influence or control over its fate. It is dependent on the benevolence of the Indian state, which is busier consolidating its military hold over Siachen and promoting Amarnath pilgrimage.

6.1. In 2000-01, Indian commentators discovered that percentage of population living “below poverty line” in J&K was 3.48 per cent as against the all-India average of  26.10 per cent. It became an occasion for jingoists in India to claim how Indian largess had brought prosperity to J&K at the expense of rest of India. However, this underestimation of incidence of poverty generated different explanations among more sober analysts.  One recent claim was that “the (Indian) state had in place a system of ‘development’ practices aimed at buying the ‘hearts and minds’ of the people, what it ended up doing was to make militants richer while at the same time entrenching the institution of corruption deeper and deeper into the culture of the state”.  And then goes on to say that “the fall in poverty rates…pointed to open and surreptitious transfers, which while mitigating poverty, entrenched the already existing system of corruption even deeper”.[Dipankar Sengupta; ‘Policy Making in a Terrorist Economy, Epilogue, July 2009].  Another was provided by Swaminathan A Aiyar who wrote  in The Times of India, July 15, 2001, that one “explanation is the huge expansion of armed forces in the state in the 1990s. India now has over 600,000 military and paramilitary personnel in Kashmir. Their purchasing power is pretty formidable in a small state of 10 million people. Tourism in the Valley may have shrunk, but the armed forces represent tourists of another kind. Most tourists spend only a week in Kashmir, but men in uniform spend the whole year in the state. So, in some ways, every jawan is the equivalent of 52 tourists. They may buy fewer silk carpets and shawls than normal tourists, but are steady buyers of agricultural produce. And that probably has a major impact on local incomes, especially of small farmers…. The irony is that if peace returns, so too might poverty. The armed forces will go away.”

6.2. In the Economic Survey for J&K, 2006-07, it was reported that the decline in poverty ratio between 1993-94 to 1999-2000, from 25.17 per cent to 3.48 per cent in 1999-2000, had been “extremely steep” (p 224)  and noted that there was “no authentic and reliable data on BPL population…available for the state of J&K.” It pointed out that for the year 1993-94 no survey was conducted by the NSSO. Instead, the poverty ratio for Himachal Pradesh was  “adjusted for J&K by the Planning Commission”. It is important to note that internal war was at its peak during this period. Now all these explanations were put to rest by a fresh survey that was undertaken by the authorities and brought out in a report: ‘Below Poverty Line Survey 2008’ [Jammu and Kashmir State; Directorate of Economics and Statistics, J&K, Planning & Development Department, Jammu and Kashmir Government].  According to the report of the survey, “the total BPL Estimated Population Ratio of J&K State has been arrived at 21.63 per cent (24.21 lakh persons) with a dispersion of 26.14 per cent (22.00 lakh persons) from rural areas and 7.96 per cent (2.21 lakh persons) living in urban areas”. In other words, the decline in poverty was far less than estimated and explanations offered were, therefore, way off the mark. [At a workshop on the ‘Role of ICDS’, experts questioned the figure of BPL population at 3.5 per cent when 29 per cent of  children were under-nourished, 52 per cent women anaemic, 41 per cent vitamin-A deficient and 68 per cent suffer from iron deficiency as per the National Family State Health Zone. (Etalaat May 10, 2008). In fact, with per capita income remaining lower than the all-India average this drop was illusory.]

6.3. I cite this for a reason. There is no doubt that Indian military forces make large-scale purchases and government and other sources transfer funds to buy acquiescence of the people. But this does not spread beyond a narrow circle and certainly does not reach the ordinary people whose lives are mired in poverty. Secondly, such transfers, while resulting in  the expansion of economy, are of a kind which accentuates inequalities. This distortion where poverty has declined much less than previously estimated is quite remarkable for an economy which saw radical land reforms in the 1950s, and which boasted of a fairly equitable land holding implying low asset inequality. In other words, it means that in the past 20 years, if not more, the socio-economic profile of J&K has undergone a change for the worse. Thus, despite funds to buy hearts and minds of people pouring in and in spite of the presence of military forces, considered as “permanent tourists”, the economy has registered no sign of being benefited. If anything, such ‘assistance’ has only further distorted the economy and entrenched corruption.

7.1. Keeping this real nature of dependency, and distortions that have been institutionalised, in mind, sovereignty becomes of  utmost importance  for any meaningful solution to emerge.  To argue for autonomy, self-rule and so forth makes little sense when J&K faces this level of control.

7.2. It has been claimed that a deal, which will enable the border/line of control to become irrelevant, has been reached between India and Pakistan over Kashmir and that all that is needed is to fine-tune and sign it. Without going into the justness of such an approach, i.e., to decide people’s fate over their heads, from what is known in the public domain about some of the key areas of agreement two things stand out. First, it is said that the current constitutional system in operation on both sides will be frozen, with some modification, for the next 15-20 years. Second, some subjects such as water will be jointly managed by India and Pakistan.

7.3. What the above means is that existing relationship of dependence will be frozen barring some adjustments. Now how does this amount to a solution? Is it not necessary to argue that unless therelationship of dependence is ended self-rule/self-governance/autonomy would become a worthless exercise? When Indian civilian and military entities own, manage and control policies over land and water, and J&K continues to be dependent on New Delhi for meeting even its salary bill under the existing dispensation (in which the war and requirements of war are prioritised) then not just psychology of dependence and its corrupting influence, but the actual fact of dependence will make “self-rule” ring hollow. Just the same way as the much-vaunted autonomy under Article 370 was made hollow. Indeed, the overall structure of dependence will be like a noose around the neck of the state throttling the realisation of its full potential.

For this state of affairs to end, a radical movement away from the present is required. What that means in short is that people must become masters and mistress of their own destiny.

All this only underlines the significance of a democratic closure for the J&K dispute after 62 years of its non-resolution.  Democratic closure in the case of J&K means ascertaining the wishes of the people, once they are freed of encumbrance, before everything else.