‘The Dangers Are Great, the Possibilities Immense’1
Saroj Giri , Monthly Review
"What made Spence dangerous to the bourgeoisie was not that he was a proletarian nor that he had ideas opposed to private property but that he was both." — Peter Linebaugh.2
‘Poorest of the Poor’ and Politics
It is always easy to criticize and dismiss an argument in its weakest formulation. Attacking the policies of the security-centric Indian state establishment, particularly the Home Minister, today does not need much daring. So let us instead take the benign, almost humanist utterance of the Prime Minister in his address to state police chiefs in September 2009: don’t forget, he said, that the Maoist movement has support among the poorest of the poor in the country. Those on the left opposing the impending armed state offensive often invoke this quote from the PM to buttress their point about how these are really poor people, innocent civilians and ordinary villagers who will suffer if the offensive is undertaken.3
But when you look at the repressive face of the Indian state gearing up for the offensive, it is almost unbelievable that it is garnering all its strength to take on such poor suffering beings as constitute the adivasis of Central India! Is it only because the state is repressive in nature that it finds the poorest of the poor so dangerous or is it that they are ‘actually’ dangerous? Why does the same state, sometimes so benign with a progressive constitution, which also promotes NREGA (National Rural Employment Guarantee Act), which also provides, even if most grudgingly, different rights, want to put its foot down in this case to eliminate the ‘problem’? Surely then the poorest of the poor must be dangerous people, there must be something about them, something fantastic, invisible to a flat, humanist, do-good perspective, which only sees them as ‘suffering’ and in need of ‘rights’!4 What is the power they have, which the mighty Indian state fears and wants to eliminate as soon as they can? I mean, one has to understand the power they have as precisely the poorest of the poor, in fact, over and above being Maoists or supporting Maoists.
The state fears not their guns, not their violence, not their taxing the local population, not that they will be another parallel power structure. What the state and Indian democracy fears is precisely that they are the poorest of the poor, that they have nothing to lose (and hence cannot be bought over or assimilated) and hence can launch and be the motive force for an unrelenting political transformation beyond their immediate grievances, the loss of their land or livelihood. Indeed the Maoist movement, or any adivasi formation engaged in armed struggle, does not even have a list of demands that can possibly be fulfilled or addressed by the government. A dynamic seems to be unfolding where they are not willing to settle down with even say ‘peace with justice’ but, like those who ‘have nothing to lose but their chains’, are aiming for ‘a world to win’.5 Surely if you are waging a war without any specific demands, you must be aiming for the world — a war waged by those who have no place in the world.6
Thus the Indian state does not fear this one Dantewada — in fact it has left Dantewada festering with the ‘Maoist virus’ for several years and only now is planning a decisive assault. It does and can tolerate it; a lot of people in fact think of the Maoists as just another power structure which acts at the behest of this or that power group, or on their own, doing extortion and so on, which means that the Maoists as only an armed group could be tolerated and assimilated.
However, if the poorest of the poor, as Maoists, are aiming for a world to win, then, fair enough, the Indian state must fear not this one (isolated) Dantewada as a local event, but that there can be not just one but two, three, many Dantewadas. Tebhaga, Telegana, Naxalbari, Srikakulam, Jharkhand, Dantewada, Lalgarh — aren’t these the many Dantewadas spread over India’s recent history? What if they were to come up simultaneously in different parts of the country — all at the same time? After all, these are people with ‘global ambitions’, present in neighbouring Nepal, who want to overthrow the Indian state singing the Internationale, are not only talking about tribal identity or tribal rights, support the nationality struggles in the North-East and Kashmir and hence have a much larger agenda, if not vision. If this ‘virus’ spreads this will not only weaken the Indian state politically, which it already has, but also militarily. Naxalbari in 1967 inaugurated this emergence of the poorest of the poor as precisely such a political subject: this legacy continues today in so many different forms all across the country but it is as part of the Maoist movement that the struggle against the ruling order has come to a head.
Innocent Civilian or Political Subject?
Large sections of the left seem to understand the repressive nature of the state and capital but not the political subjectivity of the poorest of the poor. A moral, almost subjectivist critique of the state as to its repressive ‘nature’ is however a bit too invested in presenting the poor as victims or innocent civilians — who then get preserved as that all along. Most denunciations of the state’s impending armed offensive therefore derive their power and legitimacy in being able to present the poor as victims or at best only protecting his homestead against rapacious corporates backed by the state. Or at best that they have been forced to take up guns since they had no other means, since they could not wait any longer for the state to deliver goods and services. There is a refusal to accept that the poorest of the poor might have short-circuited themselves out of being either the beneficiaries of some benign, welfare state or being just victims or innocent civilians.
Against this humanitarianism of sections of the left, it is precisely the conjugation of poor and political which needs to be imagined and asserted, and which the ruling classes fear.7 Referring to the radicalism of Tommy Spence, a proletarian in 18th century England, scholar Peter Linebaugh states that "what made Spence dangerous to the bourgeoisie was not that he was a proletarian nor that he had ideas opposed to private property but that he was both".8 Here is the formula, if you like: you can be rich and radical but not poor and radical — the ideal combination allowed in today’s rights-based capitalism is poor and needy.
Is the refusal or inability to view the poorest of the poor as political subjects another instance of how we can all gleefully laugh at Fukuyama’s end of history thesis and yet it is bloody difficult to actually make history today? Any attempt to make (universal?) history, we are sternly warned, will involve the use of force, violence, a party and will perhaps lead us to a totalitarian state. . . . So, we are told, the poorest of the poor are not a problem as such, it is their articulation as political subjects, as Maoists or Naxals, which is the problem, carrying the seeds of totalitarianism. And yet it is around the Maoist movement today that the political struggle of the poorest of the poor against the ruling order has sharpened and assumed new heights.
It is against the ‘repression’ of the political subjectivity of the poorest of the poor that we perhaps need to assert that they are not just fighting a battle to save their livelihood and resources and the armed offensive is not just going to kill and clear them from the way — rather the poorest of the poor in rising up are actually passing a verdict on the very political system and democracy in this country and the armed offensive is actually not just the voice of big capital but more fundamentally reveals the true nature of what passes for democracy in India. It is clear how it is today misleading to attack only Chidambaram and the hawks in the Home Ministry, IB and the Jungle Warfare vultures. It might be only the Chattisgarh DGP Vishwa Ranjan who openly calls for finishing the Maoists LTTE-style, but there seems to be a silent but wider consensus. None of the major political parties have launched any agitation in support of the poorest of the poor. Much like the Gujarat pogrom in 2002 or the numerous aerial bombings and killings in the North East, the present armed offensive can take place and Indian democracy will still go about its routinised, sterile normalcy. Indian democracy itself stands exposed as so many times earlier: the question today is whether or not we are willing to go with the political struggle against it that is raging in front of us.
More symptomatic is the fact that the right-wing Hindu parties, apart from some media-savvy strident declarations to go trample the Maoists challenging the Indian state, have been unable to convert it into a political plank for populist political gimmicks. When for example the Kashmiri movement gets active the BJP will publicly call upon the government to crush the movement there by sending the army, trying to mobilize support on this basis. On the Dantewada issue even the right wing is not too invested in publicly declaring or inciting war — the Naxal or Maoist issue with its poorest of the poor base is a tricky one, and Indian democracy feels frail to the core here. The best defense then is to present the militant adivasis and the Maoist movement as only challenging the actions and omissions of the Indian state and not really questioning the very idea of India, going much beyond the pet Hindu-Muslim question, secularism, and other more familiar obsessions.
People have pointed out that the adivasis, due to the wrong policies of the state, have become Maoist by default.9 What is more revealing is however the assumption that the poorest of the poor must always (by default?) only be interested in livelihood issues, implicitly assuming that they cannot go beyond them and get political. ‘Innocent trapped civilians’ soon enough feeds into a narrative where they are dependent on the support of the urban middle class left who can alone engage in politics by reaching out to them beyond its own interests. The default assumption seems to be that the poorest of the poor can be fully deserving of ‘rights’ and access to resources but they cannot be political — as though they are put in place, this far and no more!
The problem for the state is not just that the poorest of the poor are sitting over rich resources and mining treasure which they refuse to give up but that they are political, that they are, if I dare conflate, ‘Maoist’. Those on the left who are calling for peace, for ‘peace with justice’, find it extremely important to make the distinction between ordinary civilians or adivasis and Maoists. This distinction is both important and real. However, it looks like this distinction often derives from the refusal to accept that the poorest of the poor today carry the promise of a political revolution. Dantewada, Lalgarh — aren’t the political struggle around them today in some ways decisive for the prospects of political change and social transformation? Does one see only ‘violence’ and ‘armed conflict’, or only ‘livelihood issues’ and ‘resource grabbing by MNCs’, or ‘Maoist intolerance’ there, or a much larger political struggle which can inaugurate a wider mobilization of revolutionary forces across the country? Do the Maoists on their part see only expansion of their control and more areas to rule over, or do they see the possibility of radical change?
If therefore the Lalgarhs and Dantewadas are arenas sharpening the political struggle in the country, and not just looming humanitarian disasters due to ‘armed conflict’, then different struggles and resistance movements taking place in the country must therefore coalesce around this central fault line weakening the ruling classes, daring them to come out with some of their last lines of self-preservation. Pressure on the government to withdraw the armed offensive must be part of a larger, internal political solidarity with the ongoing movement, with the objective of taking it to a higher level.
Question of Violence and Political Struggle
What one should deeply ponder here is then why, particularly given that the Maoists do not have a base in urban areas, other left parties engaged in resistance refuse to align themselves with the resistance thrown down by the Maoists in different parts of the country. Thus for example the use of violence by the Maoists becomes such an important problem that one refuses to accentuate the political crisis for the Indian political order inaugurated by Dantewada today and instead sees only an impending humanitarian disaster in Dantewada. The poorest of the poor are seen only as in need for humanitarian help and goods and services: separating them from the ‘violent’, ‘intolerant’ Maoists only allows large sections of the left to overlook and indeed trash the political subjectivity of the poorest of the poor, or make it amenable to the given democratic order.10 But, in fact, the deep roots of the Maoists in the population are evidenced by the inability of the administration to recruit ‘informers’ from among the locals, say in Lalgarh.11
No wonder, in the case of Andhra Pradesh, it was only when the party leadership exposed themselves by coming overground during peace talks that the state was able to target and kill them. Today, the biggest problem for the state derives from just an opposite reading of the mass base of the Maoists than what the democratic left argues. One former Cabinet secretary suggesting ways of ‘dealing with the insurgency’ points out that "their (Maoists’) strong points are not their weaponry, but the support from large sections of the tribal community in whose midst and on whose behalf they operate".12 Further, unlike certain left commentators who argue that the Maoists like the LTTE are a mirror image of the present repressive state, a replicative state-in-the-making, the strategists of the Indian state hold that the Maoists are unlike the LTTE which "conducted itself like a state and paid a heavy price for it".13 Clearly, if, as the democratic left believes, it was so easy to separate the Maoists from the civilians, then the Indian state could have by now easily ‘drained the water and killed the fish’.
Overlooking the dynamic political revolutionary process which may have been inaugurated by the present crisis, where the Indian state and political order is forced to shed its democratic cloak and where the democratic legitimacy of the state is being exposed by the state’s own actions, leads directly to treating Dantewada and Lalgarh as just like some cesspools of violence and counter-violence, of some irrational forces working themselves out and hence needing the intervention of sane, democratic citizens of civil society. While it is true that the masses in these areas are not already ‘making history’, it is as of today far more than a struggle over economic resources, livelihood issues, or jal, jangal, jamin (Water, Forest, Land).14
The Tatas and Essars are of course out there to grab resources from the adivasis and the armed offensive is related to the interests of big capital. But this does not mean that the fight of the adivasis is only to protect ‘their’ resources, that they cannot go beyond ‘livelihood issues’ and the ‘struggle for survival’ and in fact inaugurate a larger political struggle in the country.15 Actually it is not they who cannot go beyond these issues, beyond livelihood issues, but it is large sections of the left and progressive persons who cannot.16 In reaching out (who are we to reach out, do we not have our own political struggle at hand? An element of performance is unmistakable here) to the trapped innocent civilians in Dantewada, we are trying to block from view the fact that they are actually reaching out to us, calling on us to join their struggle, by going beyond the livelihood issues and jal jangal jamin that we are bent on offering them. These sections of the left think that Dantewada and Lalgarh areas are or just waiting to become cesspools of violence and conflict; they do not see them as possible cauldrons of change that have dared and trashed Indian democracy and the existing political system — and proposed an alternative political system.
Ruling class strategists like KPS Gill seem aware of this when he states that the "Naxalites ideologue believe that they have an alternative political model to offer".17 Clearly, the poorest of the poor have thrown the ball in the court of the privileged democratic forces of the country, urging them to join a political struggle shorn of the political imbecility and juvenile belief in the nature and possibilities of the present democratic order. Is the democratic left in the country willing to accept that the poorest of the poor can try to rewrite the history of the country? Is that also considered too ambitious a project to be undertaken by the ‘masses’, in a country whose history has always been decided by the elite, by Nehru-Gandhi-Jinnah-Patel in round-table conferences?
And it is here that the otherwise legitimate question of use of violence seems like so much bickering to justify the refusal to accept the political content of the Maoist movement and the political challenge to the very nature of Indian democracy they put up today. Otherwise, it is an absolutely legitimate question to talk about violence and killings, the idea of the absolute worth of human life, the dangerous idea of ‘the enemy of the people’ and so on. Also the question of capital punishment itself must be debated thoroughly. One cannot dismiss this as just a bourgeois deviation as some Maoist utterances tend to do. However, it becomes ‘bourgeois’ precisely when these problems become a way to avoid the fundamental question of the political struggle, when it becomes the sole basis of judging the Maoist movement as a whole. For, at the end of the day, it is only against the background of the advancing political struggle that such questions can be addressed and not merely by calls ‘to eschew violence’ or abstract talk of the dehumanizing effects of violence.
Thus it is that the problem posed by the Maoists or the impending armed state offensive must and perhaps can be addressed in the course of the intensification of the ongoing political struggle. More Dantewadas, more Lalgarhs, more Naxalbaris — that is the solution. This need not necessarily mean more of the Maoists, more of the Maoists in the present form — one cannot rule out the transformation of the existing political forces or of the Maoists themselves. This cannot but involve more resistance at all levels, working class mobilization, middle class mobilization in the towns and cities, anti-caste struggles, gender struggles and so on.
Nietzschean Abyss
In pointing out how engaging in violence can suck Maoists into a vortex of violence, into a repressive movement, Sujato Bhadro quotes Nietzsche about how if you look into the abyss for too long the abyss starts staring back at you (‘Open Letter to the Maoists’).18 Bhadra is right so far as it goes; however, why does he assume that the only abyss is the one of the state? Is there some other ‘abyss’ which we can gaze at apart from the state and which in staring back at us will mould or determine us, or at least show us the political way out? That is, what if Dantewada or Lalgarh or the Maoist movement is not just a mirror image of the abyss of the state but is something in its own right as well, an alternative to the present political order?
Indeed I myself am waiting for that moment when the Nietschean wish will be fulfilled: if Dantewada and the areas of the impending offensive are like an abyss and we are looking at it, all our eyes are pinned on it, then when will the moment come when the abyss will start looking back at us, so that the broad left will then relate to the revolutionary struggle without the mediation of the existing state and its ‘progressive’ determinations? We cannot really look at this abyss, we cannot go there or even visit ‘those areas’. Reports say that security forces keep a strict check on entry and exit in those areas. Chattisgarh DGP Vishwa Ranjan talks of ‘strategic hamletting’ in order to corner the rebels shorn of the support of the villagers: ‘drain the water to kill the fish’. Nobody is allowed to enter those areas. Even those fact-finding teams who visit seem to come with the all too familiar story of suffering, trapped civilians, but nothing really of these civilians as political agents imagining a different society.
Why can we not be allowed to go meet and be with the poorest of the poor? What is it about them that, even when a Gandhian organization works with them, it creates problems? Is the state stupid or is it just repressive in blocking off any contact with the ‘trapped masses’? But it looks like that the state has a point and is being politically perceptive here, since its class interests are directly at stake. Now it seems that, when a Gandhian goes and works with the adivasis in those areas, the Gandhian himself starts transforming!19 In fact some protagonists of non-violent struggles have severe problems with some of the Gandhians in Chattisgarh who go soft on Maoist violence! Has the Gandhian Himanshu Kumar, working in Chattisgarh for a long time, gone soft on Maoist violence, it is asked. Are the pro-Maoist poorest of the poor politically astute enough to morph the Gandhian into something like a Maoist Gandhian, if not a Gandhian Maoist?
I mean, what are we trying to do when we say that we must reach out to them? Are we not trying to protect ourselves from what they can teach us? We have a fear, and I wonder to what extent civil society activism in favour of doing something for the trapped civilians secretly derives its energy from blocking what they can offer us, how this activism sustains our unconscious refusal to join the ranks of the revolutionary forces. We either look only at the state, albeit with stern accusing eyes, or we look at the revolutionary masses by sanitizing them into innocent, trapped civilians — we are avoiding something there, saving ourselves in our present existence and preempting the advance of the revolution if there is one. We are scared that abyss will start staring back at us.
The state too does not want that we should be able to look at that abyss for too long — for the abyss starts staring back at us. Thus all that we can possibly know today is that the people there are trapped, they are suffering and so on. We heard the same thing about the civilians trapped in Darfur, in Sri Lanka, in Colombia. Indeed the same thing was also told about even tsunami victims, that they need immediate goods and services, food, shelter and so on. Thus the Dantewada adivasis as an undifferentiated, homogenized category of ‘trapped and suffering’ we already know: indeed that is part of the dominant humanitarian discourse. But, what else about them? This is where we cannot but acknowledge that the poorest of the poor in the Maoist movement have today thankfully lost their ‘innocence’, as they are on the cusp of transforming themselves into a political subject, placed as they are in the central vortex of the political, class struggle in the country.
K. Balagopal criticized the Maoists for being unable to make a dent in national politics, with a biting comment: "you can hold a gun to a landlord’s head but Special Economic Zones or the Indo-US Nuclear Deal have no head to put a gun to".20 Maoists of course are unable to do many things and have a very long way to go. However, while the statement is true as far as it goes, but what if one is not really opposing this or that policy of the state like SEZ or the Deal but challenging social relations as such that support the existing state structure and political order? (The CPI(Marxist) opposes the Deal, does it not?!) Does Balagopal suggest that there is no relationship between transforming social relations at the ‘local’ (he lets out a dismissive attitude to the local as opposed to the national) level and fighting so-called national issues? It is his inability to see the connection between the head of a landlord in some nondescript remote village and the more refined machinations of bourgeois democracy, between the landless labourer with a gun and a revolutionary political subjectivity, that led Balgopal to argue that Maoists are not interested in "defeating the state politically but (only) mobilizing against it militarily".
Balagopal was not just arguing, like the Nepali Maoist critique of the Indian Maoists, that the struggle was stagnating and not able to transform say from guerilla zone to base area with a strategic view of advancing the revolution. In spite of his most brilliant insights into the inner dynamics of the Maoist movement, Balagopal never gave up the dichotomies he set between the local and the national, the military and the political, and the poor fighting for their rights and the poor as a political subject. His work is thrillingly good since, even with his thorough knowledge of the flesh and nerves of the movement, he still upheld these dichotomies without ever tripping! Here again we hit upon the problem of separating political subjectivity from the poorest of the poor and their struggles that are apparently only local and livelihood-based and not national and political, no matter whether they are carrying a gun or not.
Deep Roots in the Masses
The state would rather take the blame of having massacred innocent civilians, understood to start with as ‘collateral damage’ (yet further — this time verbal — ‘aid’ from the U.S. military), and lose some of its democratic legitimacy, than allow this virus to spread. For this virus can potentially turn into a larger political crisis. The emergence of one two many Dantewadas would involve transforming the present struggle in Dantewada into a political struggle, into a rallying point for the entire revolutionary forces in the country. Not allowing us access into the political reality of the struggle, to contain the political struggle, is a foremost task for the Indian state. The Indian state would rather go ahead with the armed offensive, killing whoever comes in its way, than allow this political struggle to intensify. Now if the Maoists turn out to be no political threat, if they convert soon enough into another power structure negotiating and compromising, then it’s another matter.
But if at all Dantewada presents a real political challenge to the ruling order today, if the Maoists are the advanced detachment of the sharpest political struggle, then any state in its senses would go ahead with its armed offensive — or not go ahead, for reasons of effectivity, since it might miserably fail. In which case, the only way out for a progressive outcome is to look for ways for the Dantewada stalemate to inaugurate a higher political crisis for the ruling order. KPS Gill predicts that the Indian state will get stuck in a war against its own people, the way the United States got stuck in Afghanistan. Progressive publications are highlighting it as a real possibility, thus further challenging the armed state offensive and calling for peace and negotiations. What Gill does not realize is that while the Indian state might get stuck, Dantewada might not; it might replicate itself elsewhere, everywhere. The Maoists are not the Indian security forces, the masses are not just ‘combatants’ — it is a political struggle.
Now in so many ways a discursive field is being created today which in an innocuous way seeks to define a political field that precludes the emergence of a higher political struggle and wants to isolate it into something akin to a humanitarian crisis.21 If the hawkish state wants to do a LTTE to the Maoists, the humanitarian discourse too already anticipates, in a hidebound manner, a similar humanitarian crisis as in Jaffna possibly unfolding here. The possibility of a radical political situation emerging is not only not anticipated here but the humanitarians, in not anticipating it, seem invested in not allowing it to emerge in the first place. Like a pseudo originary moment, the very coinage of an ‘armed offensive’ elicits this understanding of the Dantewada crisis as primarily military, draining the politics from it and thereby framing the Maoists too as more or less only an armed group. Attempts to isolate the Maoists from the ordinary civilians and masses further fuel this narrative as an armed conflict between groups with civilians as collateral damage. Human rights discourse of the ‘innocent civilian’ reinforces this idea since it treats them as collateral to the political struggle and only ‘suffering beings’ waiting for peace and a constant supply of goods and services.
One of the ways in which the emergence of the adivasi Maoist as a political subject is precluded is portrayals of ‘democratic struggles’ as political and the violent struggle as militaristic, ‘undemocratic’ and even less than political – totally missing the point about how a political struggle can and does assume violent forms. Thus a ‘political solution’ to the crisis here need not be restricted to just attending to the humanitarian needs of the population. Such an understanding of a ‘political solution’ obscures from view how the poorest of the poor are, perhaps even in their subjective understanding, a political subject willing to fight the political struggle, fight the political battle, indeed become the most advanced detachment today of revolutionary transformation in the country. Far from being militaristic, when the poorest of the poor take up arms and fight a political battle, fight the combined and so long hidden fist of capital and state, it leads to an ultimate confrontation which does not displace the political question but actually takes it to its final resolution. The question is: are broad sections of the left ready to tread this path?
One of the ways in which Maoists as a political force are blocked from view is through not allowing the gaze, so that we do not even know what the Maoists are thinking. How are the Maoists viewing this armed state offensive? For one, they do not view it as a misadventure that the state is about to launch and which will further erode the democratic basis of the state. Instead, this is, CPI(Maoist) argues, "the planned State Onslaught on mass movements in general and in particular on the revolutionary masses, CPI(Maoist) Party and its armed detachment".22 The Maoists do not view the impending offensive in military terms alone and instead understand it politically. Mass resistance against the offensive is upheld without however giving up the revolutionary political struggle. They write, "while the PLGA forces are preparing to heroically resist the enemy, the Party and its mass organizations must seek to mobilise all possible forces to resist and fight back this impending attack. The aim of the enemy is to isolate us from the masses to facilitate the attacks, with the least protest by the progressive and democratic forces in the country. Our aim must be to prevent this enemy encirclement by building deep roots in the masses".23
Building deep roots in the masses is considered part of the same process as strengthening and preparing the PLGA. That is why the state’s strategy is ‘draining the water to kill the fish’. Maoist statements suggest that they do not view the armed offensive as only a military confrontation: and they know that getting isolated from the masses will only help the state eliminate them. Further they seem keen to reach out to a wider section of mass movements and resistance.24
However, broad sections of left seem oblivious of the possibilities of integrating themselves with the political struggle unleashed by the Maoist movement. Their gaze is obsessively fixed on the state, invested into exposing its militaristic designs but without seeking to mobilize the vast masses of people in the country in tune with the advanced detachment which is the revolutionary masses of Dantewada. Thus either the democratic left looks towards the state, or, when it looks towards the revolutionary masses, it sees only innocent civilians, victims waiting for the intervention of middle class activists. The present thrust of the peace initiatives today impedes the development of a revolutionary situation in the country, the sharpening of the political struggle through mobilization of different resistance movements in the country in support of the resistance in Dantewada.
Poor Home Minister?
Are we not putting too much pressure on the Home Minister in attacking him for concentrating on the military solution to the Maoist problem? Are we not missing something vital — a kind of coded message which we need to unpack for the good of all, rather than the minister himself and the larger Indian state? What if the minister is actually admitting that Indian democracy and its political system has run its full course and is teetering at its end, so that there is no democratic card in the arsenal now that can be equal to the task of keeping the Maoists at bay — so that the military solution is apt? While those criticizing the minister for adopting security-centric and not development-centric solutions might still believe in Indian democracy and its potential to keep the Maoists at bay, he and those within the system know exactly how much worth ‘our democracy’, or the socio-economic approach, is.
It looks like even ‘our’ best democratic policies are no match for the Maoist strategy of revolutionary armed struggle which seems more endearing to vast masses of people than say the decentralization policy or empowerment of gram sabhas or social policies like NREGA. Social movements with a clear non-Naxal, non-Maoist lineage today display serious exhaustion, if not failure. Maoists teach the masses that it is right to rebel, that Indian independence is a blackmail, that the real independence is yet to come, that Gandhi was a reactionary, that, quoting Mao, ‘without a people’s army the people have nothing’. Now what is a ‘democratic response’ to this which can be worked out by remaining within the Indian Constitution or channeled through social movements? The Home Minister has a real problem at hand. Between some rozgar yojana (employment rights) or ‘forest rights’ or getting 100 days of work, and being in the people’s army, the choice seems obvious for ‘the poorest of the poor’.
The Indian state can at best offer two square meals a day; the Maoists are offering a festival for the masses. Recall the armed action of the masses led by the Maoists in Lalgarh on June 15, 2009, we saw pictures of women and ordinary villagers, in public, openly celebrating as the house of the CPIM leader was being violently demolished. Didn’t the West Bengal government, after the ‘flushing out’ operation of the joint security forces, do all that a government can do in order to reach the tribals with welfare packages and deals? Did that bring down the support for the Maoists? Buddhadev Bhattacharya made it mandatory for all secretaries to go camp in god-forsaken Lalgarh to sincerely find out the problems of the people — and they most unwillingly did. But that did not wean the masses away from the Maoists.
Thus the present Indian democracy has run its course and is tottering under the Maoist menace. The present war need not necessarily lead merely to violence and counter-violence and the loss of the middle ground. Bereft of its democratic trappings, the state is revealing itself as no more than repressive deadweight against any real political change and so is at its weakest, politically speaking. A radical social and political transformation is therefore a real possibility today.
In other words, it might today actually be an option to push the tottering Indian democratic and state order, including our beautiful secular democracy, into the dustbin of history and initiate a revolutionary process of transformation and change. In which case, of course, one is talking about a ‘moving’ middle ground and a moving Maoist movement which can then merge at some point — totally isolating the military, security and growth-centric state. Given that the poor home minister is as much as admitting that the Indian political system is irredeemable and it can only respond with a military solution, is it not time for the real left to step in not to save the decaying system but to precipitate its collapse and the emergence of a better socio-economic dispensation? A ‘higher’ middle ground will necessarily involve unshackling our attachment to the democracy within the bounds of the repressive state, and instead pitch in for a new political future against this state order.
Bhagat Singh and his comrades once thought of a social and economic revolution, and not merely political independence. It is an unfulfilled task. But while the Maoists are surely the torchbearers of change are they a credible political force to usher in a revolutionary transformation of Indian society and state? One cannot dismiss the possibility that the Maoist movement can transform itself from being what looks like only a local political power struggle and come to articulate the search for a political alternative to the present socio-economic order and state system in the country today.
And it is here that the democratic and dissident left, including the very committed rights activists, will have a crucial role to play. Unless a democratic rights perspective, calling for an end to the military option, is in so many visible and invisible ways woven around the willingness to look for a political alternative to the present Indian state order, including its sham democracy, the possibility of the present state-Maoist struggle leading to merely a violent outcome will remain. The choice is clear: military option or political alternative? That is, as a Maoist document points out, this is a time of both great dangers and immense possibilities.
Beyond Maoist?
In turning towards the state and primarily and sometimes solely invested in exposing the state (on its own grounds), what you obscure is the possibility of a wider consolidation of revolutionary democratic forces. As a good instance of how you hear only what you want or like to hear, what today is not being heard and is totally obscured is that the Maoists, the poorest of the poor, are in fact calling upon all progressive democratic forces to unite to defeat the central government offensive: it is they who are trying to reach out to you even as you try to overlook it through your humanitarian concern for them. Or else Ganapathy is merely being rhetorical when he openly calls upon all to unite: "By building the broadest fighting front, and by adopting appropriate tactics of combining the militant mass political movement with armed resistance of the people and our PLGA (People’s Liberation Guerilla Army), we will defeat the massive offensive by the Central-state forces".25
Here of course the crucial contention will be if the armed resistance and the PLGA can be accepted as legitimate political actors by other left and democratic forces. But the fact of the matter is that for the Indian state and capital today, and not just its repressive armed wing, the armed resistance and the PLGA stand as a major stumbling block providing stiff resistance everywhere they exist. It does not at all seem preposterous to suggest that the adivasis under the leadership of the Maoists today have precipitated a political struggle where capital and state are forced to come out in their true unholy nexus disregarding all supposed democratic credentials and rule of law.
Numerous activists and commentators have pointed out how the interests of big capital are what really drives the actions of the state, given that the entire region is resource rich and contains enormous mine deposits. The convergence of capital and state is clearly visible in the political struggle today. It is the achievement of the Maoist movement and its work for years in the area that state and capital are forced to give up all pretense of democracy, rule of law and business as usual. State and capital today stand exposed in their bare exploitative, oppressive essence.
The point is that the oppressive nature of capital and the state do not reveal itself spontaneously, particularly to the vast masses of people. It is in places like Dantewada and Lalgarh that people have not only understood this nature of the ruling order but actually are willing to fight against it without any recourse to the democratic pretensions of this order. This makes the masses here and the Maoists an advanced detachment particularly now that such a sharp political struggle has created a crisis of national proportions. It is for these reasons that the PLGA, locked in the thick of political struggle, cannot be rejected as just a structure of violence or merely replicating the state.
Further, this is where the Indian state is weakest today. This is where large masses of the people have rejected the Indian state and its democracy, forcing it to come out to use armed force against its own civilian population, like a mafia state which everybody hates and hence must survive on the use of force and repression. This means that we should not only rush to the defence of the one front, Dantewada or Lalgarh, in the political, class struggle today but also replicate similar and not so similar bases elsewhere in the country. If not jettisoned, our humanist ‘concern’ (which somehow always readily gets pretentious) for the ‘trapped masses’ should be strategically used to democratically corner the state with a clear eye on converting the Dantewada experiment into a nationwide phenomenon.
Now the Maoists themselves have not been astute in expanding their struggle, in reaching out to urban masses, in overcoming their often sectarian attitudes and obsolete work methods and thinking. They do not seem to know what they can do to broaden the struggle in urban areas, relate to other political forces, respond to the more sophisticated machinations of ‘democracy’ and so on. Ideally, on a less rigorous note, one can say that the best for revolution in South Asia would be to combine the ‘flexibility’ of the Nepali Maoists with the ‘dogmatism’ of the Indian Maoists. But the Maoists are willing to change, if not subjectively, but, as we saw in Lalgarh and elsewhere, at least through force of circumstances. And change they must. However, what is of crucial importance is the larger revolutionary process of which the Maoists themselves are no arbiters nor even masters but only the more advanced elements and that too, so far, in the present conjuncture.
1 ‘Build the Broadest Possible Front against the Planned State Onslaught’, SUCOMO, CPI(Maoist) Letter on Growing State Terror to Party Members, 10 September 2009.
2 Peter Linebaugh, ‘Jubilating, or How the Atlantic Working Class Used the Biblical Jubilee Against Capitalism, With Some Success’, The New Enclosures, 1990.
3 See Arundhati Roy, for example, who stated that "we should stop thinking about who is justified. . . . You have an army of very poor people being faced down by an army of rich that are corporate-backed. I am sorry but it is like that. So you can’t extract morality from the heinous act of violence that each commits against the other" (Times of India, New Delhi, 25 October 2009).
4 The humanitarian perspective which often goes under the name of being political and even left undervalues the poorest of the poor as agents of revolutionary change by framing them as deserving of rights that are no more than ‘animal rights’, rights for survival and to live. However, as Badiou shows. "if ‘rights of man’ exist, they are surely not rights of life against death, or rights of survival against misery. They are the rights of the Immortal, affirmed in their own right, or the rights of the Infinite, exercised over the contingency of suffering and death" (Alain Badiou, Ethics: An Essay on the Understanding of Evil, London: Verso, 2001, p. 12). This in some ways opens the way to the idea of the proletariat, of being both poor and radical, class-for-itself.
5 Perhaps this is why they were not upholding the kind of democracy that Santosh Rana upholds when he points out how Maoists did not allow the functioning of democratic bodies and local self-government organs and instead replaced them with ‘people’s committees’. Unlike for the Maoists, it was important for Rana "to activate Panchayats and to exercise control over them through Gram Sansads and to demand more financial and administrative power in the hands of the Panchayats" (Santosh Rana, ‘A People’s Uprising Destroyed by the Maoists’, Kafila, 11 July 2009.
6 Different groups and radical organizations have put forth demands like withdrawal of big companies, cancellations of land transfer MOUs and so on from the area, but the Maoists do not work by presenting any specific demands for the government to fulfill.
7 You can of course be rich and radical, but you must not then side with the poor and radical. Isn’t that the reason why Kobad Ghandy, apparently from a well-off family, was indulged in by the media giving him massive coverage and yet consigned behind bars?
8 Linebaugh, op. cit.
9 Sudha Bharadwaj informs us of "200,000 by-default Naxalites" (‘The Situation in Dantewada, Chattisgarh Today‘, Sanhati, 21 September 2009.
10 Indeed just looking at the manner in which the Indian state intelligence has been unable to infiltrate the ranks of the Maoists by bribing local adivasis shows the deep roots they have with the civilian population. Several officials have expressed their frustration over this lack of infiltration. Part of the reason why the state is going for an all-out offensive in spite of all the dangers it involves for its own legitimacy is precisely the substantial mass base of the Maoists.
11 In Lalgarh a senior state officer was quoted as stating that "unless we have local sources, it is going to be extremely difficult to identify the Maoists, who have mingled with the villagers. Although these (new) men are from Lalgarh, we haven’t got people from the core area. Those villages are still out of bounds (for the state)" (Telegraph, 26 June 2009).
12 B. Raman, ‘Dealing with Maoist Insurgency’, Global Geopolitics Net, 28 October 2009.
13 Ibid. For treatment of Maoists as mirror image of the present State, see for example Adita Nigam, ‘Mass Politics, Violence and the Radical Intellectual’, Kafila, 27 October 2009.
14 That is, they want to go beyond the progressive position of ‘peace with justice’.
15 That way the Maoist movement has no ‘demands’ listed for any government or power to fulfill, so that the problem can be solved. It is interesting how other left or civil society groups tend to substitute for this by throwing their own demands almost on behalf of the adivasis or Maoists! These are mostly calls for withdrawal of big capital mining and industrial projects, tribal rights over forests, ending Salwa Judum vigilante groups and so on.
16 This is the problem with say demands of ML groups like that of Santosh Rana who want to fight for tribal autonomy and identity, like their demand for an autonomous council in Lalgarh region. These are demands that can be addressed by the state and hence to that extent potentially involves dilution of the level of political struggle existing today. Rana seems to be missing the point when he criticizes the Maoists for not allowing identity demands to be taken up. Indeed Kanu Sanyal went to the extent of calling the Lalgarh uprising as an ethnic, identity-based uprising. There is an insistence on denying the political content of these movements and bringing them into some kind of a negotiable plane vis-à-vis the state and the present democratic order. See Open Letters Between the PCC CPI(ML) and CPI(Maoist), Sanhati, April-May 2009.
17 Interview with KPS Gill, Tehelka, 24 October 2009.
18 Sujato Bhadra, ‘Open Letter to the Maoists’, Radical Notes, 26 September 2009.
19 Himanshu from the Vanvasi Chetana Ashram apparently has ‘changed’, become far less critical of Maoist violence and critiques only state violence!
20 K. Balagopal, ‘Reflections on Violence and Non-violence in Political Movements in India’, South Asia Citizens Web, January 2009.
21 K. Balagopal critiqued the Maoists for being unable to make a dent in politics, in national politics.
22 ‘Build Broadest Possible Front’ op. cit.
23 Ibid.
24 See the CPI(Maoists)’s various appeals to other revolutionary and democratic forces and parties.
25 Interview with Ganapathy, Supreme Commander, CPI(Maoist), ‘We Shall Certainly Defeat the Government’, Open Magazine, 17 October 2009.
Saroj Giri is Lecturer in Political Science, University of Delhi.
J&K: Time for radical self-determination
Gautam Navlakha
Introduction
Sixty-two years is a long time for learning lessons and to cease being indulgent towards the fallacies and faults of the Indian state in obfuscating the issue of people’s right to self-determination in Jammu & Kashmir. There is a tendency in India to read wars being carried out inside the country as phenomena that are less than a war. And that is because it takes place within the borders of the ‘nation-state’, where deployment of ‘armed forces of the Union’ is somehow considered legitimate even when it is engaged in brutal suppression of the people. The most ardent supporters of non-violence have had no qualms in acquiescing to this venture in the name of the “nation”, “secularism”, fighting “Islamicist” forces, averting another partition…. And it has been accompanied by a reluctance to grasp the real nature of such wars where casualties occur in the form of ‘encounter’ killings, custodial deaths, enforced disappearances, rapes, search-and-cordon operations, arbitrary detentions, torture. The list is really endless. It is, therefore, hardly surprising that in Jammu and Kashmir the staggering scale of these crimes over nearly two decades have failed to arouse popular revulsion. However, when a non-violent mass agitation took place last year, it shook the Indian state and society to its very core because it pulverised every lie that had been fed to us and it became evident that people wanted to opt out of India. Then the elections to the J&K legislative assembly took place, and a largely malleable Indian media jumped to the conclusion that people had rejected ‘azaadi’. But they were once again left wondering when the voter turnout for the 15th Lok Sabha elections plummeted. (If elections are to be regarded as a barometer for deciphering the people’s mood then it is the turnout in parliamentary elections that should be held as the most important marker of shift in that mood.) And then came the widespread protests against the rape and murder of Nelofer and Asiya in Shopian on May 29, 2009. Once again it became evident that whatever lies Indian spinmeisters have tried to weave, anger against the Indian state continues to simmer. Therefore, it will not do to ignore and devalue aspirations of a people. But, the issue of people wanting to opt out of India is not just an emotional issue. Or, a mere matter of human rights violations. It has an objective basis in the political-economic and environmental dimension, which must inform any search for solution. What are its main contours?
1. 1. According to a statement issued on the floor of the Assembly by the former Deputy Chief Minister on August 1, 2006, there were more than 667,000 security forces in J&K. This is an incredibly high concentration of troops for an area whose total population is less than 12 million. More than half belong to the Indian army. In a meeting with the press on June 17, 2007, the GOC in C of the Northern Command of the India army, Lt. General H S Panang let out that there are 337,000 army personnel in J&K. In other words the ratio of deployment of security force personnel to people is 1 for 18 persons! This deployment is not only incredibly high but also way out of proportion to the threat posed by armed resistance. India’s army chief is on record saying that only 600 militants operated in entire J&K. But news reports from time to time refer to the threat posed by infiltration. Although, in actual fact, the number of infiltration bids have fallen sharply; in 2001 it was said to be 2,417 but dropped to 537 in 2004, 597 in 2005, 573 in 2006, 535 by 2007. In 2008, according to the army chief, there has been a 65% decline up to July 31, 2008, to 150, as compared to the same period in 2007 (The Times of India, August 23, 2008). The Indian government also claimed more than 75 per cent decline in militancy-related incidents between 1990 and 2008, from 3,500 to 709 incidents, which is officially supposed to mean that the situation is no longer considered critical (1,000+ is the criterion for terming the situation critical). Firing incidents came down from 671 to 183. Bomb explosions declined from 1,000 to just 50. Killings of civilians declined from 914 to 69. (The Times of India, January 25, 2009). Significantly, almost all the civilians killed in 2008 were at the hands of the Indian security forces. For instance, during the agitation last year, 57 persons were killed by the Indian security forces in the Kashmir Valley alone. All this means that fighting armed resistance cannot be an over-riding motive for deployment of troops.
1.2. In counter insurgency warfare there is a blurring of distinction between “(f)ront and rear; strategic and tactical; combatants and non-combatants”. The Doctrine on sub-conventional warfare of the Indian Army says that “…the military operations should aim firstly, at neutralizing all hostile elements…and secondly, at transforming the will and attitudes of the people…. However, the manifestation of such a realization can take from a couple of years to decades as attitudes take time to form and to change”. (Pp21-22)
1.3. In plain English this means that people have to be made to give up their aspirations and reconcile themselves to living under an Indian dispensation. But since people are not so easily reconciled, security forces are needed to be deployed in a manner that they can monitor public and private lives of people. And a whole system of informers, gunmen, reward and punishment…instituted. There are reportedly 671 security forces camps in J&K (excluding those in Jammu, Kargil, Leh, Akhnoor and Udhampur). These occupy 100,000 acres. Besides, it is in the nature of things that when a hostile armed force occupies land, then land adjacent to what is legally transferred also gets annexed. Thus actual land in possession of the Indian security forces is much higher than shown in official records.
1.4. Now the largest source of employment in J&K is agriculture and horticulture. According to the Economic Survey of 2008-09, more than 49 per cent of the people depend on land, one way or another. The biggest source of earning is from horticulture, followed by tourism. But J&K’s dependence on food imports have risen because per capita yields have fallen. For instance, rice yields per hectare fell by 2.78 per cent in 2008-09. In a situation where existing yields are falling, although agriculture forms the main source of livelihood, the question of land becomes critical. For, it concerns both food production and livelihood needs of the people. If the security forces occupy land, which would otherwise be available for cultivation, then, for an economy so dependent on agriculture and horticulture, it amounts to a net loss. Remove this land from cultivation, and one sees a significant decline in earnings and a dwindling in the number of jobs available. What is also eroded, inter-alia, is the opportunity for increasing food output.
1.5. Therefore, involuntary alienation of land, especially cultivable land, will always be a sensitive issue for people. But when land is acquired for armed security personnel who maintain an obtrusive presence among civilians designed to control their public and private lives and, indeed, even “transform their will and attitude”, as is the case in J&K, it compounds the problem. This contributes to increasing J&K’s dependence on New Delhi for its survival. It is worth recalling that in 2008, the Jammu-based agitation had imposed an economic blockade against the Valley, which meant that imports of foodstuffs to the Valley were curtailed. This clearly highlighted the vulnerability of a people who are dependent on the Jammu-Srinagar highway passing through the Banihal pass for their daily needs. For several weeks Indian security forces failed to clear the highway. It was this that compelled the leadership of the movement to call for the “Muzzafarabad chalo” (Let us March to Muzzafarabad) agitation. This lesson ought not to be forgotten.
2.1. Faced with burgeoning public demand for Indian troop reduction in Jammu and Kashmir, the Indian Government constituted three committees in March 2007. An expert committee headed by the defence secretary to look into the question of troop reduction; a review committee headed by M A Ansari to study the Armed Forces (Special) Powers Act as well as the Disturbed Area Act; and a high powered committee headed by the Union minister of defence to study the recommendations of the two panels.
2.2. It was evident that the most important committee was the ‘expert’ committee, headed by the defence secretary. On December 5, 2007, in response to an ‘unstarred’ question #1672 in the Rajya Sabha, which asked the defence minister to state “whether the committee headed by the defence Secretary…to look into demand of troops reduction in J&K has submitted any report and if so the salient features thereof,” the answer was:
2.3. The conspicuous absence of any reference to ‘troop reduction’ speaks for itself. But also missing were terms such as ‘relocation’ (moving forces from one place to another) and/or ‘restructuring’ (increasing the presence of police and reduce in particular army’s deployment) or reconfiguration (replacing one force with another i.e. the Army with the Border Security Force, the BSF with the Central Reserve Police Force, and the CRPF with the India Reserve Battalion). Instead, no more than cosmetic changes were recommended by way of resolving old cases, vacating some buildings and reworking of convoy timings. This amounts to trivialising a popular demand and raises serious doubts about the Indian government’s sincerity to address real issues.
3.1. When Omar Abdullah took over as the new CM, and in fact even during the election campaign, he had made many a promises. Once he came to power the language changed. One of the election promises was ending impunity provided to Indian armed forces under Armed Forces Special Powers Act. Now he claims that impunity will be revoked if the situation “improves”. What is the measure of improvement? And who decides whether it has improved or not? Fact is this decision is not in his hand. It requires New Delhi’s approval. It was left to the Indian home minister to declare on March 18, 2009, that the revocation of the AFSPA is an “old demand” but a “final decision” will be taken after the elections to Indian Parliament. Elections have come and gone and there is little to show for any movement.
3.2. Indian home ministry officials told reporters that it would take two years for the CRPF to hand over control to the local administration. Although it was said that five battalions (bns) of the CRPF will be withdrawn once the Amarnath Yatra (pilgrimage to Amarnath) was over and another five bns, it was said would be pulled out later, the reduction of all of 10 bns or approximately 11,000 personnel out of 667,000 is not a significantly large reduction. [Altogether 16 bns of CRPF (10 from J&K and 6 from NE) 5 bns of BSF and 2 of ITBP will be moved to fight left-wing extremists.] Besides, even if this was accompanied it would be only by replacing the CRPF personnel with a new force, which is called the India Reserve Battalion, from the Indian state of Haryana. [IRB’s are armed police personnel that each Indian state is helped to raise with financial help extended by the central government and used by the Indian government for deployment wherever it deems necessary.]
3.3. The minister of state for defence also categorically ruled out “thinning” of troops in J&K. In fact, the army opposed dilution or withdrawal of the AFSPA for its personnel in J&K. In response to the MHA’s “phased withdrawal of AFSPA” from districts such as Srinagar, Budgam, Jammu and Kathua, senior army officer told The Times of India (July 8, 2009) that “they (the government) should not rush to assume normalcy has returned, although situation has been brought under control”. The CM also discovered that “we (i.e. J&K state) have over 70 bns of the CRPF and the strength of the state police is not even one-third of it…. So, any rushed decision in this respect can be detrimental to state’s security” (The Asian Age, July 8, 2009). Thus, after promising reduction, including withdrawal of the AFSPA, what is the real situation? Very little has changed.
3.4. Take another example. After the Baramulla firing incident on June 29, 2009, in which four persons were killed in firing by the security forces, The district commissioner of Baramulla, Lateef ur Zama Deva, wrote a letter to Baramulla based GOC of 19 Infantry Division and GOC of Kilo Force (RR), wherein he wrote that “(t)he J&K police on the basis of deployment shall remain at the forefront at all respective locations brought under curfew with the back up of army, in standby mode for flag marches and patrolling under the supervision of respective executive magistrates”. The army took strong exception and a senior army officer told Indian Express (2 July, 2009) that “(l)ike in any other place the civil administration makes requisition for Army column. But once the Army comes in it does not work under the magistrate and the problem area is handed over to the Army for a particular task”. Since the task is suppression of a movement, and because this is something which remains incomplete and can take decades to achieve, so long as Indian army remains it will not act under the civilian administration. His seniors did not come to his aid or endorse his stance.
3.5. What about the release of political prisoners? On the issue of releasing detainees New Delhi’s consent is required. (Even the transfer of senior police officers needs New Delhi’s approval. This became apparent to the CM when he wanted to get rid of some senior police officers who, he claimed, had misled him over the Shopian rape and murder incident.) On taking over as CM he had said that those detained under the PSA during elections would be released. He could not do this. Why? Because he said, on January 15, that, while the list of prisoners was before a committee “but (this) committee now includes a member from central government who is yet to visit Kashmir”. As a matter of fact, Indian home ministry has always been a part of this committee and enjoys veto power over every proposal. In any case, in the past seven months the number of those detained under the dreadful PSA has jumped to 253. Going by the proceedings in the state assembly on August 7, 2009, where a PDP MLA had moved an amendment to section 10 A of the PSA, thereby calling for declaring invalid an order of detention if the grounds mentioned were vague, irrelevant or non-existent, the state law minister found even this mild demand unacceptable. Why? Because, he said, the preventive detention law was needed “for running the state”. He was at least being honest that without arbitrary powers, the hallmark of undemocratic rule, J&K cannot be governed.
3.6. The simple point is that J&K is not just like any other state in the Union of India enjoying additional powers of autonomy under Article 370. It is a “disturbed area” dominated by a hostile military force, which feels it is sufficient to invoke “national security” for every principle of constitutional nicety to be cast aside. Indeed, Article 370, which instead of becoming a mark of internal sovereignty, has became a conduit through which an appointed governor (nominated by the central government) could dismiss even an elected state government and then rule through ordinances and amend the J&K Constitution in such a way that it became legally possible for New Delhi to legislate on matters, which under autonomy were reserved for J&K. For example, between March 7 to September 6, 1986, i.e., in just six months of governor’s rule in J&K, 29 laws were enacted all of which extended to New Delhi powers to enact laws for J&K. A high-powered committee, set up by the pro-India National Conference government of J&K in 1996 to look into the subversion of autonomy, also pointed to several “incongruities”. Such as the fact that the constitutional provision for establishing governor’s rule on a state had been undermined in the case of J&K. For, while under the Indian Constitution, the central government can take over powers from the elected state government the term of such can be extended beyond six months only by the upper house of the Indian Parliament. Thus a degree of parliamentary oversight is provided for. But in the case of J&K, central rule requires no such parliamentary approval. As a result, between1990-96 J&K remained under direct central rule without a break. Furthermore, by giving the central government nominee the power to amend the state constitution through ordinances, the legitimacy of the state Constitution, the basis for J&K’s autonomy, was eroded. Lest we forget, democratic practice reserves this right of amendment of Constitution for the people’s representatives. And ordinances/decrees issued by non-elected executives are considered a distinguishing feature of arbitrary, i.e. repressive rule.
4.1. We need to, therefore, appreciate the gamut of dependency relationship that exists between J&K and India to understand how the Indian state perpetuates its control over Kashmir. For instance, the budget for 2009-10 reveals that out of a total non-plan revenue expenditure of Rs 14,949 crore, a sum of Rs 8,126 crore (Rs 6,594 crore for salary and Rs 1,532 crore towards pension) is set aside for salary and pension for the state employees. However, the state’s own revenue generation is only Rs 4,330 crore, i.e., lower than even its salary and pension bill! And yet, the budget proposes to increase recruitment of state employees by 23,000 ( out of which 7,035 will be in the police), fill 7,000 vacancies of Class IV employees and also create 15,000 jobs for returning Kashmiri Pandits.
4.2. The Economic Survey, 2006-07, had earlier noted that “the weakness of J&K state finances arises not from lower revenues but higher expenditures”. The ratio of revenue expenditure to GSDP (Gross State Domestic Product) of J&K at 39.2 per cent is more than twice that for all states average of 17.4 per cent, although only marginally higher than Northeastern states at 38.8 per cent, as computed by the Twelfth Finance Commission. And J&K’s revenue covers only 25 per cent of its expenditure. Which means that J&K’s revenue base is incapable of meeting its own expenditure incurred for maintaining a huge government apparatus? “Consequently, the index of self-reliance of J&K…is 0.45” (p 230). The ratio of central transfers to total revenues which, at 78.6 per cent for J&K, is twice that for all states at 38.5 per cent, compares with the 67.6 per cent for the NE. But J&K’s debt to GSDP ratio is higher than others and has been 50 per cent to start with. Thus, more than 50 per cent of J&K’s own revenue goes towards servicing debt.
4.3. However, despite “low own revenues, the public expenditure level of J&K, at 51.4 per cent, in contrast to 20.2 per cent for all (Indian) states is higher than that for all states as percentage of GSDP and on a per capita basis per capita capital expenditure in J&K of Rs 2,285 is more than three times of all state average of Rs 626, albeit marginally higher than for NE which is Rs 1,924. If revenue expenditure is included then J&K’s total expenditure of Rs 9,661 is not very different from that for NE at Rs 8,637. But it is nearly three times that of all India average of Rs 3,969. And yet, these higher public expenditures in J&K “have not translated into growth mainly for two reasons. The first reason is the higher unit cost of service delivery – the cost of providing schooling to a child or the cost of providing healthcare to a person are typically higher than the all India average because of sparse population density, difficult terrain, poor connectivity and a host of other causes. The second reason is that the beneficial impact of public expenditure spills over beyond J&K as much of the contractors payments are transferred to and purchases are made beyond the state – a phenomenon referred to as ‘missing multiplier’.” (p 232). This is as clear an admission as one will get not only about the limited benefit of public expenditure in J&K but skewed nature of the relationship between India and J&K.
4.4. The Economic Survey, 2006-07, had also noted that “Centre (i.e., Indian government) has fiscal room available to reduce taxes or increase programme spending – and satisfy its inter-temporal constraint – while the J&K’s only option are to increase taxes or reduce spending in order to achieve fiscal sustainability”. (pp 5) The authors of the Economic Survey advocated a “moratorium on filling vacant posts” (pp 171). But the government went ahead with “employment intensity growth” in its budget 2007-08, and began to fill vacancies running at 23,000. In addition to that, it began recruitment for 15 battalions of IRB and five battalions of J&K police. This defeated the very objective of fiscal policy, to reduce government expenditure and thereby reduce financial dependence on grants from India. And this process continues under the budget provisions for 2009-10.
4.5. An argument in favour of such government job creation is that one of the major causes of unrest in J&K is due to a very high incidence of unemployment. Since disputed nature of J&K inhibits private investments in general and industries in particular, there is no option but for the government to create employment. Thus irresolution of the dispute creates a logic that keeps increasing the financial outgo for J&K and pushes up its dependence on New Delhi. This, in turn, creates financial dependence on New Delhi for meeting J&K’s salary bill.
4.6. It is worth recalling that when Ghulam Nabi Azad took over as CM in November 2005, he had claimed that 50 per cent of the 2,73,508 government employees “had no work to do”. If he was speaking the truth then to enlarge government employment, particularly in the unproductive area of recruitment to armed battalions, makes little sense. A bigger and larger government apparatus will continue to dominate the economy, and dependence on New Delhi to cover revenue deficit is likely to go up. Even more disturbing, the size of armed battalions being raised in J&K will continue to raise the scale of unproductive expenditure. How does all this profit the people of J&K?
4.7. Another mark of dependence is in the field of capital expenditure. In 2004, the UPA government had with much fanfare unveiled a Rs 24,000-crore plan. This plan envisaged investing Rs 18,000 crore in the central sector. This included investments in Uri II and Kishanganga Project, Srinagar-Leh road upgradation by Indian army’s BECON and 1,000 micro hydropower stations to be built and managed by the Indian army as part of its ‘Operation Sadbhavna’. The balance Rs 6,000 crore were given to the state to meet costs of various projects, including salary support for new government jobs created. The strength of government employees, which was less than three in 2004, has risen to 4.5 lakh with 50,000 daily-wage earners. As a result, not only has non-plan expenditure increased but so has the dependence on “handouts”. Let me illustrate how dependence gets augmented.
4.8. Economic Survey, 2008-09 shows that J&K’s power requirement is 2,120 MW. It generates only 2,318.70 MW out of a 16,200 MW estimated hydel power potential. Of this 2,318.70 MW, only 758.70 MW was generated by state owned utilities. Even this figure of 758 MW was reached when 450 MW Phase I Baglihar project was recently completed. The balance 1,518 MW is in the central sector. In other words, most projects that exist here do not feed J&K’s own needs. And J&K imports power for which it pays about Rs 2,000 crore. Significantly, the National Hydel Power Corporation which controls Uri I, Salal and Dul Hasti project earned Rs 300 crore as profit for the year ended March 31, 2009. Its coffers will swell once eight more NHPC projects – which includes Kishanganga, Sewa, Nimu Bazgo, Chutak, Uri II and three others that are joint ventures with the state government – are commissioned.
4.9. The J&K government has been lobbying for a long time with New Delhi to transfer 390 MW Salal project, which is free of any encumbrance as it has paid for its cost. That would have enabled J&K to not just reduce its outlay for power purchase, which is running between Rs 1,500-2,000 crore annually but also earn additional revenue. This would have reduced deficit in the power sector, running at Rs 2,000 crore. This deficit is met from special grant from New Delhi.
4.10. On December 22, 2006, a high-powered committee headed by Dr C Rangarajan (chairperson of Prime Minister’s Economic Advisory Council) recommended that 390 MW Dul Hasti hydro project should be transferred to the state instead of the 390 MW Salal project. Dul Hasti in Doda district has been plagued by cost and time over-runs. The project began in 1985. Work was started in 1989 by a French consortium. The project cost then was Rs 1,290 crore. In 1992, when some of their people were abducted, they pulled out. Four years later Jai Prakash Industries was roped in to complete the project by October 2003. The project cost ran to Rs 3,900 crore. Then it was supposed to be completed by end of 2007 but the cost had gone up to Rs 5,200 crore (of which Rs 1,500 crore was interest). It is this project which the panel wanted transferred. The panel had, however, said that this transfer would be at “accessible tariff” and it is for the Centre to compensate the NHPC. One reason for this switch from Salal to Dul Hasti, reportedly, was opposition of some Indian states. Salal project charges Rs 0.52 per unit sold to UP, Delhi, Haryana and so on. These states did not want the project to be given to J&K because they expected the unit cost charged to them to rise. As of now, Dul Hasti remains with New Delhi.
5.1. Related to this is the issue of water. The Indus Water Treaty (IWT) has been a sore point because over the heads of people of J&K, India and Pakistan came to an agreement whereby Indus, Jhelum and Chenab waters were virtually handed over to Pakistan whereas Sutlej, Ravi and Beas rivers water remained with India. There is no doubt that the interests of the lower riparian state must be protected. Pakistan depends for its drinking water and irrigation needs up to 77 per cent on the Indus water basin. However, as the upper riparian region, J&K’s rights can also not be ignored. Such is the nature of the agreement that both use of water for irrigation and for harnessing power get restricted because flow of water cannot be interrupted by building reservoir or controlled through placing any impediment in the path of water flow. For instance, because IWT prevents water storage projects, hydel power is generated through run-off-the-river projects that result in reduction of power generation to less than one-third of installed capacity, particularly during winter months. Many political parties in Indian-held J&K have pitched for compensating J&K for the loss, estimated to be over Rs 6,000, incurred by it due to the IWT. It is worth noting that the IWT was signed in 1960 when in neither part of J&K there was even a semblance of ‘representative’ government.
5.2 .How can J&K protect its interests as an upper riparian party if it is to remain excluded from the IWT? Can a people argue their case unless they enjoy sovereignty?
5.3. The issue of water sharing has been impacted by another factor. That of melting glaciers and receding snowline, which threatens to expose J&K to environmental catastrophe. The Siachen glacier is threatened by heavy militarisation of what is described as the third pole and forms part of the Indus Water basin. Melting of Kolhai glacier at a rapid pace may turn J&K into a desert. Prof Syed Iqbal Hasnain conducted an on-the-spot assessment of Kolhai last year and told Greater Kashmir (August 10, 2009) that “(t)he glacier has developed several crevasses and cracks over the years. Human interference, including the Amarnath pilgrimage, is one of the reasons for the glacier’s recession. Gujjars who are putting up in the glacier’s core area are one of the major contributors for its meltdown.” The news report said that a study on Kolhai glacier conducted by remote sensing by the National Geophysical Research Institute, Hyderabad, revealed that its spatial extent has changed from 19.34 sq km in 1992 to 17.23 sq km in 2001, a net decrease of 2.11 sq km in 10 years. The long-term impact would be availability of water for drinking and irrigation. Thus Lidder and Sind basins of Jhelum are under threat. And this in turn may further create tensions for enforcement of IWT.
5.4. While experts do refer to increased militarisation or pilgrimage as factor in the melting of glaciers, the main reason behind rapid depletion of those glaciers is downplayed. Both Siachen and Kolhai are exposed to unprecedented human activity in its core as well as its vicinity. For instance, the presence of a brigade-strength military force in Siachen and the supply line to keep them fed, garbage disposed, use of helicopters for moving men and material is warming the environment at Saltoro ridge. In the case of Kolhai, the phenomenal increase in the number of pilgrims rising from less than 12,000 in 1989 to four lakh this year (which came down from 5.25 lakh in 2008), the huge presence of security forces (no less than 26,000), movement of people, trucks, and helicopters have become the biggest source of glacial meltdown. While soldiers and pilgrims, particularly in such large numbers, are detrimental to the environment, it is the population in the Valley which suffers its consequence since they depend on Sind and Lidder (which feeds Jhelum) for their drinking water and irrigation requirement. And yet, the local population has little influence or control over its fate. It is dependent on the benevolence of the Indian state, which is busier consolidating its military hold over Siachen and promoting Amarnath pilgrimage.
6.1. In 2000-01, Indian commentators discovered that percentage of population living “below poverty line” in J&K was 3.48 per cent as against the all-India average of 26.10 per cent. It became an occasion for jingoists in India to claim how Indian largess had brought prosperity to J&K at the expense of rest of India. However, this underestimation of incidence of poverty generated different explanations among more sober analysts. One recent claim was that “the (Indian) state had in place a system of ‘development’ practices aimed at buying the ‘hearts and minds’ of the people, what it ended up doing was to make militants richer while at the same time entrenching the institution of corruption deeper and deeper into the culture of the state”. And then goes on to say that “the fall in poverty rates…pointed to open and surreptitious transfers, which while mitigating poverty, entrenched the already existing system of corruption even deeper”.[Dipankar Sengupta; ‘Policy Making in a Terrorist Economy, Epilogue, July 2009]. Another was provided by Swaminathan A Aiyar who wrote in The Times of India, July 15, 2001, that one “explanation is the huge expansion of armed forces in the state in the 1990s. India now has over 600,000 military and paramilitary personnel in Kashmir. Their purchasing power is pretty formidable in a small state of 10 million people. Tourism in the Valley may have shrunk, but the armed forces represent tourists of another kind. Most tourists spend only a week in Kashmir, but men in uniform spend the whole year in the state. So, in some ways, every jawan is the equivalent of 52 tourists. They may buy fewer silk carpets and shawls than normal tourists, but are steady buyers of agricultural produce. And that probably has a major impact on local incomes, especially of small farmers…. The irony is that if peace returns, so too might poverty. The armed forces will go away.”
6.2. In the Economic Survey for J&K, 2006-07, it was reported that the decline in poverty ratio between 1993-94 to 1999-2000, from 25.17 per cent to 3.48 per cent in 1999-2000, had been “extremely steep” (p 224) and noted that there was “no authentic and reliable data on BPL population…available for the state of J&K.” It pointed out that for the year 1993-94 no survey was conducted by the NSSO. Instead, the poverty ratio for Himachal Pradesh was “adjusted for J&K by the Planning Commission”. It is important to note that internal war was at its peak during this period. Now all these explanations were put to rest by a fresh survey that was undertaken by the authorities and brought out in a report: ‘Below Poverty Line Survey 2008’ [Jammu and Kashmir State; Directorate of Economics and Statistics, J&K, Planning & Development Department, Jammu and Kashmir Government]. According to the report of the survey, “the total BPL Estimated Population Ratio of J&K State has been arrived at 21.63 per cent (24.21 lakh persons) with a dispersion of 26.14 per cent (22.00 lakh persons) from rural areas and 7.96 per cent (2.21 lakh persons) living in urban areas”. In other words, the decline in poverty was far less than estimated and explanations offered were, therefore, way off the mark. [At a workshop on the ‘Role of ICDS’, experts questioned the figure of BPL population at 3.5 per cent when 29 per cent of children were under-nourished, 52 per cent women anaemic, 41 per cent vitamin-A deficient and 68 per cent suffer from iron deficiency as per the National Family State Health Zone. (Etalaat May 10, 2008). In fact, with per capita income remaining lower than the all-India average this drop was illusory.]
6.3. I cite this for a reason. There is no doubt that Indian military forces make large-scale purchases and government and other sources transfer funds to buy acquiescence of the people. But this does not spread beyond a narrow circle and certainly does not reach the ordinary people whose lives are mired in poverty. Secondly, such transfers, while resulting in the expansion of economy, are of a kind which accentuates inequalities. This distortion where poverty has declined much less than previously estimated is quite remarkable for an economy which saw radical land reforms in the 1950s, and which boasted of a fairly equitable land holding implying low asset inequality. In other words, it means that in the past 20 years, if not more, the socio-economic profile of J&K has undergone a change for the worse. Thus, despite funds to buy hearts and minds of people pouring in and in spite of the presence of military forces, considered as “permanent tourists”, the economy has registered no sign of being benefited. If anything, such ‘assistance’ has only further distorted the economy and entrenched corruption.
7.1. Keeping this real nature of dependency, and distortions that have been institutionalised, in mind, sovereignty becomes of utmost importance for any meaningful solution to emerge. To argue for autonomy, self-rule and so forth makes little sense when J&K faces this level of control.
7.2. It has been claimed that a deal, which will enable the border/line of control to become irrelevant, has been reached between India and Pakistan over Kashmir and that all that is needed is to fine-tune and sign it. Without going into the justness of such an approach, i.e., to decide people’s fate over their heads, from what is known in the public domain about some of the key areas of agreement two things stand out. First, it is said that the current constitutional system in operation on both sides will be frozen, with some modification, for the next 15-20 years. Second, some subjects such as water will be jointly managed by India and Pakistan.
7.3. What the above means is that existing relationship of dependence will be frozen barring some adjustments. Now how does this amount to a solution? Is it not necessary to argue that unless therelationship of dependence is ended self-rule/self-governance/autonomy would become a worthless exercise? When Indian civilian and military entities own, manage and control policies over land and water, and J&K continues to be dependent on New Delhi for meeting even its salary bill under the existing dispensation (in which the war and requirements of war are prioritised) then not just psychology of dependence and its corrupting influence, but the actual fact of dependence will make “self-rule” ring hollow. Just the same way as the much-vaunted autonomy under Article 370 was made hollow. Indeed, the overall structure of dependence will be like a noose around the neck of the state throttling the realisation of its full potential.
For this state of affairs to end, a radical movement away from the present is required. What that means in short is that people must become masters and mistress of their own destiny.
All this only underlines the significance of a democratic closure for the J&K dispute after 62 years of its non-resolution. Democratic closure in the case of J&K means ascertaining the wishes of the people, once they are freed of encumbrance, before everything else.